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Summary
This thesis is concerned with the industrial relations consequences, of the compulsory 
introduction of competition, into the provision of local authority cleansing services. 
It seeks to show how financial savings and improvements in performance aie 
achieved, primarily, at the expense of public service workers.
Jobs, wages and conditions of employment have all been slashed, as contractors and 
local authority direct service teams attempt to keep costs down. Trade union 
organisation and resistance has been undermined by new forms of ownership and 
control.
The ideological and economic justifications for competitive tendering are 
investigated, and placed in the context of expanding public sector employment and 
increasing trade union organisation during the post war period. The contract service 
industry, which has exploited the growth of contracting out in the public and private 
sectors, is described, with specific reference to the multinational operators v/hich now 
dominate it. Detailed profiles of the key multinational service companies are 
included, with descriptions of their industrial strategies and employment practices.
The impact of European integration on public procurement is analysed, along with a 
brief description of the forms of public service provision adopted throughout the 
European Community. The nature of industrial relations in European public 
cleansing is investigated, and this study includes a detailed report on the impact of 
privatisation and multinational contractors domination of public services, on 
cleansing workers in France.
The core of the research is provided by a series of case studies, which are concerned 
with the impact of competitive tendering on cleansing workers terms and conditions, 
trade union organisation and the nature of industrial relations, in a number of 
individual local authorities. The conclusions drawn from these studies are combined 
with empirical evidence, on the employment consequences of privatisation in a 
selection of additional authorities, to demonstrate the price paid by public service 
workers during the CCT process.
The dual impact of privatisation and the internationalisation of capital in the contract 
service industry, indicates a fundamental break in the pattern of public service 
employment and local government trade unionism. Current policy is examined in the 
light of these findings and recommendations for a reappraisal of policy are outlined.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
Chapter 1: Introduction
Section 1: Background
This thesis is concerned with the labour market and industrial relations consequences 
of the Government's Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) legislation. It relates 
specifically to those services concerned with cleansing, i.e. refuse collection, street 
cleansing and the cleaning of buildings, and considers the impact of multinational 
contractors' involvement in the provision of these services.
The cleaning sector is an often neglected but substantial field of economic activity, 
employing up to one million workers. Some researchers have considered the status 
of employment in the private sector contract cleaning industry, but limited attention 
has been paid to the concerns of cleansing workers in the public sector. An interest 
has only been provoked when workers have withdrawn their labour, as in the refuse 
collectors' and ancilliaries' disputes of the late sixties and early seventies and during 
the 1978 - 1979 'winter of discontent'. Even then, industrial relations analysts tended 
to concentrate on wider aspects of public sector employment relations and the 
immediate causes of industrial militancy.
The introduction of CCT and the wave of interest being shown in local authority 
cleansing contracts, by foreign based multinationals, has created more specific 
requirements. There is a need to understand the Government’s reasons for promoting 
a change in the nature of service provision. The consequent changes in the nature of 
employment in the public cleansing services must be considered. Attention must be 
given to the aims and strategies of multinational service contractors and to the future 
forms of trade unionism in the sector.
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CCT is the most direct attempt by the Government to impose market conditions and 
an enterprise culture, on the administration of public services. The implications for 
the future of local government services and the workers that provide them are far 
reaching. The CCT initiative will extend well beyond the cleansing sector, bringing 
with it new forms of work organisation and different patterns of industrial relations.
This thesis has attempted to consider these issues from the standpoint of the trade 
union movement, in recognition of the the conflicting interests of the workers 
affected by the initiative and the employers, politicians and academics advocating it. 
This has been done through the qualitative illustration of a decline in workers terms 
of employment and trade union authority, within an economic framework accepting 
Marxist definitions of value, labour and class. The study does not seek a place in 
Marxist literature but it does aim to illustrate trade union concerns about the CCT 
process,within an economic framework which allows those concerns to be expressed 
with authority and legitimacy. The thesis aims to move beyond the neo-classical 
arguments about cost savings, efficiency and quality that have dominated previous 
analyses of competitive tendering, by considering the human cost that is incurred 
when these considerations are paramount
The main contention of this thesis is that the changes brought about by the 
Government's CCT legislation, have led to a dramatic deterioration in the terms and 
conditions of employment, of local government cleansing workers. Trade union 
activity and bargaining power has been seriously undermined. Since the Government 
considered trade unions and council employees' working practices to be the main 
obstacles to efficient public services, it is argued that any savings or benefits derived 
from the CCT initiative, have been achieved at the expense of the existing workforce. 
The competitive pressures of the contract cleaning industry and the employment 
practices of the multinational contractors have reinforced these trends.
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The evidence used to justify this position was drawn, largely, from case study 
analysis, conducted in France and in a series of local authorities in Britain. 
Additional empirical data was gathered on a sample of UK local government 
cleansing contracts won by private contractors. Detailed company profiles were also 
prepared on each of the major private contractors.
Section 2: Thesis Structure
The thesis is divided into nine Chapters which can be broken up into four parts. 
Chapters 2 and 3 are concerned with establishing a background to the issues under 
consideration. The emergence of the CCT legislation is described and explained and 
this is followed by an analysis of the private sector contract cleaning and waste 
collection industries. Chapters 4 to 7 provide the focal element of the thesis. The 
four chapters each relate to different aspects, the key private contractors, the 
European experience of privatisation, the CCT experience in Britain and trade union 
responses. Chapter 8 provides a summary of the data collected and relates it to other 
academic studies. The final chapter draws together the conclusions of the research 
and makes a series of recommendations in relation to the findings.
Chapter 2 is mainly concerned with the political economy of competitive tendering. 
It investigates the historical context of direct service provision and the role of the 
trade unions in its downfall. The Government's desire to reduce the power of public 
sector trade unions was a major motivating force behind their support for CCT, but 
there were also other economic arguments. Consideration is given to the growth of 
contracting out in the private sector, the reasons for it and how these, and other 
pressures, pushed the Government into the privatisation of NHS and local authority 
services. The details of the legislation that followed, are then described.
4
Chapter 3 provides a sectoral analysis of the private cleansing services industry. The 
extent and significance of cleaning in modem society is identified. This is followed 
by an analysis of how and why the contract cleaning industry emerged in response to 
the needs of society and the economy. The structure of the industry and its increasing 
domination by multinational operators, is then explained.
♦
Chapter 4 is concerned with the structure and strategies of the key multinational 
contractors, which are targeting local authority cleansing contracts released as a result 
of the CCT legislation. Three different types of company are identified and then 
thirteen detailed profiles are provided, on each of the major operators. Their finance, 
history, overseas operations, corporate strategies and UK tactics are all investigated. 
At the end of each profile there is a section on employment practices. These sections 
contain information on the conditions of employment on selected contracts held by 
the companies which is analysed further in Chapter 8.
Chapter 5 examines the European context to the issues under consideration. The 
impact that the single European market is likely to have on Britain's CCT legislation 
is analysed, along with its effects on the tendering strategies of the multinational 
operators who already disregard national boundaries. The extent of privatisation of 
local authority services throughout the Community is then described. Finally, the 
industrial relations of the European cleansing industry is investigated along with the 
employment consequences of privatisation in French local authorities.
Chapter 6 is perhaps the single most important, since it contains detailed analysis of 
the impact of the 1988 Local Government Act in a series of authorities throughout 
Britain. There are nine case studies, considering a variety of types of cleansing 
contract in authorities of a mixture of political complexions. Contracts that have 
been won by private contractors and by in-house units are included. Detailed 
consideration is given to the authorities' preparations for competition, the
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involvement of trade unions and the workforce in those preparations and the 
employment consequences of them. Where services have been privatised, the 
research is extended to look at the contractors' employment practices and changes to 
patterns of industrial relations. The main findings of these studies are summarised at 
the end of the Chapter.
Chapter 7 investigates the trade unions' responses to CCT and the changes brought 
about as a result. A summary of the unions' approach to competitive tendering, prior 
to the 1988 Local Government Act, is followed by a description of current national 
policies. Innovative local responses to problems associated with CCT are then 
described. The response to CCT in Newcastle, which involved an extension to 
traditional trade union activity, is analysed. This is followed by a description of the 
attempts by the TGWU to recruit contract cleaning workers at Heathrow Airport, 
another group of workers who have suffered as a result of competitive tendering.
Chapter 8 draws together much of the data and evidence collected in the previous 
four chapters. This is compared to the results of other studies which have 
investigated the employment consequences of competitive tendering. The effects of 
CCT on jobs, wages and conditions are illustrated and this is followed by a 
description of the structural impact on industrial relations. The significance of the 
multinational contractors' increasing dominance of privatised contracts is then 
addressed. Finally, the results of the research are set against those studies that have 
come out in favour of competitive tendering, challenging the Government's claims 
that the policy generates real efficiency gains.
Chapter 9 develops a series of firm conclusions, in line with the main contentions of 
the thesis indicated in this chapter. These conclusions are related to current thinking 
within the field of Industrial Relations and are followed by a series of 
recommendations, on how trade unions Should respond to the situation.
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Chapter 2
The Privatisation of Local Authority 
Cleansing Services:
A Political Context
Chapter 2: The Privatisation of Local Authority Cleansing Services: 
A Political Context
Section 1: A History of Direct Service Provision.
The Background
Prior to the introduction of competitive tendering for local authority services, under 
the provisions of the Local Government Act (1988), the employment of council 
workers to organise and carry out such services as refuse collection, street cleansing 
and the cleaning of public buildings, was regarded as standard practice. That status 
was the result of a long and fairly stable development of British local government and 
its responsibilities prior to the 1980's.
The growth of municipal responsibility for the maintenance of general good health 
and welfare amongst the population, in the late 19th century, led to some of Britain’s 
earliest experiences of public sector service delivery and the employment of 
thousands of local authority cleansing workers.. Even in the context of a free 
enterprise economy as typified by the Victorian era it was widely accepted that some 
services, which were essential, did not have the same characteristics as those usually 
provided by the private sector. The 'public' nature of a service such as street 
cleansing, where everyone benefits regardless of who pays, meant that such work had 
to be funded, and the limits of its provision determined, by state authorities. In this 
context it rapidly became the norm for those authorities to assume complete control 
of the services in question by providing them directly.
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The Growth of Private Provision
Once patterns of service delivery were established, with public cleansing placed very 
firmly within the state sector, the role of private operators in local authority cleansing 
was relegated to one of occasional assistance. The contracting out of some public 
service work developed in the post war period, but this was at a time of expansion in 
local government and had little to do with any political desire to restrict the growth of 
the public sector, or even to improve efficiency. The growth of private involvement 
was tied in with the massive growth that the economy was experiencing and the 
consequent reluctance of workers to take low paid, unskilled jobs in the public sector. 
Private operators were able to help local councils and health authorities overcome 
their labour shortage problems by offering improved terms and conditions, free from 
the restraints of national local government bargaining (Ascher 1987).
During this same period, outside of local government, many private companies found 
that by contracting out their own non-core activities, such as cleaning services, they 
would avoid the complications involved in hiring appropriate staff, dealing with 
industrial relations problems and providing the materials to keep their premises clean. 
This gave a boost to private cleaning contractors who were able to undercut existing 
rates, cutting companies' cleaning costs by up to 30% (Low Pay Unit, 1977).
These developments helped persuade Harold Wilson's Labour Government, facing a 
sterling crisis and BoP problems, to contract out one third of central government 
cleaning in 1967. Costs were cut by 30%, but the move resulted in 3,500 
redundancies and cleaners being offered jobs by contractors at £14 per week 
compared to the £19 that they got as government cleaners. (Low Pay Unit, 1977). In 
1970 the government transferred another third of its cleaning to contractors, making it 
the biggest single customer of the contract cleaning industry.
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The introduction of private service provision at a central government level was not 
based on any ideological commitment. It was more a reflection of the lack of 
centrality that cleaning had in relation to the role of the civil service. In contrast, 
within the local authorities and health service, cleaning activities remained very much 
at the heart, or essential to the hygienic running, of operations and consequently the 
position of direct labour remained largely unchallenged.
Section 2: Trade Unions and the Public Services
Throughout the post war period trade unions in the public sector had been growing 
stronger. Trade unions were regarded as having a legitimate counterveiling role to 
play and Government's adopted a "hands o f f  approach towards their development. 
Enormous growth in public sector employment resulted from the expansion of the 
economy and growth of public services in the 3 decades after the war and this was 
accompanied by an ever faster rate of growth in the appropriate trade unions (see 
Table 1).
Union 1949 1966 1975 1980 1991
NUPE 150,250 248,041 507,826 692,000 651,000
COHSE 51,319 67,588 143,479 207,000 210,000
NALGO 189,261 348,528 542,918 753,000 744,414
Table 1: Major Public Sector Unions Membership 1949 - 1991 
Source: Capital & Class, 1979; Ascher, 1987; and the individual unions.
The growth in membership levels accompanied the full employment policies pursued 
by successive post war governments and gave the unions considerable power in 
collective bargaining, which resulted in consistent improvements in their member's 
wage levels. The emergence of economic difficulties in the 1960s put a strain on
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these developments which worsened when the Wilson Government decided to adopt a 
policy of wage restraint. The trade unions had initially supported the move, but 
public sector workers became increasingly resentful towards the Government, as they 
felt that they were bearing the brunt of attempts to keep wage settlements down, 
particularly once devaluation in 1967 had led to accelerating inflation. In four of the 
six half yearly periods between Labour's 1966 election victory and the summer of 
1969, pre-tax real wages fell (Panitch, 1976). As public employees views hardened, 
the conflict became more visible with an escalation in strike activity. In 1967 less 
than 3 million days were lost to strike action, this rose to 6.8 million in 1969 and to 
11 million in 1970 (Panitch, 1976).
In 1969 an unofficial London refuse collectors' strike began, which soon developed 
into the official 'Dirty Jobs' strike of 1970. The stronger refuse collectors were 
brought out on strike around a high profile public campaign, which eventually 
resulted in a large pay rise. This was followed by the hospital ancillary workers 
dispute of 1973, which had a less dramatic effect on pay but improved shop steward 
organisation in the health service and resulted in substantial union growth (see Table 
1). This changed the balance of power in local government and the NHS, giving 
trade unionists much wider control and influence than they had before (Capital & 
Class, 1979). In the period from 1966 to 1975 dustmen's wages rose from an average 
of £10.96 per week to £30.00 and hospital porters' wages from £10.63 per week to 
£30.52. (Elliott & Fallick, 1981). Ascher (1987) points out that, in stark contrast to 
the situation today, the public sector unions were increasingly viewed as highly 
effective protectors of public employees from state manipulation.
The power struggle which emerged from these developments ensured that industrial 
turmoil reigned through the years of the Heath Government, elected after pledging to 
reform trade union law in 1970. Temporary calm only returned in 1974, with the 
election of a Labour Government and the introduction of the social contract, which
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gave trade union leaders a wider national influence. A return to income restraint in 
1976 broke the peace and ultimately led to the 'winter of discontent' 1978 -79, which 
saw waves of industrial action in the public sector, made all the more visible by the 
accumulation of rubbish heaps in the streets as binmen sought to regain their position 
in the industrial pay league.
The return of the Conservatives to power in 1979 did not bring immediate respite, as 
public sector workers and especially health service workers fought a series of bitter 
disputes, with ancillaries at the forefront of the campaigns. By this time the 
Government, already convinced that trade unions were enjoying excessive power, was 
determined to take action against the public sector unions with a strategy built around 
a programme of privatisation (see Coates & Topham, 1988, Gamble, 1988)
Section 3: Privatisation and the Contracting Out of Support Services
Privatisation and Competitive Tendering
The term privatisation had been used to describe any shift in economic activity from 
the public to the private sector (Heming & Mansoor, 1988). Theo Thiemeyer has 
cited 15 different uses of the term at a European level, which range from the total 
transfer of ownership of public undertakings to the private sector, to a simple increase 
in the margin of autonomy enjoyed by public enterprise management (ETUI, 1988).
Different methods are applicable in different circumstances. Within the cleaning 
industry, techniques adopted have centred around the practice of contracting out. 
Contracting out involves the contracting of one organisation with another to provide a 
particular good or service. This practice has been widely used in both the public and 
private sectors with the aim of improving technical efficiency and achieving 
considerable cost savings (see Hunt, 1990, Parker, 1990) as well as to exploit the
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relative expertise of different organisations. The term usually refers to activities 
which could be provided 'in-house1 by the contracting organisation itself and 
consequently it has a practical relevance when considering how to transfer the 
provision of public services from direct labour to private firms.
The method by which authorities and companies usually award contracts is known as 
competitive tendering (C.T.). Under this arrangement different organisations respond 
to a service or job specification, issued by the contracting body, with their own 
"tender". Provided each of the tenderers has demonstrated an ability to do the work, 
the contract is generally given to the one offering to do it for the lowest price.
In most circumstances this creates few changes to existing work structures or 
relationships since contracts are simply being renewed or relate to new work such as 
the building of a bridge or tunnel. The contractors' employees will be put to work on 
another contract if a tender is unsuccessful. Where CT is related to the possible 
privatisation of public services, a new scenario emerges, which involves the possible 
end of public sector employment for the direct labour force and its substitution by an 
entirely different form of labour.
The New Right
During the economic and industrial difficulties of the 1970s there emerged in Britain 
and other countries, such as the United States and France, a new school of economic 
and political thought known as the "New Right". One of the central tenets of this 
dispirate philosophy, has been the need to force back the frontiers of the state with a 
transfer of production of goods and services from the public to the private sector 
(ETUI, 1988).
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Dunleavy (1986) cites 3 major reasons for New Right advocacy of privatisation. 
Firstly, state agencies are put into competition with contractors, forcing the 
authorities to reveal information previously hidden by public sector accounting 
methods and block budgets. Putting school cleaning services out to tender 
immediately highlights the trade off between different levels of cleaning standard and 
their cost. This enables a debate about 'real' requirements, from which a true 
allocation of resources can be achieved. Secondly, contractors are seen as more 
efficient in meeting specific requirements, since they are themselves specialised in 
satisfying those needs. Thirdly, privatisation is presented as a means by which trade 
unions' restrictive practices, such as overmanning and strict demarcation lines, can be 
broken in the highly unionised public sector.
The economics of the "New Right" are founded on a belief in individualism and an 
atomistic view of society where each individual economic actor behaves so as to 
enhance his own self interest. The interaction of these interests creating an outcome 
which optimises the interests of society as a whole. In this context, individualism and 
freedom from state oppression become reliant upon competitive private markets, the 
minimalisation of state expenditure and the elimination of trade union restrictions 
(ETUI, 1988).
A 'New Right' Conservative Government
1979 saw the election in Britain of a Conservative Government, under the leadership 
of Mrs Thatcher, wholly committed to this philosophy and yet almost paranoically 
aware of the threat that the trade union movement posed to it, in ideological and in 
practical terms (see Gamble, 1988). Conservative politicians had seen the growth of 
public sector trade unionism across the post war period and witnessed the industrial 
strife of the 1970s, which had contributed to the defeat of the Party in 1974 and 
ironicaly to Labour's downfall following the 'winter of discontent’.
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The Ridley Report of 1978, on which much of the Conservative manifesto was based, 
argued that extensive restrictive practices reduced the ability of industry to adapt to 
changing market conditions and forced wage levels above their 'natural' levels, thus 
limiting profits and fuelling inflation (Painter, 1990). Consequently, various policy 
measures were adopted during the 1980s to ensure that trade unions were drained of 
their power but as the Economist noted:
"The most effective way to reduce public sector unions power is to end 
the state monopoly in the service they provide".
(NALGO,1986).
Competitive Tendering and the Trade Unions
Ascher (1987) and Whitfield (1983) have detailed how trade union positions are 
threatened by the introduction of competition into the provision of public services. 
The labour intensive nature of activities like refuse collection, street and building 
cleaning, means that price competition largely comes down to the minimalisation of 
labour costs (the CCMA estimates that the average labour content of a cleaning 
contractors total cost is 90% [Sheffield City Council, 1988]). Consequently, 
competition involves job losses and downward pressure on wages and conditions, 
undermining union credibility and membership levels.
Real problems are posed for union organisation by the hostile attitude of contractors 
and the tendency towards casualised, insecure and part-time employment in the 
industry. Following privatisation, active trade unionists are reluctant to seek 
employment with contractors, fearing discrimination and being unhappy with a 
deterioration in terms. A vicious circle of de-unionisation is set into motion which 
the unions find very hard to resist.
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Hence a government committed to the principle of free markets and openly anti-union 
in outlook, was naturally drawn towards a policy of CT for public services, which 
seemed to embody every aspect of their "New Right" philosophy.
The Environment Secretary at the time of the 1988 Local Government Act's 
introduction, Nicholas Ridley, summed up the Government's attitude:
"The root cause o f rotten local services lies in the grip which local 
government unions have over those services in many parts o f the
country  Our competitive tendering provisions will smash that grip
once and for all. The consumer will get better quality services at 
lower cost".
(Local Government Chronicle, 4 April 1988)
Section 4: The Privatisation Boom
Driven by a series of interconnected forces, including ideology, anti-unionism and 
political lobbying, the contracting out of council work and health authority support 
services emerged as the spearhead of the Government's privatisation programme. The 
concepts involved are not new. Private enterprise has always had its place within 
public service provision and sub-contracting had long since been used to offload non­
core activities in the private sector, which has been reflected in the growth of the 
contract cleaning industry (see Chapter 3).
The Foreign Experience
Experience overseas further undermines the idea of a revolutionary breakthrough in 
public policy thinking. Whilst there are competing attitudes towards how best to
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provide public services throughout Europe and the World, there are consistent levels 
of private sector penetration into the market. Private sector provision of municipal 
and health authority cleansing services has been expanding in Europe, Japan and 
North America throughout the post war period (Digings, 1991; Ascher, 1987), 
reflecting specific local requirements as well as economic and political changes.
In the order of 60% of US refuse collection has been privatised (Touch Ross 1987). 
Similar figures exist for France and Germany and extensive public - private division 
of responsibility and co-operation in the delivery of municipal services prevails 
throughout the European Community (EC) (Digings 1991). European health 
authorities have turned even more extensively to the private sector for the provision 
of cleaning services, with 50% of such activities provided by private companies in 
France and Belgium, 60% in Germany and Denmark and 70% in Sweden (Ascher, 
1987).
Overseas motivations for turning away from ’in-house' services and the employment 
of direct labour have not been so strongly influenced by ideology as in Britain. The 
specific circumstances of small rural authorities have often revealed technical and 
efficiency problems related to economies of scale, easily overcome by contracting out 
or joint arrangements with private firms. The same solutions were adopted by many 
French councils only compelled to provide such services in 1975 and Spanish 
authorities responding to the growth of 'shanty' towns on the outskirts of cities in the 
1950s.
Most privatised cleansing operations in Europe have had that status for many years 
and are generally a reflection of the particular difficulties faced by individual 
authorities. In some circumstances those difficulties have been associated with 
internal labour problems, in others the need to cut costs or eliminate over bureaucratic 
provision of front line services. In all cases though, contracting out represents a local
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response to the issues in question. Where ideology has had an impact, as in the 
Netherlands, the principle of voluntary implementation has been preserved. In the US 
where a powerful New Right philosophy has emerged, its practical influence has 
developed in a gradualised and fragmented fashion, with the contracting out of 
municipal services stretching back to the early 1970s (Williams, 1980, Savas 1982).
British Policy Boom
This is all in dramatic contrast to the British experience of privatisation in the 1980s 
which has assumed the characteristic of a public policy 'boom'. Dunleavy (1986) has 
identified 4 key features apparent in the development of C.T. initiatives in this period, 
which prove consistent with such an analysis:
1 A major marketing campaign
2 Strong interaction of the corporate campaign with party political objectives
3 A firm ideological belief in the efficiency of the central innovation
4 Large scale shifts in the behaviour of whole categories of organisations
1 Throughout the late 1970s ’New Right’ think tanks, such as the Institute of
Economic Affairs (IEA) the Adam Smith Institute (ASI) and the Centre for 
Policy Studies (CPS), had mounted a sustained campaign in favour of CT for 
council and health authority ancillary services (eg Buchanan et. al., 1978; 
Forsyth, M, 1979, 1980, 1983). These were given professional legitimacy 
with the publication of discussion papers by other bodies, such as the Royal 
Institute of Public Administration (RIPA, 1977). The large contract cleaning 
firms helped the campaign with their own marketing programmes, stressing
18
the broad range of services they could provide and ensuring rapid penetration 
into the new public sector markets with aggressive pricing policies.
There is clear evidence that 'loss leaders', involving cross subsidies from the 
profitable parts of the firms' activities, were adopted in the scramble to 
achieve a position of market leadership in new NHS and local authority 
markets (JNHSPRU, 1990; NAO, 1987). Although in some instances this was 
a reflection of the companies own lack of knowledge of the new market. 
Roger Goodman, Sales and Marketing Director with Initial put it that:
"Some contracts resulted in the companies concerned suffering 
significant losses. The main cause for this was their significant lack o f 
experience in providing services for this particular market".
(M J 28 July 1989 quoted in JPRU, 1990).
2 Of greater significance in the influencing of public policy has been the 
intimate relationship between the contract cleaning industry and the 
Conservative Party. Between 1983 and 1987, 29 Conservative MPs were 
identified as having direct or indirect links with a total of 17 contracting 
companies. 16 MPs were directors or advisers to 13 groups of companies 
with contracting interests and another 11 were consultants or directors of 
public relations firms representing contractors (JNHSPRU, 1987). There are 
further links between the Party and the main privatisation pressure groups 
such as the ASI, Aims of Industry and the Public and Local Service 
Efficiency Campaign (PULSE), each of which has at least half a dozen 
associated Conservative MPs. The extent of the contractors' involvement with 
the Party is illustrated by the contribution of over £1 million to Conservative 
Party funds during the key privatisation years 1983 - 1988 (JNHSPRU, 1988).
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Certain politicians have demonstrated their commitments openly, actively 
promoting CT policies. David Evans MP, spoke in favour of contracting out 
at the Conservative Party Conference of 1981, when he was a councillor in St 
Albans and chairman of Brengreen Holdings, since taken over by BET. 
Michael Forsyth MP has been something of a guru for the contractors, 
promoting their interests through his PR firm Michael Forsyth Associates, 
which also shares an office with the pro-privatisation group PULSE. Forsyth, 
who since his election to Parliament in 1983 has had a lower profile, has also 
produced a series of pamphlets for the ASI including Reservicing the NHS, 
1979, Reservicing Britain, 1980 and the Myths of Privatisation, 1983, which 
have informed much of the Government's privatisation policies.
3 The activities of Michael Forsyth and other promoters of contracting out were 
instrumental in pushing the Govemrqent into action only in as far as they 
were telling them what they wanted to hear. The ideological commitment of 
the Government to the principles of competition and private provision were 
unquestioned. What the publications and arguments coming from the 
contractors provided, was a policy programme and rationale that was ready 
assembled. With the backing of a Department of the Environment (DOE) 
commissioned report from Coopers and Lybrand, to illustrate possible cost 
reductions in excess of 10% (Coopers and Lybrand, 1981), the Government 
was ready to dismiss trade union and administrative opposition and begin a 
major privatisation drive.
4 The outcome of these forces has been an experience of contracting out wholly 
distinctive from that in other parts of the world. CT has been applied rapidly, 
across local authority building contracts, Government departments, NHS 
ancillary services, local authority manual services and is now being proposed 
for local council and NHS white collar support services. The debate over the
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merits of the policies has sat very much on the sidelines, whilst central 
government dictated to local agencies in the face of a heavily weakened 
opposition. Contracting out offers Conservatives the opportunity to set 
markets free from bureaucratic 'abuses', whilst stifling the power of trade 
unions who were best placed to exploit those 'abuses'. As the Economist put 
it in September 1983:
"The real purpose o f contracting out, as with state industry 
privatisation is as much to weaken the unions monopoly as to save 
money".
(Quoted in Ascher, 1987).
Section 5: The Countdown to Competitive Tendering in Local
Government Cleansing
Competitive Tendering for Local Government Building Works
In 1979 a consultative paper was released which contained a series of proposals for 
local government reform. The paper found its way onto the statute book as the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act (1980). This included a system for achieving 
greater efficiency in local authority direct labour organisations (DLOs) through the 
setting of 5% target rates of return on capital and the use of C T in the allocation of a 
certain percentage of building and highway maintenance work, above a given 
volume.
There was wide opposition to the Act in the trade unions and local government 
circles, which led some authorities into a process of contract manipulation designed 
to deter private sector interest. The legislation survived though and has been 
extended, subjecting increasing levels of work to competition. Ironically, the
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opposition of some councils exposed the loopholes in the law, which ensured that 
future legislation covering other activities, namely the Local Government Act 1988, 
would be of an altogether tougher nature.
Whilst CT was being tested on local authority building contracts, cleaners were 
feeling the effects of contracting out in the Ministry of Defence (MOD) which put its 
cleaning work out to tender in 1980. The policy was later extended to the DHSS and 
tax offices as part of the Government’s aim to reduce the number of civil servants 
(Sheffield City Council, 1988) and achieve savings, by virtue of the job losses and 
reduced pay and conditions imposed by successful contractors (LRD, 1987).
CT in the NHS
From 1980 the Government, through its Health Minister Gerard Vaughan, 
encouraged District Health Authorities (DHAs) to put ancillary services (cleaning, 
catering and laundry) out to CT on a voluntary basis. A circular was issued, entitled 
Revised Guidance on Contractual Arrangements and Co-operative Schemes, which 
stressed that the commitment to CT was strong and that authorities should implement 
the proposals wherever possible.
The publication of Michael Forsyth’s ’Reserving Britain' (1980) and 'Reservicing 
Health' (1982) and the resurgence of public sector trade union militancy in the NHS 
strikes of 1980, 1981 and 1982, gave a significant boost to the campaign for 
compulsory CT in the health service. The arguments presented in 'Reservicing 
Health' suggested that contractors could provide services more cheaply through 
improved efficiency and elimination of restrictive practices. The point was made that 
savings could be used to provide better patient care, an attractive "argument" for a 
government accused of running down the NHS.
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The Government's commitment to CT became so entrenched that the findings of a 
joint MoD - DHSS study on the relevance of the MoD's tendering experience for the 
NHS, were largely ignored. The study highlighted the possibilities that standards 
would fall as a result of reduced employee commitment and lowest cost methods and 
that the industry might not be able to cope with significant amounts of new work in 
any case (Ascher, 1987).
A draft circular was published in February 1983 formally asking health authorities to 
put certain ancillary services out to tender. Once again there was a significant degree 
of opposition amongst administrators and trade unionists who had been given forward 
warning of the plans when the circular was 'leaked' during the NHS pay dispute in 
June 1982. Much of this opposition seems to have stemmed from the Government's 
determination to impose the requirements on the health service, with few concessions 
to critical comment or analysis (Ascher, 1987; Mailly, 1986). The loss of control and 
inability to perform as a "good" employer, which derive from the process of CT, have 
also been noted as areas of management concern (Cowan, 1984; Mailly 1987).
The only relevance of the consultation period to the Government, was its illustration 
of the hostility that existed to the proposals. The impact of this hostility did not lead 
to the scrapping of the plans, it resulted in toughened legislation which took account 
of possible resistance. Efficiency savings would go directly to individual authorities 
as a source of financial incentive to motivate management, staff were to be "kept 
informed" of developments rather than be engaged in full consultation and timetables 
were imposed for the implementation of proposals.
On the 8 September 1983 the Government issued 'circular HC (83) 18, Competitive 
Tendering in the provision of Domestic, Catering and Laundry Services’, which asked 
all DHAs in England (similar ones were issued in Scotland and Wales) to draw up 
plans to submit their ancillary services to tender by the end of 1986. Regional
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timetables were to be submitted to the DHSS by April 1984 based upon DHA 
timetables completed by February 1984.
Most health authorities, being opposed to the legislation, ignored the circular or 
disrupted the process by asking for extensions or submitting incomplete timetables. 
By February 1984 only half of the 192 English DHAs had submitted timetables and 
consequently very few contracts were put out to tender in this period. Of the 21 
contracts that were put out by April 1984, 19 were won by private contractors, 
reflecting the political attitudes of the awarding authorities. Those that had co­
operated fully with the proposals were largely Tory led DHA’s keen to show support 
for the Government, Other cases included contracts for new hospitals, where the 
authorities were compelled to tender before establishing an in-house service team, 
and where capital investment in the services was planned, which was forbidden 
without a prior CT exercise.
With the implementation of the final directive in April 1984, CT began to spread 
much more rapidly through the Health Service, although not without considerable 
and sometimes bitter trade union opposition (discussed in later sections). Between 
1983 and September 1987, 84% (by value) of all ancillary contracts had gone out to 
tender (Sheffield City Council, 1988), but as the process of tendering widened, the 
degree of private contractors success narrowed, despite government attempts to 
improve their competitive position. In the face of declining private sector interest 
and more effective in-house tendering, the Government illustrated its commitment to 
privatisation, as opposed to competition, with a series of measures to improve the 
contractors market share:
DHAs were forbidden from suspending or terminating contracts
without DHSS permission.
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The "Fair Wages Resolution", requiring contractors to pay NHS 
ancillary staff rates, was abolished and "Fair Wages" clauses were 
banned from ancillary service contracts.
DHAs were instructed to put redundancy payment costs into tender 
prices over a 3 year period rather than 1.
"Equal Opportunity" claims were to be removed from contracts and 
specifications simplified.
Health authority members who were clearly resisting the 
implementation of CT were sacked.
Despite these moves there has been a consistent decline in the proportion of NHS 
contracts held by the private sector. In March 1984, 74% of all contracts and 90% of 
domestic (cleaning) contracts were won by private firms. By December 1989 the 
overall figure had fallen to 23% and the figure for domestic contracts to 27%, 
probably due to aggressive ’market building' tenders from contractors and a 
commitment to privatisation amongst many of the authorities who were the first to 
award contracts (JNHSPRU, 1990).
Scottish Health Service Developments
From the point that the DHSS circulars on CT were sent out, HA's in Scotland 
interpreted them differently than their English counterparts. The Government paper 
relating to Scotland was seen as merely offering a recommendation which HA's saw 
no need to implement. The HAs argued that they were continually reviewing 
services with a view to providing an efficient health system whilst achieving 
"efficiency savings" without the use of CT.
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This position was upheld in conjunction with a public Scottish Health Campaign 
promoted by the STUC and supported by delegates from church, union, political and 
community organisations. The strategy (described in chapter 7) was completely 
effective, with strong public and cross party (though not expressed openly) support, 
until 1986 when Tayside Health Board broke the taboo and put a series of contracts 
out to tender.
In the face of opposition in Scotland the Conservative Government adopted a familiar 
tactic and toughened its stance. 'Misinterpretation' of the Government’s position was 
ruled out with the publication of circulars demanding implementation of the policy 
and, with Michael Forsyth as Scottish Minister for Health, CT spread rapidly, with 
private contractors securing a similar proportion of contract awards as they have 
achieved in England. CT has also been carried into new areas by Scottish authorities 
without compulsion, as the Health Service adopts a generally more market orientated 
approach.
The extension of CT to other NHS services is a reflection of how strongly the 
Government remains committed to the policy, despite the failure of private 
contractors to win even a quarter of the work available. Even in the absence of 
private provision, competitive pressures are regarded by the Government as essential 
to the achievement of efficiency savings and the reduction of trade union power 
which lies at the heart of their objectives.
The point was clearly put by the pro-privatisation body PULSE when commenting on 
the extension of the range of services to be privatised:
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"Instead of having one, monolithic in-house organisation providing 
services there will be a welcome fragmentation, and the natural 
consequence o f that is decreasing unionisation. The unions may 
continue to have members among the firms involved, but competition 
means they know there are other companies available to do the job if 
they go on strike".
(Today, 4 April 1988)
Section 6: Competitive Tendering in the Local Authorities 
Voluntary Competitive Tendering
Whilst private contractors have always been used in local government, the 
development of the use of CT which culminated in the Local Government Act of 
1988 came out of the problems associated with the 1978 - 79 'Winter of Discontent'. 
During the public sector strikes of that period the power of refuse collectors and 
street cleaners to fundamentally disrupt essential public services became highly 
apparent. The build up of rubbish and litter created an appalling sanitation crisis 
which, in some areas, went on for several months. Some authorities responded to the 
situation by employing private contractors to clear away the rubbish mountains and 
many began to question the monopoly power enjoyed by their own direct labour 
forces which they viewed as lying at the heart of the 'problem'.
Local authorities, and their refuse collection services in particular, have been 
associated with restrictive practices, unwarranted bonus payments and inefficient 
'task and finish' job structures (under this arrangement, once the work for a day is 
done the workforce is free to go home). During the 1970s, attempts were made in 
various authorities to end 'task and finish' but where the practice was in place it was 
regarded by the trade unions and men as being "untouchable". The bonus schemes 
existing in the industry were also seen as outdated by many local authority managers
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but they had been built up on the back of local trade union and shop steward power 
and were consequently hard to modernise without provoking major opposition. As 
the Chief Inspector of Audit for the year ended March 31 1979 stated:
"Many bonus schemes have become little more than a complicated and 
expensive method o f calculating a man's pay and have weakened local 
authorities financial control over an important part o f their budget.
Having lived with bonus schemes fo r  so long and enjoyed their 
benefits, workmen will not readily agree to change course...."
(Audit Commission, 1984)
The mixture of local authority resentment towards their manual employees’ working 
practices and the problems posed by industrial action led to an interest, in some town 
halls, in the proposals for CT coming out of academic circles. In Southend District 
Council the Conservative Administration decided to investigate the possibility of 
putting its refuse collection and street cleaning services out to competitive tender, 
when, in the aftermath of the national local authority stoppages of 1978 - 79, their 
manual workers stayed out on strike to secure a wage settlement.
The authority did not want to further undermine industrial relations stability and so 
moved cautiously, undertaking a four month study into the implications of its 
proposals and engaging in full negotiations with the trade unions. The unions made it 
clear that they were totally opposed to the idea and achieved national prominence 
with a series of demonstrations designed to prevent the tendering exercise. Without a 
no compulsory redundancy agreement though, trade union resistance was swiftly 
broken and the council pressed ahead with its plans, eventually awarding the contract, 
which began in April 1981, to Exclusive Cleaning.
Tremendous interest was generated by the Southend experience across local 
government and a debate ensued which concentrated on the possible cost advantages
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of privatisation, illustrated by a projected annual saving in Southend of nearly 
£500,000. The policy was soon after adopted in the London Borough of 
Wandsworth, a marginal borough which had fallen under Tory control in the May 
1978 London municipal elections. The Borough was led by Christopher Chope, a 
Thatcherite, who was keen to establish the council as a ’flagship’ Tory authority.
Local authority workers in Wandsworth had a reputation for militancy which the new 
administration was keen to dampen and so, upstaged and yet enthused by events in 
Southend, the Council moved to put its street cleaning service out to tender, awarding 
the contract to Pritchards who began operations in February 1982. Whilst the unions 
had been opposed to privatisation of the service, the campaign lacked bite and this 
encouraged the council to press ahead with further CT initiatives. Having failed to 
privatise the refuse collection service in 1980 the authority was now more confident 
and in March 1982 decided to seek tenders.
The unions responded with massive industrial action on 19th April 1982 which saw 
refuse collectors and other groups on strike, virtually paralysing council operations. 
Private contractors were brought in to break the strike, which resulted in picket line 
clashes and the disabling of vehicles during the course of a very bitter dispute. 
Conservative victory in the May 6th local elections led to demoralization amongst the 
workforce who were becoming increasingly isolated by a lack of practical national 
support and after six weeks on strike they voted to return to work on the basis of 
management proposals.
Victory for Christopher Chope and his administration in Wandsworth gave 
confidence to a series of other Conservative authorities who were experiencing 
industrial relations difficulties in their cleansing departments. During the period 
1981 - 88, 90 tenders were issued for waste collection and cleansing services by
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Conservative authorities and 41 of the contracts were won by private contractors 
(Sheffield City Council, 1988).
The Campaign for Compulsory Competitive Tendering
Despite industrial relations problems being the common factor amongst privatising 
authorities it was the search for efficiency savings which formed the backbone of 
pro-privatisation propaganda during the CT 'phoney war’ from 1981 -88.
The arguments in favour of privatisation were given a major boost with the 
publication of Michael Forsyth's 'Reservicing Britain' by the ASI in 1980 (Forsyth, 
1980). The pamphlet argued that public services were endemically inefficient due to 
the lack of incentives which derived from local authority DLO monopolies and that 
only competition could ensure financial efficiency based upon public accountability.
The DOEs own investigations into the provision of local authority services offered 
some support for this position. The Report, 'Service Provision and Pricing in Local 
Government' produced by Coopers & Lybrand and published in September 1981 
(DOE, 1981), suggested that local political considerations often came before the 
implementation of appropriate policy solutions. A lack of financial expertise was 
identified alongside unsatisfactoiy costing systems. The paper identified the need for 
an updating of bonus schemes, in line with the suggestions of the Chief Inspector of 
Audit for local authorities in 1979, and also called for flexibility on the part of local 
authorities in the introduction of CT for the provision of their services. The Report 
did not argue that in-house provision should necessarily be replaced by private, or 
even that it should be subjected to competition. The point was made that flexibility 
of approach and local autonomy were also important factors in the delivery of 
suitable local services (DOE, 1981).
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If Coopers & Lybrand were not convinced of the need for CT the government and 
senior Conservative politicians certainly were. They started to actively encourage 
local authorities to contract out and following the experience of Southend and 
Wandsworth there was something of a privatisation rush during 1982 and 1983, 
amongst those authorities keen to embrace the ideology of ’Thatcherism'.
After the Conservatives were returned to power in the General Election of 1983 local 
authority contracting out in the major cleansing services lost its momentum. The 
reduction in trade union power associated with high levels of unemployment, falling 
membership levels and anti-union legislation and severe financial pressures within 
local government had combined to generate greater efficiency in local authority 
services without recourse to privatisation. Productivity in refuse collection increased 
in real terms by 25% between 1978 and 1984, across in-house and private operations, 
promoting the Audit Commission to note:
"Comparison o f the performance o f privatised refuse collection with 
DLOs .... shows that it is not inevitable that privatised services should 
be less costly. Indeed, many DLOs are doing as well or better than 
those services that have been privatised. The difference is likely to be 
attributable as much as anything to the quality o f management".
(Audit Commission, 1984)
The Government was still committed to the extension of CT in local government 
though and, with the election to Parliament of Michael Forsyth, author of 
'Reservicing Britain' and Christopher Chope, ex-leader of Wandsworth Borough 
Council, that commitment was unlikely to be buried.
In April 1984, frustrated by a lack of initiative from the Government, Christopher 
Chope introduced a Ten Minute Rule Bill (Hansard, 1984) calling for a range of local 
authority services to be submitted to compulsory CT (CCT). Ten minute rule bills
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are generally used to promote an issue among MPs and provide an indication of back 
bench feeling, and whilst the Bill was lost by a margin of 3 (with reluctant 
Ministerial abstention) the point had been made that back benchers were ready for 
legislation.
In February 1985 the Government's plans were published by the DOE, Scottish and 
Welsh Offices in a consultative document entitled 'Competition in the Provision of 
Local Authority Services ' (DOE, 1985). Lessons had been learned from the 
experience of previous legislations on local authority DLOs and NHS ancillary 
services and consequently the proposals were even tougher, although provision was 
made for a longer consultation period of 10 weeks.
The circular outlined plans to make CT mandatory for local authority refuse 
collection, street cleansing, building cleaning, grounds and vehicle maintenance and 
catering services from 1987, with authorities having to meet specified financial 
targets in each area. The Secretary of State was also to be granted powers to extend 
the coverage of the legislation and to take action against authorities seeking to 
undermine it.
Opposition was widespread, particularly in the trade unions and Labour local 
authorities who regarded the proposals as a further attack upon their autonomy, borne 
out of a hostility towards public sector employment in general. Even several 
Conservative authorities and politicians made their misgivings clear, arguing that 
central government's role was not to impose on local government a format for 
fulfilling its functions, but to provide a framework with appropriate incentives to 
achieve locally defined objectives.
The consultation period was used to gather information, advice and opinions, which 
came in abundance from the many interested and affected groups, reflecting the
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different interests of those concerned. The Government's support for the interests of 
the private contractors was confirmed once more with the decision to press ahead 
with the legislation, which was published as the Local Government (No 2) Bill on 
26th June 1987 and received its second reading in the House of Commons on 6th July 
1987.
The publicity surrounding the Government's initiative generated a certain interest in 
CT which resulted in a voluntary three fold increase in the number of councils 
contracting out services in the period from April 1987 to March 1988. Even with 
these developments though, contracting out was still on a relatively small scale with 
the private sector holding £140million of work out of a local authority spending total 
of £37.2billion in 1987/88.
The Local Government Chronicle concluded on 8th July 1988 that:
"The majority o f local authorities remain unconvinced o f the benefits 
of contracting out and continue to have no services handled by the 
private sector. Sometimes this has been a policy decision, in others 
the interest is apparently just not there".
(L C G , 1988)
Section 7: The Local Government Act 1988
The consultation paper, 'Competition in the Provision of Local Authority Services' 
which was released in February 1985, outlined the Government’s objective of 
promoting:
"a wider acceptance o f the principles o f competition across the whole 
range of Local Authority activities".
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The paper argued that:
"in order better to promote the efficient, effective and economical 
carrying out o f all functions local authorities should be subject to an 
explicit statutory duty to have regard to value for money in relation to 
the exercise o f all their functions
(D O E, 1985)
To this effect a Bill was introduced in June 1987 entitled the ’Local Government (No 
2) Bill 1987’ which received the Royal Assent as the Local Government Act 1988 in 
April 1988.
Part 1 of the Act relates to the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) into the provision of a series of public authority services referred to as 
"defined activities." It begins by defining those authorities which the legislation 
refers to. These are:
- County, District, Parish and Community Councils in England and Wales
- Regional, Island and District Councils in Scotland
- Development Corporations established for the purposes of a New Town
- The Commission for the New Towns
- Any Police Authority
- Any Fire Authority including the London Fire and Civil Defence Authority
- Metropolitan County Passenger Transport Authorities
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- Authorities established under the Local Government Act 1985 (waste 
disposal)
- Joint Education Committees and ILEA
- Water Development Boards in Scotland
- The Scottish Special Housing Association 
Coverage
The original "defined activities" affected by the legislation were refuse collection, 
building cleaning, other cleaning, school and welfare catering, other catering, vehicle 
maintenance and the maintenance of grounds, although the management of sports and 
leisure facilities was added in November 1989.
The relevant cleansing services, which this thesis is concerned with, can be described 
in greater detail:
Refuse collection: includes household and commercial waste collection
Building cleaning includes the cleaning of the interior of authority buildings and
of windows inside and out. The common parts of residential 
blocks are included but individual homes are excluded as are 
police buildings
Other cleaning refers to street cleansing, including litter removal, street
sweeping, gully emptying and the cleaning of road signs
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The Secretary of State was given powers to extend the scope of the Act to cover 
additional activities as he sees fit without recourse to further legislation.
The Act does provide for various exemptions though, namely where the work forms 
only a minor part (less than 50%) of the job of someone mainly engaged in other 
activities, or where the work performed is only on a very small scale, where the gross 
cost of the service was less than £100,000 in the previous year (the deminimus rules). 
Also made exempt was emergency work, defined as 'work which is calculated to 
avert, alleviate or eradicate the effects or potential effects of an emergency or disaster 
involving or likely to involve danger to life or health or serious damage to or 
destruction of property'. Work carried out by employees living in tied 
accommodation or working on training commission schemes is also excluded.
These exemptions have been strictly interpreted as the Government is keen to ensure 
the legislation is not abused. The feeling was that similar provisions in the Local 
Government Planning and Land Act 1980 were exploited by some authorities and 
that this experience was not to be repeated (Flynn & Walsh, 1988).
The Process
The legislation only applies when authorities want their own employees to carry out 
work which is regarded as a "defined activity". Local authority employees cannot be 
given the work without recourse to the CT process, however where an authority 
decides to give the work to a private company or has already done so, there is no 
requirement that the contractor should face competition. Nevertheless it was stated in 
the consultative document 'Competition in the Provision of Local Authority Services' 
that:
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"It is o f the essence o f the Governments policy that competition 
between Local Authority direct employees and outside contractors 
should be fair".
(DOE, 1985)
In relation to this aim the Act laid out a 6 point process by which work should be put
up for competition.
1 The authority must advertise its intention to put a contract out to tender in at 
least one local newspaper and one trade publication. The advertisement must, 
describe the work; give information regarding the inspection of a detailed 
specification; advertise the availability of the specification for a reasonable 
charge; outline the deadline for receiving replies; and state that the council 
will invite tenders for the work.
2 The times, places and charges contained in the press notice must be adhered to 
and must be reasonable. When the specification is made available it must 
state the time period when the work is to be carried out.
3 "Not less than 3 months nor more than 6 months after the publication of the 
notice formal tenders must be invited from at least 3 companies expressing an 
interest". If less that 4 apply for information then all of them must be invited 
to tender.
4 A written bid must be submitted by the authority's direct service/labour 
organisation (DSO) on the same basis as the private sector.
5 In deciding who is awarded the contract the authority must not "act in a 
manner having the effect, or intended to have the effect of restricting, 
distorting or preventing competition."
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6 In carrying out the work the authority must comply with the detailed 
specification produced at the start of the process.
The Timescale
The fear that private contractors would not be able to cope with a flood of new work 
onto the market and the realisation that this would undermine the competitive process 
prompted the Government to phase the introduction of the legislation. Tendering has 
been phased in over a 3 year period in each of the services. Authorities were 
allocated to different groups and a timetable drawn up for each of these groups which 
stated the latest date by which each of the services must be put to tender. The 
deadlines began on 1st August 1989 and continued at 6 monthly intervals until 1st 
January 1992. The schedule was organised such that no authority was engaged in 
more than one tendering exercise at a time, whilst the flow of contracts onto the 
market in each activity was staggered. In this way neither the authorities nor the 
contractors would become overwhelmed by additional workloads.
Table 2 demonstrates how this timetable was applied in the London Boroughs and 
Metropolitan Districts:
Defined Activity Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6
Collection of Refuse 1 Jan '92 1 Aug '91 1 Jan ’91 1 Aug ’90 1 Jan '90 1 Aug '89
Cleaning of Buildings 1 Jan ’90 1 Aug '89 1 Jan ’92 1 Aug ’91 1 Jan '91 1 Aug *90
Other Cleaning 1 Aug '89 1 Jan ’92 1 Aug '91 1 Jan ’91 1 Aug '90 1 Jan ’90
Catering for Schools & 
Welfare
1 Jan '91 1 Aug ’90 1 Jan '90 1 Aug ’89 1 Jan ’92 1 Aug ’91
i
Other Catering 1 Aug ’90 1 Jan ’90 1 Aug ’89 1 Jan ’92 1 Aug '91 1 Jan ’91
Vehicle Maintenance 1 Aug ’91 1 Jan ’91 1 Aug ’90 1 Jan *90 1 Aue ’89 1 Jan '92
Table 2: Competition bv Activity and Date in London Borough and Metropolitan 
District Councils.
Source: DOE,  1988
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The Act also defines the minimum and maximum contract periods applicable to each 
of the defined services. Tables 3 and 4 below illustrate the timescales relating to 
cleansing services:
Activity Minimum Period Years Maximum Period Years
Collection of refuse 5 7
Cleaning of buildings 3 4
Other cleaning 4 6
Table 3: Specified Periods for Cleansing Services in Authorities with Education 
Functions:
Source: Scottish Development Department, 1988
Activity Min. Period Years Max. Period Years
Collection of refuse 5 7
Cleaning of buildings 4 6
Other cleaning 4 6
Table 4: Specified Periods for Cleansing Services in Authorities Without Education 
Functions.
Source: Scottish Development Department, 1988 
Enforcement
If a Local Authority DSO wins a contract then it must keep a separate trading account 
for that specific defined activity and for all others thereafter. The income on each of 
these accounts is determined by the figures agreed in the contract and cannot be 
subsidised or assisted by cross subsidy from other accounts. Each account is required
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to meet financial objectives determined by the Secretary of State. These have been 
defined as an overall 5% rate of return on capital, except for in building cleaning and 
sports and leisure management, which are only required to break even, since so little 
capital is employed.
Authorities are obliged to prepare annual reports on each of the defined activities to 
demonstrate their effectiveness in achieving statutory objectives and to describe the 
allocation of work across contracts. Copies of this report must be sent to the 
authorities external auditor and the Secretary of State by 30th September in England 
and Wales and the 31st October in Scotland. The Report must also be advertised in 
the press and supplied to interested individuals for a reasonable charge.
Most UK local authorities now make a distinction between their "client" and 
"contractor" functions. The "client" determining service requirements, contract 
specifications and awarding contracts. The "contractor" preparing bids, operating 
contracts and maintaining the accounts for each of the trading activities as outlined 
above.
If an authority is thought to have contravened any of the conditions placed upon it, 
the Secretary of State can issue a notice known as a section thirteen (S13) which 
requires the authority to prove they have not contravened the conditions, or to justify 
their position. A council could be pulled up for a series of reasons:
- failing to adopt the proper tender procedure for a "works contract"
- failing to fulfil the 6 conditions of the CT process
- failure to keep proper accounts
- failure to meet the Secretary of State's financial objectives
- failure to record relevant items in the annual report
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If an authority fails to provide a response which satisfies the Secretary of State he can 
direct them to cease carrying out part or all of the work in question, or place new 
conditions on the operation of the contract. Additionaly he can issue a further 
directive which prevents the authority from performing ANY defined activity.
The Secretary of State also has considerable powers which enable him to discriminate 
between individual authorities to alter the conditions relating to individual activities 
and to establish regional variations in the conditions to the CT process. He can 
change the financial objectives to be met and the rules on divisions, accounting and 
annual reports. Furthermore he can alter any individual aspect of the tendering 
process.
Contract Compliance
Part 2 of the Act includes a list of "non-commercial matters" which authorities are 
not to consider or ask questions about when evaluating tenders for any supply 
contract.
The non-commercial matters are defined as follows:
- The terms and conditions of employment by contractors of their workers
- Whether the terms on which contractors contract with sub-contractors 
constitites the contracting of self employed persons for their services only, 
ie: the use of "lump labour"
- Any involvement of the business activities or interests of contractors with 
irrelevant fields of Government policy
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- The conduct of contractors in industrial disputes between other persons
- Business activities in or the use of supplies from any particular country or 
territory, eg: South Africa
- Any political industrial or sectarian affiliations or interests of contractors
or their directors, partners or employees
- Financial support or lack of financial support by contractors for any 
institution to or from which the authority gives or withholds support
- Use or non use by contractors of technical or professional services provided 
by the authority under the Building Act 19S4 or the Building (Scotland)
Act 1959
The Secretary of State also has powers to add any other matter to this list or to review 
the categories currently listed. Any company which feels it has suffered loss or 
damage as a result of being excluded as a contractor, on the basis of "non 
commercial" criteria, can take legal action against the authority. Additionally, 
judicial review can be opened against the authority.
If an authority decides to exclude any contractor from any part of the tendering 
process then it is obliged to inform them and provide them with reasons if requested.
There are areas where authorities remain free to ask questions about "non commercial 
matters'1.. The provisions of section 71 of the 1976 Race Relations Act require 
authorities to promote good race relations and equal opportunities, and in relation to 
that obligation they may question contractors about terms and conditions, workforce
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compositions and arrangements for promotion, transfer or training. These freedoms 
are not extended to questions about the employment of women and the disabled.
Authorities can also question prospective contractors about health and safety 
legislation and can ask a company to show that it is of sound financial footing. All 
the questions which can be asked are specified by the Secretary of State. Whatever 
autonomy that authorities do retain under the conditions laid out in the CT legislation 
is undermined by the wide variety of provisions for enforcement contained within it.
The local authority manouvering around the requirements of the 1980 'DLO 
legislation' encouraged the Government to include strong policing mechanisms in the 
1988 Act. The requirement that authorities do not act to restrict, distort or prevent 
competition ensures that DSOs must come up with very competitive tenders if they 
are to win contracts.
Updating the Legislation
In the early stages of implemention the legislation demonstrated many areas of 
uncertainty and differences of opinion which forced a certain degree of re-thinking.
In April 1990, the Government issued a draft circular entitled "Local Government 
Act 1988 Part 1. Competition in the Provision of Local Authority Services", which 
was designed to plug what were seen as loopholes in the legislation. The paper made 
it clear that the Government planned to turn the tables further in the favour of private 
contractors. Authorities were to be more accommodating in the granting of depot 
space for contractors use; contracts themselves were not to be lumped together in 
order to deter potential competitors; and cleaning contracts of more than 200 
buildings were to be regarded as 'anti competitive'. The draft circular also sanctioned 
the use of loss leader bids by private contractors whilst retaining the requirement on
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local authority DSOs to show a 5% rate of return on capital. The draft circular 
permitted the offsetting of DSO redundancy costs against contractors bids, but argued 
that with a 50% chance of losing the contract in the next round, this should be built 
into the present tender cost.
The draft circular proved highly controversial and it was not until March 1991 that 
the circular was published in its final form. The contentious proposals on loss 
leaders, redundancy costs, performance bonds and contract packaging were dropped. 
The circular did maintain that depot facilities should be offered to contractors; that 
large scale packaging of contracts should be discouraged; that performance bonds 
should represent no more than 15% of annual contract value; and that the redundancy 
costs of DSO staff to be laid off anyway, as a result of preparation for competition, 
should not be included in estimating potential redundancy costs.
The circular was accepted as largely reasonable by local government bodies but the 
Government had further plans to shake up the CCT laws.
In November 1991 the consultation paper "Competing for Quality. Competition in 
the Provision of Local Services" was published and outlined plans to extend CCT 
into local authority white collar services and housing management. Perhaps of more 
significance though, the Government plans to remove what it sees as local authority 
obstacles to more private sector bidding.
The proposed legislation would scrap current rules on redundancy costs; prevent 
favouritism to in-house tenders; simplify specifications to make tendering easier for 
outside bidders; and provide companies with "documentation that gives all potential 
contractors scope to innovate and does not tie them down to past practices".
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The re-election of the Conservatives in April 1992 suggests that these proposals will 
now be carried through.
Section 8: Concluding Comments
The growth and development of CCT must be considered within the framework of 
the political and economic changes of the late 1970s and 1980s. Based upon a 
commitment to New Right philosophies, the Conservative Government, first elected 
in 1979, has progressively extended the influence of the private sector in the British 
economy across a range of activities.
The Government's ideological commitments dictate that private enterprise is 
inherently more efficient than public and that the public sector affords too much 
power to trade unions. The introduction of CCT into the provision of local authority 
services has provided an opportunity to test that assertion.
The remainder of this thesis will begin to examine the nature of private provision of 
public cleansing services. Crucially it will examine whether private operators are 
genuinely more efficient than public or whether they merely inhibit trade union 
organisation and solidarity, enabling an attack upon cleaning workers jobs, pay and 
conditions in the pursuit of enhanced profits.
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Chapter 3
The Contract Cleaning Industry
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Chapter 3: The Contract Cleaning Industry
Section 1: Cleaning
The scale and significance of the cleaning industry has become increasingly apparent 
over the past 2 or 3 decades. The growth of contract cleaning, the attention being 
paid to environmental issues and the development of privatisation initiatives affecting 
cleansing services have focussed attention on the industry.
Cleaning work includes housework, domestic service, street cleaning, hospital and 
school cleaning, cleaning of offices, banks, factories, warehouses, transport stations, 
buses, trains, police and fire stations, window cleaning, the cleaning of buildings, 
laundry and dry cleaning services, gully emptying, drain cleaning, pest control, 
sewage and toilet cleaning, cleaning of vehicles, aircraft, boats, oil rigs and industrial 
machinery, hotel and shop cleaning, refuse collection and waste disposal, amongst 
other jobs. Associated with this work is the manufacturing, distribution and 
marketing of cleaning materials used in the delivery of services.
The entire industry employs, on conservative estimates, around 1,000,000 workers 
(Key Note Report 1990) and about 300,000 of these are employed in cleaning 
services directly (Key Note, 1992). The jobs done by those workers have been 
organised in very different ways during different periods. Much modem day 
housework was historically done by paid domestic servants in middle class homes and 
is now increasingly being done by home helps in the homes of professionally 
employed women. Private refuse collection services were replaced by municipal ones 
which are now increasingly being carried out by private contractors. Directly 
employed company cleaners or office 'chars' have been progressively pushed out of 
their jobs by contract cleaning companies.
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There are now 2 main types of employment in the cleaning industry. Direct labour, 
employed by institutions which organise and supervise their own cleaning work; and 
contract cleaning, where cleaners are employed by a specialised cleaning or industrial 
services company, which is contracted by other organisations to provide the services 
they require. Since the 1960s there has been a continual growth in the proportion of 
work carried out by contractors with consequential shifts in the pattern of cleaning 
workers employment
Section 2: The Growth of Contract Cleaning
Contract cleaning, which concentrates on the routine cleaning of building interiors, 
took on a significant role during the 1960s when the bouyant economic conditions led 
to recruitment difficulties in both the public and private sectors. In these 
circumstances it proved more convenient for many companies to hand their cleaning 
problems to specialist firms with expertise in attracting the right type of employees. 
Initially, there was little emphasis on cost or quality considerations in justifying a 
move away from direct labour. Industrial companies were simply keen to get rid of 
responsibility for a peripheral activity creating unnecessary difficulties.
Unfair competition
Despite the lack of cost considerations, competition led to problems, associated with 
pricing strategies, in the early days of the industry's expansion. Ascher (1987) refers 
to a "pseudo-trade association" amongst a group of small firms outside London who 
were said to be fixing prices with the aim of gaining contracts from older established 
companies. The profit margins existing at the time also allowed for the emergence of 
a phenomena known as 'contract selling'. This was an arrangement by which 
contracts were won by established contractors and then sold on to smaller firms who 
took full responsibility for meeting the terms of the contract The highly competitive
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tenders placed by the major players, were generally unworkable in practice and led to 
declining performance standards and bankruptcies amongst the smaller operators.
TheCCMA
Two developments in 1967 helped improve the contract cleaners image. The 
Government's decision to use contractors to clean Civil Service buildings represented 
a major vote of confidence, especially as the Labour Party were in power at the time. 
In the same year, many of the companies involved in the industry formed a trade 
association, the Contract Cleaning and Maintenance Association (CCMA), to improve 
their reputation, which had been spoilt by heavy competition and 'cowboy' operators. 
They established a 'Code of Good Practice' covering issues such as safety, insurance, 
industrial relations and fair trading to separate themselves from the less reputable 
practices which had characterised the industry. Certain conditions were placed on 
membership in order to exclude the smallest and potentially unreliable operators. The 
association changed its name to the Cleaning and Support Services Association in 
1990 but has maintained the same functions and represents companies responsible for 
around 80% of contract cleaning in the UK (Key Note, 1992). Current conditions of 
membership are a requirement that the contractor has been operating for at least 12 
months and has a turnover in excess of £250,000 per annum.
Cast benefits
During the 1970s contract cleaning expanded rapidly, exploiting its improved image 
which coincided with a boom in office occupancy and, by this time, an increasing 
awareness of the potential for cost cutting that contractors provided. Aside from the 
convenience of using industrial service companies, economic difficulties and rising 
labour costs in the 1970s generated boardroom and academic interest in the cost 
benefits of sub-contracting. Studies on the efficiency benefits of contracting out
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waste collection (see Savas,1977 and 1980) combined with analysis of the pursuit of 
non-profit goals within economic institutions to strengthen the contractors position.
Academics argued that the internal provision of services could result in market 
distortions deriving from manager’s and bureaucrat's pursuit of individual utility 
maximisation strategies (Buchanan, 1978; Leibenstein, 1966; Migue and Berbager, 
1972; and Niskaven 1972, 1978). Sub-optimal outcomes are said to derive from a 
natural human risk averseness and the avoidance of conflict and competition within 
large economic units. It was argued that the growth of corporations grants greater 
and greater opportunity for such economic 'abuses', as managers become increasingly 
separated from the front line role of the institution, and as the number of decision 
makers grows, bringing their own individual preferences with them and taking control 
away from shareholders and political representatives (Dunleavy, 1982; Leibenstein, 
1966, 1975; Williamson, 1975; Wilson,1973). The suggestion that internal 
competition would eliminate, or at least limit, the inefficiencies associated with non 
commercial utility maximising behaviour, found evidence in the studies cited by 
Savas (1980).
As many large companies sought to rationalise their operations during the economic 
downturns of the 1970s and 1980s the claims of business service companies that they 
could provide cost savings of around 20% became more attractive. Specialist 
contractors could escape the inefficiencies identified in Leibenstein and Williamson's 
work, which were closely associated with the bureaucracy of departmentalised 
enterprise. Furthermore, the removal of the cost burdens that go with the continual 
renewal of cleaning and maintenance equipment, releases capital resources for other 
purposes. The use of contractors also enabled greater flexibility in the use of labour, 
as whole divisions of activity were turned over to companies happy to comply with 
fluctuating work requirements.
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The desire of many enterprises to refine their own operations and to concentrate on 
core activities was wholly compatible with the aims of industrial service companies. 
Contract cleaners and other service firms could exploit the economies Of scale that 
specialisation brings to achieve greater competitiveness. Client companies could 
release managers into more profitable activities and avoid the industrial relations and 
personnel problems associated with in-house service teams. As Neil Ryder, BETs 
Corporate Affairs Director puts it:
"Why, companies ask, should they struggle with the problems 
associated with managing a workforce in areas of activity about which 
they know little or nothing?"
(Cassell, 1991)
An expanding .market
The interest in contracting out amongst private sector corporations created a 
substantial market for potential suppliers. The number of cleaning firms rose during 
the 1970s fiom around 800 in 1971 (Ascher, 1987) to 2,800 in 1979 (Dti, 1987). The 
rapid growth in the number of contract cleaning firms was a reflection of the profits 
that could be made by replacing in-house workforces in private companies. 
Competition was relatively light in relation to the quantity of contracts available and 
profit margins were often as high as 20%. These rates were often sustained by the 
willingness of clients to enter into long term contract arrangements (Sheffield City 
Council, 1988).
Section 3: The Structure of the Industry
The industry is characterised by a lack of barriers to entry which has enabled a range 
of companies to operate and compete with one another, despite variations in size and
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status. Little capital is required and other start up costs are low. Contractors seek out 
work rather than advertise it, they need only a small office for administration and can 
quickly recruit staff through newspaper advertisements. There are only limited 
economies of scale which offer few advantages. Larger firms can use their bulk 
purchasing power to obtain discounts on equipment and supplies but the labour 
intensive nature of the industry ensures that these are limited. Labour makes up 
around 90% of a contractors total cost (CCMA, 1988) and so competitiveness tends to 
come down to how far the workforce can be squeezed. Alan Raven, former chair of 
the CCMA sums it up:
'The contract cleaning industry has always been attractive to those 
wishing to go into business but without capital or a specific trade to 
offer. It is widely thought that office cleaning is a relatively simple 
way of earning a living. Little equipment is needed and the work takes 
place on the client's premises. The management skills needed in the 
early days of company development are little more than the energy to 
recruit and motivate others to work unsocial hours on relatively low 
pay .
(CCMA, 1987)
Increasingly, the industry has become dominated by large operators whose activities 
extend beyond contract cleaning and beyond Britain. Whilst the number of small to 
medium firms has continued to increase (in 1991 there were 5,345 companies 
offering contract cleaning services and 71% had sales of less then £100,000 a year. 
[Key Note 1992]) they are usually locally based and concentrate on office and 
industrial cleaning.
Some companies identified the nature of the commercial sector's demand for business 
services and recognised that it extended well beyond office cleaning. The wish to 
concentrate on core activities in modem corporations led to a demand for multiple 
support services which could handle the whole range of a business's operations. The
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larger companies were able to diversify into such activities, an example of which was 
laundry services.
Demand for the provision of clean work wear grew dramatically in the 1970s as a 
result of safety clauses in collective bargaining agreements. The larger contract 
cleaning companies were well poised to exploit this demand, as client company 
directors were put off by the investment required to provide in-house services and the 
further diversification of management expertise that would be necessary. Additional 
services have since been added to create ’service supermarkets' which can provide 
workwear, toilet supplies, safety wear, waste disposal, property maintenance, 
security, cleaning, catering, plant hire, transport, telecommunications and infonnation 
systems, amongst others. This development has helped create an extremely lucrative 
industry in which only the major operators can compete. Hie Oxford Forecasting 
Unit calculated that the total business support services market was worth £42.5 billion 
in 1990 or 5% of GDP (Cassell, 1991).
The importance of the sector was illustrated on 1 January 1991 when a business 
services sub-sector was created within the FT Actuaries index. The index will 
concentrate on companies involved in practical services such as cleaning, waste 
disposal, maintenance, security, recruitment and property services.
Many of the leading operators in the business services sector, such as BET, did not 
begin in cleaning or even any of the other activities listed. They shifted capital into 
the industry as it developed and have led the way in offering new services as a means 
of consolidating their position. Activities associated with cleaning remain the bread 
and butter of most support service companies though, and developments in that sector 
during the 1980s were crucial to the shaping of the industry in the run up to the 
introduction of (XT.
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Falling profits - Expanding markets
The major economic recession of the early 1980s created conflicting pressures within 
the industry. Large scale industrial and office cleaning had formed a major part of 
contractors' investment base during the 1970s but the contraction of manufacturing 
and related office work caused a decline in the scale of private sector cleaning. This 
work reduction extended across the range of cleansing services, waste collection and 
disposal, laundry services, specialist industrial cleaning, office cleaning and others.
Where contracts were maintained there was extreme pressure for cost reductions. By 
now, companies were seeking much more than convenience in the organisation of 
building maintenance services and saw the contractors as a means to achieve further 
reductions in overheads. Regular competitive tendering replaced the lucrative long 
term contracts existing previously, as clients sought better value for money (CCMA,
1987). The impact on profit margins was dramatic, with the average falling from 
5.0% in 1985 to 2.6% in 1990 (see Figure 1). This was followed in 1991 by a sharp 
rise to 4.3%, reflecting the major contractors' new approach and the continued 
expansion of the market
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Figure 1; Contract Cleaning Profit Margins 1983 - 1991
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Profit rates have been particularly hard hit by enhanced competition. The number of 
operators in the contract cleaning industry has continued to expand during the 1980s 
rising from 2,800 in 1979 (Dti, 1987) to over 5,000 in 1991 (Key Note, 1992), 
reflecting the ease with which a firm can be established and the push towards cost 
effectiveness in the economy as a whole. Many companies were drawn towards the 
idea of contracting out ancillary services as a result of recessionary pressures but 
tighter specifications and increased competition for the ensuing contracts, has made 
the market far less favourable to potential investors.
An ICC Report put it that:
"This sudden change of fortunes for some contract cleaning 
companies, the falling margins and the large number of loss making 
companies illustrated that this can be a high risk industry and with 
returns on capital falling it may become less attractive to investors".
(ICC, 1988)
The irony is that despite the recession and falling profit rates the market has 
considerable growth potential. Whilst sales grew by only 23% between 1980 and 
1984 compared to an inflation rate of 36% (Ascher, 1987), the commercial cleaning 
market was estimated to be worth £2.5 billion in 1985 and £4.0 billion in 1990, 
(Key Note, 1992), with contractors' share of the total rising from 33% to 42% over 
the same period (Key Note, 1990). Indeed the rate of sales growth itself has been 
increasing with an annual growth rate of 10% between 1985 and 1987 and a rate in 
excess of 17% over the past 5 years. The Report behind these figures suggests this 
growth has not been turned into profits, as a result of the high cost of labour in terms 
of the amount of turnover devoted to wages. As long as prices are held in check by 
heavy competition and labour costs continue to rise, a declining profit rate is 
inevitable (Key Note, 1990).
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Section 4: Multinational Domination
Office cleaning
The main basis for market growth and for individual contractors' increased sales is 
not the creation of entirely new cleaning work but the transfer of work from in-house 
workforces to contractors, or from one contractor to another (Key Note, 1990). 
Developments in the industry during the past decade have combined to create 
substantial increases in the amount of work fitting into these categories and has 
attracted the interest of major transnational conglomerates.
The desire of recession hit companies to 'farm out' peripheral activities such as 
cleaning, and the Government's desire to contract services out, to achieve reductions 
in public spending and public sector employment (Sheffield City Council, 1988), was 
a clear indication of the industry's potential. Predictably, multinationals were quick 
to see the opportunities that presented themselves and set about establishing a 
dominant market position.
During the mid-1980s British based capital sought to monopolise the industry 
through a series of interconnected policies. The first and most dramatic of these was 
the aggressive predatory approach adopted by major corporations such as BET and 
ADT (previously Hawley group). Market share was bought up with the purchase of 
just about any medium sized competitor prepared to sell (details of takeovers are 
listed in the company profiles in Chapter 4). The companies taken over by the major 
operators had themselves grown by acquiring smaller contractors, creating a 
pyramidal pattern of ownership in the industry (Manchester City Council, 1989). 
The determination to restrict competitors has been so pronounced, that success by a 
small cleaning company in terms of them winning an attractive new contract, merely 
increases the likelihood of takeover (Whitfield, 1984). Many acquisitions were also
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justified on the basis of extending the geographical base of operators beyond the 
South East of England as work moved beyond the private office and into the public 
sector on a national basis (Ascher, 1987).
Prior to the implementation of the Government's CCT legislation the major 
contractors had managed to carve up around a half of the cleaning market, with the 
multinational BET far and away the market leader (see Table 5).
Companies Percentage Market Share
BET 24.1%
ISS (Mediclean and Servisystem) 4.1%
o c s 3.9%
Godfrey Davis 2.7%
RCO 2.7%
Taylorplan 1.0%
Table 5: Market Share in the Contract Cleaning Industry 
Source: Key Note, 1992
An expanding range of services
The vast sums of money spent on achieving these market shares was not part of some 
corporate vanity exercise, it was based upon anticipation of a growth explosion in the 
industry. Recognising the Government's interest in privatisation and an increasing 
awareness of environmental issues, industrial service giants and established cleaning 
operators saw the need to establish a visible market presence as the new work came 
on stream.
The transnational conglomerates and some independent companies such as Bren green 
Holdings (prior to its takeover by BET in 1986) saw how the public sector market 
was likely to develop and prepared themselves accordingly.
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Cleaning work in the public sector goes beyond the usual ancillary support services 
required by any large enterprise. Activities such as refuse collection and street 
cleaning are at the forefront of a local authority's role and require considerable 
expertise and experience if they are to be provided adequately.
The additional needs of local authorities and other public sector bodies were 
identified, and the major contractors began to expand the range of services they could 
provide, just as they were doing in the private sector. Eric Harrison, then chief 
executive of BETs main cleansing division, Initial Contract Services, put it in 1988 
that:
'There is a growing emphasis on the provision of on site management 
to ensure the correct supervision of an ever-increasing range of
services that more and more of our larger customers are seeking
just one source for services. Starting with the basic cleaning 
requirements, these services range from the supply of toilet rolls to 
complete waste collection and disposal. It's the practice of one-stop 
shopping and something that we will be providing on a much broader 
basis".
(Cleaning, February 1988 quoted in Manchester City Council, 1989)
Widening the range of services is intended to have two main effects. On the one 
hand it fits in with the CCMA’s objective of restoring the industry's profit margins. 
By encouraging the client to pay more, for a broader set of services, 'cowboy' outfits 
offering a cheap but basic alternative can be squeezed out (Sheffield City Council,
1988). By shifting work into areas more reliant on capital investment, such as 
specialist cleaning and refuse collection, competition from small entrepreneurial 
firms is pushed out of the growth areas and into the ultra competitive market for 
small, private sector office cleaning. Small firms with public sector contracts who 
feel the pressure of this strategy become ripe for takeover by the large companies, 
who are then in a position to seek the expansion of any contracts acquired.
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In the battle to win contracts, multinational corporations have been able to use their 
emmense power and experience to further distort the principles behind competitive 
tendering. Experience of privatisation and contracting out in different countries is 
utilised in developing tendering tactics, with takeovers and mergers accompanied by 
predatory pricing strategies. This has involved the use of loss leader bids in order to 
undermine the competition and establish a market presence, with the aim of long run 
profitability (JNHSPRU, 1990; NAO, 1987; Bickerstaff, 1984; Whitfield, 1984, 
1992). In as far as the private sector has achieved success in tendering for support 
services in the NHS, the multinationals have led the way. By February 1992 
contractors had picked up only 31% of NHS cleaning contracts (PSPRU, 1992), but 
in 1990 64% of these were held by the transnational conglomerates BET and ISS 
(JNHSPRU, 1990), a significant improvement on their position in the industry as a 
whole.
The domination of these companies in the NHS is illustrative of the importance that 
they attach to the public sector market Much of the in-house cleaning sector, worth 
over £2.6 billion (Key Note, 1992), is in the state sector and with a Government 
wholly committed to the principles of privatisation (see Chapter 1) there was little 
time wasted in encouraging a movement of that work onto the open market 
Contractors have not been satisfied with persuading public authorities to privatise 
services. They and their representatives put increasing pressure on central 
Government to force authorities to subject contractible activities to competition (the 
readiness of the Government to embrace these desires has been well documented in 
the previous chapter).
Refuse collection and street cleaning
The extension of the competitive tendering initiative into local government was long 
anticipated by the industry and much sought after by the major contractors. The high
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capital intensity of refuse collection services, in relation to other cleaning, suggested 
a market in which the 'irritance' of competition could be minimised. Total municipal 
expenditure on waste collection and cleansing was estimated to be £740 million per 
annum in 1989 (Sheffield City Council and SCAT, 1990), an attractive basis for 
investment for any company in the industry which had the necessary capital.
Several of the larger cleaning contractors and conglomerates were prepared for an 
expansion of work in this sector, having diversified into refuse collection in the early 
'80's as part of the strategy to offer a complete service range. Takeovers and mergers 
proliferated and traditional waste disposal companies who had built their business on 
trade refuse were left behind Of the 30 domestic refuse collection contractors served 
by the private sector prior to the introduction of the Local Government Act 1988, 26 
went to cleaning companies who had diversified, 17 of those went to companies 
owned by BET or ADT (Manchester City Council, 1989), demonstrating the degree 
of concentration that existed in the run up to CCTs implementation.
Yet the fragmented and labour intensive nature of business within the industrial 
services sector means that competition is still fierce in some areas and is always 
threatened in others. This would suggest that the struggle for market domination will 
intensify and will be fought out amongst the larger firms. Of the companies quoted 
in the new FT business services sub-sector, only BET is big enough to appear in the 
FTSE 100 and is, in any case, currently re-examining it’s whole organisational 
approach. The stockbrokers James Capel put it that:
"Concentration within a highly fragmented industry has barely started 
but will inevitably gather pace as the industry matures, competition 
grows fiercer and the organisational and financial advantages of 
larger scale companies over independents or one-man-bands are 
brought to bear".
(Cassell, 1991)
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Sections: Cleaning Services and the Continental Challenge
The dramatic growth in the market for cleansing services and the limited experience 
of British operators in meeting the needs of the public sector (LRD, 1988), did not go 
unnoticed on the Continent Prior to the introduction of competition into the 
provision of public authority services, there had been little foreign interest in the UK 
cleaning industry. British companies like BET, ADT (now based in Bermuda, closer 
to it's major US interests) and Brengreen Holdings (prior to BETs takeover) 
established a presence as multinational cleaning contractors in the 1980s, with 
contracts in the Far and Middle East, Africa and the United States, but competition in 
the UK was mainly provided by small local companies.
The unique combination of the British CCT policy initiative and moves towards a 
single European market, encouraged various multinational service companies on the 
Continent and elsewhere to get involved (Padden, 1991). The European Service 
Industries Forum points out that there are more than 50 service companies in Europe 
whose annual revenues exceed £1 billion (Cassell, 1991). With UK companies being 
relatively slow in the recognition of the market’s new potential (competition has 
rarely been fierce) there was clearly an opportunity for these corporate giants to 
exploit
Acquiring water interests
The possibility of overseas contractors becoming involved in the battle for the 
provision of British local authority cleansing services became more apparent when 
French water companies began acquiring interests in their English and Welsh 
counterparts. There are 5 or so private water companies in France which provide 
around 70% of the country's supply. The 3 largest, G6n6rale des Eaux, Lyonnaise
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des Eaux - Dumez and SAUR, a subsidiary of Bouygues, are involved in a wide 
variety of other activities largely based on public services. The lack of market share 
left in the French water industry encouraged them to diversify and look abroad for 
new opportunities. The major companies have won many contracts to supply water 
in developing countries, but only recently saw the potential of the UK business.
Prior to the privatisation of the 10 British water authorities in 1989, French 
multinationals set about buying up the privately owned statutory water companies, 
who work alongside the large regional water authorities, supplying around 25% of 
the Nation's water. The French got control of 42% (by turnover) of the sector by 
buying stakes in 15 of the 29 statutory companies (SCAT, 1988). Establishing a 
strategic foothold in the industry was seen as the best preparation for expansion after 
privatisation (FT, 23 April 1988). As Jean-Piene Tardieu, director of CGE put it:
"It gives us the opportunity to look and learn, to meet the people in 
charge and find possible future partners. When the water authorities 
are privatised we will already have some experience in the UK to help 
us".
(FT, 17 May 1988)
It quickly became apparent that stake building in the water industry was to be part of 
a wider attack on the market for local authority services. The Water Industry 
Unions Committee, after meeting with representatives of the Confederation Gdn6rale 
du Travail (CGT), in Paris, reported that:
"they will seek to extend their activities to include transportation, 
energy, municipal cleaning and domestic services, refuse collection, 
electricity, communications, television, funeral services and many 
more".
(SCAT, 1988)
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Officers of the National and Local Government Officers Union (NALGO) concluded 
after discussions with representatives of the companies involved, that:
*They see themselves developing in Britain along similar lines to their 
French experience
(Guardian, 27 October 1988)
NOTE: Individual company strategies and the different continental contexts of 
contracting are outlined in Chapters 4 and 5.
^multinational environment
Multinational corporations are always responsive to regional economic and political 
changes (Newby, 1985), with the country by country expansion of operations 
reflecting a gradual process of learning and risk avoidance (Caves, 1982). An 
economy will prove particularly attractive if it can offer the right business 
environment along with the potential for cost minimisation. Comparison with other 
markets in which the industrial service transnationals operate, suggests that the UK 
offers greater opportunities for market expansion following the introduction of CCT. 
There are few constraints on terms and conditions of employment compared with 
other EC member states, few fully prepared domestic competitors due to a lack of 
experience in public service contracting, a Government wholly committed to the 
private sector and methods and standards of provision easily reconcilable with EC 
norms (Chambers, 1990; Burton, 1991).
The professionalism of the 'Continental Challenge' still took the industry by surprise. 
Across the country there was an interest in local authority cleansing contracts from 
major Continental companies. They had established subsidiaries and joint ventures, 
recruited leading domestic managers with knowledge of the UK industry and
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prepared impressive evidence of their considerable international experience 
(Digings, ND).
Richard Barlow, then chief executive of Sitaclean Technology, the British subsidiary 
of SIT A which is owned in turn by Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez, explained the 
enthusiasm when he said at the Conference of Local Government Personnel and 
Management Services Society in Manchester:
"The market potential in Great Britain is something we regard as 
unique. 500 local authorities seeking refuse and street cleansing 
tenders is obviously an opportunity which no major service contractor 
can afford to ignore".
(Donaldson, 1990)
The attraction is understandable when we consider that the UK municipal cleansing 
market is now worth some £800 million a year (Burton, 1991). With a volume of 
work constantly coming on stream in an industry where waste management 
companies have operated internationally for years. The atmosphere created by the 
movement towards a single European market has merely encouraged a development 
which these contractors would have led in any case. As Len Turner, Vice Chair of 
the Association of London Authorities (ALA), said in his foreword to the ALA's 
publication The Continental Challenge’:
"1992 and the Single European Market have come early to local 
Government".
(Digings, ND)
In these circumstances it was not surprising to see a rapid expansion in the scale of 
foreign competition, with interest from the Spanish cleansing company FOCSA, 
owned by the construction and business services conglomerate Con-y-Con, increased 
activity from the Danish services corporation ISS, Tayloiplan owned by the Berkeley
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Corporation from Australia and interest in other activities like catering and grounds 
maintenance from firms based in Holland, Spain and France. After a while, the US 
waste companies BFI and Waste Management Inc., who had led what foreign interest 
there was prior to CCT, renewed their intervention, having established a presence in 
the more developed Continental market
By mid-1991 foreign based companies and their subsidiaries had secured 69% (by 
value) of privatised street cleaning contracts, 23.4% of combined privatised 
refuse/cleansing contracts and about 30% of privatised refuse contracts (Burton,
1991). Only around 25% of all refuse collection and street cleaning contracts are 
controlled by the private sector but the concentration of work in multinational 
contractors hands has become highly apparent, as illustrated by the figures above.
The influence of contractors from overseas should not be underestimated. 
Companies such as General des Eaux, Lyonnaise des Eaux and ISS are truly giant 
The tradition of public service contracting is much more established on the Continent 
than in the UK and these contractors have exploited that tradition. They are into the 
provision of the whole range of public services, as distinct from having a private 
sector support service function and they will exploit that expertise in their desire to 
monopolise the British local authority cleansing market Some privatised British 
water authorities such as Severn Trent and Wessex are already taking a lead from 
their French counterparts, with ambitious attempts to break into the waste 
management industry and it is unlikely that the parallels will end there. Indeed 
Severn Trent has already been expanding internationally buying a Belgian sewage 
treatment company, Aquafin.
The following 2 chapters of this thesis will provide profiles of the leading companies 
and an examination of the European experience of contracting out local authority 
services.
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Chapter 4
The Major Cleaning and Waste Management
Contractors
66
Chapter 4: The Major Cleaning and Waste Management Contractors
Section 1: Introduction
Private sector competition for the provision of local authority cleansing services is 
increasingly dominated by a few large companies. Several firms have targeted the 
market and the tendering strategies adopted have combined with widespread 
acquisitions to create a movement towards concentration that looks set to continue.
The market leaders can be placed into three main categories:
I Multinational Service Conglomerates
These companies operate in diverse sectors of the economy, from media and 
retail, to cleaning and laundry, but increasingly they are trying to integrate 
their services so as to cater for the every need of public and private sector 
organisations.
The best known example of this type of company in Britain is BET, but 
internal reorganisation and the growing presence of overseas based service 
companies has threatened their position.
II Multinational Service Specialists
These are service companies whose core activities are cleaning, security, 
laundry and related areas. They too are interested in service packages but the 
extent of their activities is not nearly as flexible.
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Typical companies in this category are ISS Servisystem from Denmark and 
OCS in Britain.
m  Privatised British Water Authorities
Following the example of their French counterparts, who are market leaders 
in the whole range of private services, on a multinational scale, the privatised 
British water authorities have started to diversify their own operations, with 
cleansing services very prominent
The involvement of Southern Water and Welsh Water with an overseas 
conglomerate (Profile I vii), Wessex Water with a foreign based specialist 
(Profile II v) and Seven Trent’s independent purchase of the Biffa waste 
management company leaves this group of operators a little less defined than 
the two conventional categories listed above.
The following profiles consider the history, structure and approach of the main 
contractors fitting into the above categories, and are listed in Table 6 below. Whilst 
every attempt has been made to provide an accurate account of each company's 
present status, the ownership of cleansing contractors is constantly changing and 
consequently certain details may now be out of date.
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Company Category Nationality
BE.T.PLC Multinational Service 
Conglomerate
U.K.
Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez Multinational Service 
Conglomerate
Ranee
Compagnie Generale des Eaux Multinational Service 
Conglomerate
France
FOCSA S A Multinational Service 
Conglomerate
Spain
A  AH. Holdings Pic Multinational Service 
Conglomerate
U.K.
Ocean Transport & Trading 
PLC
Multinational Service 
Conglomerate
U.K.
Bouygues S A * Multinational Service 
Conglomerate
France
ISS Servisystem A/S Multinational Service 
Specialist
Denmark
OCS Group Ltd. Multinational Service 
Specialist
U.K.
Taylorplan Services Ltd. Multinational Service 
Specialist subsidiary
U.K. - Australia
Browning Ferris Industries 
Inc.
Multinational Service 
Specialist
USA
Waste Management Inc. * Multinational Service 
Specialist
USA
Severn Trent PLC Privatised British Water 
Authority
U.K.
* Both Bouygues and Waste Management Inc. arc engaged in joint ventures with
Privatised British Water Authorities.
Table 6 : Multinational Cleansing Contractors bidding for Local Government
Contracts
Section 2: Multinational Service Conglomerates 
Profile I: B.E.T.FLC. OJ.K.)
Background
B.E.T. began trading as the British Electric Traction Company in 1896. It was 
founded in order to pursue interests in two fields, passenger and freight transport and 
electricity generation and distribution.
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The Company soon became the UK's leading tramway operator, but when its leases 
ran out and local authorities took over the tramways in the 1920's, BET acquired a 
range of other interests in laundry, cleaning, printing, publishing and gas 
manufacture. Major diversification followed the nationalisation of its power interests 
in 1947, which provided the funds for a series of takeovers. The Company moved 
into broadcasting, leisure and plant hire, and extended its interests in printing, 
publishing and transport, with several major overseas acquisitions.
A significant interest in the cleansing industry developed with the groups gradual 
stake building in the cleansing and textile maintenance company, Initial, between 
1950 and 1973, by which time BET held a 40% share. The real shift into this sector, 
as a central activity, came with the rationalisation of company strategy and a decision 
to concentrate on contract services during the late 1980s.
BET had become vulnerable to takeover and asset stripping by the middle of the last 
decade, due to unimpressive results in too disparate a group of companies (NALGO,
1990). The Company anticipated rapid growth and higher returns in the industrial 
services sector and began to concentrate its activities, with the objective of achieving 
market domination.
A massive programme of acquisitions was launched involving the purchase of 
suitable companies, using the funds raised from the sale of subsidiaries no longer 
fitting into BETs plans (Landor N.D.). The result is a multinational contractor 
aiming to provide any ancillary service that is required by a broad range of customers 
in the public and private sectors. As the company puts i t :
"BET's core business is the customers chore business
(FT, 24-6-89)
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Financial Performance
In 1991 BET had a turnover of £2790.5 million and pre tax profits stood at £217 
million compared to a turnover of £2694.5 million in 1990, with greater profits of 
£322.3 million.
Whilst the Company conveys an image of itself as a service supermarket its activities 
can still be divided into three main groups. Business Services which accounted for 
£1226.4 million of turnover in 1991, Plant Services £745.7 million and Distribution 
Services £442.1 million, other interests contributed £376.3 million to sales. Business 
Services was the only section of the Company's operations to show an increase in its 
contribution to operating profits with a 7% rise. This was itself lower than the rise in 
revenues which amounted to 18%, reflecting the falling margins in cleaning and other 
activities.
BET has a truly international presence with its shares traded in New York, Toronto, 
Montreal, Paris, Amsterdam, Zurich, Frankfurt and London. Within the Business 
Services group, which includes the Company’s cleansing activities, UK operations 
account for over half of revenues and profits but important contributions come from 
continental Europe and North America.
Cleaning Interests
Cleaning services form the backbone of BETs Business Service operation generating 
around one quarter of its revenues. The bulk of its cleaning contracts are held in the 
UK where the Company has established itself as a clear market leader, holding a 
24.1% share in 1990, with a turnover of £325 million, through its subsidiary Initial 
Contract Services Ltd. (ICC, 1991).
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The Initial group was bought by BET in 1985 when £173 million was paid for the 
59% of shares not already owned. BET made around 200 acquisitions in the second 
half of the 1980s. Many were in the cleansing services and were incorporated into 
Initial's operations. The remaining 19% of shares in Advance were bought in 1985, 
giving BET control of Hoveringham Waste Control and Biffa Waste Services. This 
was followed in 1986 with the £33 million purchase of Brengreen (Holdings) pic 
which included the Exclusive group of companies, pioneers of local authority 
cleansing services privatisation. Also in 1986, the HAT group, with a turnover of 
some £240.2 million, was bought for £114.6 million and Reckitts Cleaning services 
was bought for £12.75 million in 1987. In 1988/89 a total of 85 companies were 
bought world-wide at a cost of £304 million, the largest of these was the purchase of 
Pritchard Services, Provincial Cleansing and Progressive Cleaning from BETs 
principal competitor in cleaning services, ADT, for £45 million (NALGO, 1990).
This highly predatory strategy gave BET a virtual monopoly in the public sector 
cleaning market in the run up to the introduction of CCT. The Company had around 
80 contracts in local government and was the leading contractor in the MOD, British 
Rail and the British Airports Authority. Only ADTs sale of its hospital cleaning 
subsidiary, Mediclean, to ISS, prevented complete domination of the NHS market, 
where BET already has 34% of all privatised cleansing contracts (JNHSPRU, 1990).
During 1989 various acquisitions were made which extended the Company's 
cleansing interests overseas. In the United States, Arcade in New York City and 
Southern Sendees in Atlanta were bought, confirming America's position as BETs 
fastest growing market (NALGO, 1990). In Europe the Company has cleaning 
interests in France, Belgium, Holland, Ireland, Germany and Spain and in the Far 
East they have contracts in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.
72
BETs cleansing subsidiaries were gradually absorbed into its environmental care 
group Initial Contract Services. The group was reorganised in 1988 to account for 
the wave of takeovers and for a shift in company policy, based on a commitment to 
support services provision in general. The group was split into 5 divisions, 
Commercial Services, Industrial Services, Contract Services, Waste Services and 
Manufacturing. These divisions are engaged in just about every aspect of cleansing, 
hygiene, maintenance and laundry services, including the manufacture of most of the 
products which the Company's employees actually use. By 1989 Initial had grown 
into a vast organisation employing some 80,(XX) cleansing operatives in nearly 300 
locations (Webster, 1990). In 1991 the group generated about one half of BETs total 
operating profit in the Business Services division.
Further refinement of BETs cleansing interests came with the decision to sell Biffa, 
Initial's waste disposal operation, which included Exclusive cleansing. The group 
was sold to the Seven Trent water company in May of 1991, for £212 million, 
eliminating BETs involvement in waste management
UK Activity and Tactics
BETs basic strategy is to offer a wide range of clients, in the public and private 
sectors, a complete range of support services designed to enable them to concentrate 
on their own core activities. The Company's Annual Report of 1990 put it that:
"BET is a network of inter-related companies offering a broad range 
of contract staff and equipment to provide the support services 
required by its industrial, commercial, construction and public sector 
customers. By contracting out, these customers are able to raise the 
levels of efficiency and quality in these services up to that of their 
mainstream operations".
(BET, 1990)
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It is the depth of activity which is essential to BETs approach. By offering such a 
broad range of services the Company is trying to set itself apart from the competition.
As an Initial director put it:
"It is the principle o f one-stop shopping and something that our
competitors will find difficult to provide".
(NALGO, 1990)
BET had to go through a major period of adjustment itself to develop the strategy, 
conducting a programme of disposals and acquisitions which left the Company with 
severe debt problems. The objective was to establish an early dominant position in 
support service markets which were showing rapid growth. The quickest and most 
assured route to market leadership was to buy up the competition.
t
In its effort to attract customers, BET claims to be able to provide a complete support 
service package. If it does not have a company capable of fulfilling a required 
function, it will buy one or employ the existing in-house workforce and utilize their 
knowledge and experience (Landor, N.D.). The Company’s ability to provide the full 
range of ancillary services lies at the heart of its marketing approach towards private 
businesses. BET has exploited the international trend towards the contracting out of 
peripheral activities and has sought to widen its scope, recognising that the narrower 
the definition of a client's core business, the wider the market is for their own 
business. Additionally, by encouraging a move towards contract packaging the 
Company hopes to move away from the more competitive parts of the industry, since 
’cowboy' operators will not be able to offer the same breadth of service. This in turn 
is aimed at creating an improvement in profit margins, which have been squeezed 
over the last few years. They will be encouraged by one of their customers', ICL 
(UK), assertion that this form of contract is employed to get better use of their own 
managers and resources, rather than to achieve cost reductions (FT, 11-3-91).
74
BET has been a major promoter of contracting out in the public sector. They have 
consistently lobbied the Government to allow private companies to provide ancillary 
services for public authorities and have made no secret of their support for the pro- 
privatisation stance of the Conservative Party. Former cabinet minister and chairman 
of the Conservative Party, Norman Tebitt MP, sits on the Board of Directors and over 
£100,000 has been donated to the Party in the last five years. The support given to 
privatisation initiatives in the NHS and local government, is not suprising when we 
consider how closely the activities concerned fit in with BETs business interests. As 
the Guardian commented:
"If BET did not exist it could have been invented as a vehicle for 
privatisation"
(quoted in Landor, N.D.)
The decision to concentrate on industrial services, initially proved highly successful 
for BET, with a rise in pre-tax profits from £92.8 million in 1985 to £322.3 million 
in 1990. Through that period the Company felt it had an unbeatable strategy based 
upon penetration of a ’recession proof market Things turned sour for the Company 
during 1991 when debts built up during the period of acquisitions, came home to 
roost in the middle of a severe recession. BETs shares plummeted on the London 
stock exchange from 135p to 67p, recovering to lOOp in February 1991 on rumours 
of a re-financing attempt on the Company’s heavy debt burden. Whilst these rumours 
were denied, the Company has since replaced its chief executive with John Clark, a 
man committed to cost reductions. As he stated at the time:
7  am a great believer in cost leadership".
(Owen, 1991)
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The debt and gearing problems faced by BET, became more acute with the realisation 
that the Company was not immune from the recession. As one industrial analyst put 
it:
"While it was felt that service companies would generate cash during 
a downturn, the severity of the recession has meant that this cash 
generation has not always been there".
(quoted in Owen, 1991)
The difficulties were being felt in services like recruitment and plant hire whose 
demand is directly linked to the customers own business performance. Even services 
like cleaning were seen as increasingly vulnerable, as lay offs and cost cutting 
initiatives intensified. These problems were reflected in a 33% drop in pre-tax profits 
in 1991. Despite these difficulties BET was the only major cleansing firm to be 
included in the new Business Services subsector of the FT Acturies Index.
BET has increasingly been relying on the positive impact that a recession can have on 
the attraction of contracting out, to companies looking to cut costs. The rapid 
expansion of the public sector market has also been crucial to the maintenance of the 
Company’s workload, and this is reflected in Initial's dominance of domestic 
contracts in the NHS and building cleaning contracts in local government (see Table 
7). Initial has been the most assertive of the private contractors, submitting tenders 
for local authority work all over Britain. The Company has submitted loss leader 
bids to win major contracts and is now intent on pricing up properly and emphasising 
quality, in the hope of winning more profitable contracts with authorities who are 
happy for a private firm to do their work. This approach has had some success with 
both Gloucestershire and Berkshire County Councils agreeing to transfer their whole 
DSO operations to BET. The Company is also keen to see a move away from simple 
cost considerations in the allocation of contracts, having identified the potential for
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greater profits, if other aspects such as quality become more important As the 1990 
Annual Report says:
"We have been disappointed at the continuing emphasis on price, at 
the expense of quality built into the competitive tendering process. We 
welcome the recent statement by the British Labour Party, which 
promises to establish quality specifications against which public and 
private contractors can compete fairly".
(BET, 1990)
Service Company Contracts
won
%of
contracts
won
% of 
contracts 
won by 
private 
companies
Average 
value £
% of 
contracts 
by value
% of 
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Building
Cleaning
Initial
Geaning
Services
6 0.9 2.1 197,585 0.5 3.4
Initial
Contract
Services
30 4.4 10.5 176,847 2.0 13.4
Refuse
Collection
Initial
Geansing
Services
1 0.3 0.9 975,000 0.2 0.9
Other
Geaning
Initial
Contract
Services
2 0.7 2.8 10,473
Table 7 : BET: UK Local Government Cleansing Contracts. April 1992.
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Some refuse collection contracts include street
cleansing services. For the purposes of calculating percentages, contracts run by 
Management Buy Outs are regarded as having been privatised.
The limit to BETs ability to dominate markets is illustrated by its possession of 
under 17% of the local authority building cleaning contracts which have been 
privatised, in contrast to the 34% of privatised domestic contracts it now holds in the 
NHS, where its only serious competitor is IS S. Perhaps even more significant was 
the sale of the Company's waste disposal division, Biffa, in May 1991. Prior to the 
sale, the Company's Chief Executive at the time, Nicholas Wills, pointed out that
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BET could not afford to expand as quickly as the world's major players in waste 
management:
"The world leaders in the waste market will be committing substantial 
resources in the UK".
(Owen, 1991)
It should be noted though, that the sale of this operation, for £212 million, reduced 
BETs gearing (borrowing less investments, short term deposits and cash as a 
percentage of shareholders funds and minority interests) from 87.5% to 35% (BET,
1991).
The Workforce
BETs strategy revolves around a movement of its interests into activities where 
earnings per worker are high (sales per employee were £19,454 in 1991). Such 
sectors are generally labour intensive with renumerations in contract cleaning making 
up 69.2% of sales in 1991 (ICC, 1992). In these circumstances, profit levels are 
dependent upon the suppression of wages and other labour costs. Consequently, the 
average renumeration of employees in the Initial group was only £3,548 in 1991 
(Key Note, 1992). This partly reflects the number of part-time workers employed but 
is also illustrative of the low levels of pay in the cleaning industry.
As the winning of a contract tends to depend upon the price of a bid, particularly in a 
recession, there is a further downward pressure on the wages of all contractor's staff 
and this goes hand in hand with the job losses of those workers employed previously, 
whether directly or by another contractor. Initial itself has shed around 15,000 jobs 
since its reoiganisation in 1988 with employment levels falling to 64,354 (Key Note,
1992), although many of the lost jobs were in the manufacturing division.
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Neither BET nor Initial pay a national rate of wages, they set levels locally depending 
on the local jobs market As a member of the CCSA they do claim to pay Whitley 
council rates for health service contracts, but this gives no guarantees on job numbers 
or other conditions such as sick pay, pensions and annual leave.
On most contracts no company sick pay is provided and since many workers are 
employed for less than 16 hours per week, there is no statutory provision in many 
cases either. Annual leave is generally granted on the basis of 1 weeks holiday in the 
first year of service, 2 in the second and 3 in the third, but few workers stay with the 
Company for as long as 3 years.
The Company states that it recognises the freedom of its employees to be members of 
a trade union but will only grant recognition where in excess of 50% of the 
workforce are trade union members.
A detailed example of Initial's impact on cleansing workers terms and conditions on a 
public sector contract is provided in case study 3 in Chapter 6. A summary of 
conditions on various contracts is provided in Table 8 below.
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Contracting
Authority
Union
recognition
Job losses Rate of 
pay
Hours Sickness
benefit
Annual
leave
Pension
scheme
Tayside
Regional
Council
(Contract
cancelled)
1989
No 300 £2p.h. Reduced 
to 15 
from 
17.5
None 1 week 
for each 
year of 
service 
up to 
max. o f 3 
weeks
None
Gloucester­
shire
County
Council
1989
No 190+ high 
turnover
Cut but 
then
raised to 
£3 p.h. 
due to 
staff
shortages
Reduced None As above None
Rotherham
Met.
Borough
Council
1989
No Insignific­
ant, but 
very high 
turnover
£2.15. Had 
to bus 
workers in 
from
Manchester
Summer 
recess 
and hours 
reduced
None 2 weeks 
after 1 
years 
service
None
Table 8 : Conditions of Employment on Selected Initial Cleaning Contracts
N.B. Unless stated, terms are those imposed at time of award of contract National 
Local Government Manual Workers wage rates and conditions are listed in Appendix 
1.
Profile I ii: Lvonnaise des Eaux - Dumez (France)
Background
Lvonnaise des Eaux began life in 1880 by providing water, gas and electrical services 
to French local authorities. Nationalisation of French gas and electricity distribution 
in 1946, forced the Company to concentrate on and expand its water services, but the 
limits to growth in this sector forced a re-examination of strategy (Digings, N.D.).
During the 1970s the Company sought to expand its range of services both 
domestically and internationally. By 1990 the group controlled 720 consolidated
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companies engaged in water distribution and treatment, energy creation and 
distribution, technical management, waste management and cleansing, 
communications, mortuary services, golf course building, health care, car parks, toll 
roads and, following the merger with Dumez, construction and development. Its 
interests now extend across Europe, the Middle East, South East Asia and the Pacific 
regions, North and South America and Africa, creating an increasingly global 
presence. This growth is based upon a recognition that:
"The management of municipal services and the construction of major 
projects will be awarded to groups that, like Lyonnaise des Eaux - 
Dumez, have a chain of permanent locations plus international 
support networks".
(Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez, 1991) 
Financial Performance (Exchange Rate April 1990 : FF 9.34 to £1)
In 1990 Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez had a turnover of 72 billion French Francs and 
made profits of some FF 1, 425 million compared to a turnover of FF 68.3 billion in 
1989, generating net earnings of FF 726 million. Construction and development 
became the group’s largest interest in 1990 providing revenues of FF 35.1 billion. 
The original core business of water and environmental services still returned a 
healthy 23.4 billion francs in revenue and produced by far the biggest contribution to 
Company profits, with FF 1,053 million out of a total of FF 1,425 million.
Whilst the group's interests are scattered throughout the world there is a clear 
concentration of activity in the developed world, with Europe and the United States 
providing 90% of the Company’s revenues. The indications are that the balance of 
activity is likely to change within those boundaries, with business in the rest of 
Europe (outside of France) expanding at the fastest pace.
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Cleaning Interests
Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez claims to be the largest cleaning contractor in Europe 
(SCAT, 1989), and operates its waste management services through a subsidiary 
named Soci6te Industrielle de Transport Automobiles (SITA), in which it has a 75% 
stake. SITA is a large established multinational company in its own right, with sales 
of FF 3.5 billion in 1990 (Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez, 1991).
Takeover activity in French waste management, resulted in the ownership of a series 
of different subsidiaries, which were rationalised in 1988 into 20 separate companies, 
operating on a regional basis, and all under SITA's direct control. The group now 
provides refuse collection services for over 2000 local authorities in France, 
representing around 7.5 million citizens (SITA, 1989) and, increasingly, the 
Company provides a service package dealing with all aspects of the municipal 
cleansing problem.
SITA is also a major manufacturer of cleansing vehicles. This was re-emphasised 
with the purchase of le Materiel de Voirie (LMV) in 1987, since renamed Sita 
Materiel de Voirie (SMV). The merger of activities in waste collection vehicle 
manufacture with the German group, FAUN, has created an organisation well placed 
to exploit future opportunities throughout Europe.
International Expansion
In 1989 the Lyonnaise group chairman, Jerome Monod, anticipated that by 1992 half 
of the groups profit would be generated overseas (FT, 21-3-89). The chairman later 
put it that:
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"We intend to achieve a significant market share in all o f our 
businesses and in all of the countries in the unified market. By 
significant I mean between 5 and 20 or 25% of each national market.
In some places we are doing it through joint ventures or partnerships, 
in other countries, like the UK, through acquisitions".
(FT, 27-4-89)
In the cleansing sector international expansion has not been confined to Europe. 
SITA has waste collection and industrial cleaning operations in Malaysia, Singapore 
and Hong Kong. In the United States the Company is engaged in waste treatment 
projects. In the former French colonies of Gabon, Cameroon and Ivory Coast, SITA 
provides a range of cleaning services and has further interests in the United Arab 
Emerates and South America.
Despite these global interests the Company's central strategy is to expand its 
operations in Europe. SITA's 1989 Report gave two reasons for this approach:
"firstly to ensure the company has a sufficiently broad based European 
outlook by 1993 and secondly to counter the offensive launched by 
American groups, who have recently pulled off several takeovers in 
community countries".
(SITA, 1989)
The policy has so far concentrated on Spain, where the Company has an established 
market share through its CESPA subsidiary; Belgium, where SITA took control of 
the specialist cleaning company, Fusiman Industrial Cleaning, and has since 
expanded its waste collection and treatment services with a 49% stake in PAGE; and 
Italy, where a 40% stake in Soraro, and a joint venture with the public works 
company Pivato, has expanded the Company's presence considerably.
Priority has now been given to the UK market, in response to the conditions created 
by the introduction of CCT, water privatisation and the importance of Britain in
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relation to the Single European Market. As a Confederation Gendrale du Travail 
(CGT) appraisal of Lyonnaise des Eaux's activities put it in 1989:
"Lyonnaise des Eaux exploits the failure of the public sector in order 
to create new sources of profit, at the same time they support attacks 
on public provision of services and participate actively in 
privatisation. Everything which is dismantled from the public sector 
becomes, for them, a source of profit. It is also a jumping off point for 
their exploitation of the Single European Market".
(CGT, 1989)
UK Activity and Tactics
Lyonnaise des Eaux's interest in the UK began with the purchase of several statutory 
water companies in 1987/88 which was said to be done in preparation for the 
privatisation of the 10 English and Welsh water authorities in 1989 (see Table 9). 
Certainly the timing of the acquisitions were compatible with such a strategy but it 
seems clear that there were additional incentives. The French felt that the British 
statutory water companies could provide a basis for diversification into related 
services, because of their local links and customer base (FT, 28-4-89).
Company Type Initial Stake Approx. Value Present Stake
Anglian Water Privatised 9% £43.8m 9%
Wessex Water Water 6% £10.3m —
Severn Trent Authorities 2% £ 10.2m —
Essex Water 
Company
Statutory 98% £47.6m 79%
East Anglian 
Water Company
— 90% £21.6m 77%
Newcastle & 
Gateshead
Water 99% £39.1m 80%
Sunderland & 
South Shields
— 99% £35.9m 79%
Bristol Water 
Company
Companies 18% £5.0m —
Table 9 : Lvonnaise des Eaux's Investments in UK Water Companies.
Sources: Lyonnaise des Eaux, 1990; Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez, 1991; 
FT, 19-12-89.
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Jerome Monod was quick to encourage the Company's British partners to extend their 
activities into waste management, arguing that:
"If you distribute water in a large territory you must also ensure that 
this territory is clean. You are thus forced to take an interest in 
industrial and urban waste disposal and treatment".
(FT, 27-4-89)
The regional spread of Lyonnaise's acquisitions also suggested preparation for future 
activity, on a national basis, in other markets such as public cleansing. Certainly the 
Company's interest in the privatised water authorities proved to be limited (see Table 
9), and the stakes established in Seven Trent and Wessex Water were disposed of in 
November 1990. These companies have launched or acquired major waste 
management operations of their own, and Jerome Monod had already made it clear 
that he does not like sharing power with competitors, when he lapsed the Company’s 
interest in the Bristol water company following stake building by its rival, CGEA. 
The sale of its stakes in Wessex and Seven Trent clearly demonstrates how the 
priorities of Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez do not lie exclusively in water.
SITA first entered the UK cleaning industry with the acquisition of a British cleaning 
equipment manufacturer, Municipal Vehicles and Equipment Ltd. The company was 
acquired at the time of the purchase of its previous owner LMV in 1987. This was 
followed in August 1988 with the incorporation of a wholly owned subsidiary, 
Bucksdene Limited. In November, the company, whose specific purpose was to 
tender for refuse collection and street cleaning contracts put to tender as a result of 
the Local Government Act 1988 (Cooper Paul, 1990), changed its name to Sitaclean 
Technology Limited. Interests in UK waste management were broadened further 
with the purchase of Midland Landfill, the operator of 8 British landfill sites, in 1990.
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Sitaclean appointed Richard Barlow as its chief executive. As the former chairman 
of Exclusive Cleaning Services he had experience of the early privatisation of British 
refuse collection services, in Southend and elsewhere. The Company claims that he:
"spearheaded that company's growth to market leadership in public
cleansing services".
(LGPRU, 1989)
Whilst Sitaclean Technology is a newly formed company it is set apart from other 
opportunist contractors by the enormous financial backing and practical expertise that 
it can call upon from its French parents. Richard Barlow argues that French 
involvement provides three key advantages; wide experience in competing for 
contracts; financial security and new technology (FT, 28-4-89).
The Company was fairly aggressive in the first round of tendering for contracts, and 
managed to get onto around 60 shortlists out of the one hundred or so contracts for 
which they applied. More recently, contracts have been targeted, but the Company 
has continued to show a willingness to tender in any part of the country, for contracts 
of varying sizes and has consistently placed competitive bids. By April 1992 this had 
resulted in the securing of 10 refuse collection contracts worth an average of £1.5 
million p.a. and 1 street cleansing contract with a similar value (see Table 10). 
However, in its first two years of trading, Sitaclean recorded significant losses, 
£447,554 in the first year to 31st December 1989 and £496,783 the following year.
The losses incurred by Sitaclean confirm that their French parents have adopted a 
long term strategy in relation to the UK public cleansing market. A substantial early 
presence is being established with the objective of winning contracts with a higher 
financial return in the future. This approach is consistent with SITA's commitment to 
what might be termed 'contract building*. This is a process by which a highly
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collaborative relationship is built up with the local authority, enabling the Company 
to secure long term contract commitments and to sell a series of additional and more 
profitable services (see the case study on French public cleansing in Chapter 5).
The development of this approach in Britain was indicated by Richard Barlow in his 
assertion that Sitaclean would not necessarily deliver the cheapest tender, but one that 
would provide the best value for money (Donaldson, 1990).
In its attempts to move into the Scottish refuse collection market Sitaclean targeted 
Glasgow, and engaged in a joint venture with Lilley Ventures of Glasgow, called 
Lilley Sitaclean (Scotland) Ltd. The subsequent tender was outbid by both the DSO 
and FOCSA Services, but demonstrated a willingness to engage local expertise in 
their tendering strategy.
Service Contracts
won
%of
contracts
won
%of 
contracts 
won by 
private 
contractors
Average 
value in £
% of 
contracts 
by value
% o f  
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Refuse
Collection
10 2.7 9.3 1,557,031 3.4 14.5
Other
Cleaning
1 0.4 1.4 1,479,281 12 7.1
Table 10 : Sitaclean Technology's UK Local Government Cleansing Contracts - 
April 199\.
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note : Refer to Table 7.
The Workforce
Sitaclean made it clear before they won any contracts that they made no guarantees to 
employ all former DLO workers where they were successful in securing local 
authority work. Indeed the company has stated that.
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"We expect to be able to make improvements in productivity and 
performance and will use less people"
(TUSIU, 1989)
In France enhanced productivity has been achieved with the use of advanced 
technology, which has resulted in considerable job losses over the last decade, and 
attacks upon the pay and conditions of the Company's staff (CGT, 1989). Despite 
assurances from Sitaclean that they will pay higher rates than local authorities in 
Britain, the Company conditions of service booklet suggests a considerable down 
grading of other benefits, with cuts in annual, sickness and maternity leave 
entitlements, reductions in overtime rates and no standard pension scheme. 
Furthermore, the Company has indicated that it is not interested in entering into a 
national agreement with any union and that union recognition will be a matter for the 
contract manager on each site. Union recognition is not ruled out though, and 
employees do have the right to join a trade union. A fuller picture of the nature of 
employment with Sitaclean is provided in Table 11 below and in case study 4 in 
Chapter 6.
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Contracting
Authority
Union
Recognition
Job
Losses
Rate of 
Pay
Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
Babergh
District
Council
1989
No. TGWU 
is main 
union
Minimal. No
compulsory
redundancies
Wages
freeze
Loaders
40
Drivers
45
Statutory
scheme
15 days 
20 after 
5 years
No
Blackpool
Borough
Council
1990
No but 
NUPE 
retains 
membership
16% Wages 
freeze 
and no 
weekend 
increment
Loaders
40
Drivers
45
Statutory
only.
Dismissals
for
repeated
absence.
As above No
Rossendale
Borough
Council
1990
Recognition 
of GMB 
only
33% £189 pw 
+ profit 
share 
(was £155 
+ bonus)
Loaders
40
Drivers
45
After 1
years
service
As above No
Erewash
District
Council
1989
Recognition 
of GMB 
only
Insignificant £2.80- 
£3.20 p.h. 
New 
recruits 
£2.55 p.h. 
Equalised 
1991 
£2.91- 
£3.38 p.h.
39 Yes, but 
schemes' 
coverage 
has been 
reduced
16 days, 
increased 
to 20 in 
1991
No
Table IL Conditions of Employment on Selected Sitaclean Refuse Contracts 
Profile I iii:_Coropagnie Generate des Eaux (CGE) (France)
Background
CGE began life as a water distribution contractor in 1853. The Company has grown 
to become market leader in the industry in France and water remains the core 
business, despite a movement into a range of other services.
CGE now provides engineering, heating , construction, healthcare, communications 
and waste management services throughout Europe and the USA. The group has a 
turnover in excess of £11 billion and the broad base of its activities suggests that it is 
likely to expand further. As the Company President, Guy Dejouany put it:
7/i... markets that deal directly with the environment and which are, 
infact, closely intertwined with the water business the combination of
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our own size and the huge high growth global market puts us in the 
paradoxical position of a mature company facing extensive new 
opportunities...
"The environment will be tomorrows wealth."
(CGE, 1990).
Financial Performance (Exchange Rate: April 1990; FF 9.34 to £11
In 1990 CGE had a turnover of IT 117 billion, making it France's fifth largest 
company. The group generated net profits of FF 2.2 billion. These figures compared 
to sales of FF 98.5 billion with profits of FF 1.83 billion in 1989.
Around 20% of the Company’s sales come from activities based outside of France, 
with the USA and UK the key growth markets.
Whilst water remains the group's core business it no longer dominates the sales 
figures. Public works and construction now account for over 35% of turnover with 
water contributing 24%. Urban maintenance and waste services generate around 5% 
of group sales.
Cleaning Interests
CGE has a series of subsidiaries in the cleaning sector, the most important of which is 
Compagnie Generale d'Enterprises Automobiles (CGEA) which uses the corporate 
name Onyx. CGEA operates around 800 contracts in France, and other subsidiaries 
hold another 40 or so more, with many others overseas.
Expansion in this sector has relied on internal growth, acquisitions, co-operation with 
competitors, local partnerships and the extensive use of new technology. CGEA is 
now Europe’s largest provider of street cleaning services and provides a refuse 
collection service for 5.5 million people with the assistance of 4,000 employees. It is
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backed up by the group’s cleansing equipment manufacturer SEMET, the leading 
French firm in the field:
"technical innovation, puts it [CGEA] in a prime position in an 
environment where the management of labour used to be a dominant 
factor"
(CGE, 1990)
CGE now provides the full range of cleansing services from street sweeping and 
domestic refuse collection to industrial waste collection, treatment, disposal and 
reclamation. The ability to manage these functions is central to the Company’s aim 
of being a single source public service contractor. The breadth of the group's 
activities allows them to continually expand the range of services sold to each 
authority.
International Expansion
Aside from it's domination of the French urban cleansing market, CGEA has major 
interests in other parts of Europe and elsewhere. The bulk of its foreign operations 
can be found in Spain where it provides refuse collection services for around 2 
million people.
The extent of CGEA's activities abroad is not as great as those of it's rival SITA, the 
Lyonnaise des Eaux subsidiary, but interests have been built in French territories 
overseas, in South America and, crucially, elsewhere in Europe, particularly in 
Germany and the UK.
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UK Activity and Tactics
CGE launched a broad attack on UK public service markets in the late 1980's. The 
Company was deeply involved in the stake building in the UK statutory water 
companies in 1988, through its subsidiary General Utilities Ltd (see Table 12)
COMPANY CGE’S STAKE
Folkestone 100%
Lee Valley Water 100%
North Surrey Water 100%
Bristol Waterworks 29.9%
Colne Valley Water 28.2%
South Staffs Waterworks 23.9%
Tendering Hundreds Waterworks 16.2%
Mid Southern Water 15.0%
Table 12: CGE's Initial Stakes in the UK Statutory Water Companies. 
Source: SCAT, 1988
Two of these companies, Colne Valley and Lee Valley, have since merged with 
Rickmansworth Water to form Three Valley Water Services, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of General Utilities.
The stakebuilding in these water companies was not necessarily a prelude to a larger 
intervention in the UK water industry, following the privatisation of the 10 water 
authorities in 1989. As Jean Claude Baron, the director responsible for corporate 
development in Britain and the US put in:
"Obviously we are interested in privatisation, but we are far from 
deciding what course of action we will be following."
(FT, 8-8-89)
The desire to expand the Company's interests in the UK, was illustrated by CGEAs 
purchase of a controlling interest in the Norwest Holst construction group in 1989.
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This group has since diversified into water services, contact catering and healthcare. 
A majority stake has also been acquired in AMI Healthcare, the UK’s largest quoted 
private medical company, and a share obtained in the broadcasting company TVS 
entertainment, mirroring the parent company’s broad range of domestic activities.
The key objective was to find partners rather than to make acquisitions though, so 
that a base for further diversification could be established This process began in 
October 1988 in a 50:50 joint venture, named Cory CGEA, between CGEA and the 
British waste disposal and transportation firm Ocean Environmental Management 
Limited The Company was subsequently named Cory Onyx Limited and was 
formed specifically to tender for local authority refuse collection, street cleaning and 
ancillary service contracts in Great Britain.
The new Company saw its strength lying in a combination of established Continental 
technologies and expertise, and British environmental management skills. The Cory 
Onyx general manager Mike Blundy, recruited from Exclusive Cleaning Services, 
pointed out that:
"CGEA viewed the UK market as an enormous opportunity - they 
recognised there were no major contractors bidding for street 
cleansing contracts. It was a golden opportunity but they didn't have 
the knowledge of how the UK market works. In turn Ocean 
Environmental needed a partner and obviously CGEA had the 
experience and innovation in street cleansing".
(Burton, 1989)
The Company set itself an ambitious target of winning £30 million of contracts in it's 
first 3 years, but it remained fairly selective in it's choice of targets, concentrating on 
larger towns and cities, particularly in the South. Once the first contracts were 
secured, problems emerged over what approach should be adopted The French 
directors wanted to use the style they are accustomed to, which involves the use of
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technology and a close collaborative relationship with the local authority. As Mike 
Blundy puts it:
"Because the French are so much further into the contracting business 
the local authorities have got the confidence in the good contractors 
and they're prepared to discuss ways of developing services, which is 
what we hope to do".
(Burton, 1989)
Differences of attitude eventually led to the collapse of the partnership. CGEA sold 
it's 50% stake in the Company to Ocean Environmental and Cory Onyx became Cory 
Environmental Municipal, a wholly British owned waste company which now holds 
16 local authority contracts for refuse collection and street cleaning.
As early as December 1988 CGEA was busy arranging an additional intervention into 
the British waste management industry. Through Offertest, a specially formed 
company heavily backed by CGEA, an offer was made for the Wistech 
environmental services group. Wistech Pic was formed out of a management buyout 
of Wimpey Industrial Services Ltd from George Wimpey PLC in 1983. The 
Company was restricted from engaging in any business in competition with the 
Wimpey Group for 5 years.
With the lapsing of that restriction Wistech became an attractive proposition for 
waste management predators. The connection with CGEA was taken a step further in 
May 1990 when a joint venture deal was completed, with the French group taking a 
40% stake and a 40% stake in Wistech itself. In 1991 CGE purchased the remaining 
60% of shares in the Company through it's subsidiary Sarp Industries. CGEA then 
went on to buy out L&C Waste Tech, a small Scottish based waste management firm, 
and incorporated it into the Wistech business.
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The Wistech operation has itself been put into the shadows by CGEA's purchase of a 
majority stake in United Environmental Systems, the holding company of the leading 
refuse contractor, UK Waste Control. This has proved by far the most effective way 
of breaking into the UK local authority cleansing market for CGEA, which is now the 
clear market leader, operating under the name of Onyx UK Ltd, registered in 
March 1990. Despite the number of contracts Onyx operates (see Table 13) the 
Company made the considerable pre-tax loss in the period to December 1990 of 
£5.5 million, adding credence to the claims that CGEA is operating a "loss leader" 
pricing strategy (Padden, 1991).
Service Company Contracts
won
% of
contracts
won
% of 
contracts 
won by 
private 
companies
Average 
value in £
% of 
contracts 
by value
% o i  
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Refuse
Collection
Onyx UK 11 3.0 10.3 1,952,958 4.3 18.3
Other
Cleaning
Onyx UK 11 3.9 15.5 585,683 4.6 27.0
Other
Cleaning
Wistech 1 0.35 1.4 166,334 0.1 0.6
Table 13 CGEA's UK Local Government Cleansing Contracts April 1992 
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7
The Workforce
In France, CGEA recognises the major trade unions and industrial relations are now 
relatively calm in its cleansing divisions. However, this was not the case in the 
period immediately after the privatisation of cleansing services in Paris, when there 
was a spate of strike action followed by heavy job losses. This pattern was repeated 
when CGEA secured the contract to clean the Paris Metro, resulting in heavy 
automation, job losses, reduced terms and conditions and trade union divisions.
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CGEA's cleansing operations in France rely very heavily on the automation of 
services, to produce increases in productivity and to replace labour. This approach is 
planned for use on the Company's UK contracts and can be expected to accelerate as 
Onyx UK consolidates its market position. At this stage the emphasis on financial 
criteria in the CCT process means that the workforce is being forced to increase 
productivity levels, without recourse to the technological resources at the Company's 
disposal, with inevitable negative consequences for the employees.
An impression of the nature of employment on one of Onyx's contracts is provided in 
case study 2 in Chapter 6 and a general perspective provided by Table 14 below.
Contracting
Authority
Union
Regulation
Job Losses Rate of Pay Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
Liverpool
City
Council
1991
Initially 
no. Now 
GMB only
260 by 
Onyx. DSO 
had
previously 
shed 133 in 
preparation
Loader 
reduced to 
£160 p. w. 
from £187. 
Driver 
£190 from 
£210
Increased 
to 40 
from 35
Reduced
provision
3 weeks 
rising to
4
No
London 
Borough of 
Camden 
1991
No 5 DSO 
applicants 
turned 
down
Reduced to 
£185 p.w.
Increased 
to 40 
from 35
Reduced
provision
15 days No
Table 14: Conditions of Employment on Selected Onvx Contracts
Profile I iv: FOCSA S.A. (Spain) 
Background
Fomento de Obras Y Construcciones SA or FOCSA is mainly owned by the huge 
Spanish property, construction and investment conglomerate Construcciones Y 
Contratas (Con-y-Con).
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FOCSA was founded in 1900 and is itself one of Spain’s leading construction groups. 
It has over 60 subsidiaries, engaged in a wide range of activities including refuse 
collection, waste disposal, cleansing, construction, water and sewage, ground 
maintenance and environmental engineering. The Company describes itself as:
"the largest European contractor for municipal public services".
(Digings, NX).)
Financial Performance (Exchange Rate April 1990 177 pesetas to £1)
In 1990 the FOCSA group had a turnover of nearly 174 billion pesetas, generating 
pre-tax profits of over 8.5 billion pesetas. This contrasts strongly with the 
performance of the British subsidiary FOCSA Services (UK) Ltd which has recorded 
losses in each of its 3 years of operation. The Company’s loss for the financial year 
to the 31 December 1991 was £1.46 million, giving an accumulated loss of £2.8 
million. Turnover continues to grow however, rising from £1.45 million in 1990 to 
£6.3 million in 1991.
Cleaning Interests
Whilst FOCSA is essentially a construction company it has a major urban cleansing 
operation in common with its competitors in the Spanish construction industry.
The Company has operated cleansing contracts in Spain since the 1920s and now 
serves over 17 million residents, having built up a 70% market share in the Country's 
domestic refuse collection and street cleaning industry (Sheffield City Council, 
1990). Their main competition in that market is the French company CGEA (see 
profile 3).
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FOCSA have foreign interests of their own in Paraguay, Venezuela, France and the 
UK.
UK Activity and Tactics
FOCSA established a UK subsidiary, FOCSA Services (UK) Ltd in April 1989 as 
part of its plan to expand its interests in Europe and to exploit the opportunities 
provided by the introduction of CCT.
The Company has steadily built up its presence and had 5 local authority contracts by 
1992, employing 500 people and generating a turnover in excess of £6 million (see 
Table 15).
Service Contracts
won
%of
contracts
won
% of 
contracts 
won by 
private 
companies
Average 
value in £
% of 
contracts 
by value
% of 
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Refuse
Collection
4 1.1 3.7 1,904,543 0.9 3.8
Other
Cleaning
1 0.6 1.4 1,990,768 1.6 9.4
Table 15: FOCSA’s UK Local Government Contracts - April 1992 
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7
The pattern of FOCSA's bidding has been fairly scattered, but has tended to avoid 
targets in London favoured by the French contractors. There is clear evidence that 
the Company has been 'feeling its way1 in the market, submitting wildly fluctuating 
tenders, even within the same authority. In Nottingham, FOCSA put in a competitive 
street cleaning tender but placed a very highly priced bid for the City's refuse 
collection service.
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There have also been suggestions that the Company has been using loss leader bids in 
order to secure a strong early presence in the market. Brighton DC referred their 
street cleaning contract to the Office of Fair Trading after FOCS A undercut the DSO 
by around £400,000 p.a. In Stockport the Company agreed with council officials that 
their bid, which was £1 million p.a. cheaper than the DSO's, was "under resourced" 
but that "resources would be made available within the quoted price" (PSPRU, 1990), 
a clear indication of inter company subsidisation. In Perth and Kinross FOCSA had 
to pull out of a street cleaning and refuse collection contract at the last minute, saying 
they could not operate the contract at the price submitted.
FOCSA has faced difficulties on many of its contracts, missing bins in Torbay, 
uncleaned streets and strike action in Stockport, low standards in West Devon in the 
first few weeks of the contract and a strike followed by complaints about the 
Company’s depot arrangements in Brighton. Fines associated with these problems 
and the under resourcing of the Company's tenders have contributed to FOCSA 
(UK)’s accumulated losses of £2.8 million to December 1991.
The Workforce
FOCSA has over 12,000 employees, 500 of whom now work in the UK. In Spain 
these workers are fully unionised and the Company has a collective agreement with 
the General Union of the Comisiones Obreras confederation which covers their 
cleansing operations.
FOCSA has not been so keen to recognise unions in Britain and this led to strike 
action in both Brighton and Stockport which has since been resolved with recognition 
being granted. In both cases though, FOCSA sought single union agreements in 
preference to general recognition. However, pressure in Stockport forced a 
concession on this issue (see case study 5 in Chapter 6).
99
\There have been other difficulties for FOCSA's new employees, associated with job 
losses and reduced terms and conditions which are summarized in Table 16 below.
Contracting
Authority
Union
Recognition
Job
Losses
Rate of 
Pay
Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
Stockport 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Council 1990
After strike 
action. 
Initially for 
GMB only
25%-200
reduced
150
£119.34- 
£140.79 
p.w. + 
reduced 
bonus
39 hours 
Compulsory 
Saturday 
overtime
Statutory
scheme
4 weeks SERPS
scheme
Brighton 
Borough 
Council 1990
Recognition 
of GMB 
only
10 + high 
rate of 
dismissals 
and
turnover
Reduced 
by c. £40 
p.w. with 
allowances
As above As
above
4 weeks No
Torbay 1991 GMB only 14 Same basic 
cut bonus
As above As
above
4
weeks.
5 after 5 
years
No
Table 16: Conditions of Employment on selected FOCSA Contracts
Profile I v: A.A.H. Holdings Pic (UK)
Backgrpimfl
AAH Holdings is a major services company with interests in healthcare, building 
supplies, consumer products, transport and environmental services.
Financial Performance
In 1991 AAH Holdings had a turnover of £1122.3 million and pre-tax profits of 
£28.7 million which compared to sales of £1011.5 million and pre-tax profits of 
£32.8 million in 1990. £3.6 million of the 1991 profits came from the groups 
environmental services division.
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Cleaning Interests
The group's waste management interests are operated through its subsidiaries Tyler 
Environmental Services Ltd, R.B. Tyler (Plant) Ltd and Tyler Waste Management, 
which have established a sizeable presence in the UK local authority cleansing 
market
These companies came out of the R.B. Tyler Group, established in the 1960s and 
they entered into the local authority refuse collection market in the mid-1980s. Since 
then, the Tyler companies have had a good deal of success through internal growth 
and acquisition, returning profits in each of the last 5 years.
AAH Holdings had a total of 33 refuse collection and street cleaning contracts and 
has now acquired several more with the acquisition of Charlesplant, who also operate 
vehicle maintenance contracts (see Table 17).
The Tyler companies are proving highly successful at extending the range of sendees 
they provide for individual authorities. In each of the London Boroughs of 
Wandsworth, Croyden and Bainet, Tylers have secured contracts for more than one 
service. In Wandsworth the Company now provides refuse, street cleaning, grounds 
maintenance and school transport services.
101
Service Company Contracts
won
%of
contracts
won
% of contracts 
won by private 
companies
Average 
value in £
%of 
contracts 
by value
%of 
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Refuse
Collection
Charlesplant 2 0.5 1.9 402,477 0.2 0.9
Refuse
Collection
R B Tyler 2 0.5 1.9 1,319,256 0.6 2.6
Refuse
Collection
Tyler
Environmental
8 2.2 15 890,013 1.6 6.8
Refuse
Collection
Tyler Waste 
Management
5 1.4 4.7 1,015348 0.9 3.8
Other
Cleaning
Charlesplant 5 1.8 7.0 283307 1.1 6.5
Other
Cleaning
R B Tyler 1 0.4 1.4 1,487383 1.1 6.5
Other
Cleaning
Tyler
Environmental
5 1.8 7.0 313,753 1.2 7.1
Other
Cleaning
Tyler Waste 
Management
5 1.8 7.0 447,698 1.7 10.0
Table 17: AAH Holdings UK Local Government Contracts - April 1992
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7 
International Expansion
Tylers have an operation in Germany which is involved in contract work, 
concentrating on land maintenance.
The Workforce
AAH employed over 1200 people in its environmental services division in 1991 and 
the Company states in its Annual Report that managers have a specific responsibility 
to communicate effectively with their employees (AAH Holdings, 1992). This desire 
to communicate is practiced through internal structures though, and not the trade 
union movement In their tender for the Wandsworth refuse contract the Company 
told the local authority that they had 'no objection1 to union recognition. On winning 
the contract the local manager stated:
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"this company has a policy that we do not recognise a union. They 
[the employees] have every right to belong to a union. We have just 
said we will not recognise it".
(TSUIU, 1989 b)
On this same contract in Wandsworth pay rates were cut, hours increased, holidays 
reduced and sick pay restricted, as illustrated in Table 18 below.
Contracting
Authority
Union
Recognition
Job Losses Rate of 
Pay
Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
London 
Borough of 
Wandsworth 
1987
No Heavy losses
under
previous
contractor
BH
Cuts in 
pay
40 hours After 1 
year
20 days No
Hertsmere
District
Council
1991
No 30% Reduced 
by c. 30%
40 hours After 1 
year
13 days No
Table 18: Conditions of Employment on selected Tvler Contracts
Profile I vi: Ocean Transport and Trading Pic (UK1
Background
Ocean Transport and Trading was established in 1865 as a shipping company. It is 
now engaged in a range of activities including international freight and distribution 
and marine, environmental and energy services. The shipping side of the business 
has been played down in recent years but the group is still one of the largest transport 
companies in Europe with a turnover in excess of £1 billion.
Cleaning Interests
Ocean Transport and Trading has 2 main environmental service subsidiaries. Ocean 
Environmental Management has an established history in a wide range of domestic
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and industrial waste management services in the UK. Its main activities have centred 
on river transport and landfill disposal of domestic refuse from London.
In 1988 Ocean Environmental moved into the domestic refuse collection market 
through a joint venture with the French giant CGEA originally named Cory CGEA. 
This was a 50:50 joint venture and was subsequently renamed Cory Onyx Ltd (see 
Profile Iiii). The Company had a very specific purpose as outlined in Ocean's Annual 
Report for 1988:
"Cory Onyx will compete for local authority refuse collection and 
street cleansing contracts which are being put out to tender in 
accordance with the recent changes in Government legislation".
(Ocean Transport and Trading PLC, 1988)
Following reasonable success with 2 major refuse contracts in London, CGEA pulled 
out of the venture selling its 50% share to Ocean Environmental. Since then the 
Company has traded under the name of Cory Environmental Municipal Services Ltd 
and has established itself as a market leader in domestic refuse collection, winning 13 
local authority refuse contracts by April 1992. Despite its success, Cory still made a 
loss of £812,000 in the year to December 1990, which followed a loss of £400,000 
the previous year (PSPRU, 1990 a).
Service Contracts
won
% of
contracts
won
% of contracts 
won by private 
companies
Average 
value in £
% of 
contracts 
by value
% of 
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Refuse
Collection
13 3.6 12.1 955,784 2.8 11.9
Other
Cleaning
1 0.4 1.4 300,000 0.2 1.2
Table 19: Cory Environmental's UK Local Government Contracts - April 1992 
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7
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The Workforce
Whilst not being overtly anti-union the Company has not welcomed unions and offers 
recognition only where the majority of staff are already members. This is not 
surprising since the Company regularly cuts jobs and worker's terms and conditions 
in its attempts to raise productivity on its contracts.
In Bromley, the number of refuse rounds was cut from 30 to 24 with the result of a 
33% reduction in staffing levels. In Waveney redundancies on the refuse collection 
and street cleaning contract were accompanied by cuts in holiday entitlements and 
sickness benefit See Table 20 below for full details of changes in terms and 
conditions on 2 of Cory's contracts.
Contracting
Authority
Union
Recognition
Job
Losses
Rate of Pay Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
London 
Borough of 
Bromley 
1990
Yes 25-33% £4.13 -£4.56 
per hour
Driver 45 
Loader 40
None in 1st 
year then 1 
week full 
pay +1 
weeks half 
pay each 
year up to 
4+4
15 days 
1st year 
20 days 
2nd year
SERFS
London 
Borough of 
Tower
Hamlets 1989
Yes Minimal £4.13
sweeper/loader 
£4.56 HGV 
driver
HGV Driver 
45 Other 
drivers and 
loaders 40
None in 1st 
year then 1 
weeks full 
pay +1 
weeks half 
pay each 
year up to 
total of 4 
weeks F.P. 
+ 4 weeks 
H.P.
15 days 
in 1st 
year 
then 20 
days
SERFS
Table 20: Conditions of Employment on Selected Cory Environmental Contracts.
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Profile I vii. Bouvgues S. A. (France)
Background
Bouygues was founded in 1952 as a construction company specialising in apartments 
and institutional buildings. It has grown into an international multi-service giant 
covering 12 different trades. The Company is now involved in building, high-tech 
engineering, leisure, foods, communications, public utilities, energy networks, 
waterproofing, off-shore on-shore maintenance and extraction, property, road 
building and public works in 64 different countries around the world.
Financial Performance (Exchange Rate: April 1990 FF 9.34 to £1)
In 1990 Bouygues had a turnover of FF 56,727 million, an increase of 20% on the 
results for 1989, generating profits of FF 801 million. The Company's public service 
arm provided 9% of Group sales which were themselves heavily concentrated in the 
home market. Nearly three quarters of the Company’s turnover was from activity in 
France in 1991.
Cleaning Interests
Bouygues moved into public utilities and the environmental services market with the 
acquisition of Saur, France's 3rd largest water distribution and treatment company, in 
1984. Saw's main activity is the distribution of drinking water but they are also 
involved in energy production, sewage systems, research and development, design 
engineering and construction and public cleansing.
Saw is a major company in its own right, with forecasted turnover of FF 6.8 billion 
in 1991 (Saw, N.D.), and 11,000 employees working on projects throughout the
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World. The group's cleansing services account for 5% of turnover and are operated 
through a specialist subsidiary named Coved.
Coved is involved in all areas of public cleansing from refuse collection, processing 
and recycling to street cleaning. The Company is active throughout France operating 
landfill and waste disposal sites and providing refuse collection services for around 2 
million people. A 16% share of all privatised municipal cleansing services in France 
has been won in just 5 years. This includes a contract in the Parisian district of 
Sevres, breaking the Lyonnaise des Eaux - G6nerale des Eaux duopoly in that City.
Coved works closely with other Saur groups in water distribution and sewage 
management in order to provide a complete public utilities package to French local 
authorities. This capacity lies at the heart of its growth strategy. As the Company 
puts it:
’Whatever short or long term problems may arise SAUR is ever 
present, at the heart of the community".
(Saur ND)
International Expansion
Saur has become a market leader in European public utilities, developing major 
interests in Spain, Italy and the UK. The Spanish interests date back 10 years, 
providing water, sewage and public cleansing services. In Italy, a joint venture 
named SIGESA, founded in 1990, is active in water and sewage services, refuse 
collection, processing and recycling and even mains gas distribution. Saur has also 
had operations in Africa since 1960, which now generate 37% of Group revenues 
(Saur, N.D.) and plans to expand into eastern Europe:
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"With European integration now well underway, the new openness and 
desire for progress in the East are opening up great new development 
opportunities
(Saur, N.D.)
UK Activity and Tactics
As with the other French water companies Saur's interest in the UK began with the 
purchase of stakes in a series of statutory water companies in the late 1980s, through 
its subsidiary Cfcmentation Saur Water Industries, which was jointly run with the UK 
Group, Tafalgar House (see Table 21).
Company Stake
Rickman sworth Water 27.7%
Colne Valley Water 25%
Lee Valley Water 20%
North Surrey Water 20%
West Kent Water 4%
Folkestone and District Water 2.5%
Mid Sussex Water 1.5%
Table 21: Saur's Initial Stakes in the UK Statutory Water Companies 
Source: SCAT. 1988
In 1989 a series of recommended takeover bids led to 4 water companies, 
Eastbourne, West Kent, Mid Sussex and Mid Southern joining the Saur Group 
proper, under the direct ownership of Saur Water Services Pic.
Having established this base Saur UK entered into a 50:50 joint venture with 
Southern Water in late 1989. The Company, named Stalwart Environmental 
Services, was to provide refuse collection and disposal services for domestic and 
industrial customers. The joint venture aimed to combine Southern Water’s 
knowledge of the British local authority and industrial markets and their regulatory
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machanisms, with Saur's experience in providing local services. As the Southern 
chairman put it:
7  think we bring together complimentary skills".
(FT, 1 September 1989)
Difficulties were anticipated in breaking into the local authority market, but moderate 
success has been achieved with Stalwart Environmental winning 4 contracts to date 
(see Table 22).
Service Company Contracts
won
%of
contracts
won
% of contracts 
won by private 
companies
Average 
value in 
£
%of 
contracts 
by value
%of 
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Refuse
Collection
Stalwart
Environmental
3 0.8 2.8 820,174 0.5 2.1
Other
Cleaning
Stalwart
Environmental
1 0.4 1.4 504,340 0.4 2.4
Table 22: Stalwart Environmental^ UK Local Government Contracts - April 1992 
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7
In early 1990 Saur added to this development with another 50:50 joint venture, this 
time with Welsh Water. The new company, Cambrian Environmental Services, was 
formed to provide solid waste collection and disposal services and municipal, 
industrial and commercial cleansing in Wales and neighbouring parts of England. 
The aim was to build their market share through internal growth and acquisitions, a 
strategy which has proved fairly successful. By May 1991 the Company had 5 
contracts, 3 won by internal efforts and 2 with the acquisition of the Fosse Group 
(initially a management buy-out of Stratford-on-Avon's DSO) in February 1991.
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Service Contracts
won
% of
contracts
won
% of contracts 
won by private 
companies
Average 
value in £
%of 
contracts 
by value
% of 
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Other
Cleaning
4 1.4 5.6 337,250 1.0 5.9
Table 23: Cambrian EnvironmentaTs UK Local Government Contracts - April 1992
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7
Despite winning contracts, both Stalwart Environmental and Cambrian 
Environmental made losses in their first year of trading. Stalwart lost £239,000 and 
Cambrian £798,000 in the year to March 1991, suggesting a determination on the part 
of the parent companies to become established in the market.
The Workforce
Stalwart Environmental has proved to be fairly anti-union and on its contract in the 
London Borough of Harrow has refused union recognition, with NUPE officers 
claiming that workers are afraid to join a trade union for fear of being sacked. There 
is a "works committee" on which management and personnel officers sit with 
"appointed" workside staff. There is however no grievance procedure and no safety 
representatives. The conditions of employment on this contract are summarised in 
Table 24 below.
Contracting
Authority
Union
Recognition
Job
Losses
Rate of Pay Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
London 
Borough of 
Harrow 
1990
No Beats 
were 
Driver + 
4 now 
Driver + 
2
£220 + £20 
bonus. No 
rise for 2 
years.
Increased 
to 39 
from 38
Reduced 
coverage 
and no 
bonus
15 days in 
1st year 
then 20. 
No bonus 
on
holidays
No
Table 24: Conditions of Employment on a Stalwart Environmental Contract.
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Section 3: Multinational Service Specialists
Profile H i: ISS Servisvstem A/S (Denmark^
Background
ISS began as a small Danish security company in 1901 moving into cleaning services 
in 1934. The Company diversified into a series of other services in the post war 
period but the emphasis was increasingly placed on cleaning.
Dramatic growth was achieved through acquisitions and international expansion, 
leading ISS to its current position of world leadership in building cleaning services, 
employing 135,000 staff in Europe and North and South America.
Financial Performance (Exchange Rate; April 1990 Danish Krone 11.4 to £1)
In 1991 ISS had a turnover of DKr 11.8 billion and consolidated net profits of DKr 
244 million. This compares with sales worth DKr 9.36 billion and profits of DKr 
202.6 million in 1990.
Group sales are heavily concentrated in the cleaning services (see Table 25) in First 
World countries throughout Scandinavia, Europe and North America.
I l l
Service Area Turnover (%) Operating Profit (%)
Cleaning and maintenance 80.4 69.9
Security services 9.8 9.5
Canteen services 2.0 1.2
Sales of cleaning products 1.4 4.7
Linen services 3.1 6.2
Energy services 2.9 (2.4)
Other 0.4 10.9
Table 25: ISS Results bv Service Area 1989 
Source: ISS,1989
Cleaning Interests
ISS did begin as a security firm at the beginning of the century, but it was through 
this activity that the Company expanded into cleaning. Cleaning, like security, was 
seen as a service which other firms could delegate rather than organise themselves. 
In recognition of this, ISS formed the Danish Cleaning Company in 1934.
Once established the Company based its growth on an expansion into other cleaning 
services such as window cleaning and the export of its service philosophy to other 
countries. Whilst ISS has got involved in a series of other business services and 
increasingly provides service packages in line with market trends, cleaning is likely 
to remain the dominant group activity for some time.
International Expansion
ISS's international interests date back to 1939 when the Company opened a 
subsidiary of its cleaning company in Malmo, Sweden. This was followed in 1952 
by a movement into the neighbouring Norwegian market.
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It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that serious interests were developed outside of 
Scandinavia, and 'Intemationalisation, became central to the Company's growth 
strategy. Modest market shares have since been built across Europe and North 
America, through acquisitions and organic growth, leaving the Company well placed 
to expand further in the World's richest markets. ISS is already market leader in 
building cleaning in the USA, Denmark, Norway, Brazil, Austria, Greece and 
Sweden, and is now looking at opportunities in Eastern Europe and Asia.
UK Activity and Tactics
The UK has become a major part of ISS's operations over the past few years as a 
result of acquisitions and increased opportunities, resulting in the movement of ISS 
Europe's headquarters to London in 1989. Chief Executive Paul Andreassen put it 
that:
"The UK is one of our most exciting markets by virtue of privatisation 
and the use of private service companies in the public sector, so it was 
natural for us to place our European HQ in London
(FT, 6-9-89)
Growth in the UK is expected to come largely from public sector contracts, especially 
in the Health Sendee. This explains the purchase in January 1989 of Mediclean from 
ADT, with some 80 hospital cleaning contracts, a turnover of £27.7 million in 1989 
and 6000 employees. This firm, now known as ISS Mediclean Ltd, operates 
alongside ISS Servisystem Ltd, the main UK cleaning division, which operates 20 
local authority cleaning contracts alongside private sector responsibilities.
Expansion has been rapid, with Mediclean’s turnover doubling in the three years since 
ISS acquired it, and this growing strength in the UK public sector cleaning market is
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being used as a basis for further expansion throughout Europe. As Mr Andreassen 
says:
'The potential in hospitals is enormous, but it is not an easy market.
We shall use the know-how we gained with Mediclean as the basis for 
developing services in the rest of Europe".
(FT, 6-9-89)
This explains the Company's willingness to stand a loss from ISS Mediclean of £0.5 
million in 1989, which was only just offset by ISS Servisystems UK profit of £0.6 
million.
In terms of market share, ISS has a fairly strong position in the NHS which is not 
parallelled in the much more competitive local authority market. ISS only has one 
serious competitor in the NHS, BET, which has a 34% share of privatised cleaning 
contracts in comparison to ISS's 32%. In the local authority market ISS has only 2% 
of privatised cleaning contracts (see Table 26).
Service Contracts
won
% of contracts 
won
% of contracts 
won by private 
companies
Average 
value in 
£
% of contracts 
by value
% of contracts 
privatised by 
value
Building
Geaning
20 2.9 7.0 240,780 1.9 12.8
Table 26: ISS Servisvstems UK Local Government Building Cleaning Contracts
April 1992
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7 
The Workforce
By 1989, following the acquisition of ADTs office cleaning operations in the USA, 
ISS had a world-wide workforce of some 115,000 with 13,000 working in the UK. 
The Company makes much of its attempts to improve the status of these workers
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despite the traditional image of cleaners as low grade employees. An emphasis is 
placed on training and education, designed as much to reduce high staff turnover 
rates as to improve the quality of service. As ISS director lb Goldshmidt put it:
"We need job satisfaction, and if we don't do something about i t , we 
just won't get the staff we need".
(FT, 5-4-89)
ISS operates a training programme, called the Partner Project, which is aimed at 
devolving responsibility and decision making to its employees. The project has gone 
hand in hand with an attempt to generate a sense of common purpose in the Company 
through share issues to the workforce, which have left the employees with an 8% 
stake in the Company.
This commitment to the workforce and its ability to make decisions for itself, does 
not extend as far as welcoming trade union organisation. The Company is willing to 
recognise unions, but only when 50% of the workforce on a particular contract are 
already members. Such a situation is very unusual with the high rates of labour 
turnover created by pay cuts and declining conditions on ISS's public sector 
contracts. The Company's largest contract, for building cleaning in Lincolnshire, was 
won on the basis of a cut in cleaners pay from £2.24 to £1.70 per hour and reduced 
terms and conditions, with a consequential decline in standards flowing from staff 
shortages and high turnover (SCAT, 1988a). The contract has since been renewed 
and the unions totally isolated, despite continued low rates of pay and a lack of other 
employment benefits (rates of pay have since increased to £2.70 per hour compared 
with NJC rates of £3.11 per hour).
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Profile H ii: PCS Group Ltd HIKl
Background
The OCS group of companies started operations in 1900 as the New Window and 
General Geaning Company. It has grown to be one of the largest cleaning 
contractors in Britain and remains privately owned by the Goodliffe and Bowthorpe 
families.
The Group has expanded into related areas such as hygiene, workwear, carpet 
cleaning, store cleaning, security, laundry, office refurbishment and window 
manufacture, but the cleansing division remains the dominant activity.
Financial Performance
In the year to 31st March 1991 OCS achieved sales of £188 million, an increase of 
7.3% on 1990, which generated profits of £9.5 million, slightly down on 1990.
Cleaning Interests
The Company’s core business remains cleaning services, which are largely operated 
through the subsidiary, Office Cleaning Services Ltd, which has over 50 branches 
throughout the UK. Office Cleaning Services provides cleaning and ancillary 
services to business and public sector clients and achieved a turnover of £58 million 
in the year to March 1991. The bulk of the Company's work is in the private sector 
contract cleaning industry, where it has a 4% share of the market (Key Note, 1992).
Difficulties have been experienced with public sector contracts, with OCS being 
sacked from its NHS contract at Addenbrookes hospital, Cambridge and receiving
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bad references from eight out of ten local authorities for whom they had done school 
cleaning work (PSPRU, 1991).
OCS is a highly resilient company though, and has continued to pick up both local 
government and Health Service contracts (see Table 27). The Company now 
operates in the Health Service under the name of Hospital Contract Services and has 
been awarded registration under BS 5750 in respect of all sizes of contract, endorsing 
its own Quality Assurance policy.
Service Contracts
won
% of contracts 
won
% of 
contracts 
won by 
private 
companies
Average 
value in 
£
%of
contracts by 
value
% of contracts 
privatised by 
value
Building
Geaning
23 3.3 8.0 165,757 1.1 7.4
Table 27: Office Cleaning Services' UK Local Government Building Cleaning
Contracts - April 1992
Source: LGMB, 1992 Note: Refer to Table 7.
OCS does not limit itself to cleaning contracts and has responded to developments in 
the industry with a flexibility allowing it to provide:
"what the customer asked for"
(Key Note, 1992)
This ranges in practice from an individual service to a complete support services 
package. The Company's ability to meet these requirements is illustrated by the 
transfer of Wokingham DCs entire, loss making, DSO to the OCS subsidiary, 
Cleanmaster, in March 1992. The contract requires the provision of street cleaning, 
road mending, sewer and drainage maintenance and grass cutting services. OCS has 
little or no experience in some of these areas and will make use of the knowledge of
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the existing staff in order to fulfil its responsibilities, a tactic used widely by market 
leader BET.
International Expansion
OCS has expanded overseas in the last decade acquiring interests in the Far East and 
Canada and in several EC countries. OCS has major joint ventures in both Spain and 
Holland, where a stake is held in the major Dutch services group Vendex 
International’s cleaning subsidiary, CEMSTO, which in turn owns 20% of OCS.
The Workforce
OCS has a workforce of nearly 30,000 but has a history of poor labour relations, 
particularly in the NHS, where it had problems on its infamous Addenbrookes 
contract and more recently at Ely Hospital, Cardiff, where there have been regular 
disputes over hygiene, recognition and victimisation, ending in agreement to accept 
union recognition in early 1992 (PSPRU, 1992a).
In local government, the Company, eager to win more contracts by keeping costs 
down, but aware of the need to achieve its work requirements, has moved away from 
its earlier policy of imposing heavy job cuts. On its huge Cleveland school cleaning 
contract the Company cut jobs by just 6% but cut individual cleaners hours heavily 
and cut rates of pay by 18%, along with the usual policy of cutting additional benefits 
such as sick pay, holidays and pensions (PSPRU, 1992).
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Profile II iii: /Taylorplan Services Ltd. (TJK - Australian parents)
Background
Taylorplan was established in 1983 as a UK subsidiary of the Australian contract 
cleaning and catering company Berkeley Commercial Co (Management) Pty Ltd. It 
is now technically owned by the Singapore registered C S Facilities Pte. Ltd. but it is 
the Berkeley Commercial Co. directors who sit on Taylorplan’s Board.
Financial Performance
Taylorplan has been described as technically unreliable by accountants Price 
Waterhouse and the Company only recorded its first profitable year of trading in
1990. In 1990 the firm had a turnover of £27.6 million making profits of £132,000, 
this followed losses of £40,000 in 1989 and nearly £400,000 in 1988.
Taylorplan's financial position has been quite unstable, with periods when the 
Company was technically insolvent, only maintaining operations due to a 
complicated pattern of finance within the Group. Loans have been made to 
subsidiaries from the parent company and assets written off in an attempt to balance 
the books, although the situation seems to have settled down with Taylorplan's 
movement into profitability.
Cleaning Interests
Taylorplan was established in order to compete for NHS contracts in 1983, aiming to 
secure both cleaning and catering work. In practice the Company has been far more 
successful in winning cleaning contracts, especially in the health service.
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Cleaning interests are the main factor behind Tayloiplan’s new found profitability, 
with the Group's cleaning division producing pre-tax profits of £568,000 on a 
turnover of £14.5 million in 1990.
Various catering interests were disposed of in 1990 and 1991, focusing activity more 
closely on cleaning, although Taylorplan has declared its intention of bidding for 
sports and leisure management contracts in the future.
The Company has suffered from the degree of uncertainty that surrounds its financial 
performance. Even Conservative authorities with a strong commitment to 
competitive tendering, such as the London Borough of Westminster have expressed 
concern about Tayloiplan's ability to fulfil its obligations. In 1988 it was put to the 
Council that:
'The City Treasurer has reservations over accepting Taylorplan's 
tender ....a greater than usual degree of risk exists
(PSPRU, 1992 b)
The Company has pulled out of two school cleaning contracts, in Suffolk when 
adequate resourcing of the contract led to unprofitability, and in Warwickshire when 
only 50 of the 350 cleaners required for the work could be recruited. They have still 
won, and are operating, 13 other local authority contracts (see Table 28) and have 
around 20 NHS contracts.
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Service
Company Contracts
won
%of
contracts
won
%of 
contracts 
won by 
private 
companies
Average 
value in 
£
%of
contracts by 
value
%of 
contracts 
privatised by 
value
Building
Cleaning
Taylorplan
Cleaning
8 1.2 2.8 175,751 0.5 3.4
Building
Cleaning
Taylorplan
Services
3 0.4 1.0 165.932 0.2 1.3
Table 28: Taylorplan's UK Local Government Building Cleaning Contracts - April 1992 
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7
The Workforce
Taylorplan is not determindly hostile to trade unions and has granted recognition on 
several contracts, although they do prefer to keep the workforce informed through:
"informal meetings, company newsletters and training sessions"
(TUSIU, N.D.)
The Company also has a history of paying low wages and providing poor conditions. 
In Warwickshire the offer of £2.80 per hour to cleaning staff led to the recruitment 
problems mentioned above, and to the firms withdrawal from the contract three days 
before it was due to commence.
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Contracting
Authority
Union
Recognition
Job
Losses
Rate of Pay Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
NoLondon Borough 
of Kingston 
Upon Thames 
1991
No No
figures
£3.50 Hours
reduced
Statutory
scheme
None
Mid Glamorgan 
County Council 
1992
Under
consideration
1600 
reduced 
to 1200
Range £3- 
3.15. DSO 
planned 
£3.20
Reduced 
by 16% 
Avg.
\2 lh
None 2 weeks No
Hounslow D H A 
1990
Yes 232 £2.96 ph 
(tender was 
3.10)
Reduced 
by 17%
5 days 
benefit 
for each 
year of 
service
12 days - 
15 days 
after 2 
years
No
Table 29: Conditions of Employment on selected Taylorplan contracts.
Profile II iv: Browning Ferris Industries Inc. fBFD flJSA'l
Background
BFI is the world's second largest waste disposal company (SCAT, 1990). They are 
based in Houston, Texas, USA and have contracts throughout North America and 
others in Australia, Hong Kong, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, New Zealand 
and Venezuela.
The Company was only incoiporated in 1970 but expanded rapidly with a series of 
acquisitions. Initially concentrating on the more profitable businesses of commercial 
and industrial waste collection and disposal, BFI moved into domestic refuse 
collection when those markets became exhausted. This also led to international 
expansion during the 1980s creating an empire employing 27,000 people in over 625 
locations.
The Companys' stated objective is:
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"to provide the highest quality waste collection, transportation, 
processing, disposal and related services to both public and private 
customers world-wide".
(BFI, 1990)
Financial Performance (Exchange Rate : April 1991 $1.77 to £1.1
In 1991 BFI had a turnover of $3.18 billion, an increase of 7% on the 1990 figures, 
which generated $65.18 million in profits, down 75% on 1990.
By 1991 the Company was suffering from the recession's effect on waste services and 
new environmental legislation which forced a special charge of $246.5 million. In 
this context, the importance of BFIs foreign interests took on an added significance 
and foreign revenues have grown from $260 million in 1989 to over $540 million in
1991.
US Activity
BFI is the second largest waste management company in America but it has only 
established that position with the aid of a series of uncompetitive and illegal 
practices.
A profile of the Company by the Public Services Division of the US trade union 
federation, the AFL - CIO, states that:
"BFI has often failed to comply with the standards laid out in its 
contracts and has commonly disregarded government environmental 
regulations and business laws in its quest for profit.... BFI leads the 
industry in the total number of legal cases with which it is involved".
(quoted in SCAT, 1990)
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BFI gained a strategic early control of the USA's main landfill sites and then used its 
monopoly power to stop others opening sites, increase tipping fees and reduce its 
own collection charges, by integrating its collection and disposal activities (TUSIU, 
1989a). In Toledo, Ohio in 1988 the Company was found guilty of price fixing with 
Waste Management Inc. In 1981 they had decided to allocate customers among 
themselves; to refrain from competing for the business of each others recognised 
customers; to submit uncompetitive or deliberately high quotations to each others 
customers; and to raise and maintain prices for waste services in the area. Similar 
arrangements were uncovered in Cleveland, Ohio (SCAT, 1990).
The Company claims that these practices are no longer employed but the executive at 
the centre of the Ohio case is now on the BFI board, and the Company continues to 
find itself in court.
The dubious practices linked with BFI have stretched as far as accusations of links 
with organised crime, leading to truck bombings and even murders in the pursuit of 
market domination (TUSIU, 1989a). One thing that is not in doubt is the presence 
that the Company has achieved in North America, holding 760 municipal contracts in 
1991 and operating around 9000 solid waste trucks and vehicles (BFI, 1991).
International Expansion
BFIs first overseas interest was its Spanish operation established in 1973. This was 
followed by expansion into markets across Europe, Asia, Australasia and South 
America. Europe has been at the centre of BFIs international strategy and a major 
operator was bought in the Netherlands in 1987, where BFI is now market leader. 
This has formed the base for further European development, the Dutch city of 
Utrecht being chosen as the home for BFI Europe. The opening of another office in
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Brussels has made it quite clear that the Company intends to be well placed to exploit 
the European Single Market to be completed in 1992.
UK Activity and Tactics
BFIs first penetration into the UK waste business came in 1985 with the acquisition 
of Wastecare Ltd from Grand Metropolitan. The chief executive of the UK business 
stated then that:
"we want to be a significant force in British Industry"
(TUSIU, 1989a)
The Company, now named BFI Wastecare, only had 3 UK contracts at the time but 
despite its attempts to expand further into UK municipal refuse collection, has not 
made much progress.
BFIs most significant action in the run up to the introduction of CCT was the 
purchase of a major waste disposal site in Warwickshire in May 1989. The move 
mirrors the Company's US strategy of integrating the whole process of waste 
management, from collection to disposal and recycling.
Despite its bold claims though, BFI has only won 4 local authority contracts to date 
(see Table 30), having adopted a cautious strategy towards tendering in the early 
stages. This led to losses in excess of £4 million in the year to September 1990.
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Service Contracts
won
% of contracts 
won
% of contracts 
won by private 
companies
Average 
value in £
% of contracts 
by value
% of contracts 
privatised by 
value
Refuse
Collection
4 1.1 3.7 3,350,000 1.5 6.4
Table 30: BFI Wastecare UK Local Government Cleansing Contractors. April 1992 
Source: LGMB, 1992. Note: Refer to Table 7
Its’ biggest contract is a joint refuse collection and street cleaning service, worth £5.5 
million p.a., with the Royal London Borough of Kensington of Chelsea. There was 
no in-house tender and the Company was in fact under cut by its competitor UK 
Waste Control. BFI already had a close relationship with the Authority though, 
having previously held a contract to provide refuse collection services in Chelsea.
The Workforce
BFI has a history of anti union activities and this practice has been continued in 
Britain. The Company does not encourage union membership and makes a point of 
resisting recognition. Recognition was achieved by unions in Wandsworth, after a 
struggle, but the degree of enthusiasm the Company has for its employees' interests is 
better illustrated by the insecurity of their employment and the nature of their terms 
and conditions, as illustrated in Table 31.
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Contracting
Authority
Union
Recognition
Job
Losses
Rate of Pay Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
London 
Borough of 
Wandsworth 
1987
No 38.4% £137-173 pw 
incl. bonus
40 Loaders 
42 Drivers. 
From 35
After 13 
weeks
20 days 
25 after 
5 years
After 1 
year
RUB of 
Kensington 
and Chelsea 
1989
No 20% £146-201 pw 
incl. bonus. 
From £182- 
234 pw
40 Loaders, 
421h  
Drivers. 
From 35
After 14 
weeks
15 days No
Solihull 
Metropolitan 
Borough 
Council 1986
No 44.9% £125 pw 
From £143
40 Loaders 
42 Drivers 
From 35
After 13 
weeks
15 days No
Table 31: Conditions of Employment on Selected BFI contracts
BFI Wastecare was in fact taken to court for breaking the Fair Wages resolution in 
respect of refuse collectors' wages in Wandsworth, and at the time the Companys1 QC 
stated that:
"there is no purpose in privatisation .... if local authority rates are to 
be the comparables
(TUISU, 1989a)
In Kensington and Chelsea things got so bad that only around 20% of the Council's 
former workforce stayed with the Company, compared to a starting point of around 
60%. Even the Conservative council was forced to call for an increase in wages in a 
report by the Council's Director of Engineering (SCAT, 1989a).
BFIs commitment to a lowering of workers renumeration is accompanied by an 
expectation of a significant intensification of work as illustrated in Table 32 below, 
which relates to work schedules on the contract with the RLB of Kensington and 
Chelsea.
127
Workload Council Employees BFI Employees
Loads to tip per day 3 2
Tonnage per vehicle per day 11 16.5
Number of collections per crew 
per week 980 1800
Over time as a percentage of 
normal working time 10 5
Bonuses as a percentage of 
basic pay 56.5 0
Table 32: Comparative workloads for Refuse Collectors employed directly and by 
BFI Wastecare in the Rovai London Borough of Kensington and Chelsea.
Profile II v: Waste Management Inc. (TJS A)
Background
Waste Management Inc (WMI) is the World's largest waste company (MJ, 7-13 June, 
1991). Based in Oak Brook, Illinois it has contracts throughout the USA and Canada, 
Saudi Arabia, South America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe. It offers solid 
waste, hazardous waste, environmental technology and energy services both 
domestically and internationally.
WMI employs over 62,000 staff and serves over 25 million people around the world 
and continues to expand on a global basis, increasingly targeting Europe as its key 
developing market
Financial Performance (Exchange Rate: April 1990 $1.64 to £1.1
In 1990 WMI had a turnover of over $6 billion, earning net profits of over $684 
million, compared to revenues of over $4.4 billion and net profits of over $562 
million in 1989.
128
These revenues came from five different sources, with North American solid waste 
collection and disposal dominant, but with International Services becoming 
increasingly important By 1990, WMIs revenues from foreign sources had risen to 
$956.5 million.
US Activity
In an industry which has become big business over the past two decades, Waste 
Management Inc. has established itself as market leader by getting into new activities 
ahead of its rivals, adapting rapidly to regulatory changes and engaging in anti­
competitive practices. WMI rarely admits that it has infringed legal regulations or 
committed environmental violations, but often pays fines in respect of such 
allegations. The fines are seen as a cost incurred in running the business. Between 
1981 and 1986 WMI paid out $31 million in fines for environmental violations 
(SCAT, 1991).
The Company paid $250,000 in 1989 and $100,000 in 1990 to settle price fixing 
disputes in Rochester, New York State. They paid $725,000 to settle market 
allocation charges against the South Florida subsidiary, and paid out $1 million for 
price fixing in Toledo, Ohio in 1987, and they now face further charges of bid 
rigging and price fixing in the same area.
Whilst flouting the law in this way the Company has, at the same time, exploited 
Federal environmental regulations to expand its market share. As the environmental 
rules were tightened, smaller independent operators were forced to upgrade their 
services or sell up. Qties which had their own systems for collection and disposal of 
refuse were forced to contract services out to the larger operators with the 
technology, to satisfy the new regulations (FT, 8-1-91). In the USA new legislation
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has put the future of around 50% of existing landfill sites in jeopardy, whilst WMI 
has already ensured that their facilities will be up to standard (MJ, 7-13 June, 1991).
Following this strategy, WMI has built up the largest solid waste operation in North 
America, holding contracts with 1500 municipalities, serving over 9 million 
households and holding over 840,000 commercial contracts in 1990 (WMI, 1990). 
Despite its methods WMI remains a highly respected company (FT, 22-11-91).
International Expansion
Waste Management Inc. has a history of international operations which stretches back 
to the mid-1970s. Europe is at the centre of its foreign plans and the Company is 
already active in Denmark, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the 
UK and is looking to expand into France.
Much growth has taken place in the last two years through a series of acquisitions 
across the continent. This has led to a rise in revenues from less than $50 million a 
year to almost $1 billion. As the Company's 1989 Annual Report notes:
"Internationally the Company moved strategically in 1989, positioning 
itself strongly in Europe. Waste Management Inc. made acquisitions of 
both solid waste and hazardous waste businesses, anticipating the 
sizeable opportunities we expect to derive from the consolidation of 
Europe in 1992".
(WMI, 1989)
The Company is also placing itself in anticipation of a wave of environmental 
awareness and regulations about to sweep Europe. Whilst initially concentrating on 
waste collection and disposal, WMI expects the EC to regulate the industry in the 
same way as in the USA, and they are planning to move forward on that basis,
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hoping that this results in the same levels of competitive concentration achieved in 
the US market.
In March 1992 the Company confirmed this approach by announcing its plans to sell 
20% of its international operations in a share placing aimed at raising £405 million, 
to exploit the opportunities expected to come out of tightened environmental 
regulations in Europe. A Chicago based investment adviser has confidence in the 
plan, stating in January 1991 that:
"We think .... they're (WMI) well positioned. Europe is the next big 
opportunity".
(FT, 8-1-91)
UK Activity and Tactics
WMIs first interest in Britain was a subsidiary named UK Waste Management Ltd., 
established in 1983 (this firm should not be confused with the NFC pic subsidiary, 
Waste Management Ltd). The parent company then decided to concentrate its 
interest on continental Europe and no further direct interest was shown in the UK 
waste business until 1991.
In February 1991 a joint venture was launched with one of the smaller of the 
privatised UK water authorities, Wessex Water, called Wessex Waste Management. 
On formation, the Company had £125.5 million worth of funds available. Waste 
Management International put in £62.75 million and Wessex Water a similar figure 
funded by the sale of 18.14 million new shares to Waste Management, giving them a 
14.9% stake in Wessex, which may rise to 20% before the end of the decade.
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Wessex Waste Management aims to get involved in the collection, disposal, treatment 
and recycling of waste; the operation of industrial treatment plants; the creation and 
operation of landfills and incinerators; and waste to energy conversion schemes. The 
Company has been talking to the owners of incinerators throughout the Country and 
is aware of their need to update standards in order to meet new regulations and 
clearly has the resources to fund such investment.
It seems that Waste Management have joined with Wessex in order to exploit their 
political expertise and experience of the British regulatory environment. New 
regulations in the waste industry resemble those prevailing in the water industry with 
which Wessex is highly familiar.
For Wessex Water the deal provides an opportunity to diversify into a higher margin 
activity than its core water business where profits are restricted. The determination to 
succeed in waste management is demonstrated by the Company's suggestion that 
profits from non regulated activities (i.e. not water) could contribute as much as its 
water business, within 6 to 7 years.
Wessex shares WMIs view of the opportunities in the industry, acknowledging the 
growing need for expertise, technology and investment, due to the tougher legal 
requirements, but is also keen to exploit the opportunities arising from the 
Government's CCT legislation.
Waste Management Europe's Managing Director, Mike Collier, has said that he 
believes the UK Waste Management industry is ripe for consolidation and will follow 
the US pattern, with smaller operations being replaced by larger, more 
technologically advanced sites (no doubt run by his Company).
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Wessex Waste Management's operations are to be built up through a combination of 
joint ventures, start ups and acquisitions. This strategy resulted in the purchase of 
Wimpey Waste, the UKs fifth largest waste company, in October 1991, for £105 
million, confirming that the Company's main interest is in the disposal and treatment 
of waste, rather than its collection. Indeed Wessex Waste Management had no refuse 
collection contracts by the beginning of 1992, although there are plans to move into 
this market
The Workforce
Like its US rival BFI, Waste Management Inc has been no friend of trade unions in 
its domestic market. Whether this attitude is to be extended to the UK is at present 
uncertain. Having no local authority contracts, it is difficult to speculate on how 
Wessex Waste Management will look after its employees in this sector. However, 
Wessex Water makes its opposition to any national pay bargaining clear in its 1991 
Annual Report, stating that:
"Freed from national arrangements for determining pay and 
conditions, we have made good progress on providing more flexible 
employment packages ".
(Wessex Water, 1991)
Section 4 : Privatised British Water Authorities
As indicated in the introduction to this Chapter, this category is rather less defined 
than the other two, largely due to the fact that the newly privatised water authorities 
have preferred to enter the UK cleaning market in partnership with more experienced 
operators. In the earlier profiles on Bouygues S A (I vii) and Waste Management Inc. 
(Dv), we saw how Southern Water, Welsh Water and Wessex Water had all become
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involved in the cleaning services, reflecting the French pattern, where the main water 
companies dominate the entire environmental services market.
Severn Trent is the only one of the British water companies to have entered the waste 
management and cleaning market in a major but independent fashion.
Profile m  i Severn Trent PLC (THO 
Background
Severn Trent was one of the ten regional Water Authorities of England and Wales 
privatised in 1989. It is now one of the one hundred largest UK companies and 
claims to be one of the "major water and waste management companies in the world" 
(Severn Trent 1991). The Company quickly saw the opportunity to widen its 
activities following privatisation and has expanded its interests overseas, into a range 
of research and development programmes and into the field of waste management. 
Water remains the groups core business, with Severn Trent Water Limited employing 
7,182 of the companies 7729 employees in 1991.
Financial Performance
In 1991 Seven Trent had a turnover of £627 million earning pre-tax profits of £249 
million, compared to a revenue of £544 million and profits of £130 million in 1990.
Whilst UK water services are the group's main interest, other trading activities had a 
turnover of £25.7 million in 1991 rising from only £5.7 million in 1990. 
International expansion was reflected in the increase in profits from non-UK 
activities from £1.4 million to £11.3 million.
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Cleaning Interests
Severn Trent’s 1991 Annual Report States:
"Our purpose is to be a world leader in the water business, to 
establish ourselves as a successful international corporation founded 
on a strong home water utility base, and to develop a substantial 
earnings stream in other appropriate business".
(Severn Trent, 1991)
The Company sees waste management as one such appropriate business and has 
sought to expand into the field ever since it was privatised. In September 1990, a £74 
million hostile bid was made for, and a 29.9% interest acquired in, the Caird group, a 
major waste management company owning the refuse collection firm Enviroman. 
The offer was lapsed in October 1990, following unsatisfactory performance by 
Caird, and Severn Trent's stake was sold a year later for about £16 million. The 
determination to make a significant entry into the waste business continued though 
and resulted in the purchase of the leading UK waste management company, Biffa, 
from BET, in May 1991, for £212 million.
Biffa made profits before interest, of £17.8 million in 1990, although this fell to 
£49,000 in the year to March 1991. Turnover remains over £100 million and Severn 
Trent chairman John Beliak has said the acquisition means that waste management 
will account for around 15% of the Group's total turnover (FT 14-5-91).
Severn Trent now faces the dilemma of wanting to operate a substantial unregulated 
(non-water) business, having paid an inflated price for Biffa (rumoured estimates 
valued the Company nearer to £170 million [FT, 14-5-91]), whilst the water industry 
watch-dog, OFWAT, seeks to ensure the separating of core and non core businesses
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within the privatized water companies. Responding to this requirement Severn Trent 
has stated that:
"The money to buy Biffa was raised in the financial markets"
(MJ, 14-20 June, 1991)
The purchase of Biffa is the largest move out of the regulated sector made by any of 
the UK water companies and gives Severn Trent a broad national spread in waste 
activities along with overseas interests through Biffa's Belgian operation.
International Expansion
The similarity of Severn Trent's approach to that of their French rivals, Lyonnaise des 
Eaux, Generale des Eaux and Saur, becomes clearer when considering their 
international presence. The Company has won consultancy and operating contracts in 
India , the United States, Australia and Europe. Local partners have been found in all 
cases and local offices established in the US and throughout Europe, where the 
Company has substantial interests in Belgium, and is in talks with German and Italian 
local authorities.
Part of the attraction of the Biffa purchase was the Company's interests in Belgium 
and transnational partnerships, demonstrating Severn's desire to have a wide ranging 
service presence in all its geographic markets. This approach is for more in line with 
the French water companies than with other UK water companies who have been 
content with consultancy and management contracts overseas (FT, 22-1-91).
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UK Activity and Tactics
Severn Trent Waste, the Group's waste management division, is dominated by the 
recently purchased Biffa Waste Services. Biffa provides the full range of waste 
collection , management and disposal services , including landfill services and higher 
margin activities such as chemical waste collection and disposal.
The Company has a wealth of experience in contracting for public sector cleansing 
contracts. The Group includes Exclusive Cleansing Services who secured the 
privatised cleansing contact in Southend in 1981 against a back drop of bitter trade 
union resistance. Biffa used that start to expand its interests and emerged as the clear 
market leader in the run up to CCTs introduction, holding 14 contracts at one stage 
in the mid-1980's.
The Company has benefited from political goodwill in various Conservative 
controlled authorities, with contacts being renewed against no competition in Arun, 
North Norfolk, Chiltem, Southend, East Hampshire, Medina and Vale of White 
Horse.
The introduction of competition for other contracts, under the provisions of the CCT 
legislation, has affected Biffa's domination of the market. The Company has only 
once managed to retain a contract when faced with competition, in South Kestevem, 
and that required Government intervention to overturn the local authority decision.
Biffa is one of the few businesses with waste disposal interests, to be interested in 
local authority waste collection work, which generally has lower profit margins. 
Early entry into the market benefited the Company but increasing competition has 
threatened its position and this is reflected in BETs willingness to sell, and the 
decline in profits to only £49,000 in the last financial year.
137
In response to the more difficult conditions created by CCT, the Company has tended 
to concentrate on small Conservative authorities, presumably more sympathetic to 
private operators. They have also argued for much longer term contracts over a ten 
or twenty year period, which might "engender a better feeling of partnership".
It is not clear whether the Company will continue with the same approach now that it 
is under Severn Trent control. It is likely that with a new sense of direction Biffa 
will become more aggressive in its tendering approach, widening its national and 
international presence in line with Severn Trent's objectives. It is also likely that the 
Company will be encouraged to improve its quality and services in return for higher 
prices from its customers in an attempt to improve the business' profit margins. This 
would be consistent with the groups overall approach, as outlined in the Annual 
Report for 1991, but is highly dependent upon the level and nature of competition in 
the market as a whole.
Service Contracts
won
% of
contracts
won
%of 
contracts 
won by 
private 
companies
Average 
value in 
pounds
%of 
contracts 
by value
% of 
contracts 
privatised 
by value
Refuse
collection
17 4.6 15.9 631,811 2.2 9.4
Table 33: Biffas UK Local Government Contracts - April 1992 
Source: LGMB, 1992 Note: Refer to Table 7
The Workforce
Employment with Biffa is generally characterised by a sense of insecurity generated 
by the heavy job losses imposed when the Company wins local government contracts. 
Biffa has also tended to be very anti - union in attitude, rarely agreeing to talk with
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trade unions or grant recognition. This position is illustrated by the Company's 
statement in Chorley that:
"It is not our intention to enter into any form of recognition agreement 
with NUPE either now or in the future.
(PSPRU ,1990a)
Whether this attitude changes under the Company's new ownership is not yet clear 
but a fuller picture of Biffa's employment record to date is provided in the summary 
of terms and conditions provided in Table 34 below.
Contracting
Authority
Union
Recognition
Job
Losses
Rate of Pay Hours Sickness
Benefit
Annual
Leave
Pension
Scheme
Carlisle
City
Council
1989
No 33% Similar Loaders
40
Drivers
45
None in 
first year
15 days 
after 1 
year 20 
after 5 
years
Serps
based
East
Hampshire
District
Council
1989
No Reduced 
to 33 
men
Loaders 
£145. 
Drivers 
£170 per 
week
As above 
and no 
job and 
finish
None in 
first year 
or for 
first 4 
days
As above No
North
Norfolk
1989
No.
TGWU 
members on 
Refuse 
contract
20% Slightly 
more basic 
but bonus 
was cut
As above 
with 20% 
higher 
work rate
None in 
first year
As above No
Forest of
Dean
District
Council
1989
No 33% No
information
Loaders
40
Drivers
45
As above As above No
Table 34: Conditions of employment on selected Biffa contracts
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Section 5 : Other Major Contractors
Other important players in the UK local government cleansing industry include:
In refuse collection and street cleaning:
1. Attwoods pic, an American and UK waste management company, heavily 
backed by the Canadian waste services operator, Laidlaw, which holds around 
30% of the shares. The Company trades in the UK through its subsidiaries, 
Drinkwater Sabey and Taskmasters Cleaning Services, who between them 
hold 10 street cleaning and 3 refuse collection contracts.
2. Cleanaway, a joint venture between GKN and the Australian conglomerate, 
Brambles Industries. The firm has concentrated on waste disposal and 
operates several landfill sites, but it has recently bought the Caird Group's dry 
waste collection business, Enviroman, for £5.4 million. This confirms the 
Company’s desire to expand into the UK local authority domestic cleansing 
market and leaves them with 3 small refuse collection contracts.
In Building Cleaning:
1. RCO and the Davis Group companies, Sunlight and Pall Mall, are major
contract cleaning and support service companies in the private sector, with 
substantial public sector interests, particularly in the Health Service, and can 
be expected to make a more concerted attempt to win local government 
contracts in the future. RCO already earns more than half its income in the 
public sector.
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2. Securiguard operates in the Health Service and local government through its 
subsidiaries Mediguard and Academy Cleaning Services, which has ten local 
government cleaning contracts.
3. Another company to look out for is Serco, which is targeting local 
government and Health Service ancillary contracts in a big way, declaring an 
interest in the entire range of local authority activities being subjected to 
CCT.
Section 6: Whose Tendering in Scotland?
In general, private contractors have been far less active and successful in Scotland 
than elsewhere in the UK, winning less than 10% of all contracts subjected to 
tendering in CCTs first three phases.
Contracts that were won, tended to go to smaller operators than those dominating in 
England and Wales, reflecting the size of the contracts themselves. Of the eight 
refuse collection contracts going to private operators in the first three phases, seven 
were contracts with Orkney Regional Council and each one of these went to a 
different firm.
The other refuse contract went to L & C Wastetech Ltd, who have since been taken 
over by Onyx UK, owned by the French giant CGE. This leaves Onyx as the only 
one of the major contractors to have a contract in Scotland, although several others 
have been indicating a strong interest. Sitaclean Technology had bid for 6 refuse 
collection and street cleaning contracts by the end of March 1991, L&C Wastetech 
for 4. Initial, the cleaning arm of BET tendered for 8 building cleaning contracts and 
the Scottish branch of OCS for 3.
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The only major Scottish contracts to go to a private firm in the cleaning services were 
2 of Strathclyde Regional Councils 12 building cleaning contracts and Fife Regional 
Council's major building cleaning contract, which were won by Southdown Cleaning 
and Maintenance. Southdown had no history of local government work and had a 
turnover of only £410,000 in the year prior to bidding.
Following Southdown’s victory in Strathclyde, 1400 cleaners were made redundant 
and wages were cut from £2.60 to £2.25 an hour. Holiday pay and sick pay were 
scrapped, hours cut and 14 cleaners were sacked for challenging the deterioration in 
working conditions.
The multinationals continue to show an interest in the Scottish market and are now 
targeting their bids more effectively. Onyx UK came extremely close to winning 
Edinburgh’s refuse collection contract and FOCSA did win the refuse collection and 
street cleaning contract in Perth and Kinross but had to withdraw three days before 
the contract began, as the Company had under resourced its tender. FOCSA also 
came close on the Glasgow City Council refuse collection contract, the largest single 
contract put out by any authority in the UK. That particular contract was also of 
significance since it saw Sitaclean Technology involve itself in a joint venture with 
Lilley Ventures, a local firm which came close to winning the Council's street 
cleaning contract several months earlier. It will be surprising if the major private 
contractors do not make significant gains in Scotland during the second round of 
tendering.
142
Chapter 5
The European Context
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Chapter 5: The European Context 
Section 1: The Single European Market.
By the first of January 1993, the European Community (EC) aims to have removed 
the remaining physical, technical and fiscal barriers to trade in goods and services 
between its member states. This objective is dependent upon agreement being 
reached on a long list of 'directives' proposed by the EC's bureauaracy, the European 
Commision. The programme stems from a decision, made in 1985, by EC heads of 
government, to step up the movement towards a single European Market. This was, 
after all, the idea that originally inspired the Treaty of Rome from which the EC 
emerged (see Cecchini, 1988; Lambert, 1988; and Palmer, 1989).
The Role of Multinational companies
The policy emerged from a tangle of political and industrial interests which largely 
bypassed debate and criticism over everything but the technicalities of 
implementation. Jacques Delors, the President of the Commision, and other 
'Eurocrats' were in need of a theme around which to mobilise support for an 
expansion of European authority. This came from Europes major industrialists who 
had already benefitted from the EC's development. Over the last twenty years the top 
one hundred European companies have increased their share of the EC's Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) from one fifth to one third (TICL, 1988). They now 
realised the need to take advantage of having the largest home market in the world if 
they were to compete effectively with Multinaltionals from the US and Japan. To do 
this, the restrictions created by national boundries and associated technical differences 
within the EC would have to go. These desires were articulated informally and 
through semi-formal bodies such as the Round Table of European Industrialists and 
had a considerable impact on the content of proposals and the member states' 
commitment to them (Duning & Robson, 1988; Lambert, 1988; IRIM, 1985).
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There seems little doubt that the inspiration behind the moves towards a single 
market is the defence of European capital's profitability, with only limited attention 
being paid to the interests of labour and the wider social consquences of the plan. As 
the Conservative MEP, James Elies, put it:
"In short, 1992 signals that Europe's time has come and those who are 
aware of the potential this represents will be tommorrows winners. By 
the natural laws o f competition when markets are opened up, there 
will be both winners and losers".
(Elies, N D )
The Single Market and thf» Privatisation of Public Services.
Barnes, Campbell and Pepper (1989) have argued that open competition in the public 
sector is a pre requisite to a 'completed internal market. The use of open tendering 
arrangements in the public sector sets an example to the private sector and 
demonstrates the economic 'benefits' of such a system, as well as providing national 
governments with the opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to the European 
ideal. This position has clear parallels in the British Government's domestic attempts 
to open up the public sector to competitive pressures, leading Padden (1991) to note 
that the Pocurement Directives fit into the wider debate about contracting out and 
privatisation. As Elies notes:
"It (1992) i s  confirmation of the major policy line taken by the
British Conservative Government over the past decade for 
privatisation and market liberalisation".
(Elies, N D)
It was noted in Chapter 4 that the major multinational cleansing contractors have 
already been turning their eyes towards British local government and Health Service 
work, made available by the Government's CCT legislation, establishing firm
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operational bases and actively tendering for contracts. This led Len Turner, vice 
chair of the Association of London Authorities, to note that:
"1992 and the Single European Market have come early to local 
government".
(Forward to Digings 1989)
Yet the imposition of CCT on British local authorities and the consequent interest of 
European contractors in the work made available does not isolate the UK from the 
impact of new European public procurement legislation as outlined below.
The Public Procurement Directives
The liberalisation of European public procurement is part of the programme to create 
an interal market by the end of 1992. The EC Commision is keen to see competition 
extended to all areas of public procurement if only because it accounts for 15% of 
total Community spending (22% in the UK). Despite the size of the market only a 
tiny proportion (less than 0.114 per cent of the EC's GDP) of public contracts have 
been awarded to companies not based in the country of the public bodies concerned 
(Cecchini, 1988), and this led the EC to prioritise the area of reform.
In relation to this aim a draft directive was circulated at the end of 1989 which seeks 
to extend the Commisions public contracting rules to public services. When 
implemented, by late 1993, the Services Directive will affect all the defined activities 
presently subject to CCT under the Local Government Act 1988. The Directive was 
submitted along with others which are already agreed and which strengthen the rules 
on public works and supply contracts, introducing new compliance rules covering 
purchasing by public utilities and new rules providing a right of redress for 
unsatisfied contractors. The Public Services Directive will be the final part of an EC 
jigsaw covering all forms of public contracts for works, supplies and services.
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The Directives lay down proceedures for all contracts above a specified value, in the 
case of services 200,000 Ecu, equivatent to about £132,000. Contracts are to be 
advertised in the Offical Journal of the EC, technical specifiations are to be laid out 
in European standards whenever possible, time limits must be applied to the 
submission of tenders, selection rules and proceedures must be specified in advance 
and must consider either price alone or a combination of factors which identify the 
"most economically advantages" tender, the results of the exercise must be reported 
in the Official Journal of the EC, and unsuccessful contractors have an additional 
right to know the reasons for their non selection.
The importance of the Directives to British local authorities is brought home by the 
fact that these requirements are only triggered where the local authority chooses to 
expose services to competition by tender (Cirell & Bennett, 1991). Since this 
practice is complusory in the UK it is the Governments CCT legislation which forces 
the applications of the EC regulations.
The Impact on British Local Government
The EC Directives are motivated by very different forces to those which promoted 
the British CCT legislation. The Directives seek to eliminate national discrimation 
and to open up trade in public sector goods and services, they do not aim to improve 
efficiency in local government or to achieve value for money in service provision. 
Although the Cecchini report does claim that:
"By not encouraging intra - EC competition the public sector pays
more than if should for the goods it needs and in so doing, supports 
sub-optimal enterprises in the community".
(Cecchini,1988)
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What the EC rules specifically avoid is any compulsion on local authorities to involve 
the private sector, even in a ’market testing1 capacity, in the provision of their 
services. As the Commision puts it:
"Community procurement rules do not interfere with public authorities 
decisions as to buying in the market place or satisfying their needs 
with their own means".
(European Commision, 1990)
By contrast the UK’s CCT legislation challenges the in-house provision of certain 
local authority services and the EC Directives ensure that that challenge is not 
contained within the local economy. The combined effect is to compel local 
authorities to 'test the market' for various services on an EC - wide scale (Pinsent & 
Co, 1992).
The Community rules will hit UK local authorities harder than those in other parts of 
Europe. As CCT is unique to Britain only British local authorities will automatically 
face the new regulations as they do not have the option of keeping services in-house 
without facing competition first. Additionally, as UK local authorities tend to be 
larger than on the continent, France has around 36,000 compared with under 500 in 
the UK, the contracts they submit for tendering will be longer and will consequently 
exceed the Community threshold more often and will tend to be more attractive to 
contractors interested in cross border tendering.
The thresholds for triggering the application of the new public pocurement rules are 
an additional problem. As the sum of ECU 200,000 refers to the total value of a 
contract and not annual value as in the diminimus provisions of the Local 
Government Act 1988, a six year building cleaning contract with an annual value of 
only £22,000 would be subject to the Commissions proceedures. In effect this leaves 
virtually no contract unaffected. Futhermore, the size of local authority DSOs in
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Britain means that their own purchasing might well be subject to the regulations, 
imposing added administrative burdens on the DSO and authorities concerned.
In general, it is felt by UK authorities that the Directives will bring few benefits, but 
will be time consuming and costly to implement, particulary as the thresholds and 
time limits do not correspond with the UK's domestic regulations, generating further 
confusion and delays (AMA, 1991). It is a widely held belief that the provisions of 
the Directives will not attract new waves of contractors in any case (Padden, 1990). 
One authority has already placed over eighty notices advertising supply contracts in 
the Official Journal without receiving a single positive response (Burton, 1991a).
There are two areas where local autorities and trade unions have had some hope that 
the EC regulations might weaken the provisions of the 1988 Local Government Act. 
The draft Services Directive specifies that a contract must be awarded either to the 
lowest priced tender or to the tender which is most economically advantageous on the 
basis of quality, technical merit, aesthetic and functional charcheristics,technical 
assistance and service, delivery date, delivery period or period of completion and 
price. However, opting for the 'most economically advantageous’ alternative under 
the EC rules may not prove re conciliable with the factors specified in the 
Government CCT Circulars which are more strongly worded:
'The Secretary of State believes that a decision to reject a lower bid in 
favour of the DSO will be consistent with the duty of the authority to 
avoid restriction, distortion or prevention of competition only if it can 
be shown that there were sound reasons to justify rejection of the 
lower tender
(DOE, 1991)
The DOE regard the CCT legislation as placing extra constraints over and above, but 
not in conflict with, the Community rules (Pinsent & Co, 1992) but the introduction 
of the ECs criteria for the 'most economically advantageous tender' could undermine
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the current regulations whereby price is the principal consideration in the allocation 
of contracts.
The second but less hopeful area for local authorities and trade unions is in the field 
of contract compliance. Under EC rules an authority is permitted to ask contractors 
to indicate that they have taken account of the obligations relating to employment 
protection and working conditions applying to the works or service in preparing their 
tender. This wording seems to conflict woth the exclusion of non-commercial 
considerations under the Local Government Act 1988. However, authorities are not 
allowed to reject a tender on account of an unsatisfactory response which rather 
knocks the teeth out of the provision.
The Impact on the Multuational Assualt on UK Public Cleansing Services.
Two of the services, listed as defined activities under the UKs CCT legislation, which 
are particularly affected by the ECs draft Services Directive, are building cleaning 
and refuse collection. It is in these services that European based multinationals have 
been targetting their own activity over the past five years, using the opportunities 
generated by privatisation initiatives in the Health Service and local government.
Precisely because of this established involvement in the UK public sector cleansing 
market the EC Directives are likely to have only a limited impact upon the companies 
strategies. Through acquisitions, joint ventures and independent initiatives, several 
leading European Service Companies (See Chapter 4) have established strong 
operational bases in the UK and are in a position to tender for a variety of public 
contracts regardless of the provisions of the EC Public Procurement Directives 
(Padden, 1991). However, use may be made of the ECs enforcement procedures 
where contractors feel agrieved about the methods used and decisions of individual 
authorities in the tendering process.
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The Social Charter.
There is no doubting that the EC Directives, culminating in the completion of the 
Single Market, will lead to considerable re organisation within the European 
economy and will have a profound impact on the regions labour force (Cecchini, 
1988; Emerson, 1988; Lambert, 1988; TUC, 1989). As Emerson notes:
"Adjustment to new conditions gives rise to major costs ...... The
restructuring of the productive system, the shift of employment to other 
areas, the mobility and retraining of labour and the regional 
distributive effects are all aspects which make the adjustment to new 
market conditions costly in social and political terms".
(Emerson et al, 1988)
Furthermore, it is more than likely that the changes made by Europes leading 
industrialists will be in favour of the interests of capital at labour expence. Cecchini 
outlined the potential for such a development in his report on the economic and 
employment implications of creating a Single European Market:
"EC integration gives management a supply - side shock - a market 
sent opportunity to promote new ways of organising work".
(Cecchini, 1988)
It was this situation which led eleven of the twelve Member States of the European 
Community to adopt the 'Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights' (EC, 
1989a) at Strasbourg in December 1989. The Charter lays out certain standards to be 
applied to labour in Europe, on aspects such as freedom of movement, jobs and pay, 
living and working conditions, social protection, freedom of assocation, training, 
equal opportunities, information and participation, health and safety and treatment of 
the young, elderly and disabled.
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At the European Summit in Maastricht in December 1991 political wrangling led to 
the decision to drop these social issues from the union treaty. The eleven Member 
States other than Britain agreed to adopt a ’protocol an social policy', which includes 
most of the provisions of the social charter and is now binding on them alone.
However, this did not set aside the existing Treaty provisions on social policy, 
already legislated upon on the basis of majority voting. Where EC rules allow for 
majority voting any legislation agreed is binding on all twelve Member States. This 
category includes all health and safety law and, if the Commision gets its way, 
regulations on working time, training, the treatment of subcontractors abroad and 
some aspects of part-time work. Such provisions would have some effect on workers 
employed in the public cleansing industry, but without an all embracing charter for 
workers rights, enshrined in EC law, such as the draft Vredling Directive, dropped 
due to multinational corporate pressure (see Bamouin, 1986; Gold, 1986) the 
prospects are bleak. In this respect the fact that the social element in the ECs Public 
Service Directive is so limited is not insignifcant.
The isolation of Britain, in its oppostion to a social element within the Internal 
Market, does suggest that there might be some movement on the Government's part 
as time goes on. Certainly a change of government would result in an immediate 
reversal of policy, but even without that situation emerging the existence of more 
extensive provisions for workers protection in all the other Member States, might 
encourage moves towards harmonisation, particularly if multinational companies 
begin to adopt single employment practices across the Community.
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Section 2: The Privatisation of Local Government Cleansing Services in the
European Community.
The structure of local government in Europe is very varied, with most countries 
having a regional tier of government beyond the local authority system which 
prevails in Britain. However, it is normally the localised level of government which 
has responsibility for cleansing services. In practice, the size of authorities on the 
continent often demands that several join together in order to provide these functions.
More significantly, there is nothing unusual or controversial about the contracting out 
of public services in other European countries. There is a far more deep seated 
tradition of privatisation amongst continental local authorities who rarely have access 
to large scale direct service organisations of their own.
The extent of privatisation tends to vary across the Community and has developed in 
an inconsistent fashion, moving in ebbs and flows as local conditions have dictated. 
The key factor in this pattern of development has been the compulsory nature of 
competitive tendering elsewhere in Europe, and the widespread practice of awarding 
contracts on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender rather than 
which is the cheapest
Digings (1991) provides a detailed account of the nature of tendering proceedures in 
the different member states of the EC with an indication of the extent of privatisation. 
Some of these observations are summarised below.
Germany
In Germany whilst there is a potential preference for the privatisation of local 
authority services on the part of the federal government, the policy is not actively
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promoted. However, privatisation is on the increase and cleansing services such as 
refuse collection, street cleansing and building cleaning are commonly put out tender. 
As much as 75% of the countries refuse services are privatised. The smaller the local 
authority the more likely it is to use private contractors in the provision of services.
Whilst the contracting out of council functions is quite common in Germany the 
companies doing the work tend to be locally based and modest in size. The 
multinationals identified in Chapter 4 have not established a significant presence.
France
The testing of local authority services against the market is neither complusory, nor 
encouraged by central government in France. The small scale and rural nature of 
many local authorities has led them to involve the private sector in the provision of 
many services though. This has increasingly been the case since 1975, when the 
provision of a weekly refuse collection service because compulsory for the first time. 
For many municipatities with limited resources there was no option but to turn to the 
private sector and today around 60% of all domestic refuse collection is privatised.
This was not the practice in the larger towns and cities until more recently, when 
during the 1980s the City of Paris began to contract out its cleansing services (this 
development is described in more detail in the case study in Section 3 below).
The private provision of public cleansing services in France is dominated by three 
large conglomerates, Compagnie Gdndrale des Eaux, Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez 
and Bouygues SA, through their respective subsidiaies CGEA, SITA and Saur (see 
Company Profiles in Chapter 4).
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Italy
Italy retains an extensive municipal enterprise system which in many large cities 
takes care of everything from electricity and gas supply to milk distribution, but 
major privatisation initiatives have still emerged in Rome and Naples. Corruption 
and organised crime have provided the main obstacles to contracting out in these 
cities but in smaller rural authorities private provision of refuse collection and other 
services is commonplace.
Multinational operators such as Waste Management Inc, BFI, Lyonnaise des Eaux 
and CGE are now building a subtantial presence in the country. Particularly in the 
industrialised North and this is placing heavy competitive pressures on smaller local 
firms.
Sp&in
In Spain there is a long history of co-operation between local authorities and private 
contractors. The smaller Spanish municipalities, like others in Europe, have always 
relied on private operators or joint arrangements to fulfil their responsibilities, but 
even the cities of Madrid, Barcelona and Seville began contracting out as far back as 
the 1920s and '30s.
Also the transition from dictatorship under General Franco, to democracy in 1977, 
brought a rapid expansion of public services which could only be provided at short 
notice by private operators.
The market is dominated by very large domestic companies with a base in the 
construction industry who built a relationship with local authorities through their 
public works contracts. These companies include FOCSA (see Chapter 4) which
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claims to have a 70% share of the Spanish cleansing market, although this is probably 
over ambitious.
CGE, Lyonniase des Eaux - Dumez and Waste Management Inc all have significant 
interests of their own in Spain, built up through a mixture of acquisitions and joint 
vertures. About one hundred municipalities are served by the subsidiaries of these 
companies, with CGE companies collecting refuse from around two millioin people.
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands there is a strong ideological commitment to privatisation. This is 
a part of a strategy to reduce public spending and the number of public sector 
employees. Consequently, the privatisation of local services is widespread and has 
been further induced with the squeezing of local authority finances, which has 
encouraged the search for cost cutting measures. Around seventy five per cent of 
municipalities have considered privstisation measures and over fourty per cent have 
contracted out their building cleaning services. A similar proportion use private 
operators to provide refuse services although this is a much more established practice, 
often used by the smaller authorities. Councils of both the left and right have 
employed these measures despite the lack of compulsion, which reflects the genuine 
financial pressures that have been brought to bear.
The market is not concentrated but is shared out among around thirty firms who tend 
to serve one authority each. Local firms compete against the American 
multinationals, WMI and BFI (see Chapter 4) whose European headquaters is situated 
in the Netherlands.
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Belgium
Contracting out of services such as refuse collection is commonplace in Belgium 
despite the lack of compulsion or even the advocation of privatisation measures from 
the central government. Some cities such as Ghent and Antwerp rely heavily on 
direct services but other like Liege have made significant movements towards private 
provision, awarding a ten year refuse contract to a transnational joint venture between 
Cocherill - Sambre from Belgium and Lyonnaise des Eaux - Dumez of France.
Denmark
Direct service has been the traditional form of provision for municipal functions in 
Denmark although cleansing services, amongst others, have recently come under the 
threat of privatisation. The Government has been encouraging councils to look at the 
potential for contracting out in their authorities and has listed the services it sees as 
suitable, including all the cleansing functions. In total, around fifteen per cent of 
public cleansing is contracted out in Denmark.
Cleansing in Denmark is dominated by the giant cleaning multinational ISS 
Servisystem which has around fifty per cent of the total cleaning market. Waste 
Management has registered its interest in refuse collection though and now has a 
Danish subsidiary providing refuse services for several small towns.
Others
In Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Luxembourg whilst there is some private provision 
of small council building and maintenance work, cleansing services such as refuse 
collection and building cleaning are largely provided by direct labour. There is a
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greater private sector presence in the smaller authorities of Greece and Portugal and 
there has been some experimentation with contracting out in Ireland, but the scale of 
these operations is limited.
So there was already significant scope for the development of private cleansing 
contractors' European markets before the UK embarked on its CCT initiative, and 
whilst the flow of cross border tendering in Europe has been limited the level of 
activity in general has been significant. As Digings notes:
"Europe is already a Single Market in most public services. The 
dismantling of any remaining restrictions may make 
internationalisation simpler, but the process is well underway 
already".
(Digings, 1991)
Section 3: Industrial Relations in the European Cleaning Industry
The history of privatisation in Europe and the associated activity of the multinational 
contractors now sweeping in on the UK public cleansing market provides an 
opportunity for us to review the industrial relations position as if has developed 
across Europe.
Summaries of the nature of employment in the cleansing industry in Spain and 
Belgium will be followed by a detailed case study of public cleansing and the impact 
of privatisation on trade union and workers rights in France.
Industrial Relations in Spanish Contract Cleaning
The basic system of industrial relations in Spain is a democratised version of the one 
inherited from the Franco era. Minimum wages and conditions are established in the
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private sector by the ’Convenios' (Conventions). These are bodies in which 
employers and workers representatives negotiate and set legally binding minimum for 
their industry. Employers are represented by their Association and workers by the 
unions in proportion to the votes each received in elections to the statutory workplace 
committees. Workplace committees negotiate at the level of the enterprise with the 
aim of ensuring implementation of the Convenio and obtaining top up agreements at 
local level.
Within the cleansing industry Convenios are made at the level of the Province, which 
is usually a large urban area. The Convenios tend to represent only around fifty per 
cent of employers due to heavy non membership of trade assocoations by 'cowboy' 
operators. The workforce is represented by two trade unions, the socialist UGT 
(Union General de Trabajo) and the communist CCOO (Comissioner Obreas). Both 
suffer from Spains low union membership rates although their influence goes well 
beyond the 15 - 20 per cent who do join. The CCOO tends to be the dominant union 
within the cleaning industry.
Despite this formalistic structure, which allows for union representation, one of the 
major problems in the industry is ensuring the implementation of Covenio clauses 
allowing for union activity. The main private contractor, FOCSA, is a unionised 
company though and has signed a collective agreement with the General Union of the 
CCOO which covers the full range of public cleansing services.
Public cleansing is completely privatised in Spain and contractors have a highly 
co-operative relationship with local authorities whether they be to the right or left 
politically. The unions still formally oppose the arrangement and the ending of 
contracting in favour of direct employment of cleaners remains a basic objective, 
although it is not perceived as being realisable. With this assessment in mind the 
unions have won the right for cleaners to remain in their jobs when a contract is won
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by another contractor. So when a company wins a new contract, responsibility for 
the exisiting workforce comes with it. This is not as satisfactory as securing direct 
employment but it does provide the employees with some security and the union with 
a stable workforce around which to organise.
Conditions of employment in the Spanish cleaning industry are not good, a European 
Federation of Cleaning Industries report on the cleaning industry in Europe found 
that the minimum wage in the Spanish cleaning industry in 1989 was ninth placed out 
of ten European countries at only 3.33 ECU per hour, (although this was higher than 
Spains national minimum wage of 2.29 ECU per hour [EFCI, 1990]).
There has been pressure to lower conditions in recent years from multinationals such 
as Pritchards, now owned by BET. Landor (1986) notes Pritchard's determination to 
raise profits and break union organisation by:
" -imposing tighter work discipline
- reducing the power of workplace committees
- buying off leading union members
- cutting the workforce
- cutting lower paid casual staff during peak periods".
(Landor, 1986)
Whilst workers have shown a willingness to resist these pressures, it is becoming an 
increasingly difficult struggle with the increased presence of multinationals from 
France and the United States who have ideas of there own about the organisation of 
work.
Industrial Relations in the Belgian Cleaning Industry.
Conditions in the cleaning industry in Belgium are determined by a national 
Collective Agreement arrived at following negotiations between government,
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employers and unions. The unions are represented by the two main federations, the 
FGTB (Federation Generale des Travailleurs en Belgique) and the CSC (Centrale 
des Syndicats Chretiens) who both organise cleaners in the public and private sectors. 
This Agreement tends to have some authority with the larger companies but as there 
is no effective shop steward organisation in Begium smaller companies tend to ignore 
it
Union membership rates amongst cleaners are between fifty and sixty per cent, which 
seems reasonably high but is in fact well below the national average of eighty five 
per cent, so high because of certain bonuses, known as the thriteenth month, paid by 
the union. The unionisation of cleaners is relatively low due to the predominance of 
migrant workers in the industry who come from countries where union membership 
results in persecution and who are untrained in literacy skills and trade union 
consciousness (Landor, 1986).
The cleaning of public buildings has been largely contracted out in Belgium and the 
process is now spreading to other services. The unions are formally opposed to this 
development but have not managed to fight it successfully and are increasingly 
resigned to a rearguard defence of workers conditions.
The industry is dominated by foreign multinationals such as Censtobel, owned by the 
Dutch services group Vendex, ISS Servisystem (see chapter 4) and Temco Service 
Industries of the USA. As in the UK the smaller companies are being swallowed up 
by giant international corporations attempting to monoplise the market. This has 
resulted in ingenious methods of improving profitability in the Censtobel has a 
ingerious methods of improving profitability at the expense of the workforce. A 
union representative in the Censtobel subsidiary of Vendex explained:
161
"Censtobel has a Commercial Service which estimates the cost of each 
contract by measuring the area to be cleaned and calculating how
many hours per day it will take to clean. For example ...... One
hundred workers doing three hours a day each. After about six 
months or a year, twenty of the cleaners are sacked. The remaining 
cleaners have to work 20% harder to fill the gap. The price remains
the same for the client  The company is then paying twenty less
salaries and the remaining workers do not earn more".
(Landor, 1986)
The Director of the Company put it another way:
"After a number of years it is possible to clean the same premises in 
two thirds of the man hours. This is made possible by better chemical 
products and machinery. In the long term we intend to buy more 
robots".
(Landor, 1986)
The conclusion is the same, that workers will lose their jobs in the pursuit of 
enhanced profitability.
Productivity is also raised on the basis of work studies checking up on employees 
effort levels, increased specialisation and the lowering of standards. As the Censtobel 
Director put it:
"We have also changed the way we clean. Thirty years ago everything 
was cleaned  Now we only clean the bits that look dirty".
(Landor, 1986)
Temco Service Industries took this a stage further with its offer to cut clients costs by 
using the company's "visible cleaning" programme, which literally meant cleaning 
the bits you can see.
It is not only jobs and standards that have come under attack though, hours have 
reduced, meal breaks denied, workers employed on trial without pay, migrant
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workers not paid for the work they have done, workers sacked for being pregnant and 
victimisation of trade unionists.
There are particular problems for the migrant workers that make up the bulk of 
Belgium's cleaning workforce associated with their lack of knowledge of their own 
rights. Workers are often sacked after sickness and are told to sign voluntary 
declaration of redundancy forms without knowledge of what they are signing. The 
number of hours they work is often filled in after a contract is signed along with other 
malpractices. The workers form a pool of cheap labour which is easily abused and 
from which replacements can readily be drawn.
The problems are worsened by the fact that most sites do not have a union 
representative and full time officers are often tied to their office, leaving no contact 
between the workforce and union. Even the employer is rarely seen by the 
employees, leaving them open to abuse by 'cowboy' and multinational operators 
alike.
In Belgium the demand for a return to in-house labour is not a viable solution due to 
institutionalised racism. Migrant workers cannot be employed in Belgium's public 
services, so to take the services in-house would result in the migrant employees being 
thrown out of work. Public services wanting to tap the cheap migrant labour are 
consequently forced to contract out the work, re emphasising how cost benefits are 
achieved at the expence of public service workers.
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Case Studv: Privatisation. Workers Rights and Multinational Strategies in French 
Public Cleaning.
Introduction
This case study provides a description of how the privatisation of local cleansing 
services has developed in France. The reasons for its growth, the major contractors 
approach to the resulting opportunities and the impact on trade union organisation 
and workers conditions are all analysed. There is an emphasis on Paris in the study 
since this is where the research was largely conducted.
Information has been drawn principally from interviews with trade union officers, 
shop stewards and company managers conducted during September and October 
1991. A full list of those interviewed is noted in Appendix 2. Written data and 
information was also obtained from union and company documents and from other 
sources as cited in the text.
Local Goverment and Public Service Provision in France
France has traditionally been fairly centralised in its administrative functions. The 
importance of local authorities has only become significant in the post war period and 
particularly over the past twenty five years. Following the fall of the Paris Commune 
in 1871, Paris did not elect its own mayor again until 1977, between which time the 
City was governed by the French state.
France now has an extensive system of regional and local government which 
comprises 22 regions, 96 metropolitan departments and over 36,000 muncipalities or 
communes. The muncipalities themselves are relatively small, rarely having more
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than 2000 residents and they often group together in and around cities as 
communautes urbraines (urban communities) or districts, in order to provide certain 
services. The city of Paris, excluding its surburban hinterland, is a metropolitan 
department in its own right with twenty individual arrondissements (administrative 
districts or boroughs).
The municipalities have tended to have responsibility for the provision of basic 
public services such as urban cleansing and have always had the freedom to choose 
how to deliver those services, whether directly or through the employment of private 
contractors. The small scale of most authorities has resulted in a high rate of 
involvement of the private sector in the more technically based services, particularly 
refuse collection as the regular provision of this service was only made compulsory in 
1975.
It is also perfectly normal for municipalities to combine together to provide services 
in all regions of France and there are many thousands of sydicats specialises 
(specialised associations), providing a single service for several authorities and 
serveral thousand other sydicats mixes (mixed associations) and SIVOM providing 
multiple services.
Up to eighty per cent of domestic refuse collection services are now provided by 
private contractors and the volantary contracting out of other services is now 
spreading rapidly. Political considerations have rarely been the motivation behind 
this development, although the privatisation of services in Paris did not conform to 
this trend and the political complection of authorities does seem to affect which 
contractors are favoured in the allocation of contracts.
The procedures for public contracting in France are codified in the Code des Marches 
Publics (CAP) (1989). This is a five volume collation of legal matters relating to
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public procurement, Book III of which is concerned with local government. The 
CMP was used as the basis for EC legislation on public procurement and 
consequently there are few variations in the procedural arrangements established by 
the European Commision and the French authorities.
The Cleansing Contractors
There are three companies in France which dominate the market for local authority 
cleansing services. Compagnie G6n6rale des Eaux (CGE), Lyonnaise des Eaux- 
Dumez (LdE) and Bouygues. Each of these enterprises has been profiled in Chapter 
4 but it is worth nothing some further details about their French operations and 
strategies.
CGE and LdE, operating through their cleansing divisions CGEA and SITA, are the 
market leaders with well over one hundred local authority contracts each for refuse 
collection and street cleansing services. The construction group Bouygues, which 
only moved into public cleansing in 1985 through its environmental services arm, 
Saur, is catching up fast, having already established a market share of around twenty 
per cent.
All of these companies are involved in a vast range of activities aside from cleansing 
services and consequently co ordinated strategies have been adopted to expand their 
public sector presence in a variety of functions.
Jacques Delattre, who is responsible for organisation and privatisation issues in the 
Federation CGT des Services Publics, argues that the ability to deal with all of a 
towns service problems, enables contractors to charge a mark up on the cost of 
providing services. He explains:
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"As towns face financial difficulties they see the companies as bringing 
in fresh money, including areas which have nothing to do with the 
public service such as financing cable TV, new metro etc. Of course 
these areas are profitable but only in the long run. The town needs 
quick money but the companies require some quick profits to offset the 
expenditure on long term projects. So it is almost compulsory for the 
towns to give companies profit immediately in some areas to satisfy 
their demands. These areas include refuse collection, cleansing and 
water distribution".
Dominique Geoffray, a LdE manager in Paris sees no problem with this approach. 
He believes that all three of the major companies have the same strategy and explains 
that:
"If a local authority wants to privatise one of its services, all three 
companies will be able to provide it, so each company will ask the 
mayor what is his big priorty, whether it be a sports complex, a new 
school, a cultural facility, a big crossroads or whether it is he wants to 
improve the local environment. In exchange for being offered the 
contract you will pay cash for the other investment which he wants, 
which will have nothing to do with the services you are contracting 
for".
The extent to which this strategy can be applied, depends on the will of the authority 
mayor. In some cases the mayor wants to avoid problems and so contracts all of his 
services with one company but in others there is a fear of dependency on one 
company and responsibility is shared between contractors or with the authority itself.
The crucial factor for the companies is to secure contracts when they fisrt become 
available to the private sector, as this appears to be the only point when competition 
is evident. Digings (1989) notes how contractors and local authorities collaborate 
closely on the management of any investment in public cleansing services and 
Dominique Geoffray comfirmed this approach:
"After a contract is won, in the future we negotiate with the mayor to 
keep it. He may want some small changes in the service or he may 
want funding for a major urban project, so we will give it provided the 
scheme is going to be there long enough to get a return. If we were
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not to co-operate then the mayor might refuse to negotiate on the 
renewal of other contracts. He can threaten you with competitive 
tendering which is otherwise not compulsory in France
"In all cases we tend to arrive at a good compromise with mayors 
once we have established our credentials on a contract".
This explains the companies willingness to put up with initial losses on their 
cleansing contracts and to cross subsidise. As Lde's Monsieur Anclare put it:
"sometimes the return of equity is calculated not only on the term of 
one contract but across two or three contracts. It is better for 
everybody to have each contract equilibrated but sometimes, in 
accordance with local needs, it is possible to equilibrate across 
several contracts".
The CGTs Jacques Delattre argues that since this collaborative approach is the main 
strategy of the companies it will be applied globally and Dominique Geoffray gives 
support to that position stating that:
"We would like the same co-operative approach in the UK, but we 
must first prove we can improve services so people realise we are good 
partners technically, that we are financially strong and that we have 
good relations with our clients. The second time around it is then 
easier for us to win contracts for our services".
Each of the companies in question aims to be able to deal with all of a municipal 
authorities problems, from burial services to public works contracts and so they all 
have a series of subsidiary companies dealing with each of these activities which act 
independendy but are still part of a wider corporate strategy. Even within a 
particular activity though, there can still be a variety of companies trading. For 
example the SITA group, which is the cleansing division of LdE, has itself got thirty 
four subsidiaries, which Jacques Delattre claims compete against one another for 
local authority contracts. Monsieur Auclare of LdE argues that the system of 
subsidiaries is only used so that the company is adapted towards each local market 
where it operates. He points out that there tends to be only one company operating in
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each area and where this is not so, the companies do not generally compete with one 
another.
This practice of dividing the market up between Group subsidiaries, seems to have 
been taken a stage further in some areas with the sharing out of contracts between the 
different groups. The President of LdE, Jerome Monod, is an ex-General Secretary 
of the RPR, the French party of the Right, and there is certainly a tendency for the 
company to win contracts with authorities controlled by the RPR. Conversely 
Socialist and Communist authorities tend to favour CGEA, although both companies 
will work with authorities of any political make up (Dingings, 1989)
In Paris the division is clearest, with CGE controlling contracts for virtually all 
activities on the South bank of the Seine and LdE doing likewise in the North. This 
follows the allocation of twenty five year water distribution contracts on that same 
basis in 1985, giving each company a virtually impregnable operational base, 
although Saur have been establishing a presence in the South West of the City.
Privatisation of Cleansing Services and the Impact on Working Conditions.
In most French towns and cities cleansing services are provided entirely by the 
private sector or by an in-house labour force, but dependance upon private operators 
has accelerated dramaticaly in services such as refuse collection over the past fifteen 
years. Guy Yesle, General Secretary of the GGT's refuse collection branches says 
that French local authorities argued that they could not afford the necessary 
modenisation of their services operations but that the multinational contractors could. 
He says that they used this as an excuse for privatisation.
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Where public services have been modernised Guy Yesle claims that they provide a 
healthy and efficient service. In contrast, the private sector’s pursuit of profits means 
inadequate resources are applied to contracts. He points out that:
"You have three dustmen to a truck with the local authorities but only 
two men to a truck in the private sector. Where a man collects ten 
tonnes of rubbish in the public sector he must collect twenty tonnes in 
the private sector".
Landor (1986) quotes a Tunisian working as a cleaner in the University of Jusseu in 
Paris who confirms this trend:
"If you are cleaning a building belonging to an organisation it is 
better that they employ you. It is not that the money is better because 
that is based on the minimum wage. But you have to work much 
harder if you are working for a contractor. A study was done at the 
University and they found that you had to work three times harder for 
a contractor than you did if you were employed directly on a full staff 
of cleaners".
(Landor, 1986)
Jacques Delattre argues that the contractors pursuit of profits from public services is 
always achieved on the back of its employees and the residents it serves, he says:
"There is no example of a private company collecting [refuse] at a 
lower cost than the public service. Even if during the first six months 
they operate with a lower cost to the market, very quickly the reality of 
the cost appears and working conditions are reduced".
This has become much more of a problem since a change of law 122 - 12, in 1985, 
which had required contractors to take on the in-house workforce who were generally 
well organised. Now contractors can bring in new workers and can employ them on 
different terms and conditions, creating insecurity and undermining trade union 
solidarity and organisation. Workers who are re employed lose all their rights to 
benefits built up through long service such as seniority, holiday pay and bonuses.
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Changes in the organisation of work have not made the situation any better. In the 
private sector refuse collection is organised on a 'job and finish' basis which 
encourages the workforce to hurry the work in order to get finished early. Whilst this 
practice has been widely used in the public sector in Britain and is generally popular 
with workers, it does have clear implications for safety and quality issues which 
require additional monitoring. Aside from these problems British refuse workers will 
have sympathy with Guy Yesles claim that the speed with which work is completed 
under a 'job and finish' system encourages management to allocate additional work to 
the refuse gangs, often cutting the number of employees in the process.
In contrast to the attractiveness of an early finish for refuse workers, contractors in 
the cleansing services are increasingly moving towards the introduction of night time 
working. This will enable a more efficient use of equipment which will be employed 
24 hours a day and can be justified in the public mind with claims that it will reduce 
Paris' enormous traffic problem. The CGT is opposed to this development since as 
Daniel Gavard, a CGT shop steward argues:
"It is worse for a man's health to work at night and the maintainance 
of safety is far more difficult, since it is dark and cars move much 
faster at night so there would be more accidents".
The concern for health and satety is a legitimate one for a man who has worked for a
private contractor for twenty five years and never known one of his workmates reach
the age of retirement with his company. He says that:
"All have died before they could retire or were not able to work for 
five ot ten years prior to the statutory age of retirement due to the bad 
working conditions".
Trade Union Organisation and Migrant Workers
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The two unions which organise cleaning workers are the CFDT (Confederation 
Francaise Democratqiue du Travail) and the CGT (Confederation G6n6rale de 
Travail). Both of these organisations are confederations of separate unions and 
cleaners are organised in appropriate sections such as the Syndicat des Services 
Publics in the CFDT and the Federation des Services Publics in the CGT. The CGTs 
members in the private sector are now concentrated in the union’s transport section, 
the Federation nationale des Syndicats de transport while CFDTs members are more 
scattered across the different associations.
The biggest problem that the French trade union movement faces is falling 
membership levels. The CGT has only 500,000 compared to three million fifteen 
years ago. The effect of privatisation has been to worsen this situation. Guy Yesle 
estimates that the CGT has a membership of only seven hundred workers in the 
private cleansing sector, less than one per cent of the workforce. The CFDT is in an 
even weaker position with around two hundred members. Old ties and solidaities 
have been broken up with the redefinition of job titles and the farming out of work.
Private contractors have further undermined union organisation and solidarity by 
employing very large numbers of immigrant workers. Jacques Delattre claims that 
migrant workers are deliberately employed to break national collective agreements 
and existing terms and conditions. These workers are under permanent threat due to 
the prevailing racist atmosphere in France and receive only the bare minimum of 
conditions and rights as guaranteed under the country's social code. They are blamed 
for unemployment and other problems in France and the insecurity this generates is 
used to exploit them. Although the Code Penal (Penal Code) provides a framework 
for fining employers who refuse to employ or sack someone on the grounds of ethnic 
origin (Digings N.D.). Daniel Gavard of the CGT points out that it is hard for the 
migrants to protect themselves from this abuse since many have language and literacy 
difficulties and are in any case delighted to have a job of any nature when they first
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arrive in France. He argues that it takes time for the workers to develop a political 
and trade union consciousness.
The CGT has tried to recruit migrant workers within the cleansing sector and does 
represent them through their shop stewards, but no specialised recruitment strategies 
have been devised which target this group of workers and no attempts have been 
made to establish educational programmes which might overcome the unions 
difficulties in this area. This might be related to the fact that the proportions of 
immigrant workers employed in the industry are falling rapidly. Whilst up to ninety 
per cent of cleansing workers in Paris were once immiggrants, the proportion has 
dropped to around fifty as the pressures of unemployment have forced young while 
workers to accept less attractive jobs.
There is a certain amount of resignation amongst union officers to the low levels of 
membership in the cleansing sector. Alain Dubourg, General Secretary of the Air 
France section of the CGTs Transport Federation argues that the only way around the 
problem is to 'talk, talk and talk' which he accepts is not a very efficient method of 
recruitment, but the union is in decline, facing hostile employers in an industry which 
is increasingly privatised.
Fortunately for the trade unions their influence amongst cleaners goes well beyond 
their levels of membership, and workers voting in the elections for shop stewards 
consistently return trade union representatives, with the CGT predominant. The CGT 
generally wins around fifty per cent of the vote in the elections, for shop stewards 
and in elections to the Commites d Enterprises (Company Councils), with the CFDT 
and Christian FO (Force Ouvriere) splitting the other fifty per cent.
The unions have an undeniable influence amongst cleaning workers and whilst that 
influence is generally applied at a local level and on individual contracts, their
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presure has managed to secure national collective agreements for workers in the 
industry. In 1981, after 15 years of struggle, the Convention Collective des Locaux 
was signed which guarantees minimum working cnditions for 20,000 largely 
unorganised office cleaners.
However, local presures mean that wages and conditions vary enormously across jobs 
and between regions in the industry. French dustmen employed directly, outside of 
Paris have the same minimum salary of around FF 6,000 per month but this is topped 
up by a variety of local bonuses. In the private sector conditions fluctuate wildly 
from one company to another due to the influence of different collective agreements. 
Within companies such as SITA and CGEA there can be further variations due to the 
complex pattern of subsidiaries that exists.
It is virtually impossible for the unions to alter this uncordinated pattern, since, as 
Jacques Delattre explains:
"there is a difficulty in making people understand that wherever they 
are they have a common interest. A clening worker on the Metro will 
not consider himself to be in the same situation as a dustman in the 
private sector".
"It is even .... difficult for us to make a dustman from another part of 
France see that he has a common interest with a dustman from Paris.
People identify themselves with their own town and even their own 
mayor despite him being their boss."
Whilst many of these difficulties would be eased by a return to the in-house provision 
of cleansing services the unions see no prospect of this happening. Guy Yeslte put it 
in no uncertain terms:
'The unions' fight against privatisation is unwinable. It cannot be 
prevented".
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Jacques Delattre explained that whilst the CGT sees privatisation as a ‘robbery of 
public goods' the multinationals have real support at a government level and in many 
town halls, so if anything, the movement towards private provision is likely to spread 
further. Resistance has prevented the complete privatisation of public cleansing 
services but this does not open the door to bringing refuse collection services back in- 
house although this does remain the CGTs stated aim.
So the unions have concentrate on other issues such as ensuring good public services 
are provided, where workers have time to do the job. This means an opposition to 
the 'job and finish1 system, resistance to movements towards 24 hour cleaning and 
traditional union activity aimed at protecting the workers wages and conditions.
The Privatisation of Cleansing Services in Paris
The Privatisation Programme
Private companies have been involved in the provision of refuse colection services in 
Paris since the 1920s but privatisation policies have only been actively promoted 
since the election of Jacque Chirac to the Mayor's office in 1977.
Chirac faced major industrial action from the City’s cleansing operatives in 1979, 
which lasted for 2 months and forced him to request the assistance of the army to 
clean the city up. This experience demonstrated the strength of the unions in Paris 
and encouraged Chirac to seek curbs on their power. One way to break their grip was 
to split up the cleansing services where they were strongest.
A strategy was developed to reorganise cleansing in Paris which included a 
progressive privatisation programme. Up to this point the private sector's only
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contribution to the City's cleansing service had been to provide the drivers for the 
refuse trucks. Now private contractors were to be invited to manage and staff the 
entire refuse service for 6 of the 20 Paris Arrondissements with similarly organised 
public services in the other districts. The proportion of work held by the private 
sector has been gradually increased since then, up to its present level of around 50%.
The privatisation programme was accompanied by a massive modernisation initiative, 
with dustbins being replaced by 'wheelie bins' and mechanised lifting equipment and 
the introduction of various other new street and pavement cleaning vehicles and 
machinery (see Digins, 1989). This revolution in cleansing methods was 
accomplished in close co-operation with the private contractors, CGEA and SITA, 
who have shared the costs of investment on the basis outlined above.
There is no question that the reorganisation has resulted in a dramatic improvement 
in cleansing standards in the City but this is due more to the enormous increase in 
resources applied to the problem than to any revolution in management techniques. 
Paris spends £68 per resident per annum on public cleansing compared to £17 in 
London (Barlow, 1990). Yet the apparent success of this investment has led to the 
extension of the privatisation programme to a range of other services such as central 
heating, water distribution, waste incineration, coffin building, catering and house 
building. Since CGE and LDE provide each of these services they have naturally 
benefitted from the policy and have established a virtually unshakeable and highly 
lucrative oligopoly in the Parisien public service market.
Jean Louis Machecourt, General Secretary of the Syndicate CGT du Nettoiment de 
Paris (Paris public sector cleaners union) argues that there was not even any 
competitive process involved in the privatisation of the refuse collection service. 
Prior to privatisation CGEA provided 25% of the City's refuse truck drivers and
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SITA 50%, and these companies gained the same proportions of the refuse contracts 
when privatised- He says:
"There was no competition, the choice was made beforehand with 
SITA getting the same two thirds share. Although 'officially' there was 
competition".
The Impact on Workers Terms and Conditions
The contractors were first introduced in 1982 to break a strike by cleansing workers 
who were resisting the City's reorganisation plans. They were successful in that 
objective and have enjoyed the benefits of helping to force new conditions on the 
workforce ever since. The City had been worsening the cleaners terms of 
employment in order to make the service more commercial in a blatant preparation 
for privatisation. Francis Combaud, a CFDT shop Stewart says that:
"It became obvious they were going to privatise, they introduced 2 new 
shifts and then threatened to move over to night shifts to make the 
service more competitive....
The first offer was to work from 6 pm to midnight, over 5 days, but this 
only made 30 hours so they decided we also had to work Saturdays ....
Previously workers worked 5 days one week, 4 days on the second and 
only 3 days on the third week so the new schedule meant a big 
increase in the number of days worked. The unions naturally refused 
the offer and negotiations continued for 8 months, at which point the 
Administration agreed that the offer was unacceptable and so decided 
to privatise the service instead”.
Combaud points to the fact that services have been split up into smaller sections 
which has dispersed workers and broken down the solidarity that had existed. Rather 
than all being cleansing operatives some workers now collect refuse and others are 
known as technicians or cleaners, earning different salaries. Only the dustmen in the
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public service have managed to remain undivided and retain their wage rates. They 
have a special status in France which gives them an extra FF 1100 per month over 
and above the rates agreed in the Convention Collective (TACAP) along with a series 
of other benefits such as a 38.5 hour week and retirement at 55 for drivers and 60 for 
loaders.
In the private sector workers work a 6 day week of 5 hours a day which results in a 
considerable wages shortfall of about FF 1500 per month compared with the public 
service. SITA employees are covered by a collective agreement dating from 1966 
which offers very favourable conditions, 26 days leave with additional allowances for 
marriages, births and deaths, enhanced sickness benefits and early retirement. 
However, the Agreement has never been updated and SITA has increasingly shifted 
work to its subsidiaries such as SPEED in order to bypass it.
The mechanisation of services has resulted in 3 man collection teams being replaced 
by 2 man teams and the need to get the most out of the machinery means that shifts 
are being worked virtually around the clock, forcing employees to work increasingly 
unsocial hours. The heavy investment in additional cleansing services in Paris has 
ensured that most workers have been kept in employment though, and the overall 
cleansing workforce across the public and private sector has remained fairly constant 
at around 10,000.
The 1990 Public Refuse Service Dispute
Despite the declining conditions of employment of cleansing workers Jean Louis 
Machecourt insists that the public service is cheaper than the private one. In 1990 
the refuse service was 57% run by the public sector and 43% by the private sector 
and yet the public service accounted for only 40% of the cost. This was used as the 
basis for a pay claim in 1990. The demand was for an increase of FF 1500 per
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month, justified by arguing that if all the work done by the private sector was brought 
back in - house, it would save Paris FF 23 million per annum.
The CGT led the demands for the pay rise after over two hundred discussion meetings 
and a final decision at a mass meeting attended by 1200 workers. After several days 
the movement was joined by the other trade unions and a degree of unity was 
achieved. This was the first time such a situation had existed since parts of the 
service had been privatised. This non - existence of a collective agreement for most 
private sector workers, before 1990, meant that they were often used to break strikes, 
collecting their own loads at night and the strikers by day. During the strike in 
activists and private sector workers refused to collect the public service workers 
refuse.
There were disputes about strategy, with CFDT asking for a much more modest 
increase based upon a percentage rise, but this was rejected by the workforce who 
held out for twenty four days in an increasingly bitter dispute, which involved strike 
breaking trucks from cities with administrations sympathetic to Chirars’ politics, 
private contractors from outside of Paris and retaliatory attacks upon refuse trucks by 
the strikers. In the end of the workers settled for a rise of FF 150 per month.
Whilst the unions achieved a degree of co-ordination in this strike not seen since the 
introdution of private contractors, clear divisions of attitude remain. Jean Louis 
Machecourt points out that refuse collectors are organised in three different CGT 
organisations, for the City of Paris, for LdE and for CGE and in four different union 
federations, which does not ease the path to unity. Jean Pasquier, a CFDT shop 
steward adds that since his union is the minority one there is a feeling that it must 
address issues in its own way so that it is dominated by the CGT and retains a voice. 
This encourages the disunity and widens the gulf between the two union federations.
179
The Lessons of Paris
There are clear distinctions between the experience of the privatisation of public 
cleansing services in the U.K. and in France and the rest of Europe. Not least the fact 
that a competitive process is compulsory in Britain and that in-house service 
organisations regularly participate in that process. However, the experience of public 
cleansing workers employed by private contractors and the hostility shown towards 
trade union organisation in the companies who are providing the main competition to 
DSO's in Britain is not something that British local authority workers, or their trade 
union representatives, will welcome.
In the following Chapter a series of case studies, on the impact of CCT in various 
British local authorities, will provide a clearer picture of whether this experience is 
being or will be repeated in the U.K.
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Chapter 6: The Impact of CCT on Local Authority Cleansing Workers
and Trade Union Organisation. The Case Studies.
Section 1: Introduction and Methodology
The following chapter consists of a series of case studies relating to the introduction 
of CCT into the provision of UK local government cleansing services. The studies 
aim to illuminate the approach adopted by local authorities and trade unions towards 
the CT process and the outcomes of it, in terms of workers jobs and conditions and 
levels of trade union organisation and influence.
This predominantly qualitative style of research was adopted for a variety of reasons. 
The use of case studies enables us to gain an indepth appreciation of the impact of 
CCT as it has unfolded in different local authorities. Different pressures such as local 
political conditions, industrial traditions and other subjective influences have 
provided varying environments and experiences which would not have come out in a 
structured quantitative survey. By engaging in first hand fieldwork activity it was 
possible to get a feel for the research in question and then develop it to maximum 
effect, identifying the sources of high quality material and presenting the information 
in an undistorted fashion (see Dean, Eichhom and Dean, 1969).
Attempts were made to support the results with quantitative research methods, 
involving the use of a coded questionnaire to be distributed amongst trade union area 
officers, but this approach proved impractical. The considerable pressures on the 
officers concerned led to the firm conclusion that response rates would not be 
sufficient to justify this type of research. Instead telephone questioning of officers 
and documentary evidence was utilised to provide basic data on the employment 
consequences of privatisation. Information was collected on twenty two privatised 
cleansing contracts which is tabulated in the sections titled 'The Workforce' in the
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company profiles in Chapter Four. The details of this survey are analysed further in 
Chapter Eight.
The methodology has taken account of the specific criticisms which have been 
levelled at case study techniques such as a tendency towards over generalisation and a 
lack of control (Stouffer, 1950; Campbell and Stanley, 1963). I have avoided any 
focus on one specific situation and attempted to use a broad comparative approach. 
The nine case studies in this Chapter consider the circumstances in authorities in 
several regions of the UK with an allowance for different political complexions, 
various defined activities, the influence of several private contractors and the 
prevalence of successful DSOs.
In the presence of comparative case study-methods, Donald Campbell (1979) has 
withdrawn his earlier criticisms and advocated the approach as a means of feeding 
"qualitative common sense knowing" into evaluation research (Bulmer, 1986). As 
Rist (1984) argued:
"Qualitative data can give the policy-maker a 'feel'for the setting, the 
program, and the participants that reams of statistical printouts can 
never match."
(Rist, 1984)
Since the introduction of CCT and its impact upon local government workers has 
been an ongoing process, the need for dynamism in the evaluation of the 
development is essential. As Weiss and Rein (1972) have argued what is important 
in social research is not so much the outcome of a programme but the process by 
which that outcome was achieved. So the aim is as Bulmer (1986) puts it:
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"to build up a near-to-complete description of the community or 
institution before intervention, the nature of the intervention, and the 
new system which develops after the intervention. Thus an indepth 
analysis of resistances to change, the part played by administrative 
and political considerations and the interpersonal dynamics of 
programme implementation can be provided, in a way that the more 
rigourous but more distant approach of the randomized experiment 
cannot ”
(Bulmer, 1986).
Information for the case studies was drawn mainly from unstructured interviews with 
trade union officers, shop stewards, local government officers, company managers 
and other observers. In each case approaches were made to representatives of all 
these parties. The nature of the research led some company managers to resist my 
approaches and in these situations the local press, correspondents and council 
documents were used to provide an alternative source of opinions and data. In all but 
one of the cases local authority officers were able to provide an additional 
management perspective which balanced the eager co-operation of interviewees from 
the workforces and trade unions.
The case studies in question are tabulated in Table 35 below to summarise the 
contracts under investigation. The predominance of Labour authorities in the study 
reflects the Party's dominance of local government during the period of research and 
the fact that many pro-privatisation Conservative authorities had already contracted 
services out prior to the CCT legislation.
Indeed one of the crucial aspects of this thesis is that it is the first major academic 
study of the implications of competitive tendering in an environment where the 
exercise is compelled rather than being introduced voluntarily. The experiences 
associated with earlier initiatives that were introduced on this basis are already well
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documented (Ascher, 1987;Centre for Public Services, 1991; LGIU, N.D; Sheffield 
City Council, 1988,1990; Wandsworth Trade Union Publications, 1983).
Case
Study
Authority Location Political 
control when 
contract 
awarded
Service Contractor
1 Brighton South Labour Street cleaning FOCSA
2 Liverpool Merseyside Labour Refuse
collection
Onyx UK
3 Rotherham North Labour Building
cleaning
Initial Contract 
Services
4 District
Council
Midlands Conservative Refuse
collection
Sitaclean
Technology
5 Stockport North West Liberal 
Democrat 
led - N.O.C.
Refuse 
collection 
& street cleaning
FOCSA
6 Manchester North West Labour Refuse 
collection 
& street cleaning
DSO
7 Mid
Glamorgan
Wales Labour Building
cleaning
DSO and
Taylorplan
services
8 Glasglow Scotland Labour Refuse
collection
DSO
9 Ealing London Conservative 
and Labour
Building
cleaning
DSO
Table 35: The Case Studies
Section 2: Case Study I. Street Cleansing in Brighton.
Introduction
The study is concerned with a Borough council situated on the south coast of 
England, with a population of around 140,000 people. Until the mid 1980's the 
Authority was dominated by the Conservative Party but now has a Labour 
administration which has consolidated power during the last decade. The Council has 
had a position of outright opposition to CCT on ideological grounds since the
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introduction of the legislation, and the privatisation of its street cleansing service 
must be seen in this context.
The Councils Policy
The attitude of the Brighton Borough Council towards CCT was set out in July of 
1988 at a meeting of the Authority's Policy and Resources Committee by the Council 
leader. He stated that:
"The proposals for compulsory competitive tendering are a thinly 
disguised attack on the provision of services to the community through 
democratically elected local authorities."
(Bassam, 1988)
The Council leaders' report pointed out that: ^
"unless the Council acts positively, [the Act] could affect the security 
of employment ofparts of its own workforce."
The need to avoid such a situation led the committee to agree that they:
"will ...be sure that the services which [they] provide meet the real 
needs of the community and that [the] workforce is well organised and 
equipped to ensure that tenders for the Councils services are won by 
[the] in-house direct service organisations."
(Bassam, 1988)
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The Council's Assistant Director of Technical Services, argues that keeping all of the 
Authority's services in-house is a fundamental part of the Council’s political doctrine 
and not something that was to be sacrificed easily.
From this statement of principle the Authority developed a strategy which involved 
the creation of a new unit, including representatives from the Borough's works, client 
and accountancy departments, to provide advice to all of the client departments 
putting contracts out to tender. The Unit's function was to make sure the 
interpretation of the legislation was consistent, so that a uniform approach could be 
adopted. The trade unions were consulted in this process but the crucial role for them 
came in the compilation of the in-house tenders.
Preparing the Tender
Any analysis of the privatisation of Brighton's street cleansing service must be 
considered against the experience of the refuse collection tender, submitted a few 
months earlier, with fairly dramatic consequences.
In April of 1989 the Borough Council awarded the refuse collection contract to its 
own DSO by undercutting the main competitor, FOSCA Services, by some £800,000 
p.a. That bid was prepared without any involvement from the main union, the GMB, 
who had a hostile- attitude towards the whole tender process locally and did not want 
to get diawn into a concession bargaining situation with DSO bosses. Faced with a 
lack of union co-operation and an administrative commitment to win the contract, the 
DSO managers misjudged the strength of the competition and put in a bid which 
would necessarily involve steep cuts.
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On the basis of the tender submitted, the DSO was forced to cut the number of refuse 
collectors from 119 to 75, the number of rounds from 18 to 11 and end the 
established practice of organising the work on a task and finish basis.
The number of beats has since been increased to 13 due to the unworkability of the 
original tender but as a local NUPE branch officer and National Committee member 
explains:
"lessons were learned that it was unwise not to be involved in the 
specification or the bid itself. There was criticism by the unions of 
panic amongst DSO managers in trying to win the contract... but the 
process taught us to be involved, to ensure no repeat of the panic 
measures."
In contrast to the refuse collection contract, in the preparation of the street cleansing 
tender, to be submitted by the 31st August 1989, there was a considerable degree of 
consultation with the workforce and trade unions, although this did not go beyond the 
existing negotiating machinery.
There was a recognition that it is the workforce who actually do the work and since 
the Authority was committed to retaining and improving the service, there was a need 
to tap the workforce's knowledge. Staff were consulted from the level of chargehand 
down to toilet cleaner to see what work people did, so that it would all go into the 
specification. The unions were involved in this process on the basis that they had a 
broader knowledge of work organisation across the boundaries of individual job 
descriptions. Suggestions were sometimes taken on board and in other cases ignored, 
largely on the basis of what was allowed under the terms of the legislation.
The workforce was kept informed of developments at each stage of the tendering 
process, and once the tender document was ready a presentation was arranged
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explaining how it could affect the staff, so that confusions and misunderstandings 
were ironed out early.
Whilst the Authority had a strong ideological commitment to keeping services in- 
house and a desire to protect the jobs and condition of its workforce, there was also a 
determination to keep its activities within the boundaries of the law. No attempts 
were made to dissuade competitors from tendering by combining services into one 
large contract or by drawing up over detailed specifications. The Council aimed to 
keep its services in-house by acting in a competitive fashion, whilst maintaining a co­
operative relationship with the workforce and trade unions.
As the Council leader stated in his report:
"The Council will undertake to actively promote public service 
provision and build public support for retention of in-house direct 
service organisations. This strategy to be evolved by fostering good 
working relationships between the Administration, Town Hall trade 
unions and service managers."
(Bassam, 1988)
The Trade Union Response
There were three unions with a direct interest in the arrangements for street cleaning 
in Brighton. On the staff side, NALGO and on the manual side, the GMB with 
around 120 members and NUPE with 30.
All the unions adopted a joint and detailed approach to the preparation of the 
specification and tender documents, to ensure no repeat of the destruction of jobs and 
conditions experienced by the refuse collectors. But it was NALGO, with few 
members directly affected, that adopted the most vociferous position in the lead up to 
privatisation.
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NALGO made it clear in July 1988, that it was prepared to take an active political 
stand against privatisation of council services. The local branch made a statement 
describing the three likely consequences of privatisation:
"1 The standard of service falls
2 Jobs, pay and conditions of service of the workforce decline 
with a weakening of trade union organisation
3 That there is a loss of accountability in the running of the 
service."
Whilst supporting NALGOs national policy of opposition to the Act, the branch also 
instructed the staff side to negotiate certain terms with the employer in relation to CT.
"] No compulsory redundancy.
2 No cuts in wages or deterioration in conditions of service,
wherever possible CCT should be used to improve wages and 
conditions.
3 Maintain commitment to Equal Opportunities.
4 Special consideration and resources to training requirements
occurring as a result of CCT.
5 NALGO must be involved in all negotiations regarding any 
proposed changes within the workforce including job 
descriptions, redeployment, regrading and changes in working 
practices.
6 Full union involvement in drawing up detailed specification 
and in monitoring contracts.
7 Union should press Council to improve and extend services 
and the workforces ability to carry out that work.
8 NALGO discourages the Council from bidding for work in 
other local authorities against their own in-house tender."
(NALGO, Brighton Branch Executive, 1988)
All of these points were to be implemented in accordance with the Unions proposed 
In-House Service Agreement which would establish a special joint trade union- 
Council body to deal with CCT matters and protect in-house services.
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On the 18th August 1988 this policy statement was put into action with a letter from 
the Deputy Branch Secretary, Stuart Neate, seeking affirmation that the Authority 
was opposed to the privatisation legislation and to the use of CT to undermine jobs, 
pay, conditions of service and trade union organisation. The letter sought satisfaction 
on proposals for various committees and consultation arrangements giving the union 
authority across the whole tendering and evaluation process.
The Council's response, on the 2nd September, reiterated its policy of opposition to 
the requirements of the Act, but on the specific proposals for consultation and related 
mechanisms, only gave assurances of a commitment to consult with the unions at all 
stages of CCT whilst retaining control of the format of those consultations and the 
final decision making process.
Despite NALGO's pressure it was only at the level of the DSO tender and the 
specification that the unions had any real input. NUPE and the GMB were happy to 
leave policy decisions and political pressure to their head offices. The GMB saw its 
role as building into the specification the quality and frequency levels which its 
members already knew, and fighting to cut the supervisory and administration side of 
the service to keep things competitive. For NALGOs Deputy Branch Secretary, this 
gave the impression that the GMB was really saying:
"You negotiate a price and then we will negotiate with you."
This created a degree of animosity and a feeling that the GMB was not getting 
involved enough, despite the experience of the refuse contract. There is no doubt that 
the position of the GMB was passive in relation to NALGOs, but it seems unlikely 
that the DSO bid would have been very different had the manual unions been more
191
actively involved, since the bid was designed to improve the level of service and to 
protect workers jobs and conditions.
The In-house Bid
As stated above, the main influence that the unions had was in the preparation of the 
specification for the service and this clearly affected the nature of the DSO bid.
Improvements were made in the standard of service to be provided, but this was not 
part of any strategy to make a DSO victory more likely, it was merely to improve the 
service. The main change involved the introduction of performance standards which 
would guarantee a certain minimum of service beyond the minimum frequency which 
existed under the old system.
In order to meet the requirements of the specification the DSO proposed:
"a) A small increase in the number of staff from 103 full time
equivalents to 108.
b) An increase in overtime working at weekends.
c) An increased number of vehicles to ensure spares are always
available and to give greater flexibility
d) A greater degree of effort and conscientiousness by the 
workforce.
e) Closer supervision."
(Smalley, 1989).
For the cleaning of public conveniences, which was also in the contract, few changes 
were proposed, but a higher staffing level was considered necessary to ensure 
sufficient attendance and reduce excessive overtime, Consequently staffing was to be 
increased from 35 to 40 full time equivalents.
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Proposed wages were as described in Table 36 below:
Service Street Sweepers P.C. Employees
Job title Sweeper Driver 1 Driver 2 Attendant Driver
National 
Basic Wage
101.25 110.45 115.05 105.85 110.45
One third 
bonus
33.75 36.82 38.35 35.28 36.82
Extra bonus 13.50 13.50 13.50 - -
Drivers
payment
- 15.00 15.00 - 15.00
Total weekly 
wage
148.50 175.77 181.90 141.13 162.27
Chargehand
payment
£12.52 per week
Table 36: Proposed DSO Wages on Brighton Other Cleaning Contract. 
Source: Smalley, 1989
The fixed extra bonus for street sweepers was introduced to ensure the undertaking of 
all street cleansing duties without extra payment and to allow for additional 
operational flexibility such as the variation of working times and locations. The one 
third bonus for public convenience employees was a new provision and was awarded 
in return for increased productivity.
The total cost of the DSO bid was about 25% higher than the existing budget when 
allowance was made for the service improvements and additional vehicles. The key 
tender prices for emptying a litter bin, sweeping a street manually and emptying a 
gulley were measured against those of other authorities and found to be two and a 
half times greater that the average. The Council’s consultant stated that the work 
could not be done at these lower prices, which would result in the contracts failure, 
and so the bid was submitted despite the Authority's recognition that there was a need 
for a further 10% cut in costs, to be achieved through enhanced labour productivity.
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The Tender Evaluation
In early October 1989, the various tenders were put before the Environmental 
Services and Policy and Finance Committees, with the Council officers 
recommendations. The companies invited to tender were FOCSA Services, Sitaclean 
Technology, UK Waste Control and Brighton Borough DSO. Reservations were 
expressed about UK Waste's competence, but the legislation requires a minimum of 
three competitors to the DSO so they were included on the tender list. Subsequently 
Sitaclean withdrew from the process.
In the tender evaluation documents it was noted that tender prices could vary widely 
from the officer's projection of around £2.5 million per annum due to the subjective 
nature of determining when something is clean to an acceptable standard, and what 
resources might need to be allocated to maintain those standards. In relation to this 
point it was stated that:
"Where the Authority feels a tenderers proposals are incapable of 
meeting the specification or the prices submitted are unrealistically 
low ... this is not grounds for rejecting a tender."
Such a scenario was seen as the contractors risk and they would be under an 
obligation to fulfil the contract at the prices quoted.
The importance of this advice became clearer when the tenders were revealed:
(Smalley, 1989 a)
UK Waste Control Ltd £1,754,368.07 per annum 
£1,990,767.70 per annum 
£2,732,199.53 per annum
FOCSA Services (UK) Ltd 
Brighion Borough DSO
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UK Waste Control's bid represented reasonably the cost of resources proposed but 
these resources were identified as being wholly inadequate to achieve the 
requirements of the specification. The Company was proposing as few as 37 street 
sweepers in contrast to the 100 plus that FOCSA and the DSO were suggesting. It 
was clear that the contract would operate at a tremendous loss or that the Company 
would fail to meet the specification requirements. However, the Company insisted 
they could do the work for the price submitted. The Authority's technical evaluation 
did not meet the necessary requirements and consequently the Company's tender was 
not recommended for acceptance.
FOCSA put in the second lowest bid and its resourcing of the contract appeared 
satisfactory, however the pricing of those resources was totally inadequate, being up 
to 50% below what was realistic. From the point of view of the officers:
"FOCSA underpriced their bid either intentionally or unintentionally 
but they have the necessary financial standing to take such a course of 
action"
(Smalley, 1989 a)
The DSOs bid was the highest and fully reflected the resources required to undertake 
the service satisfactorily and the cost of those resources.
All of the tenderers indicated that they would be happy to consider the existing 
workforce for employment and their proposals for staffing levels are indicated in 
Table 37 below:
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Service UK Waste FOCSA DSO Existing
Street cleaning 29 94 98 95
Litter bins 6 6 4
Beach cleaning 2 (+4*) 6 4 4
Car parks 2 3 3 Incl.
Weed control Incl. Incl. Sublet. Siblet.
Drainage 2 4 4 3
Public conveniences 20 (10 p-time) 40 41 38
Fitters 1 2 Sublet. Sublet.
Spare 10 Incl. Incl. Incl.
Totals:
Operatives 72 (10 p-time) 149 156 144
Management 4 6 9 8
* Summer supplement - taken from other services
Table 37: Proposed Employees for Brighton's Other Cleaning Contract.
Source: Smalley, 1989 a.
Additionally, officers made it clear that should either of the private contractors be 
awarded the work there would be a need to expand staffing in the Client Unit to 
ensure effective monitoring and control of the contract.
Acceptance of UK Waste's bid was never really likely, considering the Company’s 
limited record and under resourced bid, but there was no automatic decision to award 
it to FOCSA either. Extensive legal advice was sought in an attempt to find a way to 
ensure the in-house bid was successful. Specifically, advice was obtained on whether 
potential staffing difficulties, the lack of a depot and the 'loss leader' nature of the bid 
could be used to avoid awarding the contract to FOCSA, to which counsels advice 
was an unequivocal no!
In this context, the Authority found itself with little option but to award the contract 
to FOCSA at a meeting of the Council's Policy and Finance Committee on the 11th 
October 1989.
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The reaction of the unions to this news was one of dismay and resentment. The 
NALGO District Officer advanced this opinion in a letter to the Council leaders. In it 
he pointed out that in order for DSOs to win against private contractors it was 
becoming a norm to bid around 10% below the existing annual price, which in this 
case had been approximately £2 million. The main complaint and matter of dispute 
related to how the Council could come to sanction a tender which represented a 40% 
increase on the current annual price.
Steve Bassam pointed out that counsel advised that the Authority had no alternative 
but to award the contract in the manner it did, and that the DSO bid had in their 
opinion been competently priced against the improved contract specification, which 
involved additional duties, additional sweeps, longer hours, more plant and 
equipment and different work practices. The additional wages built into the contract 
were around £100,000, nowhere near as much as FOCSA had undercut the DSO. 
The overriding point made by Mr Bassam was that FOSCA had won the contract 
because they submitted a loss leader bid to the tune of four or five hundred thousand 
pounds.
That position won support from the local area officer of the GMB. He spoke against 
the idea of a more commercial approach arguing that if a company has the resources 
and decides it is going to win a contract then there is very little that can be done 
about it. As he argues:
"There is no point ravaging workers conditions simply to keep a
contract in-house."
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The Loss Leader Question
The Council’s officers are convinced that FOCSAs bid was not financially viable and 
implied an annual loss of between £400,000 and £500,000. What was seen as the 
Company's deliberate decision to stand a loss on the contract was condemned by 
council officers, elected members and union officials and used as a basis for getting 
the bid rejected.
The Council leader wrote to Jack Cunningham, Shadow Environment Secretary, so 
that the matter would be raised in Parliament. He pointed out that FOCSA was 
effectively cross subsidising the contract from profits made in other European cities 
and that DSOs do not have the same opportunities, due to the requirement that they 
show a 5% return. It was suggested that the practice introduced an element of unfair 
competition between the public and private sectors which needed to be addressed 
(Bassam, 1989). He later went on to argue that the bid was being used as a spearhead 
to the Company's expansionist plans, with clear consequences for the Council's 
Service:
7  do not believe that the competitive tendering legislation was 
designed to facilitate this, and the whole way in which we were 
obliged to let this contract to FOCSA, has, in my view, undermined the 
service and its long term viability in Brighton", adding that:
"Little consideration is given in the legislation to the impact on staff 
affected who are some of the most poorly paid in the councils service
(MJ, 12.1.90)
One Labour councillor argued strongly that the nature of the bid provided a basis for 
witholding the contract from FOCSA. Councillor Stanton believed that financial 
penalties would not protect the service since daily losses would be so great that the
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Company would be willing, in certain circumstances, to stand the penalties rather 
than do the work. On a wider scale it was pointed out that if the contract has been 
secured to attract attention in the hope of winning other contracts on a profitable 
basis, then once enough contracts have been secured, what is to stop FOCSA from 
dropping its commitments in Brighton, in return for the once only cost of the 
Council's penalty fee. Even the Financial Times noted that:
"Thomas Nunez [FOSCA Head of UK operations] makes no secret of 
the fact that he regards the Brighton contract as a potential stepping 
stone towards other similar contracts across Britain."
(FT. March 1990)
The Council's leadership decided to accept their legal advice which argued that 
acceptance of the bid was the only option. The matter was raised with Government 
Ministers though and was referred to the Office of Fair Trading, who, in a reply to 
Brighton Borough Council stated that:
"In this particular instance, the evidence supplied does not, by itself, 
appear to indicate that FOCSA is acting in a predatory manner.
Indeed, predation, which involves the acceptance of short term losses 
in order to raise prices at some time in the future seems unlikely when 
the length of these contracts and the recurring competitive tendering 
process are taken into account. It should of course be noted that a low 
tender bid is not, in itself, evidence of an anti-competitive practice."
(OFT, 1990)
When FOCSA Services' Brighton contract manager was faced with the question of 
whether the contract was being run on a commercial basis, one year into the contract 
in December 1990, he said:
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"It will be eventually. At the moment 1 don't think its really been run 
properly but hopefully, in the future, it will be a financial venture".
Whose Got a Job?
The decision to award the Contract to FOCSA was announced to the street cleansing 
workforce at a mass meeting on the 12th October 1989, when the workers were told 
that the Council had had no alternative but to accept the bid. Brighton Borough 
Council's Director of Technical Services said:
"We are devastated about the consequences to our own workforce but 
at least FOCSA has agreed to interview our men and indicated that 
those it employs will get comparable pay."
However, FOCSA then put up a wall of silence giving very little information to the 
ex-Council workers they were considering for employment. In turn, the Council 
leader demanded assurances on wages, conditions of employment and working 
practices, arguing that:
"Competitive tendering should not be used as an excuse for private 
employees to play fast and loose with the lives of staff."
(Evening Argos, 31.10.89)
It was the Council itself though, who were causing the workforce the most immediate 
distress. With redundancy arrangements not sorted out, the workforce stopped work 
on the 16th January 1990, demanding that the situation be cleared up. The Regional 
Organiser of the GMB said that the Council’s explanatory letters were 
incomprehensible, but the Council's chief executive argued that:
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"The letters outline dismissal from their cleaning jobs with the council 
which is a technicality."
(Evening Argos, 16.1.90)
The confusion came about because the Council wanted to redeploy as many workers 
as possible (who would then not be eligible for redundancy payments) and was still 
trying to interview the twenty-six workers who had not received a job offer. Union 
officers were claiming that staff who did not have jobs with FOCSA could lose 
redundancy pay if they did not accept compulsory redeployment.
In the end, of the 104 workers affected, 71 took redundancy and 33 were redeployed. 
Most of those taking redundancy were offered jobs with FOCSA, although some 
workers were offered unsuitable positions. Nine elderly women previously employed 
as toilet attendants were offered jobs as street sweepers. Pressure from the Council 
and unions forced a change of heart but concessions in other areas were less apparent.
FOCSA held two meetings with the Council workforce in October and two more in 
November, when it was promised that they would match the Council's conditions of 
employment. By January 1990, when the contract was due to start, they were 
refusing to establish a contributory pension scheme, only agreeing to employ Scottish 
Provident to manage one. Also, FOCSA was only prepared to pay statutory sick pay 
despite earlier assurances thot the national local government conditions of service 
would be maintained. They refused to rule out the possibility of seven day working 
on the basis of its new six day, 39 hour work rota, with a requirement to work 
Sundays if requested. The Company preferred to say that it was confident that 
weekend shifts would normally be worked by volunteers, failing to point out that if 
an employee did refuse Sunday overtime on two occasions, they would be dismissed.
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On the issue of trade union recognition, FOCSA was not prepared to give a decision 
and so through its inaction was in fact declining union recognition and threatening 
the existence of union organisation amongst the workforce, which had been 
supplemented by new locally recruited workers.
Working for FOCSA
The Company began operating the contract for Brighton's street cleansing service on 
Monday 29th January 1990, with assurances to the Council that the contract would 
"provide an example of how well a private company tackles street cleansing in a 
British seaside town."
Under the terms of the specification the Company took full responsibility for the 
contract. They were to provide depot, vehicles, plant, workforce and supervision. 
That responsibility soon resulted in changes in the way work was organised.
The working week was stretched out under a new shift system operating on the basis 
of a 6V2 bour day, 6 day week. The first shift runs from 6am to 1pm with a half hour 
break between 9am and 9.30am. The other shifts run from 1pm to 8pm and 4pm to 
midnight.
Promises that national rates of pay would be observed were cast aside. The Council's 
rate of pay, with four hours worked on Saturday and Sunday at the supplemented 
rates gave a driver about £180 take home pay. With FOCSA, again working 
Saturday (no supplemented rate) and four hours on a Sunday, the figure was reduced 
to £134. Holiday entitlements did remain unaltered.
The changes in the workers conditions of employment resulted in forty ex-Authority 
employees leaving FOCSA in the first two weeks of the contract. The Company was
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not concerned by the rate of turnover though, and they indicated to shop stewards 
who had raised the matter, that ex-Council employees were not the type they really 
wanted, since they had 'old attitudes'.
The workers who did stay became more antagonistic as other practices changed. 
They had to assemble in military fashion at the start of each shift to receive their 
instructions. Permission had to be granted to leave a beat and go to the toilet and 
employees were not allowed to speak to the public. Every week people were 
dismissed. Whether management or operative. Even FOCSAs Director of 
Operations was sacked during the contracts start up problems, which prompted the 
GMBs Area Officer to comment that:
"They suffer with communications problems and how to control 
workers. They used a very aggressive method of dealing with the 
staff"
The unions were powerless to influence the situation without a recognition 
agreement. Both NUPE and GMB applied formally for union recognition and 
FOCSA did interview both unions, although they chose to do this separately. NUPE 
put forward the view that both unions should be recognised as both already had 
members and could offer shop steward services. The unions argued that since they 
were both recognised by the Council there was no reason that FOCSA should behave 
differently. However, despite having employed an industrial relations consultant to 
conduct the interviews, the Company never even wrote back to give an answer on the 
recognition issue.
Without recognition for their unions and with grievances mounting, the workforce, 
through their shop stewards, issued a warning to FOCSA in March. They demanded
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the local authority pay and conditions they were promised and full trade union rights 
and made it clear that they would take strike action if the Company did not respond.
On Wednesday the 14th March a strike was called by the GMB to force the issue, but 
while around a quarter of the workforce came out, many others argued that there had 
been no ballot and so they would not join. Indeed several employees took on double 
shifts to make up the strikers' missed work. A ballot was organised for Saturday 17th 
March and two thirds of the 69 members voting supported the action.
In the meantime, 22 workers, including shop stewards, who had defied Company 
ultimatums to return to work, were sacked. A FOCSA spokesman said the strikers 
had:
"dismissed themselves ... They went ahead with unofficial and 
unnecessary action without even talking to us!"
(Evening Argos, 17.3.90)
The sacked workers set up an official picket on Monday 19th March and were joined 
by other new strikers. Shop stewards suggested that about half the workforce joined 
the action and that FOCSA had only about 70 employees working, made up of those 
defying the official strike call and employees drafted from Job Centres. FOCSA 
claimed that once it was known that they had vacancies there was no shortage of 
applicants and that they were working normally with around 120 workers.
The dispute then dragged on for months, during which time several meetings were 
held with FOCSA as the Company began to recognise the industrial actions' public 
relations implications. Despite the fact that an acceptable service was maintained and
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that strikers were drifting away, the Company decided nationally that they should 
renegotiate their positions.
NUPE officers believe that the Company was weighing up the different forces in 
different local authorities around the country in the search for a deal with one union. 
Regardless of the national situation, this approach seems applicable in Brighton 
where FOCSA finally signed an exclusive recognition agreement with the GMB in 
October 1990. The Company also offered jobs to those strikers who were dismissed, 
but all of them refused to work for FOCSA. Their resistance had a great deal to do 
with the GMBs achievement of total organisation on the contract though, which has 
contributed to a more stable industrial relations environment. As one GMB Area 
Officer now argues:
"We're not here to bring FOCSA down, we're here to provide a service 
for Brighton."
The Service
The FOCSA run street cleansing service in Brighton has not seen any revolution in 
techniques and has not been associated with an influx of new technology. If anything 
FOCSA have de-mechanised the service. Brighton did have large mechanical 
sweepers, mid range sweepers and small module pavement sweepers. FOCSA have 
only one large mechanical sweeper and the modules have been replaced by three 
wheel open backed vehicles into which dirt is manually shovelled. FOCSAs 
Brighton Contract Manager pointed out that in Spain, specifications are much higher 
with much more money going into contracts and this allows for the use of hi-tech 
equipment. In Brighton, the Company operates more on the basis of the needs of the 
day than under the Authority system, when there were detailed work schedules.
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Monitoring of the contract has shown up no major problems other than in the first 
month, when allowances were made for the Company's need to settle in. Indeed an 
independent assessment from the Director of the Lewis Cohen Urban Studies Centre, 
suggests that:
"there is no doubt that the streets are cleaner."
This is attributed to the removal of restrictive practices which has allowed FOCSA to 
be more flexible in its adjustment to particular problems.
Summary
As a consequence of FOCSA's success in winning the Other Cleaning contract in 
Brighton, the Town's street cleansing workforce has seen dramatic changes. One 
year into the contract in December 1990, the workforce had been reduced from 134 
with the Authority (projected 156) to 124. Allowing for overtime differentials and 
weekend working, average payment fell by around £40 per week. The contributory 
pension scheme and enhanced sickness benefits have been withdrawn. Over 50 
workers were sacked, accumulated employment rights, such as the right to claim 
unfair dismissal, were lost and trade union recognition has only been reinstated on the 
basis of a single union agreement, excluding NUPE members from representation.
The evidence suggests that the service itself has been provided to an acceptable 
standard, at a considerable cost saving to the Authority. The ability to maintain the 
service and the cost savings have been achieved at the expense of the workforce, with 
the imposition of conditions which resulted in 220 workers leaving the Company in 
the first year of the contract, out of a workforce total of only 124.
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Section 3: Case Study II. Refuse Collection in Liverpool.
Introduction
At the very heart of Merseyside, Liverpool City Council serves a population of nearly 
half a million people. The Council is the Region's biggest single employer with a 
payroll of around 28,000 people. The Authority is under Labour control, although 
power was only regained from a coalition of Liberal and Conservative councillors in 
the mid 1980s. Since then the collapse of Conservative support in the City has left 
Labour in control, despite severe internal divisions.
A Conflictual Context
The City's refuse collection contract had to be awarded by the 1st August 1991 under 
the terms of the Governments CCT legislation. But the build up to the tendering 
exercise was overshadowed by a major dispute, affecting the whole Authority, which 
ran throughout 1991.
Following the expulsion of 29 'Militant' Labour councillors from the Labour group in 
1990, a new moderate administration was formed which immediately initiated a 
programme of cuts, centred around a proposal to shed 900 jobs from the City's
29,000 strong workforce, in order to avoid facing a £10 million budget deficit and the 
possibility of councillors being surcharged.
386 redundancies amongst grounds maintenance and security staff were agreed at a 
full council meeting in March 1991, since there was an acceptance on all sides that 
some jobs would have to go. The main sticking point was an objection to 
compulsory redundancies. There was some hope that workers losing their jobs but
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not wanting redundancy would be able to transfer to other positions within the 
Authority.
The confrontation came to a head when a second batch of 600 compulsory 
redundancies in building, maintenance, cleansing and education was pushed through 
'by the back door' at a finance committee meeting on March 27th. The unions argued 
that this should not have happened while discussions were continuing with the 
Council's Chief Executive about alternative cost savings. The spokesman for the 
Joint Trade Union Committee (JTUC) expressed their feelings:
"We thought these discussions were making progress but then the 
Council issued these redundancy notices without any consultation. On 
that basis, until they withdraw the threat of compulsory redundancies 
the trade unions are not prepared to enter into any further 
negotiations."
(Daily Post, 12.4.91)
The Unions decided on a three day strike from April 16th, timed to coincide with the 
full Council meeting on the 17th April, with a mass march through the City centre to 
the Town Hall on that day. The Chair of the JTUC argued that:
"Industrial action is the only way we can force councillors to change 
their minds. We have been very reasonable and tried every other 
means but we feel this is our last resort."
The Authority was in no mood to climb down though with the Council leader stating:
"These people think they can hold us to ransom but there is no way 
they will succeed."
(Daily Post, 4.4.91)
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Calls for an eleventh hour meeting by regional officers of the local government 
unions were 'dismissed out of hand' and the impression developed that the dispute 
was about more than just the 900 redundancies. The conflict was increasingly seen as 
an attempt to break the trade unions' control over much of the Council's activity 
(Daily Post, 18.4.91).
However, most of the unions involved balloted in favour of the three day strike and
20,000 workers stopped work on the 16th April, shutting down virtually all Liverpool 
City Council services. On the same day though, it became clear that 500 workers had 
volunteered for redundancy, leaving the Authority to find only 400 more to meet its 
quota. This did not weaken the unions stand and when they agreed to meet with the 
City's ruling Labour group it was made clear that if they did not achieve their 
objectives, a series of selective strikes would be launched. As the NALGO Branch 
Secretary put it:
"If he [the Council leader] wont listen, we will launch a series of 
selective strikes on Friday in key areas of the Council to cause 
maximum disruption. That will continue indefinately until we get 
satisfaction."
The Static Security Force
The influence of the Government's CCT legislation on the dispute became clearer 
with the issuing of a letter to 1000 workers in the Council's Environmental Services 
Department, covering grounds maintenance, landscape, cemetery and security 
workers. 220 of the 950 redundancies were to come from this department, even 
though there were far fewer volunteers than in other sections. The letter, from the 
Department's Director, Ken Robinson, argued that it was necessary to lose a quarter 
of the Department’s 1000 workers in order to save the other 750. The section was
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expecting to make a loss on its contracts during the financial year, raising the spectre 
of its closure by the Secretary of State.
Other observers have argued that the concentration of redundancies amongst this 
group of workers was instigated as an act of political vindictiveness. The workers are 
largely members of the GMBs Branch 5, which rose to prominence during the mid 
1980s, when Militant and Derek Hatton dominated Liverpool politics, and provided 
the Static Security Force, which policed the City's municipal buildings during that 
era.
The Force had an important political role. If industrial action was to be made 
effective across the Authority there was a requirement that as many Council premises 
as possible be locked shut, and it was the Branch 5 members who performed this 
function. This brought members of the security force into conflict with moderate 
members of the Labour group at the time, and is now identified as a reason for the 
heavy redundancies forced upon them. One worker argued:
"These redundancies have nothing to do with council efficiency. This 
is the settling of scores."
The argument is given credence by the apparent development of a new force, the 
Special Investigations Unit, modelled on the old lines but loyal to the new moderate 
leadership and having the aim of keeping council premises open at all costs in the 
midst of the industrial action. The Independent reported that prospective recruits to 
this new Unit were told:
"no specific qualifications are required, but 'analytical skills' and 
'experience in industrial relations' would be an advantage."
(Independent, 19.6.91)
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Mounting Rubbish
Even though the binmen were not brought out in the selective strike action launched 
by the Town Hall unions there was a considerable backlog of rubbish building in the 
City, as a result of the three day strike, the easter break and dispute over the Council’s 
preparations for CCT, which had involved reducing the number of rounds and re­
routing existing ones (see CCT and the Refuse Collection Service below). By the end 
of April, management was trying to get the problem sorted out and offered overtime 
in order to get the backlog cleared. The offer was rejected and an overtime ban was 
imposed by the unions in opposition to the 25 compulsory redundancies to come 
from the refuse collectors and in sympathy with the other council workers facing 
redundancy.
On the 29th April the Council ordered the binmen to go back to normal working and 
to clear the backlog in two weeks, or face the loss of bonuses worth up to £60 a 
week. The ultimatum was rejected by the workforce who then received a lock out 
threat from the Authority without warning. The Council’s deputy leader explained:
"We will be asking the employees to do their jobs, and if they refuse 
they cannot be expected to be paid."
The worker's GMB convener responded by saying:
'They have lost the ability to manage the service, now they believe the 
only way to get off the hook is to get us out on strike."
(Daily Post, 25.5.91)
By the 8th May the Council was calling for a return to negotiations, since all 133 of 
the required redundancies from the refuse service, including the 25 projected as
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compulsory, had been met by volunteers. The unions' position remained resolute 
however, as the JTUC spokesman declared:
"The cleansing department will not meet Mr Bounds (chief executive) 
because, as part of the JTUC, they will not talk until the threat of 
compulsory redundancies as a whole has been withdrawn from the 
Council"
(Daily Post, 9.5.91)
On the 14th May the Council carried out its threat to stop the binmens' bonuses as the 
backlog of rubbish continued to build, with half the City having waited over four 
weeks for a collection service.
CCT and the Refuse Collection service
The Councils Approach
When the CCT process began in 1988, Liverpool City Council was under the control 
of a left of centre administration led by Keva Coombes. At the time, the Council was 
totally committed to keeping all of its services in-house with no job losses. In line 
with that commitment, a tripartite body was established with councillor, officer and 
union representatives, based on the AMAs recommendations.
The committee prepared the bid for the Council's building cleaning contract and, in 
the knowledge that there would be no compulsory redundancies, was able to make 
the necessary cuts to win the contract. 800 cleaners did lose their jobs, but all of 
those wanting it were offered re-deployment within the Authority. The problem was 
that the workers losing their jobs were largely moved into clerical positions, creating 
animosity between the declining blue collar unions and the expanding white collar
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unions. Following this experience, blue collar unions such as the GMB and TGWU 
adopted a more isolated attitude towards the CCT process, believing that they were 
better able to defend their members interests by negotiating independently.
This development combined with the ousting of Keva Coombes in March 1990 to 
create a different approach within the Authority. The new administration made it 
clear that it wanted to reduce trade union and elected member influences over the 
management of the Authority’s activities. The appointment of a new chief executive 
confirmed this desire which led to a more 'professional' approach, where the 
management and officers run the Council and councillors concentrate on policy. 
Inevitably this meant a reduction in trade union involvement, leading the Chair of the 
JTUC to comment:
"After Keva Coombes was 'bounced' the complexion and approach of 
councillors changed and the joint approach towards saving the 
services just wasn't there. The co-operation and tripartite thing fell 
away and basically it became an officer led approach with the unions 
being called on now and again."
Union Concessions and Resistance v Management Apathy?
As far as the refuse collection contract was concerned negotiating between the drivers 
union, the TGWU, the loaders union, the GMB and the Council, began in early 1990. 
The service had employed around 520 men in total and used 60 vehicles for 
household waste collection. There was a recognition on all sides that if the contract 
was to be won these figures would have to come down.
In February 1990, it was agreed that the number of vehicles be reduced from 60 to 45 
with the loss of around 60 men and that the passage sweeper with each crew, who 
pushed the empty bins back into place, should go, amounting to another 60 job
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losses. A decision was also taken, as part of the reorganisation, that the fourteen 
depots the Authority had around the City be closed and replaced by one central depot 
at Breckside Park.
The Unions agreed to these changes on the basis of the Council's continuing 
commitment to redeploy staff into the street cleansing section, but they were not 
prepared to let the staff go to under 400. The Authority was looking to cut the 
workforce to around 275 but they were trapped by agreements that staff would have 
to be transferred to street cleansing, which was itself already heavily overmanned.
When it became clear that the refuse service was to be included in the Authority’s 
wider plans for manning reductions, with 25 of the 133 job losses being marked for 
compulsory redundancy, negotiations came to a stand still. A three day strike took 
place in protest at the job cuts and problems over the reorganisation of the service 
following the reduction to 45 vehicles on 1st April 1991. This was followed by an 
involvement in the Council wide action over redundancies and another dispute over 
the 'picking up' of the resulting backlog.
The refuse collectors and, to some extent, their union representatives simply did not 
believe that the Authority would privatise the service, regardless of the cost of 
keeping it in-house. The process had been gone through before under the Liberal 
administration in 1982, at which time the unions offered no co-operation, and the 
plans were dropped with the election of a Labour Council. There was a feeling that 
things would be no different this time around. As the Councils Director of the 
Cleansing Department's client side says:
"The union simply didn't believe there was any possibility of the
Council awarding the contract to a private tender, regardless of the
price. Not the full-time officers but the men locally, and so they
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weren't prepared to negotiate changes in working practices, especially 
on productivity levels."
The chaotic state that the service was in at the time tended to confirm this opinion, as 
the GMBs convener noted:
"The theory among the men was 'who the hell is going to come here in 
the middle of all this?' "
There were a number of differences to the situation in 1982 though, not least that the 
completion of the CT process was compulsory as was the requirement to award the 
contract to the lowest tenderer provided the contract would be fulfilled. This
combined with what the unions saw as an apparent lack of commitment on the part of 
the Authority to keep the service in-house.
The original manager of cleansing resigned a year before the contract was due to go 
out and was not replaced until several months later. The new manager came in in an 
acting capacity, having been transferred from the Building Works and Maintenance 
Department. He had no experience of cleansing whatsoever, yet he was responsible 
for compiling the Council's bid for the refuse collection contract. The Chair of the 
JTUC was certainly not happy with the appointment and argues that:
"If the Council were sincere in their intentions they would have 
immediately re-deployed, getting someone in who could put together a 
very strong bid. That didn't happen."
This attitude must be countered by the fact that the officers concerned already knew 
the reality of what had to be done to win the contract. One key officer says that the 
cleansing departments original estimate of the cost of the service was only about 
£300,000 outside the eventual winning tender. However, the unions refused to
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negotiate on reducing manning below 400 which meant the required tender price 
could never be met.
The Tenders
Tenders were invited by the Client Services sub committee in April 1991 from the 
three companies completing the pre tender qualification process. In the event only 
two tenders were submitted with the third arriving after the June 1st deadline and 
remaining unopened. The two bids received for the seven year contract were:
Liverpool City Council DSO £7,896,094 per annum
Onyx (UK Waste Control) Ltd £3,923,021 per annum
The main reason for the disparity between the bids was found to be in the anticipated 
productivity levels, Onyx insisting that they could operate with half the staff that the 
DSO was planning to use (see Table 38). Furthermore the workforce would 
experience a dramatic deterioration in its terms and conditions under Onyx as 
illustrated in Table 39.
Resources and work requirements Onyx UK DSO
Number of operational vehicles 32 49
Other vehicles 17 + hire if needed 27
Average weight per vehicle per day
a) 24 tonne GVW 22 tonnes 16 tonnes
b) 17 tonne GVW 13 tonnes 11 tonnes
Total staff: 208 415
Management 8 13
Loaders 106 230
Other operatives 94 172
Domestic properties per loader 400 200
Average tonnes per loader per day 5.37 tonnes 2.4 tonnes
Reserve to cover absence 11% 25%
Table 38: Planned resources to be applied to Liverpool refuse collection contract bv
Onyx and the Councils DSO. 
Source: Liverpool City Council, 1991.
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Terms and Benefits Onyx UK DSO
Working week (hours) 40 35
Working day (hours) 8 7
Pay per week, i) loader £160 £187
including bonus ii) ganger N/A £201
excluding iii) driver £190 £210
overtime iv) foreman £210 N/A
Holidays 3/4 weeks 4/5 weeks
Pension None Local Authority Scheme
Sick pay year 1 Statutory sick pay only 1 month/full; 2 months/half
Sick pay maximum 2 weeks/full; 1 week/half 6 months/full; 6 months/half
entitlement (after 2 years) (after 5 years)
Table 39: Comparative pav and conditions of Onyx and Liverpool Citv Council 
DSO for refuse collectors in Liverpool.
Source: Liverpool City Council, 1991.
The Evaluation Process
The acting Director of Cleansing, recommended in his evaluation of the 17th June 
1991 (Liverpool City Council, 1991), that the Council accept the Onyx bid which 
would produce a saving over the seven year period of £24.5 million. He explains:
"If you consider that they [the Unions] would not go below 400 men 
and the cost per man is around £12,000 per year then it is a matter of 
simple arithmetic that you come up with £4.8 million, with inflation 
that made £5.1 million. The extra vehicle hire brought the bid up to 
£8 million.
"The winning Onyx bid was £4 million since they came in with a figure 
not for 400 men but for 200, doing 32 rounds not 60. That was the 
difference and that's why we lost."
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The unions were furious with the acting Director's support for the Onyx bid and the 
attitude of the Council in general. The Regional Officer of the GMB sums up the 
feeling:
"/ don't know how you can have a professional who puts in a tender 
for twice the price of his competitor and then starts praising and 
defending the other bid. You would have thought he would claim it 
was a loss leader or that you can't do it for that price but in fact he 
immediately defended it.
"It really goes to show what the whole Council was about. They were 
really trying to smack peoples' arses and say 'look we'll teach you a 
lesson for whats gone on in the past amongst the refuse collectors'."
Even at this stage though, the unions remained confident that the bid would not be 
accepted. The feeling was that the tender was simply too low, that the contract could 
not be properly resourced at that price, and consequently that it was in fact a loss 
leader, which the Authority would not accept. The sub committee receiving the 
tender evaluation on Monday 17th June put off the decision until the full council 
meeting on Wednesday 19tn June when the unions were due to hold a day of action 
as a part of the continuing dispute over City Council redundancies. However, 
councillors were still indicating that the service would be privatised bearing in mind 
the nature of the Government’s legislation.
At this point, the unions brought in Jonathon Swallow, head of the Competition 
Advice Project, an independent public sector consultancy, to provide an alternative 
evaluation of the tenders. At short notice a report was drawn up (Swallow, N.D.) 
which identified twelve areas of concern with regard to the Onyx bid. The points 
ranged from the financial status of tenderers, through health and safety, race 
relations, productivity rates, methods of operation, rates of pay and other issues but
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the main focus was on the 'lack of technical merit' in the Onyx tender and its 
perceived status as a loss leader. He pointed out that 20 to 30 councils have rejected 
lowest tenders on the basis that they would not be capable of meeting the 
specification. He went on to point out that no councillors have been surcharged for 
such activity but that the threat did hang over councillors who made awards which 
resulted in a major breakdown of services and consequent recovery costs to the 
council.
On the day of the decisive Council meeting the unions were able to use the report to 
try and influence the councillors decisions. One GMB officer at the centre of 
attempts to talk the politicians and officers out of privatising the contract explains:
"We went to the Council and said 'look, we're not saying give us the 
contract because we're in-house and we're better than them', as we 
recognised our bid was probably a bit over the top. All we said was 
'let's take some time to consider the recommendations in this report'.
But the officers responsible for the bid and the elected members 
immediately distanced themselves from it. It was a case of 'we don't 
want to know, we've got two tenders in, one of £4 million and one of 
£8 million, end of story, game over'."
A combination of moderate Labour and Liberal Democrat councillors took the 
decision to award the contract to Onyx by 58 votes to 30 at the Council meeting on 
the 19th June 1991, rejecting a call from the Liverpool Labour councillors group for 
a full investigation of Onyx before any decision be taken. The decision was taken in 
the glare of national publicity, with a debate over the Council's redundancy proposals 
and a visit by Neil Kinnock, leader of the Labour party, to the Liverpool Walton 
constituency on the same day.
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The animosity which had built up between councillors and the unions and the 
consequent reluctance to consider the refuse workers concerns, was summed up by 
the Chair of the Policy and Resources Committee who announced that:
"We are not prepared to continue with the obscenity of sacrificing City 
services to the political agenda of a small number of our workforce "
(Burton, 1991 a)
This position was supported by David Blunkett, the Labour Party's local government 
spokesman, with his statement that:
"Delivering services and protecting the interests of users of services 
must be the top priority - not protecting vested interests at their 
expense
(Blunkett, 1991)
A Widening Dispute
The decision to award Onyx the refuse collection contract was taken at the same 
meeting which confirmed the Council's intention of pressing ahead with its other 
redundancy proposals which had provoked escalating industrial action in the City. In 
the run up to the meeting, Town Hall unions balloted their members across the 
Authority on the possibility of selective strike action, with NALGO threatening to 
pull out its key members in the Treasury department, who could force the Council 
into bankruptcy, and GMB Branch 5 proposing an all out strike of its 1200 members, 
including cemeteiy workers.
Undaunted by the threats, the Council's move was confirmed, although 94 of the 274 
planned compulsory redundancies (the others had been taken up by volunteers) were
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withdrawn, following an alliance between Broad Left councillors expelled from the 
Labour Party and Liberal Democrats. An ultimatum was also put to the City's refuse 
collectors which set a midnight deadline for an end to the overtime ban, preventing a 
clearance of the rubbish backlog. The meeting gave the Chief Executive immediate 
authority:
"to ‘strike back and clean up the City', using private firms if 
necessary"
(Guardian, 20.6.91)
The threats and counter threats placed the City’s industrial relations in a state of 
chaos, with the General Secretary of the GMB, John Edmonds, intervening to 
demand a suspension of the planned strike action by gravediggers and crematorium 
workers, until such time as the dispute could be considered by the Union’s National 
Executive.
The midnight deadline for a return to normal working by binmen passed without any 
assurances from the unions, with the GMB branch convenor, stating that:
"1 do not intend to let the matter lie, this is an act of political spite and 
vindictiveness, the matter will not end here."
(Daily Post, 20.6.91)
A meeting was held on the 20th June and the men decided to continue with their 
work to rule pending clarification of the decision to privatise the service.
Local leaders of the GMB decided on the 21st June to ballot all members in the nine 
GMB branches covering Liverpool City Council employees, including the refuse
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collectors, on all out strike action in order to force a climb down on the redundancy 
issue, creating a dilemma for the Union's national leadership. The GMB was 
attempting to maintain an image of industrial and political moderation, but did not 
want to undermine local negotiators, despite militant leadership from such figures as 
Ian Lowes, Chair of GMB Branch 5 and expelled from the Labour Party in 1986 for 
membership of Militant. There is general agreement in the Union that Liverpool City 
Council has been incompetent in handling the refuse collection tender, but frustration 
that the politics of the City prevent the advocation of a straightforward industrial case 
(FT, 22.6.91).
The GMBs 300 binmen continued to defy the Council at another mass meeting on 
Monday 24th June, despite threats to start the Onyx contract early and the fact that 
redundancy payments would be based on the last weeks earnings of employees, 
giving them an incentive to return to normal working. There was no agreement to the 
Council's terms for cleaning the backlog of rubbish in the City, which involved a 
requirement to pick the work up in three weeks, in return for the restoration of the 
£60 a week bonus, overtime on three Saturdays worth £150 and a lump sum of £150, 
due to a fear that failure to meet the deadline would affect bonus payments. They did 
agree to go back to normal five day working and to abandon the work to rule, which 
it was hoped would be enough to restore the bonus payment essential for the full 
redundancy package. Following assurances from the Authority that bonuses would 
not be affected by performance in the clear up operation, the workforce 
overwhelmingly agreed to the Council's deal on Thursday 25th June. The attitude of 
the workforce was expressed by their union convener:
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"We are all losing our jobs and thats bad enough but they were 
holding a gun to our heads as well. We might be down but we are not 
going to be kicked. We were not going down on our knees to them.
We know when we have got to go, but we are determined to go out 
with our heads up."
(FT, 25.6.91)
The threat of all out industrial action by the GMB gradually evaporated following the 
collapse of opposition amongst the refuse collectors. On the 2nd July, national union 
officers decided against authorising a ballot on the stepping up of industrial action, as 
the Authority warned of a further 1100 job losses if action continued. The action was 
regarded as undermining the Council's ability to compete with private contractors in 
the CCT process (Daily Post, 3.7.91). The GMB withdrew from the dispute on the 
1st August, leaving NALGO on its own in the battle to prevent compulsory 
redundancies until they settled in the New Year.
Working for Onvx
Onyx was brought in by the City Council two weeks ahead of the official 29th July 
start date, to help clear the 12,000 tonne backlog of rubbish in the City. Over a 
hundred of the Authority's 461 refuse collectors took early retirement, leaving the 
service short handed in the run up to the contract start date, so the Company was paid 
an additional £100,000 to help with the rubbish clearance, alongside the City's 
workforce, employing 72 agency workers, on a casual basis, along with 12 of its own 
refuse vehicles.
When the contract proper started, Onyx took on around 190 ex-City Council binmen 
on the terms and conditions noted in Table 39 above. To begin with they were joined 
by the 12 temporary crews already operating, to help clear the backlog by the end of 
the Company’s three week deadline, but by the beginning of October, Onyx was still
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employing nearly 300 men and 60 vehicles in order to keep to the terms of the 
contract.
The additional staff were provided by an employment agency called E.C.C.O., the 
subsidiary of another French based multinational E.C.C.O. S.A., which pays the staff 
£1 an hour less than those employed directly by Onyx. One employee suggested that 
these workers would gradually replace those recruited from the Council:
"No matter how many Council binmen they take on, over a period of 
months they'll sack them. They only want their knowledge. They'll 
pick their brains and then slowly but surely, whether by casuals or 
YTS lads, they'll be replaced. Its the only way they'll be able to make 
ends meet.
"Eighteen guys have been sacked already for no real reason, just that 
they were 'unsuitable for the job', but we are talking about lads with 
up to 30 years service."
The GMB branch convener added:
"They will just have a casual workforce, employed by an agency ...
Any personnel problems are then dealt with by the agency and are 
nothing to do with Onyx which keeps their image clean."
Aside from the changing employment relationship applied to some of the workforce, 
the Contractor has far more control over the workforce in general. The agency gangs 
are out at 6a.m. and the Onyx workers at 7a.m. There is no time for the workforce to 
gather and discuss problems over a cup of tea, it is straight into the job. The lunch 
break has been cut to half an hour and the workers must remain with their vehicle 
during this period, cleaning their hands with 'baby wipes'.
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It is all part of a strategy to get the gangs competing with one another to achieve the 
maximum effort levels. One Onyx employee describes the process:
"They get the lads 'whipped up' before they go out, in the same way as 
you see in McDonalds. A gang will come in with 30 tonnes of rubbish, 
a lot for one day, and say look boss done 30 tonnes today' and the 
boss will say '32 tomorrow lads, Beat 5 did 35 today'. So they are 
competing against each other on the one hand but at the same time 
there's no time for them to sit down and discuss it, because the 
Company gets them in at 7a.m, whips them up and gets them straight 
out.
"They've also split the old gangs up. Of all the guys who stayed on, 
there might have been two or three or four who worked on the same 
gang, but now they've all been put into different beats so that all the 
old methods and practices were lost."
The biggest problem is the deterioration in terms and conditions. As the union 
convener describes:
"With regards to privatisation, by far the worst affected are the people 
now working for the contractor because the job has just gone back 
thirty or forty years in terms of the conditions of employment. That 
has to be the worst aspect of privatisation. There is nothing a local 
authority could do that would be worse."
Union Recognition
Despite all the difficulties the GMB was always confident of securing a recognition 
agreement. At first the Company was resistant, but the GMBs Regional Organiser 
had discussions with the Company and explained how the politics of the City could 
easily change, leaving a group in charge who would be very hostile towards them. 
Furthermore, the tradition of union organisation and militancy amongst the workforce
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suggested that it would be hard to resist the Union's pressure in the long run. Onyx 
UKs Managing Director admitted as much when he said:
"We do not negotiate with unions at the moment but we do not rule it
out in the future "
(Daily Post, 21.6.91).
Once Onyx started to dismiss people the pressure to recognise the Union intensified, 
with the men more determined to stand up to the Company, since there was not even 
a disciplinary or dismissal procedure in place, something that the men recognised 
could only come about through union recognition. Two of the old local authority 
shop stewards were employed by Onyx and they began to organise the men. The 
temporary workers from E.C.C.O. were not interested in joining the Union but, of the 
130 or so ex-Authority workers who got jobs with Onyx, about 60 were recruited 
back into the GMB. The logistics of this process were extremely complicated as 
union subscriptions had to be collected manually, whilst the workforce was never 
congregated in any one place at any one time, due to the new methods of 
organization. There was also a resistance to join amongst many workers who were 
scared of the consequences and who had just gone through a long and ultimately 
unsuccessful struggle.
The Union's ability to maintain a membership base using manual collections provided 
the groundwork for forcing the recognition issue and meetings between Onyx and the 
GMB continued, with a recognition agreement finally being signed on the 17th 
December 1991. By June 1992 this had helped the Union to recruit around 140 of the 
200 Onyx employees and put an end to the dismissals that the Company had handed 
out prior to the agreement.
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Onyx have continued to refuse to grant any concessions to the TGWU, who used to 
organise the refuse drivers, and seem happier dealing with just one union.
Monitoring
The Authority's Client Services Department introduced a monitoring system to 
oversee the operation of its contracts and on the refuse collection contract this works 
in two ways. Firstly, complaints are monitored along with the Contractor's response 
to them. Secondly, random checks are made on streets in nine specified areas of the 
City.
Points are awarded against the contractor, depending on whether any failures are in a 
low or high priority area. In a low priority area poor quality earns 0.1 penalty points 
and in a high priority area 0.2 penalty points. A missed bin earns one or two points 
respectively. If the contract earns 15,000 points in four weeks or 45,000 in six weeks 
this would provide a basis for termination of the contract.
The contractor is given instructions to put failures right within a specified period and 
failure to do so earns a double penalty. Each penalty point earns a £1 administration 
fee and since it only costs around 25p to empty each bin failure proves quite 
expensive to the contractor.
No comprehensive report on the performance of the Contractor had been complied by 
the summer of 1992 but the unions are under the clear impression that Onyx is not 
sticking to the terms of the contract. Performance targets have not been met despite a 
15% over resourcing of the contract by Onyx, according to the Councils Director of 
Cleansing's Client Services. Of more significance to the unions is that the 
specification requires refuse collectors to carry identity cards which would help 
reduce the use of casual labour, but this requirement is not being enforced. Neither is
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the restriction on working hours which prevents collections after 4.30 p.m, with some 
gangs out as late as 8.00 p.m.
The workforce feels that councillors should be making sure that every part of the 
contract is fulfilled in order to assist the DSO in winning the work back in-house. 
There is a strong feeling that this is not happening because the Authority would 
prefer to see the contract in private hands in order to "teach the unions a lesson". As 
the GMBs Regional Officer argues:
7  believe the Council really didn't give a damn about the bin service 
because of the problems that the unions gave them. So its the old idea 
that if you smack the biggest fella then everyone else collapses behind 
him, and sure enough, since we lost the bin service the attitude of the 
rest of the workforce has changed."
The Aftermath - Sfreet Cleansing
Liverpool's Street Cleansing service was awarded to the Council's DSO on the 21st 
October 1991. Management consultants, Coopers and Lybrand had been brought in, 
and came up with a package with which the unions fully co-operated, following the 
loss of the refuse collection contract, and which undercut the only competitor, Onyx, 
by £1.2 million per annum.
The service was mechanised, 280 jobs were lost and working patterns changed to 
bring in two shifts of 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. and 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. along with an increase in 
the working week from 35 hours to 39. On top of this, an additional 107 job cuts 
were made at the beginning of October to secure the contract, which meant an overall 
reduction in the street cleansing workforce of 70%. Only 176 of the original 560 
workers were kept on by the Authority, although most of those leaving took 
voluntary redundancy and early retirement.
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The City Council's Director of Cleansing, describes the new approach:
"This time we sorted out exactly what we needed to provide a service 
and built up a workforce around that, rather than picking away at the 
old service, and in that process we have had tremendous co-operation 
from the unions.
One of the street cleaners shop stewards explained the change in attitude:
"We’ve learned our lesson. What ever happens you’ve got to win the 
contract and keep them [private contractors] out. It isn’t about 
competing for the best service its competing for the lowest cost, 
because Onyx has dragged us down to their level even though it means 
we won’t have enough men to do the job properly and that working 
conditions are going back twenty years.”
Union Responses and Concluding Comments
A combination of factors made the privatisation of refuse collection in Liverpool 
quite unique. The conflictual nature of politics in the City, the intense industrial 
strife gripping the Authority at the time that the tender was prepared, the history of 
strength within the Town Hall unions, the Labour Party's desire to stand up to 
Militant in the midst of a by-election in the City and the apparent willingness of 
Onyx to make a loss on the contract, all combined to leave the DSO bid hopelessly 
uncompetitive.
The result has been a dramatic shift in trade union thinking in the City. The GMB 
convenor who was the principle defender of the refuse collector's jobs and conditions 
before the contract was lost, has fundamentally altered his perspective:
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"I will draw the line at cutting the actual terms and conditions, wages, 
holidays, sick pay, pensions etc, but you have, and its very sad to say, 
to budge on the number of men you employ. But if the Council doesn't 
back you up then you've got no chance anyway, and if the contractor 
wants the work badly enough then thats it too. I mean this was a 
flagship for Onyx. If they can come here in the middle of this mess
and sort it out, then they can do it anywhere."
The GMBs Regional Officer says that there must be a concentration on defending the 
service by drawing up a rigid specification which will tie contractors down. A policy 
which is dependant upon the exercise of a political will, on the part of the Authority, 
to keep the service in-house. The extent to which that political will is expressed in 
Liverpool has become dependant upon the trade unions acceptance of management 
initiative. The influence of CCT in that process cannot be overstated. Indeed the 
dispute surrounding the award of the refuse collection contract in Liverpool must be 
seen as a watershed in the balance of trade union thinking about how to respond to 
CCT. The fundamentalist position of all out localised resistance to any cuts was
demonstrably shown to be lacking, in a City which has shown itself better able to
resist the tide of change in local government than most others.
Section 4: Case Study III. Building Cleaning in Rotherham
Introduction
Situated in South Yorkshire the Authority is a Metropolitan Borough Council serving 
a population of around a quarter of a million people. There is a mixture of rural and 
urban areas within the Borough boundaries, but the Council represents an essentially 
industrial region.
The politics of the Authority is totally dominated by the Labour Party which holds all 
but one of the seats on the Council.
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Preparing for Competition
The Policy
The Council's leader, Sir Jack Layden, who is also chair of the Labour led 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities, made the Council's position on CCT quite 
clear in 1987, when he stated that:
"We will fight for all these services [the defined activities]. We have 
sought over the years to provide a high level of service consistent with 
available resources.
It is the view of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council that this 
objective is generally best served by the direct employment of local 
people."
(Rotherham Advertiser, 20.11.87)
This reflected the policy agreed by the Authority's Policy and Resources Committee 
on the 30th July 1987:
"It [the Authority] considers that the imposition of tendering is not in 
the best interests of effective senice provision or, indeed, in the longer 
term, economy.
It is determined, therefore, to take all necessary steps to ensure that, 
within the law and as far as possible, services provided directly by the 
Councils own employees continue to be so provided."
(Rotherham MBC, 1987)
231
The first test of this commitment was to come with preparations for the Borough's 
building cleaning contract, due to begin on the 24th July 1989.
The Councils Approach
As with most authorities the CT exercise was approached on two levels, from the 
service provision side and from the client side. A DLO was established to prepare in- 
house tenders and a working party was created on the client side. The group initially 
drew together representatives from all of the departments currently employing 
cleaners directly, but this was then reduced to a smaller group consisting of officers 
from the major employers of cleaners, the Education and Housing departments, from 
Financial Services, Personnel Resources and a solicitor. Client and DLO boards 
incorporating trade union representatives were not established, but the unions were 
fully involved in discussions on CCT issues and were encouraged to submit 
suggestions on the formulation of Council policy and to inform their members of the 
effects of CCT. Indeed three trade union officers, from the three major unions, 
NUPE, NALGO, and the GMB, were seconded on a full-time basis, to fulfil this 
function.
The need for trade union co-operation was particularly apparent in the preparation of 
the DLO bid for the building cleaning contract. The unions were requested to 
appoint a small group of their representatives, who were actively involved with the 
cleaning workforce, in order to have consultations with Council officers about the 
tendering process within the service. The workers appointed were shop stewards and 
came from six sites across the Borough, where they were employed as caretakers. 
They co-operated with the Authority in preparing and monitoring "dummy run" 
exercises in their buildings, on the basis of the productivity levels amongst cleaners 
that the DLO was trying to achieve.
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The intention was to provide a level of service which was no less and no more than 
that already in place. As a representative from the Council's Management Services 
Unit put it:
"What we tried to do with the specification was to put into words what 
was already happening at the present time.
"The only changes were to be those to correct minor faults in certain 
areas, but basically the service to be provided was the same as that 
already operating."
Increasing DLO Prodctivity
Bearing this in mind, the DLO was aware that in order to compete with private 
contractors, cuts would have to be made in the labour element of the service's cost. 
Under the old arrangements, the Authority had employed around 900 cleaners who 
were expected to clean about 250 square foot per cleaning hour. The intention was to 
double this performance level, through the introduction of revised working methods 
and new equipment alongside reductions in staffing.
The Borough was split up into four areas and a separate contract was drawn up for 
each one. The DLO planned to employ around 150 cleaners in each area reducing the 
overall workforce by a third. As the Council operated a no compulsory redundancy 
policy, cleaning workers were offered redeployment or voluntary severance terms, 
which successfully brought the payroll down to the required level.
Prior to the introduction of CCT cleaners hours varied tremendously, ranging from 
single figures to over thirty hours a week. The DLO decided to impose a ceiling if 
12'/2 hours in order to keep the cleaners below the national insurance contribution
233
(NIC) threshold, which comes into effect when workers are employed for over 
sixteen hours a week. The new ceiling also meant that the work could be organised 
in 2V2 hour, daily, single shifts, avoiding the extra payments required if cleaners 
worked two shifts, morning and evening.
What were not to be changed were the nationally agreed terms and conditions such as 
rates of pay, sick pay and holiday entitlements, nor were the provisions for those 
cleaners wishing to remain superannuated. The changes that were agreed in order to 
bring down labour costs are summarised in Table 40 below:
Teims and Conditions Alterations
Pay Switch from cash to direct payment into bank account
Hours Hours reduced to between 8 and 12 V? hours
Bonus No bonus scheme (Only applied to Housing 
Department cleaners - bought out)
Holidays For school cleaners annual leave only to be taken 
during school holidays
Work organisation Single shift patterns
Table 40: Changes in working conditions for cleaners employed bv Rotherham 
Metropolitan Borough Council DLO.
Source: Rotherham MBC, 1988
It should also be noted that the reduction in employees hours to below the NIC 
threshold also eliminates entitlements to certain statutory benefits such as statutory 
sick pay and rights to claim unfair dismissal. This is not significant so long as 
nationally agreed terms and conditions are maintained, but if they were to be 
threatened, then the loss of statutory backup benefits would represent a considerable 
additional blow to the employees. This situation seems quite conceivable, since the 
fact that private cleaning contractors tend not to pay sick pay and that the Authority’s 
payment of sickness benefit represented around 6% of the wage bill, did not go 
unnoticed.
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The Tenders
Eleven external contractors along with the Council's own DLO expressed an interest 
in the building cleaning contracts, five of whom withdrew after receiving the 
Authority's detailed questionnaire. Of the six firms left, other than the DLO, three 
were called to interview on the 16th December 1988. They were Caroll and 
Smallpage, CCA and Initial Contract Services (ICS), all of whom were subsequently 
invited to tender. Caroll and Smallpage and CCA both pulled out of the tendering 
exercise, complaining about the amount of paperwork required to prepare a tender 
and the size of the performance bond in the contract. That left ICS, who were always 
regarded as the main contenders following their submission of a highly competitive 
bid in the nearby Metropolitan Borough of Doncaster.
Tenders from ICS and the DLO were received prior to the closing date of 31st March 
1989 and an evaluation process began. The outcome of that process was to be 
relayed to the employees at meetings organised for the 21st April. At a meeting of 
the Policy and Resources Committee, on the 18th April, it was resolved that the 
lowest tenders for each of the four contracts be accepted. In contracts one, two and 
three the successful contractor was ICS and in contract four the Council’s DLO won, 
in the face of no competition. The tender prices are listed in Table 41 below.
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Contract ICS DLO
Educa­
tion (£)
Others
(£)
Total
(£)
£/m2
p.a.
Educa­
tion (£)
Others
(£)
Total
(£)
£/m2
p.a.
1 223,224 51,11
3
284,337 3.30 333,237 73,42
4
406,661 4.76
2 222,811 64,69
8
297,509 3.58 320,676 89,16
5
409,841 4.92
3 253,108 90,79
1
343,899 3.88 351,750 79,42
0
431,170 4.84
4 - - - - 276,538 94,50
3
371,041 4.69
Table 41: ICS and DLO Tender Prices for Rotherham MBS Building Cleaning 
Contracts.
Whv Did ICS Win?
Loss Leaders
There were immediate accusations that the ICS bid was a loss leader, targeting the 
Authority due to the Council leader's influential position in local government circles. 
A victory here would open the door in other authorities as the Council's Client 
Cleansing Services Manager in the Education Department explained:
"With the AM A anti-CCT (and with Sir John Layden Chair of the 
Council) we may have been specifically targeted by Initial"
NALGOs Chief CCT spokesman in the Authority is convinced the bid was a loss 
leader. He stated that:
"I don't believe the contractor can perform to the contract and break 
even"
236
This position was given added weight by the Company's recent failure to pick up a 
contract in Doncaster. The firm had bid an average of £5.45 per square metre there, 
compared to the DLO bid of £4.18 per square metre, believing that the tender was 
fair and reasonable and which, in the words of one officer they claimed:
"would meet operating costs but not give much of a return."
The bid in Rotherham ranged in price from £3.30 to £3.88 per square metre, £2 per 
square metre less than in Doncaster. That contract, won by the DLO, later proved to 
be unworkable and the Authority was forced to retender it, even though the DLOs 
price per square metre was higher than ICSs in Rotherham. A NALGO officer put it 
that:
"Rotherham tendered lower than Doncaster Council workforce when it 
came up and the same firm lost out. So either they were going to make 
an exorbitant profit there or a loss here."
Pay and Conditions
The pay and conditions offered by ICS were certainly inferior to those offered by the 
Authority's DLO and this could explain the lower price. There are no sick pay 
provisions, no pension, no holidays in the first year of service and only two weeks 
thereafter. Furthermore, the rate of pay was set at £2.15 per hour despite earlier 
assurances that it would be £2.25 per hour (as had been planned in Doncaster) which 
compared to the Authority rate of £2.53 per hour prevailing at the time.
On this basis alone, a representative from the Management Services Unit concedes 
that the Authority simply could not have competed, even if it had seen the ICS bid in 
advance:
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"the bulk of the contract was made up of labour and their labour rate 
and their terms and conditions were much cheaper than the 
Authority's. We could not possibly compete"
Working for ICS
ICS took on 520 staff to work on the three contracts they won, and jobs were offered 
to existing Council employees first. The Authority secured 150 jobs itself by 
winning the fourth contract, but all their staff were made redundant on the 24th July 
1989 and invited to apply for the remaining jobs on an equal footing.
The workers who secured jobs with ICS faced a considerable decline in their 
conditions of employment, as described above, and an increase in their workrate. 
Most cleaners found that they were not employed for more than ten hours a week and 
no cleaners work more than fifteen hours a week. A further intensification of the 
work has come from reductions in caretakers contributions to cleaning tasks. Under 
the old system, between 28 and 32 hours of a caretakers working week were taken up 
by cleaning duties and whilst low productivity rates meant that many of these hours 
did not have to be worked, the reduction of the caretakers contribution to between 5 
and 10 hours did have an impact, particularly since these hours were not part of the 
contract and applied to separate cleaning duties. This change was equally apparent 
on the contract won by the DLO.
At one school it was pointed out that the cleaners hours had been reduced by 25 hours 
a week with a requirement that the work given up by the caretaker be picked up by 
the cleaners. The caretaker was adamant that this is not possible.
"We know they can't do the job properly. I mean the cleaners do try, 
the first two that started when Initial first took over ,used to spend 
twenty minutes extra a day without pay to get the school clean, 
because they knew the standard that it used to be."
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This process had a direct effect on the commitment of the cleaning staff to the work 
and led to a rapidly accelerating rate of labour turnover on the contract. As one of 
the cleaners who has since left ICS explained.
"At first we were dead hard working, putting in this fifteen to twenty 
minutes extra until we realised what fools we were. We kept asking 
for extra time but they wouldn’t allow it.
"After two or three months we left. The other girl finished with me.
We just couldn’t take it any more."
It was not the changes in the organisation of work or the methods used that caused 
the resentment, just the pressure of work. As another ex-initial employee put it:
"Cleaning is cleaning. We still got on with it, there were slight 
variations but basically it were just that we had a larger amount of 
work to do and less time to do it in."
These attitudes led to major recruitment problems in the first few months of the 
contract, when workers were being buzzed in from Manchester in time for a 6a.m. 
start. The rate of turnover was identified by Geoff Walker as being far greater than 
that of the DLO, which he attributed to the lower rates of pay and conditions offered, 
rather than the pressure of the work. This in turn has been related to low standards of 
cleaning:
"I do make a direct link between the type of worker recruited and the 
level of wages paid. You pay peanuts, you get monkeys."
As one caretaker said:
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" They'll ju st set anybody on, anybody that wants a jo b "
In three schools visited, two had two cleaners and one had three. All of them 
experienced a rapid turnover of staff having had eight, ten and eleven different 
cleaners respectively in the first two years of the contract. When the Company is 
short staffed, cleaners are brought in from other schools or brought in in the 
afternoon, in contravention of the contract conditions. One caretaker described how 
one of his current cleaners has worked at every school in the contract area, nearly 30 
different sites.
A year into the contracts, ICS and DLO cleaners were to take another blow with the 
"capping" of the Local Authority's community charge, which resulted in the need to 
find £2.3 million worth of savings in the Education department, £100,000 of it from 
cleaning services. The way this was to be achieved was by suspending cleaning for 
five weeks during school holidays, the savings generated would inevitably come from 
the suspension of cleaners wages. As the Deputy Director of Education explains:
"If you are going to save money you have got to affect the amount of 
money people can earn.
"The least hurtful way of saving money on cleaning is not to do 
cleaning in the holiday period."
£75,(XX) of the saving was to come from ICS who expressed no concern about the 
change. Indeed there is some evidence that they were quite grateful, due to a 
shortage of staff on other contracts at the time. A NUPE full-time officer also 
pointed out that by laying off the workforce for five weeks they could prevent their 
employees from accumulating the statutory rights that come with five years 
permanent employment and the holiday entitlements that are granted after a years 
service.
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As far as the DLO was concerned the savings were achieved by requesting cleaners to 
take up to five weeks unpaid leave or to time their paid leave to coincide with this 
period or by securing them other work within the Authority.
Trade Union Organisation
The impact on trade union organisation amongst the cleaners has been devastating. 
The Unions have lost in the region of 800 members and now have no members 
whatsoever amongst the ICS workforce. As an ex ICS cleaner explained:
"Once Initial took over, without people signing the forms so that they 
had the deductions made at source, they weren't keeping up the 
payments at all and very few of the women asked if they could pay 
their subscriptions."
One caretaker said that he began a manual collection and distributed direct debit 
forms but managed to recruit only one member who has since left the job. The 
NUPE full- time officer responsible for organising the workers described the 
difficulties involved:
"Traditionally, caretakers or chefs have been the union centres in 
schools,but they are no longer interested in recruiting the workers. 
They don't work for the same people and they don't work together.
"Temporary or part-time women workers have always been difficult to 
organise in these types of jobs. The women are on such low wages 
they are not interested in paying a union even when we point out the 
legal and other benefits.
"The turnover of staff means that when you do get members due to a 
particular problem coming up, they soon leave and the membership
base collapses. I just don't think its possible to organise in these 
firms.
"Initial said they would recognise the Union if we got 50% 
membership but thats not even a dream. The truth is that these 
companies don't want anything to do with the unions."
Monitoring the Contract
In the different buildings the caretaker is usually the on-site monitor and he provides 
a weekly return on how well the job is being done, which in turn provides the 
information for the application of the default procedure. This involves a big change 
in responsibility for the caretakers who had previously been heavily involved in 
performing the work now under contract. In recognition of this extra responsibility 
and the need to start work earlier, caretakers receive an addition to their salary of 
£5.25 a week.
The reports sent back by the caretakers each week, make sure of all the jobs listed in 
the specification which have not been completed. Each one of these jobs has a unit 
price, provided by the contractor, which is used by the Authority to do two things:
1) Calculate the value of defaults for work not done
2) Calculate the cost of adding work to the contract.
So the default procedure works on the basis of the cost of work not done, which as 
the Education Department's Client Services Manager points out, is not necessarily 
equivalent to value. Work can be high value but low cost and might have different 
values at different times, such as when a parents evening is being held at a school as 
compared to the first day of a school holiday.
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The other difficulty with the monitoring process is the bureaucracy involved. Whilst 
before CCT any problem or failure could be dealt with immediately by the caretaker 
and cleaning staff on site, now, any complaints must go through the Client Services 
Department who will make a charge on the contractor as a punishment for the failure, 
rather than a rectification of it.
This situation places considerable pressure on the Authority’s caretakers who, in 
identifying problems, may be encouraged to avoid the bureaucracy and do the work 
themselves, especially where there is a cross over of duties. As one caretaker pointed 
out, he is now responsible for cleaning floors during the summer recess which might 
encourage ICS to skimp on cleaning the floors during term time, in the knowledge 
that he will take care of the problem later.
Despite these areas of concern, default levels have run at only around 1% on the ICS 
contracts which is about the same as on the DLO contract. There is a definite feeling 
within the Authority that this comparison was the reason for ICS tendering for only 
three of the four contracts. In this way the DLO contract could be used as a 
"control". If the DLO has to be monitored then ICS has to be monitored in the same 
way and cannot be victimised or have undue burdens placed upon it, as the Authority 
would be forced to apply the same pressures to its own DLO. Describing the reasons 
for ICS not tendering for Contract 4, the Authority's NALGO spokesman said:
"1 cant reveal the details, hut there were commercial reasons [for not 
tendering] and it wasn’t because they couldn’t make a profit on the 
other one."
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Concluding Comments
The experience of cleaning workers following the privatisation of building cleaning 
services in Rotherham, is illustrative of the specific problems associated with trade 
union organisation within this activity.
Heavy union membership had been maintained due to the support of the Authority 
for trade union activity. It would seem that the total inability to maintain any kind of 
membership base amongst cleaners following privatisation, demonstrates a very low 
level of commitment to the unions amongst the workers concerned.
This was compounded by the tremendous rates of labour turnover on the contract, 
which must be related to the decline in terms and conditions and increased pressure 
of work following the introduction of CCT. Prior to tendering, more than 500 
cleaners out of a workforce of 650 had been employed for longer than two years 
(Rotherham MBC, 1989) which provided a stable base around which to organise. 
The subsequent collapse of that organisation demonstrates the lack of union 
consciousness that stemmed from it.
The case study provides the paradox that, from the point of view of trade union 
organisation and the defence of terms and conditions, it is essential to keep such 
services in-house, whilst it is the maintenance of these conditions that provides the 
biggest incentive to privatise.
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Section 5: Case Study IV. Refuse collection in an East Midlands Borough Council.
Introduction
This study is concerned with the refuse collection contract in a Borough Council 
situated in the East Midlands with a population of just over 100,000 people. The full 
identity of the Authority will not be revealed so as to protect the confidentiality of 
sources of information which could be considered damaging to certain parties.
The Council is now controlled by the Labour Party but the tendering process for the 
contract in question was completed in early 1989 whilst the Conservative Party had 
control. Due to the Conservative councillors isolation from power when the 
investigation was conducted in late 1990 and early 1991, and changes of personnel in 
officer positions, there was a reluctance on the part of these sources to discuss matters 
concerned with the Council's preparations for tendering and the compilation of the in- 
house bid. Not wanting to obtain a one sided view of events, it was decided to 
concentrate on the industrial relations issues which arose following the award of the 
contract to Sitaclean Technology on the 26th April 1989.
Changing Terms and Conditions
Sitaclean heavily undercut the Councils DSO with a bid of £886,000, but that 
reduction in price has not had the catastrophic effect upon jobs and conditions seen in 
other authorities, although there was an initial downgrading of certain benefits.
As far as the immediate impact on the jobs and conditions of the workforce is 
concerned, Sitaclean offered positions to each of the sixty employees on the existing 
council service. The final payroll was fifty eight compared with the projected fifty 
six in the Company’s tender. Drivers were to be paid £3.20 per hour and loaders
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£2.80 per hour, although any new recruits not previously in the employ of the 
Authority were to be paid only £2.55 per hour. Colin Carr, Contracts Manager for 
Sitaclean explained:
"The Company promised to look after the council workers when we 
took over the contract."
These wages were to be topped up with a production bonus, worth 30% of basic pay, 
and an attendance bonus worth 10%. The workers officially remain on a thirty nine 
hour week running from 06.45 - 15.30, inclusive of a three quarter hour meal break, 
on Mondays to Thursdays and from 06.45 to 14.30, with the same break, on Fridays. 
Any overtime worked outside of these hours was to be paid at 1 primes basic rate.
Other benefits faired worse, with annual leave entitlements reduced from five weeks 
to four and a significant downgrading of sickness allowances. With the Borough 
Council, employees had been entitled to up to six months on full pay during absence 
due to sickness, from day one of their employment. The new arrangements 
introduced by Sitaclean are outlined in Table 42 below.
Period of Service Entitlement
During first year of service One weeks full pay (after four weeks 
service) and two weeks half pay
During second year of service Two weeks full pay and two weeks half 
pay
During third year of service Three weeks full pay and three weeks 
half pay
During and after fourth year of service Four weeks full pay and four weeks half
pay
Table 42: Sickness benefit entitlement for Sitaclean Technology Refuse Collectors.
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Disputes and Single Union Deals?
The contract began in August 1989 and as early as December discontent amongst the 
workforce led to the threat of strike action. Despite a lack of recognition, the GMB 
retained its status as the workers representative, with 51 members, and began to voice 
the demands of an increasingly restless workforce. The lack of union recognition, the 
two-tier wage structure and reduced benefits combined with high standards of 
discipline, led to resentment which was catalysed when, instead of the normal two 
weeks bonus pay and a lump sum of £75 to clear the Christmas backlog, the refuse 
collectors were offered 23 hours to do the two days work.
The dispute over the issue highlighted the need to secure some form of recognition 
agreement, through which negotiating procedures could be established. Negotiations 
were already taking place with the Company at local and national levels on this 
subject, which exposed a series of conflicting interests. At a national level the 
Company was indicating its interest in a single union no strike agreement with the 
GMB, whilst, following discussions between the GMB, NUPE and the TGWU, the 
National Officer of the GMB wrote to Sitaclean requesting recognition of all three 
unions. This position was restated in correspondence with the TUC along with the 
belief that Sitaclean would decline recognition of all three unions.
This response was indeed forthcoming from the Company. In a letter to the GMB, 
Sitaclean stated their desire not to sign any national agreement with the unions. At 
the same time, the right of individual employees to join a trade union of their choice 
was confirmed in line with the requirements of the Authority's 'Conditions of 
Contract'. At a local level the GMBs position remained unclear, which, bearing in 
mind that this was Sitaclean's first contract, was probably related to the national 
significance of negotiations. In a draft recognition agreement between Sitaclean and
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the GMB, prepared for the purposes of this contract, the Union appears to have been 
ready to sign on a single union basis:
"Recognition
(i) The company recognises the right of the GMB to represent and 
negotiate on behalf of its manual workers employed in the 
public cleansing field.
(ii) The company hereby confirms the right of the GMB as the sole 
bargaining agency for collective issues concerning conditions
of employment.
(iii) The company ... will make it clear to all employees that it 
recognises the GMB as the sole bargaining agency and that it 
strongly advises its employees that they should be members of 
the GMB”
N.B. Authors emphasis
(Amended draft Agreement GMB - Sitaclean, 1989)
The nature of any prospective agreement between the GMB and Sitaclean was 
overshadowed by the escalation of the workforce's resentment towards their treatment 
by the Company following a formal refusal to recognise the Union at all. This 
resulted in a ballot on strike action in February 1990 in pursuance of 'positive action’ 
on various points:
1 Recognition and procedural rights
2 Dismissal of a named member of staff
3 Recognition of the workers chosen shop steward
4 Management attitude towards the membership.
In the ballot, 39 members voted, 32 in favour of action and 7 against. Strike action 
commenced at 06.45 on Thursday 22nd February and lasted for 4V2 hours before the 
Company agreed to sign the required Recognition and Procedural Agreement. This
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was the first such agreement that Sitaclean had entered in the UK and was finally 
signed on the 7th March 1990.
The Agreement itself did not contain the contentious wording, referring to sole 
representation, that was evident in the draft version noted above. The section on 
recognition was amended as follows:
1 "Recognition
(i) The Company recognises the right of the Trade Union [GMB] 
to represent and negotiate on behalf of its members who are 
employed by the Company at the above locations ...
(ii) The Company believes that a fully representative Trade Union 
capable of negotiating with authority leads to good industrial 
relations and will make it clear to all new employees that this 
Agreement exists and provide facilities for union 
representatives to recruit new employees into membership of 
the Union."
(Procedural Agreement, 1990)
Following this development, the other aims of the strikers were achieved, with the 
required dismissal, and election of shop stewards being carried out in early April 
1990.
The question of single union deals did not go away though. A report in the local 
evening paper had raised the issue on the 27th February, stating that:
"Union negotiatiors have won a single union agreement from the 
company which operates refuse collecting services for [the] Borough 
Council."
Local NUPE members took note of this disclosure and passed the information on to 
the Union's Assistant General Secretary, who then raised the issue with the GMB.
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In response to the allegations made, the GMBs Regional Organiser defended the 
Unions position in a letter to the National Officer. He argued that:
"First o f all the Agreement I  signed on March 7th was not a single 
union Agreement. You are aware o f my personal feelings against such 
deals ... Nowhere in the Agreement does the Union have sole rights, 
even though with the strength o f the members behind us, we could 
have forced such an Agreement if we had wished.
"Both you and I have acted honourably in this matter in our joint 
insistence with the Company that they should be prepared to recognise 
other Unions as well as the GMB."
He goes on to say that:
"the Agreement forced out o f Sitaclean came about as the result o f 
collective action by the membership ...I t  did not come about as the 
result o f any 'back door' dealing but quite openly through efficient 
organisation and total membership support."
The GMBs National Officer then made various points, in a letter to NUPEs Assistant 
General Secretary, explaining events as he sees them:
"At the end of last year I approached the Company on the basis that it 
should recognise all unions. As we all know in the end they 
recognised no organisation. Our organisation had been trying to get 
recognition on behalf o f our members who worked on the [Borough 
Council] contract ... The company refused to recognise our 
organisation and indeed the site manager was particularly hostile to 
any recognition o f the Union.
"Relationships between our members and the Company were getting 
steadily worse - not helped by the fact that this Company were hiring a 
lot o f casual labour to weaken the position o f our members. The
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Company were also issuing disciplinary notices to union members and 
refusing to entertain any approaches from the Union on behalf of these 
members.
"As you would expect, and I am sure this is a tactic being followed by 
all our organisations, we have aggressively pursued private companies 
where the membership is strong enough to support such moves. An 
agreement with this Company ... has had to be fought very hard for by 
our members and local officials."
The Procedural Agreement
The Procedural Agreement which was signed on the 7th March 1990 states several 
’General Principles’ which are to guide the relationship between Sitaclean and the 
GMB on the contract. These 'principles' are mostly concerned with outlining the 
respective areas of responsibility of the two parties; managements right to manage 
and the unions right to represent the interests of its members, in regard to wages and 
conditions, security of employment and general grievances; and a commitment to 
joint consultation on the basis of the procedures laid out in the Agreement. However, 
the Union also makes other commitments, which could be seen to compromise its 
position of opposition to private contractors' provision of local authority services.
In Section 2 (General Principles) part (i) of the Agreement, the GMB acknowledges 
that:
"the Company's business is the provision of a public service, and that 
continuity of such service is essential. In the light of this ... the Union 
agree!sj to use [its] best endeavours to avoid any disruption of 
senice."
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The point is developed in part (ii), with the statement that:
"Both parties have a common objective in ensuring the efficiency and 
the prosperity of the Company."
(Procedural Agreement, 1990)
It could be argued that the Union and its members have a clear interest in 
demonstrating inefficiency in the Company leading to a lack of prosperity. Such a 
development would certainly add weight to the case for a return of the service to the 
in-house DSO, which is the policy of the Union.
Any desire on the part of the Union to follow such a course of action would be
further restricted by part (v) of the same section which states that:
"In the event of any matter arising, ... related to the provision of
ser\>ice, the Company and the Union agree that any statement made to
the press, or other media, shall be mutually agreed by both parties 
prior to issue."
(Procedural Agreement, 1990)
Section 3 of the Agreement relates to the Annual Review Procedure. It points out 
that the contract price is subject to annual increases related to specific indices, and 
that in consequence, increases in wages and benefits will be linked to increases in the 
contract price made by the Authority in relation to the labour element of these 
indices. This formally commits the Union to local pay bargaining on the contract, 
setting refuse workers aside from colleagues employed by Sitaclean elsewhere in 
Britain, as well as placing them outside the coverage of national agreements on local 
authority manual workers wages and conditions.
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The Agreement then goes on in sections 4, 5 and 6 to cover union organisational 
issues such as shop steward entitlements (one for each of the two depots) and rights, 
the deduction of employee union contributions and the provision of union facilities. 
These are covered in a fairly standard fashion providing the Union with a genuine 
improvement in status and capability.
Sections 7, 8 and 9 are concerned with procedural arrangements. The disputes 
procedure has four stages taking issues through the hierarchy of management and 
union structures and culminates, on failure to achieve settlement by stage 4, in a 
possible referral to ACAS, whose decision is binding on both parties. Section 8 
relates to agreement on a similarly conventional disciplinary procedure and Section 9 
to a detailed redundancy procedure. The Company commits itself to taking 
appropriate measures to prevent redundancy, including.
"a) Restriction of recruitment and arrangements made for suitable
transfers internally...
b) Restriction of overtime ... without affecting the efficiency of 
the business.
c) Investigation of change in working arrangements."
(Procedural Agreement, 1990)
When redundancies are required selection is to follow a set criteria running through 
volunteers, employees beyond normal pension date, competence, length of service, 
part-time employees and personal circumstance.
Sections 10 and 11 of the Agreement relate to provisions for its amendment and 
termination, which requires a period of three months notice by either party.
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Monitoring the Contract
Despite Sitaclean's recognition of the importance of continuity in the provision of 
public services, as noted in the Procedural Agreement with the GMB, the Company 
was warned about contract failures during the early part of the contract's operation. 
In fact the Council's Chief technical officer at the time had to instruct the Company 
not to use the Authority as a future source of reference.
The Authority's Technical Services Department is responsible for the monitoring of 
the contractors performance on the refuse collection service and for the issuing of 
default notices. Where default notices are issued there is a percentage deduction 
from the monthly instalment of the contract price as shown in Table 43 below. A 
default notice can be issued in relation to any individual property or collection point.
Default notices in any one week % Deduction from monthly instalment
More than 5 but less than 11 1
More than 10 but less than 16 2
More than 15 but less than 26 5
More than 25 10
Table 43: Percentage deductions from monthly installments as a result of default 
notices
The contract can be terminated where more than 25 defaults are recorded in any one 
week or more than 75 in any four week period. The contract can also be terminated 
where the contractor has breached any other provisions within it, or where they fail to 
complete the services for a period of two weeks. Various financial and 
administrative matters relating to bankruptcy and receivership also provide grounds 
for termination.
The provisions relating to default notices are of significant interest to the workers, 
since they can result in the reduction of the contract price and consequently have an
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impact on the money available for increased renumeration within the Company's 
Annual Review. Furthermore, regardless of any lack of resourcing, it is the 
workforce that is likely to receive the blame for any contract failures. This was 
illustrated in late 1989 when the Authority complained to Sitaclean about the early 
bringing out of bins, to the front of premises, for subsequent collections. This 
practice was being adopted by the workforce to speed up their collection times in 
response to an increasing workload. However, the Company responded by assuring 
the Council that they took the complaint seriously and that the workforce had been 
informed that the practice must stop. They went on to say that if the notification was 
ignored then formal disciplinary warnings would be issued.
In the first year of the contract, 1989/90, fifteen default notices were served, with 
more than five in one week which resulted in a 1% financial penalty. Only eleven 
notices were served during 1990/91 and no financial penalties imposed. In the 
Council's second year review it is stated that:
"the Council's statutory responsibility with regard to refuse collection 
have been met but there is little doubt ... that with additional 
management input ... the service to the public could have been 
considerably improved."
The 1990 Annual Review Dispute
Having established recognition rights with the Company, and with virtually total 
organisation of the workforce, the GMB had the opportunity to test its influence with 
the approach of the contract's first anniversary and the Annual Review in August 
1990.
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The Union held a meeting of its refuse members in the Borough on the 12th July, in 
order to assess their aspirations as far as the contract was concerned. These can be 
summarised as follows:
1) 5 weeks annual holiday (presently 4 weeks).
2) Holiday pay to be paid at the rate of average earnings (including bonus).
3) One rate of pay for all loaders.
4) Improved sick pay, ie. from day one and for a longer period.
5) Payment for increased numbers of properties.
6) When running a man short, cover should be provided, where this is not
possible, the earnings of the absent crew member to be split among the other
crew members.
7) 20% increase in basic pay and bonus.
This information was sent in a memo to Sitaclean's Director of Operations, and 
formed the basis of a meeting between Company representatives and GMB shop 
stewards on the 4th September 1990.
The minutes of that meeting noted that at several points in the discussion, the 
conditions on the contract were related to the conditions on other Sitaclean contracts, 
to which they compare favourably. The GMBs representatives were determined that 
such comparisons did not form the basis of negotiations and that the conditions in the 
Borough should be negotiated separately, with the aim of achieving parity with the 
conditions enjoyed by Council employees locally.
No final agreement was reached on the Review since some items had to be put to the 
members and others could not be finalised without notice of the contract price 
increase awarded by the Authority. The Union was adamant on certain issues though, 
in particular that the same rates of pay should apply to all employees on the same
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grade and that this did not result in additional use of agency labour, which the Union 
wanted to be minimised. Furthermore, it was not to result in a pay cut to the higher 
paid workers such as drivers, whose wages had to be at least maintained. The Union 
was also keen to see a return to the holiday entitlements received from the Authority 
of four weeks annual leave rising to five weeks after five years.
The demands were placed along with a 20% pay claim, which the Company insisted 
was unrealistic and would in practice be wholly dependant upon the increase in the 
contract price, less whatever payments were made in kind, such as additional 
holidays.
The Authority released its assessment of the adjustment to the contract price in early 
October which was based upon the Department of the Environment's Monthly 
Bulletin of Construction Indices. The figures suggested an overall increase in the 
Contract Price of 14.358% with the increase in labour and supervision costs 
accounting for 12.995% of the rise.
Whilst the Authority finalised the figures in order to assist the passage of the pay 
negotiations, it was after this point that they began to break down. After meeting 
with the contract manager in November, the Union was convinced that agreement 
was reached on a package to improve pay and conditions, which included an 8.5% 
increase in earnings, the equalisation of pay rates, four days extra holiday and bonus 
to be paid on basic during holidays. This represented a rise of 12.7% in the wages 
bill but fell within the review figure. However, on the 28th November the Contract 
manager refuted this position, arguing that the matter was still under consideration 
internally. This led the Union's Regional Organiser to place an ultimatum on 30th 
November which insisted on implementation of the 12.7% package by the 5th 
December or the issuing of ballot papers to the membership calling for strike action.
257
The problem arose following the Company Director's refusal to ratify the deal, but, 
having received an assurance from the Contract Manager that this would not be the 
case, the Union's members had been informed of the agreement and were anticipating 
its introduction. The Company attempted to cool the situation by awarding a 
preliminary back payment of £160 per employee and a £10 per week supplement, but 
with the passing of the Union's ultimatum deadline, on the 5th December, application 
was made to the Union's Regional Secretary for permission to ballot the membership 
on strike action. This was duly granted on the 14th December.
On the 10th December the Company provided figures, which indicated that the 
amount available to fund the increase in renumerations was not the entire labour 
element of the rise in the price index, worth 12.995%, upon which earlier 
negotiations had been based. Account had to be taken of deductions of NHI and 
sickness contributions, which left an increase on the original tender wages figure of 
9.415%.
Sitaclean granted an additional £6,012 to bring the rise up to 10.87% but this was still 
short of the agreed package worth 12.7%. By this time the negotiations were only 
falling down over the duration of the deal, which the Company was trying to limit to 
the 12 months of the contract but which the Union wanted to extend to cover the 
period February 1989 to July 1990, in line with the review indices provided by the 
Borough Council.
Weight was added to the Union case when the membership voted heavily in favour of 
strike action in the ballot on 20th December. Of the 50 members voting from a 
membership of 51,43 voted in favour of action and 7 against.
After the announcement of this result, Sitaclean’s Director of Operations wrote to the 
GMBs Regional Organiser agreeing to extend the review offer as requested, which
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released the 12.995% required to meet the earlier agreement in full. There followed a 
series of Tine-tuning' negotiations to sort out the method by which the Union's 
priorities of equalisation of pay, four additional days holiday, 40% bonus on holidays 
and a weekly wage increase could be met, taking into account the £160 back payment 
and £10 weekly supplement already paid. This was all finalised by the 10th January 
1991, without recourse to industrial action, and resulted in the new rates of payment 
listed in Table 44 below, along with an extra four days annual leave and the payment 
of attendance and performance bounces whilst on leave.
Occupation Hourly rate Weekly
rate
Attendance
bonus
Performance
bonus
Weekly
total
HGV driver 3-38 131.82 13.18 39.55 184.55
Driver non- 
HGV
3-12 121.68 12.17 36.50 170.35
Loaders 2-19 113.49 11.35 34.05 158.89
Table 44: Sitaclean rates of pav on the contract effective 1.1.91
To gradualise the introduction of equal pay, ex-Borough Council employees were to 
receive an extra £1.40 per day from the 1st January 1991 to the 31st July 1991, 
effectively equalising pay by the 1st August 1991.
Concluding Comments
The experience of the GMB on this contract provides an illustration of how a union 
can retain its influence and authority if the membership remains organised and active. 
In five months, the Union managed to gain recognition in the face of the Company's 
resistance. Sitaclean was forced to abandon its divisive two-tier wage structure, on 
the basis of better rates of pay than those received by local authority manuals. 
Holiday entitlements were restored and jobs protected.
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Question marks remain over whether this approach can be adopted nationally due to 
the irregularity of union strength. The reliance on local pay bargaining is okay when 
the union has the power to force concessions but where this is not the case it would 
seem likely that Sitaclean will push hard for a deterioration in terms and conditions, 
as evidenced by the terms originally imposed here.
The potential for the emergence of single union deals as a result of CCT is also raised 
by this study and remains an area of concern to which we will return in Chapter 8. 
Sitaclean's failure to recognise unions, other than the GMB, remains a difficulty in 
principle, but in terms of organisation the GMB has shown its ability to represent the 
workforce on the contract and to defend their interests, despite the concessions made 
in the Procedural Agreement which I have referred to.
Section 6: Case Study V. Public Cleansing in Stockport.
Introduction
Situated in the district of Greater Manchester the Authority is a Metropolitan 
Borough Council with a population of nearly 300,000 people. Predominantly urban 
in character the Council's political make up leaves no party in overall control but with 
the Liberal Democrats forming an administration as the single largest party.
Preparing for Competition
In 1987 it was decided to put the Council's refuse service and other cleaning services 
(namely street sweeping) out to tender in one contract. In the negotiations which 
followed between the DSO management and the three unions with members who 
were affected, the GMB, NUPE and URTU, there was a considerable amount of 
resistance to the idea of making any concessions on jobs and conditions in order to
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strengthen the DSO bid. It must be bome in mind that this resistance derived from 
the fact that the service had already been squeezed hard by the Authority over the 
past few years.
Prior to the CT exercise, Stockport had a reputation for having, in the words of one 
NUPE Area Officer:
"the best refuse service in the country."
The service had been put through an extensive rationalisation programme which had 
addressed the issues of overmaning and restrictive practices to the satisfaction of 
Liberal Democrat and Conservative councillors. Within this context, when 
preparations were made for the joint refuse collection and other cleaning contract, 
due to begin on the 1st August 1999, there were no real concerns about the contract 
being lost to a private contractor.
The Management did try to make further cuts in the refuse service, proposing a 
change in the organisation of the work from the old practice of assigning one gang to 
a particular area to sending all crews to one part of the Borough each day in a "blitz" 
approach. This was accompanied by proposals to shed 25 jobs, cut the number of 
beats, extend working hours and cut payments by up to £40 a week. The plan 
prompted a spontaneous one day walk out by the workforce on the 6th March 1990, 
demonstrating the strength of feeling amongst the workers. NUPE and URTU were 
prepared to negotiate on some parts of the package, such as reducing the crew on 
each round by one man, but the GMB held its position and flatly refused to negotiate 
on further cuts.
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In the end two tenders were submitted to the elected members of the Authority, one 
from the management and one which represented the status quo and had the support 
of the unions. Whilst not wanting to accept responsibility for the possible 
consequences, the councillors did not want to impose anything on the unions and so 
asked the DSO management to submit the tender based on the terms agreed with the 
trade unions.
The Tender Evaluation
Tenders were invited in January 1990 from five private contractors, Sitaclean 
Technology, Tyler Waste Management, Leigh Environmental, BFI Wastecare and 
FOCSA Services along with the Council's DSO, Stockport Works Services. In the 
event only two tenders, from FOCSA and the DSO, were received by the deadline at 
the beginning of March. These were examined in the run up to their consideration by 
councillors on the Policy and Resources Committee Tender Evaluation Panel on the 
22nd March 1990.
The two bids, once adjusted to take account of 'additional costs’ were as follows:
Following the explanation of several minor queries, both tenders were found to be 
proposing adequate resources to deliver the services advertised at the required 
standard.
In assessing the relative merits of the tenders the financial considerations which can 
legally be applied to the process did not eliminate either bid nor alter the balance of
FOCSA Services (UK) Ltd 
Stockport Works Services
£3,008,329.88 per annum 
£4,229,645.10 per annum
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potential cost savings. In assessing whether the FOCSA price was too low to be 
viable it was noted that:
"The evidence is that the tender prices are subtainable. It is possible 
however, that there is very little element of profit within the lower 
[FOCSA J bid".
(Stockport MBC, 1990)
The recommendation of Client Services officers from the Works Division was that 
the FOCSA bid be accepted on the basis of a £42,000 increase in the contract price to 
account for an oversight by the contractor in calculating the cost of the gully 
emptying service. This recommendation was agreed by the elected members who 
awarded the contract to FOCSA at the increased price of £2,899,319.69 per annum 
(unadjusted to take account of "additional costs") for a period of %. years beginning 
on the 1st August 1990.
Council officers expressed "considerable sadness" (Stockport MBC, 1990a) at losing 
the contract, but it was pointed out that it could not reasonably be rejected given 
FOCSA's guarantees of providing the service, and that the DSO would have lost by
over million even if it had cut wages by £20 a week. As the Council leader
explained:
"The company's [FOCSA's] bid was so much below ours that we had
no alternative but to accept it, otherwise the government would have
come down on us like a ton of bricks".
(Manchester Evening News, 23-3-90)
NUPE's Area Officer responsible for the cleansing staff is adamant that the bid was a 
loss leader though, stating that:
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"I do not believe that they will be able to deliver the service for the 
cost they claim. They have decided to lose money to get a foot in the 
door elsewhere. It is such a ridiculously low tender that it has to be a 
loss leader. People must remember that this is a massive company 
that can afford to take a loss for a few years until it becomes 
established. The next time the contract is up for grabs and Stockport 
Council is out of the running, I'm sure we'll see the real costs".
Countering these claims a Company spokesman said:
"We do not tender to lose money. Every tender is a commercial 
calculation. There is no point in us going around the country> making 
loss leader bids".
This, despite assertions that at the tender evaluation interview FOCSA representatives 
declared that:
"If it costs more to foot the bill then [we] would stand the cost".
(NUPE, 1990)
Preparing for FOCSA
Following the award of the contract redundancy notices were posted and an enhanced 
redundancy package negotiated that was worth around £1500 extra per man. 
Following advice from the Audit Commission that such severance payments were 
ultra virus, the payment was withheld, and this resulted in renewed unrest amongst 
the workforce who indicated a willingness to strike. Wishing to avoid conflict, the 
Authority responded by offering to make the payment under a different title. The 
men were given three months notice and told that if they worked until the last day 
then they would receive payment of a continuity bonus, which had the dual role of 
settling the dispute and ensuring maintenance of the service until FOCSA took over.
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FOCSA indicated that their labour force was likely to be in the region of 150, about 
50 less than was currently employed by the Authority. In their tender the Company 
stated that:
"It is our intention to ask each existing employee to complete and 
return a questionnaire stating their interest.
We will interview each person expressing an interest and offer 
employment to those found suitable".
(Stockport MBC, 1990a)
In the event, FOCSA interviewed 170 ex-Authority employees and 200 unemployed 
workers for the jobs. Redeployment was sought for those workers not obtaining 
employment with FOCSA or eligible for early retirement. Several employees did not 
find alternative positions and for these the Authority organised counselling services 
and employed a consultant to give individual advice on interview techniques and how 
to obtain alternative employment.
Terms and Conditions
The variety of services contained in the combined refuse collection, other cleaning 
and public convenience contract resulted in a range of wage rates being introduced by 
FOCSA. These are listed in Table 45 below.
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Occupation Basic weekly wage in £
Refuse collector/driver 140.79 + bonus
Refuse collector/operative 124.80 + bonus
Mechanical sweeper/driver 135.33 + bonus
Street cleansing/driver 129.87 + bonus
Street cleansing/operative 119.34 + bonus
Gully emptier/driver 135.33 + bonus
Gully emptier/operative 124.80 + bonus
Public convenience/driver 129.87 + bonus
Public convenience/cleaner 119.34 + bonus
Table 45 : Basic wage rates for FOCSA employees in Stockport.
These rates were comparable with the local government manual workers rates 
prevailing at the time, as listed in Appendix 1, but there was a major deterioration in 
other payments and conditions of employment.
The standard working week remained 39 hours a week but the task and finish system 
applied to refuse collection workers was abolished. Refuse collectors were to work 7 
hours and 48 minutes each day, exclusive of meal breaks, beginning at 7a.m. 
Cleansing operatives were to work on two shifts, 7a.m. to 3p.m. and 3p.m. to 11 
p.m,. inclusive of a meal break of one and a half hours, six days a week.
Bonuses were set at £8.11 per day for refuse collectors provided performance each 
day is "satisfactory in terms of quality and quantity". This compares with bonuses of 
up to £95 per week under the old system. Cleansing operatives were given a bonus 
of £1.99 per day on the same terms.
Other conditions included the provision of twenty days annual leave with a pro rata 
entitlement in the first year of service and a public holiday allocation of eight days 
per year. Payment for work done on public holidays is at double the basic rate with 
time off in lieu. Other overtime payments are the same as local authority rates, one
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and a half times basic rate Monday to Saturday and double time on Sundays. There 
is no sickness benefit other than statutory sick pay and no separate company pension 
scheme, the workforce is covered by the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme 
(SERPS). FOCSA does provide life assurance cover of £10,000, provided for death 
while in service, and an attendance bonus payable on the day after the anniversary of 
joining the Company. Payments of this bonus are calculated on the basis noted in 
Table 46 below.
Days absence in year Level of payment
None £150
Three £80
Four £60
Five days or more NONE
Table 46 : FOCSA's attendance bonus.
Aside from the changes in benefits the Company introduced new flexibility 
requirements which give FOCSA the right to:
(1) require [workers] to undertake any other duties which may reasonably be 
required including those which are carried out by the other categories of 
refuse collection, street cleansing and other services workers employed by 
the company
(2) transfer [workers] between teams
(3) vary the areas in which [workers] work
(4) require [workers] to be based at a different depot or location within the 
Metropolitan Borough without additional payment.
(FOCSA, 1990)
In contrast to some other contractors the Company has a defined disciplinary 
procedure designed to protect workers from unnecessary summary dismissals, but
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there was no indication that the Company was willing to recognise trade unions prior 
to the start of the contract.
Industrial Relations and Inter-Union Rivalry
Immediately following the decision to award FOCSA the contract, the Company was 
contacted by union officers seeking recognition and discussions about the 
implementation of new working practices. After an initial indication that it was not 
the Company's intention to talk to trade unions, FOCSA failed to reply to three 
further letters requesting talks on union recognition.
A peaceful lobby of the management was planned by pickets from NUPE, GM3 and 
URTU on the first day of the contract. As the NUPE Area Organiser explained at the 
time:
"We want to make a peaceful protest in the hope that people who have 
signed contracts with FOCSA will stand up for the rights of working 
people".
(Stockport Express Advertiser, 1-8-90)
On the day, problems arose when ex-Authority workers asked the unions to talk to 
management about the new working conditions. They were unable to do so since 
there was no recognition agreement in place. With no resolution to the dispute the 
men decided not to go out until union recognition was granted. Only twelve men, 
most of whom were new to the job, out of a workforce of 150, went out in two of 
FOCSA's 11 bin wagons. Following this development the unions' full time officers 
were called into talks and on the second day of the dispute this, along with the threat 
of dismissal, led about a third of the workforce to return to work.
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The men were particularly unhappy about changes in bonuses which would leave 
some of them £65 a week worse off in return for more work and a compulsory finish 
for binmen of 3.45 p.m., even if the job was done by 1.00 or 2.00 p.m. So, as 
NUPE's spokeswoman said:
"Until FOCSA are prepared to sit down and talk to and recognise the 
union, the men are not going out to work. We cannot do anything 
about working conditions or pay unless the company recognizes us".
(Stockport Messenger, 3-8-90)
All the unions recommended a return to work on Friday the 3rd August, as the 
Company seemed serious about considering a recognition agreement and as they were 
issuing dismissal notices to those workers continuing with industrial action. Sixty 
workers did not return to work in the hope of securing an improvement in terms and 
conditions and were then dismissed for breach of contract.
Negotiations continued on the format of a recognition agreement, the principle of 
which had been accepted by FOCSA on the 3rd August 1990. At this time though, 
inter union rivalries came to the fore. The GMB was the majority union on the refuse 
service and URTU the majority union on street cleansing. NUPE had a significant 
presence amongst both groups of workers with a total membership of 52, but there is 
some indication that the GMB was in private discussions with the Company about a 
single union agreement. In the end this approach was dismissed in favour of a 
tripartite approach from the unions to the Company, although the actual Agreement, 
signed on 3rd September in the absence of NUPE officers, is identical to others 
signed by the GMB in other areas where they &!£ the only recognized union (see Case 
Study IV).
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The identical wording of the Procedural Agreement means the same concessions 
outlined in the previous section apply. NUPE officers were particularly annoyed 
about sections in the Agreement which refer to "statements made to the press or other 
media " being " mutually agreed by both parties prior to issue". Heavy use had been 
made of the local press in running the campaign to secure the recognition Agreement. 
Denial of further access to this weapon was seen as a significant blow. NUPE had 
been informing other local authorities of the problems FOCSA was having on the 
contract and it is thought that the recognition Agreement was seen as a way of 
silencing this criticism.
Following the signing of the Agreement, facilities were requested for recruiting the 
workforce into the unions, which were granted, from NUPE's point of view, without 
any general specification of details. The following morning the GMB established a 
desk in the Company office and it is alleged that the impression was given that the 
GMB was the only union that had secured recognition rights and consequently most 
of the men joined up. The next day NUPE began recruiting and managed to win 
about 30 new members, some workers transferring from the GMB, which illustrates 
the tensions which existed between the two unions. This was not helped by FOCSA’s 
insistence that there would only be one shop steward, chosen from the majority 
union, which, at the time, was the GMB. Once NUPE became the majority union 
amongst the street cleaners an additional steward was secured, representing the 
NUPE members, but the relationship remains tense. As one NUPE officer put it:
"There is not really any comradeship between NUPE and the GMB".
Despite the Agreement, union officers claim that agreed procedures are not followed 
and that workers are sacked for virtually any misdemeanour. Union pressure has 
only had a limited impact on this situation due to the fairly anti-union and dictatorial
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approach adopted by the contract manager. Indeed four street cleaners were going to 
be sacked for being found in a cafe whilst on their meal break, against Company 
regulations. NUPE’s ability to keep the men their jobs was regarded as a victory. 
Under the previous conditions this incident would not even have been an issue. 
Another worker was sacked for picking up an employee for work in a Company van 
whilst somebody else got no punishment at all for the same offence, creating 
uncertainty and resentment within the workforce.
These conditions and pressures led to a rapid turnover of staff in the first few months 
of the contract's operation. The Company was even forced to re-employ most of the 
workers previously dismissed for taking industrial action, as suitable replacements 
who could stick the job could not be found.
After Christmas 1990, and another dispute over working arrangements, FOCSA 
adopted a more conciliatory attitude, seeing the role that the shop stewards could 
have in avoiding direct conflict. From February 1991 regular works committee 
meetings have been held with a direct input from the shop stewards. Morale amongst 
the workforce was also raised with a return to the task and finish system on the refuse 
service, which was recognised by the Company as the only way to ensure the 
required amount of work is done, although there are indications that the early finishes 
now being achieved may lead to further job cuts.
Monitoring the Contract
The Technical and Administrative Section of the Council's Works Division 
established a team to undertake the monitoring of the cleansing contract. Monitoring 
is done by on-site inspection using pre-determined standards. The inspections allow 
different response times to deal with contract failures and when failures are not dealt
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with in accordance with the criteria established, then a penalty points system is used 
to penalise the contractor. The time limits used are specified in Table 47 below.
Item Number of 
units
Time limit for 
completion
Default points
Respond to 
directive from 
Authorised Officer 
in relation to a 
specific complaint
1 Complaint directed to 
Contractor prior to 
noon to be attended on 
the same day
Complaint directed to 
Contractor after noon 
to be attended to in the 
moming of the next 
working day
1 point/unit/ 
working day
i
Table 47 : Time limits for rectifying contract failures. 
Source : Stockport MBC, 1990b
Default points are issued for the various categories as illustrated in Table 48 below.
Service Score (% performance) Default Points
Refuse collection 85 - 90 1
7 9 -8 4 2
Other Cleaning 8 5 -9 0 1
7 9 -8 4 2
7 0 -7 8 3
6 4 -6 9 4
Public Conveniences 8 5 -9 0 1
8 0 -8 4 2
7 5 -7 9 3
Table 48 : Determination of Default Points.
Source : Stockport MBC, 1990b.
Where default points are awarded, the Authority may deduct 0.05% of the total 
monthly account due to the contractor under the terms of the contract. If a recurring 
problem is identified, or if 500 points are awarded inside a 12 month period, then the 
Council has the option of bringing in alternative methods of cleansing with all costs
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incurred deducted from the contractor’s monthly claim, alternatively the contract can 
be terminated.
These procedures were queried by the Evironmental Health Committee on the 30th 
July 1990, when the following resolution was passed:
"(1) That the Policy and Resources Committee be informed that in the 
opinion of the Committee any question of a 91% service delivery in 
respect of refuse collection, street cleansing and other cleaning is 
totally unacceptable".
(Stockport MBC, 1990b)
The default procedure noted above seems to imply that this is not the case.
The default procedure was not implemented for the first three months of the contract 
to allow the contractor time to "settle in", but by the middle of August FOCSA was 
being warned about service standards following complaints at the rate of over 1000 a 
day and the issuing of 5000 bin bags a day to cope with uncollected rubbish. This 
situation forced the Company to rethink its logistics and the resourcing of the 
contract. As the Company spokesman put it:
"There have been difficulties. There is a backlog and we are
extremely sorry if there has been any inconvenience. The company is 
throwing extra resources into the problem in a bid to get it cleared as 
quickly as is humanly possible".
(Stockport Messenger, 17-8-90)
The number of crews was increased from 11 to 15 and temporary staff were taken on 
along with longer hours for the established workforce in return for special bonuses, 
including work on the August bank holiday. The bonuses were only a temporary
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measure employed until the backlog was cleared but the extra rounds were 
maintained.
Despite FOCSA's attempts to sort the problems out, the Council's Policy and 
Resources Committee expressed "considerable disappointment" at the service at its 
meeting on the 29th August 1990, resolving that:
"the committee regrets the deplorable effects of the privatisation of the 
Councils refuse and street cleansing services resulting from the 
Government's insistence on competitive tendering and considers that 
the accumulation of waste and litter has been detrimental to amenities 
and that the Councils reputation as an efficient provider of services 
has been damaged".
(Stockport MBC, 1990c)
Unlike many other contracts the problems associated with the service did not 
disappear after the settling in period. Difficulties re-emerged with the autumn leaf 
fall, resulting in another application of additional resources. As the Director of the 
Council's Environmental Health Department explained:
"FOCSA found it necessary to resource the refuse collection ... and it 
is having the same problem with the leaf fall. Their original 
programme did not completely account for the enormous cost of 
keeping the streets free from leaves".
By the end of November the Authority had already withheld payment of £53,000 for 
the failure on the refuse collection service and the street cleansing service, in addition 
to the costs incurred by FOCSA in allocating additional resources to the problems.
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Concluding Comments
The problems faced by FOCSA on the Stockport Cleansing contract have not been 
sufficient to result in its termination but the unions are still seeking a return of the 
service to in-house provision. There is a feeling that FOCSA should never have been 
awarded the contract due to the loss leader nature of the tender. Whether making a 
loss on the contract was a deliberate policy employed by the Company is impossible 
to prove, but there is little doubt that a loss has now been made, when additional 
charges and the application of extra resources are considered.
The unions' main concern though, is with the CT exercise itself. Firstly, it is not 
possible to compete with the loss leader bids since the DSO must make a 5% return 
on its capital, whilst multinational contractors can finance contracts from overseas 
sources. Secondly, what genuine savings are made, are made at the expense of the 
workforce. As NUPE’s Area Officer explained:
"The fact is that there are people out there who are willing to do 
someone else jobs for less money. Competitive tendering is the 
auctioneering of jobs".
Furthermore, in the Authority's other tendering exercises the FOCSA experience has 
been quoted as an example of what will happen if terms and conditions are not 
sacrificed. The same officer described the process:
"At CCT meetings they [the Authority] permanently quote the FOCSA 
experience and ask what the men would prefer, to stay with the 
Authority on reduced terms or to go through the FOCSA experience, 
and they get the answer they want.
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CCT and the FOCSA experience are definitely used as a weapon to 
bludgeon down terms and conditions. The whole process is about 
taking money from local government by squeezing it from the 
workforce”.
Section 7 : Case Study VI. Public Cleansing in Manchester.
Introduction
Situated in South Lancashire, Manchester City Council serves a population of almost 
half a million people in the heart of the Greater Manchester conurbation. The 
Authority is the City's main employer with a pay-roll of over 25,000.
There is a deep seated tradition of Labour Party control in the City and Labour 
continues to provide over three quarters of the Council's elected members.
Preparing for CCT
In 1987 the Council established an Enforced Tendering Group to co-ordinate the 
Authority's strategy towards CCT and its attempt to keep services in-house. A 
programme of work was outlined in November 1987, which was designed to last until 
the next General Election, by which time a reassessment of policy would be 
necessary.
The objectives were clearly stated (Machin, 1987):
1. To create service profiles which would assess the areas most under threat and 
identify the levels of service provided, involving the workforce and service 
users.
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Service profiles were to be compiled by individual service groups responsible 
for the different activities, cleaning, catering, recreation, cleansing and 
vehicle maintenance. Each of these groups contained representatives from 
management, the Enforced Tendering Group and any union with members 
who were affected.
2. To provide training and briefing for those concerned with policy discussions
in service areas. The training to cover the lessons from the Planing and Land 
Act, NHS privatisation and previous local government privatisation as well as 
details of current CCT proposals.
3. To ensure Authority employees and service users were aware of the
provisions of the CCT legislation and the Council's and Union's response.
4. To commission and assist in compiling a 'Contractors Audit' (see Manchester
City Council, 1989) to obtain information on likely competitors. To establish 
a monitoring procedure and contract conditions relating to the contractors 
organisation, its workforce, the work to be done and the quality of that work.
5. To develop clear and comprehensive specifications in order to set out the
level and quality of service to be provided.
6. To establish the best legal means of ensuring employment issues remain on
the agenda. This is to be achieved by the development of an Employment 
Charter which would encourage and seek to commit contractors to 'best 
practice1 employment guide-lines.
There was further discussion within the Group about a movement away from the
'monolithic' in-house DLO style of service provision, towards a community based
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approach, built around non-profit making enterprises, accessible trade union and local 
authority structures in individual neighbourhoods. These discussions were not 
developed though, due to political differences within the Authority's ruling Labour 
Group and the immediate pressure to keep contracts in-house in the face of enforced 
competition, as Steve Machin, deputy Director of the Council's Economic 
Development Department put it:
"Unfortunately, winning tenders has been seen as an end in itself.
The policy of the City Council was unequivicable in its support for keeping services 
in-house and in that objective it has been entirely successful, with no contracts being 
lost to private contractors in the first three years of tendering. Without a 
development of that principle, involving changes of structure, Machin believes that 
the Authority will always be fighting a rearguard action.
The policies adopted suited the trade unions at this early stage, since they were much 
better prepared for negotiations at that time. The GMB and Manchester Trades 
Council ran training courses for stewards and union activists on CCT and quality 
issues, whilst the Authority's management appears not to have had the same level of 
training, despite the Council's rhetoric. Consequently, the GMB's representative on 
the Enforced Tendering Group claims that:
"we set the agenda on the service teams and got our way on nine 
tenths of the issues. The Union reps were absolutely essential to the 
teams, they could not function without them".
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The Competition
The Council made a decision to put its cleansing services, refuse collection and street 
sweeping, to tender in one contract, to begin on the 1st January 1991. Little outside 
interest was shown in the contract, possibly a reflection of the Authority's 
determination to keep the service in-house.
The one major contractor which did show an interest and which eventually put in the 
only bid in competition to the DLO was Onyx (UK) Ltd, owned by the French giant 
CGEA. There was some surprise that FOCSA Services (UK) Ltd, with its head 
office in Manchester, did not follow up its earlier interest with a bid, particularly after 
its successful tender in the neighbouring Borough of Stockport.
In the event, even Onyx's bid was in excess of the in-house figure:
Manchester City Council Cleansing DLO £6,800,000 p.a.
Onyx (UK) Ltd £7,130,000 p.a.
The six year contract was accordingly awarded to the Council's DLO.
The Impact on the Workforce
The impact of CT on Manchester City Council cleansing workers jobs and conditions 
must be distinguished from cuts made due to other Government policies. Cuts have 
been introduced as a result of the removal of rate support grants, rate capping and the 
community charge and have resulted in a steady decline in employment, within the 
cleansing service over the past decade. This process has been most pronounced in the 
refuse service where changing methods of work, involving metal bins, paper bags, 
plastic bins and now plastic bags, have resulted in a continual shedding of labour.
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Within this context the introduction of CCT was initially seen by the workforce as 
just another excuse for increasing productivity and resulted in considerable pressure 
to resist any further cuts.
As the experience of other authorities became more apparent, particularly after the 
award of Stockport's cleansing contract to FOCSA, the Manchester workforce 
recognised the threat that existed to their own pensions and conditions of 
employment and they became more flexible. The GMB's convener of cleansing 
explains:
"We had to become more business-like under CCT and accept that the 
pressures on the men would become more acute. But a decision was 
taken that national terms and conditions would be protected and 
maintained. The main effects were felt in terms of the number of jobs 
and on bonuses".
The street sweepers bonus was actually increased from 33-/3% to 50% of basic pay  
and the refuse collectors bonuses were consolidated at 3 3 ^ %  with additional 
guaranteed payments contained within a wet weather allowance and the granting of 
two and a half hours a week for breakdowns.
The number of domestic refuse rounds was cut by around one half, with each crew 
being made up of a driver and four loaders instead of a driver and three loaders in 
order to make up the extra work. The additional workload created a good deal of 
resentment at first, since an increase in a refuse collectors work is very identifiable; as 
it is reflected in the number of bins collected. The unions argue that this process of 
change should have been introduced more gradually.
Despite the cut in rounds no drivers were made redundant. The spare men were 
transferred to the Council's bulk waste service (for household items) or to the multi­
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skips, a new public service organised by the Authority on a commercial basis in 
competition with private operators. Others were transferred to the reorganised city 
centre service, which has two crews employing a driver and two loaders, collecting 
commercial, trade refuse, with the aim of eventually providing a 24 hour service.
The men that did leave the Authority's employ were not made compulsory redundant. 
Numbers were reduced through natural wastage, voluntary redundancy and early 
retirement. The men left with the Council service have generally been in the job for 
a long period of time, many men having over thirty years service. The turnover of 
staff is virtually non-existent.
Abuses of the Council's sick pay scheme have been tightened up with a requirement 
that sickness is reported by 10 a.m. If sickness is recorded for five days in a quarter 
or on three separate occasions in a quarter, then the worker in question is called to a 
formal meeting to explain the situation.
On the Council's building cleaning contract the impact was not so limited. Cleaners 
had their bonuses removed, which had the effect of removing their entitlement to be 
in the pension scheme and other benefits and the workforce was reduced by a half 
from around 900 to 450. This combined with the administrative nightmare of finding 
which of the original 900 workers were employed by which department in which of 
the Council's 600 buildings, to leave the contract in a state of chaos. According to 
union officers the situation has left management with little control, as the 
departments receiving the cleaning services either hang on to their own cleaners or 
leave the problem to the over pressed, nine building cleaning DLO managers.
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Trade Union Organisation
Within Manchester's Cleansing DLO the trade unions have maintained high levels of 
organisation, achieving membership rates of virtually 100%.
The unions have always been strong in the City Council but there is a feeling that that 
strength has developed a new character as a result of the struggles surrounding CCT. 
As one GMB officer explained:
"Union organisation was always strong in Manchester but it has got 
stronger with the introduction of CCT. Stewards have grown in 
•character and the members have become more conscious and are 
asking more questions. They are interested in more than just the 
annual pay round now".
The Unions Convener of Cleansing added that:
"The problems associated with tendering and the Union's role in 
preparing for CCT has greatly strengthened the Union's position in 
terms of its level of influence and its perception among the men".
Running the contract
Whilst all of Manchester's defined services have been won in-house, antagonism 
remains between the DLO management and the workforce representatives. Once the 
cleansing contract was put into operation consultation with the workforce was given 
less priority.
The Council's monitoring procedure imposes default points and financial penalties for 
failure to meet the contract specifications, in much the same way that private 
contractors are penalised on the contracts described in the other case studies. When
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the cleansing contract began, the management was informed of the failures which 
would attract penalty points but not the workforce. The trade unions had to point out 
that it was the workforce who would be held responsible for any failures so it was 
them who should receive the specialist training. A co-operative approach was then 
adopted which involved small groups of street cleaners in training sessions where 
criticisms were encouraged. The outcome was a complete redrawing of the 
procedure into a format which the men had confidence in and which has proved 
workable.
There is an appreciation amongst the workforce and their representatives that 
continual improvements and savings had to be made in the service, to keep it 
competitive. Consequently, various suggestions have come forward, through the 
unions, of ways to make the system more efficient. Ways of reducing theft and 
administrative problems have emerged from the employees front line experience of 
them. As the workers' GMB convener argues:
"In some respects the lads are leading management rather than the
other way round".
In contrast to this informal influence the unions' direct role in the service provision 
process has been curtailed. Despite the tremendous early involvement in building the 
specifications and general preparation for CCT, the Unions were largely kept out of 
the evaluation process, although this has been put down to the need to maintain 
commercial confidentiality. Since the contracts were awarded, the Enforced 
Tendering Service Teams have met much less regularly and the flow of information 
from management to staff has been far more restricted.
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Union officers say that is has become very difficult to get information on how 
contracts are working. The Authority argues that there is no reason for the unions to 
have this information despite the clear implications for the protection of the contracts 
and thus their members jobs. There was agreement though, that all unions with 
affected members would receive monitoring reports and would be free to discuss 
their content with management before they were presented to councillors.
The GMB's representative in the Enforced Tendering Group argues that the growing 
reluctance to involve the unions, stems from their own lack of competence. He 
explains:
"The management has become scared of the Service Groups as a 
forum because they know we have been more clued up than them.
They didnt have the same training as our people in the Group and 
consequently they fear the organisations and try to by-pass them".
The Union's Convener of Cleansing adds that:
"It is a reality that where management is the least competent the most 
anti-union attitudes prevail, because we raise questions about their 
ability."
Officers are not so much concerned about the lack of information, since this comes 
from the membership in any case, but are worried about decreased involvement in the 
decision making process. The increasing emphasis on quality within the service is a 
big concern, particularly when the policy is budget led. As the cleansing convener 
argues:
"It is a case of the dictation of customers needs at the expense of the 
people providing the sen'ice. This is not in the interest of the City as a
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whole as the needs that are met will he the most vocal and organised.
That doesn't mean the poorest areas or the workforce who live in the 
City and benefit from the Authority's role as the City's major 
employer."
He argues that the unions must continue to be heavily involved in the service 
provision and CCT process since under the new arrangements their members jobs are 
permanently at risk. If the unions are involved then the political will to keep the 
services in-house can be maintained and with it, the workers jobs.
Section 8. Case Study VII. Building Cleaning in Mid Glamorgan
Introduction
Mid Glamorgan County Council is responsible for the administration of the largest 
County in Wales, covering the Valleys in the South of the Country, which used to 
dominate Britain's coal and steel industry. Employment in the County is now 
concentrated in services and light industry but the political complexion of the Council 
still reflects that of an industrial region, with the Labour Party totally dominant.
Preparing for CCT
Building cleaning, as in most County Councils, was largely organised by the 
Education Authority prior to CCT, since it was their buildings that were cleaned. 
There was little centralized information on what was actually done in each building 
though, since this was left to head teachers, managers and caretakers at the sites 
concerned. Consequently, the Authority was not in any way geared up for the 
preparation of a properly specified contract.
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Management consultants Coopers and Lybrand were brought in early in 1988 to offer 
advice, and the decision was taken to impose a contract - client split, with a DSO 
Board providing an overall perspective on the CT process. A working party was 
established following the demands of the GMB and NUPE, who organise most of the 
cleaners, which involved personnel officers, trade union officers, workforce 
representatives, the chairs of the 'task teams' responsible for each service and the 
management consultants. This working group put forward the ideas which formed 
the basis of the Authority's approach towards the whole first round CCT programme.
The Council's attitude impressed the unions. The GMB's Regional Officer 
responsible for the Authority explains:
"At this time the Authority couldn't be faulted. They were totally 
committed to winning the contract and organised research and brain 
storming weekend schools with the management consultants. We 
talked about the problems in great detail considering all the angles.
The preparation was extremely thorough."
It was the Building Cleaning contract that was most pressing since the date set for the 
commencement of the contract was brought forward from April 1991 to August 
1989.
Preparing the Tender
A decision was taken by the Council to let the Building Cleaning work as four 
separate contracts in Ogwr; Rhondda and Taff Ely; Merthyr and Cynon valley; and 
Rhymney Valley and Cardiff offices.
Whilst there was a strong commitment to winning each of these contracts, the 
Council was very conscious of what it regarded as a "significant competitive gap"
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between the DSO and private contractors (Mid Glamorgan County Council, 1988) 
and that;
"action needed to bridge the competitive gap m il affect terms and. 
conditions of employment to an extent which causes a redundancy 
situation to exist for all operatives"
(Mid Glamorgan County Council, 1988)
The management consultants were adamant that the DSOs productivity rates would 
have to improve in order to become competitive. They argued that private 
contractors would be cleaning around 500 square foot an hour in comparison to the 
DSOs rate of 250 square foot. Furthermore, they pointed to the wage rates in the 
private sector which were ranging between £1.50 and £2.20 per hour, compared with 
the national local government rate of £2.59 per hour.
The Cleaning Services Manager at the time was recruited from a private contractor, 
and he was able to put the Consultant's claims into perspective, pointing out that 
competitors productivity rates would certainly be higher than those prevailing, but 
would be nothing like the 500 square foot that Coopers and Lybrand were talking 
about.
The Authority agreed to begin a moderate programme of capital investment as a part 
of the plan to raise productivity rates. An investment of £50,000 was allocated for 
1988/89 followed by £350,000 the next year and £100,000 in 1991/92 and again in 
1992/93. This had to be accompanied by reductions in staffing levels and a 
consequent increase in work done by each operative if savings were to be achieved.
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The problem was the lack of knowledge of what work was to be done or who was 
responsible for doing it. As the Chief Officer of the Direct Services Committee put 
it:
"Management and supervision of operatives is weak or non-existent 
because of poorly defined lines of responsibility. This results in 
inadequate direction, advice and guidance for operatives at the 
establishment level."
In order to increase the level of information, school caretakers were used to provide 
documentary evidence on each school, the number of rooms, the types of floors, the 
cleaning methods used and so forth. This information then went into the 
specification which formed the basis of the contract. To determine the appropriate 
productivity rate to go with the specif cation, cleaning trials were set up in the nine 
school sites during August and September 1988. When the results of the study came 
out, formal negotiations between the Authority and the trade unions began. The lead 
unions were the GMB and NUPE although the TGWU and AEU also had a handful 
of members.
The productivity achieved during the cleaning trials was very high, at around 400 
square foot per hour, which the unions recognised would result in heavy job losses. 
Various tactics were employed to demonstrate how the rates would not be 
sustainable, due to bad weather, equipment breakdowns and training requirements, in 
order to bring the projected rate down and protect jobs. The problem was that by this 
time, seven private contractors had expressed an interest in the contracts, five of 
whom were eventually invited to tender and one of which had already visited the 
schools, which seemed to indicate that they would submit a bid.
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Pressure was building for concessions on staffing levels, with a commitment from the 
Council that:
"An early retirement!severance scheme shall be introduced with 
redundancy and severance payment or superannuation!gratuity 
benefits as appropriate "
(Mid Glamorgan County Council, 1988)
The authority was also saying that national rates of pay could not be maintained if the 
service was going to be kept in-house and that national conditions were under threat, 
since contractors were offering only two or three weeks annual leave in comparison 
to the four or five weeks provided by the Council. So a decision was taken by the 
GMB to hold a full consultation exercise amongst the membership. Mass meetings 
were organised in five different locations throughout the County during late 
September. Each of the meetings was well attended and it was explained that the 
competitive process meant productivity levels would have to rise, along with a 
possible deterioration of conditions if the work was kept in-house.
The attitude of the membership indicated a willingness to give the Union a free hand 
in negotiations if it meant securing the work in-house with the best conditions 
obtainable. There was an insistence though, that any redundancies should be 
concentrated amongst the older workers, who worked most hours, were 
superannuated and who would find change most stressful to cope with. These 
workers would additionally be entitled to the most favourable redundancy packages.
The Council accepted that these workers would be offered early retirement or 
redundancy in preference to any other method of selection should the DSO be 
successful, despite the extra costs involved. There was a need to lose around 400 
workers from the 2000 currently employed, and the Authority was grateful that a
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painless way had been found to secure these reductions. Furthermore, the workers in 
question were the most expensive to employ since they worked the longest hours and 
had the full range of benefits.
By mid-October the County Council was re-affirming its intention of pursuing
"a very positive polity o f keeping cleaning in-house by putting in a 
competitive bid against the external opposition
(Mid Glamorgan County Council, 1988)
But this required agreement on a productivity rate which would make the contract 
work. It was not until January 1989 that the CT Working Group put together the 
costs of the DSO and of potential competitors in the search for an appropriate rate. 
This was finally set at 340 square foot per hour in the knowledge that the necessary 
staff cuts could be met voluntarily.
Terms and Conditions
A decision was made to hold payments at the existing level of £2.5962 per hour but 
to freeze them until August 1990, the anniversary of the contract. Sick pay, 
maternity pay and leave arrangements were brought into line with the statutory 
schemes and annual leave cut to two weeks a year. The working year was also 
reduced from fifty-two weeks to forty-six (including holiday entitlements) although a 
profit sharing scheme, relating to any surplus of income over expenditure, beyond the 
statutory financial target, was introduced in compensation.
After the unions agreed to this package of cuts, the Chief Officer of the Direct 
Services Committee and the Cleansing Services Manager indicated that they still did
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not think this was enough to secure the contract. The unions were asked to consider 
the matter further and come back with a final package. By this stage the view was 
that the workforce could be stretched no further and that the bid should be presented 
as it stood and the Authority finally agreed to respect the unions stand-point.
In the event there was no alternative bid and so the contract was awarded to the DSO, 
now named County Cleaning on the basis of the terms agreed. To the workforce this 
meant 400 job losses, reductions in hours, two weeks less holiday a year, reduced 
sickness and maternity benefits and an increased workload.
Operating the Contract
The contract, which was due to run for three years from August 1st 1989, did not face 
any major difficulties other than those associated with a high rate of labour turn over, 
with some workers only staying in the job for a couple of days due to the pressure of 
work.
However, union officers claim that there was no effective monitoring of the contract 
and that there were not even any formal procedures laying out guide-lines or 
timetables for monitoring. As the GMB's Regional Officer put it:
"The Authority didn't really want to know and we didn't want to push 
them because the service was in-house."
More of an interest was shown as the contract moved towards its end and the second 
round of tendering came onto the agenda. There was then more of a recognition of 
the need to satisfy user requirements.
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Round Two
The contract was to be reawarded in March 1992 but this time around the 
preparations were far more limited, with preparatory meetings only beginning in June 
1991. Union officers claim that the Group meetings which were held were far less 
frequent than before and were used more as a means of informing them of what 
management was already doing rather than involving them in the decision making 
process.
Even wage rates were determined unilaterally. The rate had risen to £3.03 per hour 
over the lifetime of the first contract and a decision was taken to raise it further to 
£3.20 per hour despite prevailing rates in the County of around £3.00 per hour. This 
reflected the confidence that County Cleaning had in its own position, Stemming 
from their status as incumbents and the expression of satisfaction by 85% of the 
service’s users.
Despile this confidence the competition was much greater this time, with thirteen 
companies expressing an interest, five of whom were invited to tender, including 
Taylorplan, OCS, ISS, Pace and ARA. This time all of the potential competitors 
visited the buildings in the contract and submitted tenders. It became clear that the 
confidence expressed by County Cleaning was illfounded. The in-house contractor 
was heavily undercut by Taylorplan and OCS. Taylorplan bid £400,000 per annum 
cheaper than County Cleaning with a tender price of £9.8 million over three years 
and was eventually awarded the contract.
There was some dispute over Taylorplan’s bid following allegations that it was a loss 
leader and the company's request to defer the start of two of the contracts. However, 
the argument was not vigorously pursued since County Cleaning came third behind 
OCS, who would have been the only beneficiaries of Taylorplan's disqualification.
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Terms and Conditions
Taylorplan is aiming to use 1200 operatives, a reduction of 400 on County Cleaning 
staffing levels. It is also planned to reduce the total number of hours worked on the 
contract from 18000 per week to 15000 per week with an annual contingency of 
19000 hours.
The Company quoted an hourly rate of £3.15 in its tender submission but after 
securing the contract a different story was told in the different contract areas. In the 
less depressed area of Ogwr, cleaners were informed that they would keep their jobs 
and their hours and that they might even get a pay rise. There was also to be no 
change in District C, but in Districts B and D, the areas where Taylorplan requested a 
deferred start, it was implied that there will be cuts in hours and that whilst a rate of 
£3.01 will be paid until January 1993, thereafter, the Company will introduce its own 
rates reflecting the state of local labour markets.
Taylorplan has now stated that there is no plan to introduce a non-variable rate of 
£3.15 an hour. That is to be the average across the contract with a minimum of £3.01 
per hour. There is also no holiday pay unless more than twenty-five hours a week are 
worked. In fact most employees are on less than sixteen hours with an average of 
twelve and a half hours. Since few workers had been on more than sixteen hours 
under County Cleaning very few were entitled to redundancy payments either.
Union Organisation
Prior to the second round of tendering it was revealed that union membership 
amongst the 1600 workforce had fallen to a total of 600, with NUPE establishing 
itself as the largest union. This seems to have been due to an inactive recruitment
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policy despite high labour turnover on the contract. Once the seriousness of the 
decline became apparent the unions got organised and the GMB and NUPE both have 
over 500 members now.
Taylorplan has indicated that they would favour a single union recognition agreement 
with any union representing over 50% of the workforce, but the GMB and NUPE 
have agreed to push for a joint approach. The TGWU has applied for recognition 
independently and did have a meeting with the Company's directors, but their request 
has already been denied.
GMB officers believe that the TGWU would in any case find it hard to put any 
agreement into practice due to individual union loyalties. It is the GMB that is 
dominant amongst the workforce, but even they are not interested in a single union 
deal locally, for fear of becoming tied into a relationship with Taylorplan that would 
create a vested interest in keeping the contact with the Company.
There is no doubt amongst union officers in Mid Glamorgan that recognition will 
come, due to the trade unionist traditions of the workforce. The decline in 
membership is blamed exclusively on high turnover rates but with a more active 
recruitment policy the situation has been turned around which, it is felt, will force the 
recognition issue.
There is a feeling that the CCT process itself has created a very high union profile in 
the minds of the membership, although there are doubts about whether this can be 
sustained. The involvement of officers during the tendering phase necessarily 
improves the unions' profile, but it is only local activists and representatives that can 
maintain it after the contracts have been awarded. This process highlights where the 
unions' strengths and weaknesses lie. As the cleaners GMB convener puts it:
"Where the activists are strong is where the Union is strong."
Whilst there is confidence that there is enough strength to win union 
recognition rights from the Company, there is a certain resignation when it 
comes to maintaining national rates and conditions, which have already been 
ripped to pieces. The GMB's Regional Organiser argues:
"It is alright saying ‘keep national conditions' at the head office level 
but at the local level it is not possible if services are to be kept in- 
house. I was told to 'keep national conditions' but also told to 'keep 
the 600 members, keep that contract!' well you can't have both."
Monitoring
Now that the work has been lost to a private contractor the importance of monitoring 
becomes clearer. The County Council believed that:
"greater control and hence better standards can be achieved by using 
directly employed labour."
(Mid Glamorgan County Council, 1988)
So with the introduction of Taylorplan the unions have put a lot of pressure on the 
Authority to create an effective monitoring procedure. As the GMB's officer 
currently responsible for the County's cleaners says:
"Monitoring is the only effective weapon we have now.We are telling 
our cleaners to only work within the hours allocated and to make it 
clear to supervisors and monitors when the work can't be done so that 
they don't get the blame for failure."
By the end of May the Authority had released a detailed monitoring procedure 
involving day to day monitoring on site and formal monitoring checks. The
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By the end of May the Authority had released a detailed monitoring procedure 
involving day to day monitoring on site and formal monitoring checks. The 
computer package ‘Optimise1 is to be used for the formal check, and any 
performance:
"will be deemed to have failed if  95% performance has not been 
achieved on the initial check."
(Mid Glamorgan County Council, 1992) 
with deductions made from daily payments on the basis outlined in Table 49 below.
Performance
achieved
Deductions from daily payment Example
100% - 95% Nil Nil
94%< - 0% 6% increasing by increments of 1%, up to 
a total of 100%
76% performance 
= 24% deduction
Table 49: Deductions made from daily payment for inadequate performance on 
Mid Glamorgan Countv Council Building Cleaning Contracts.
Source: Mid Glamorgan County Council, 1992 
Concluding Comments
Mid Glamorgan County Council is probably the first Authority to have won a service 
in-house on the first round of CCT but lost it to a private contractor in the second 
round. It is clear that the preparations for the second round were not as extensive, but 
also that the interest shown by private contractors was far more intensive.
Perhaps of more importance is the fact that in order to secure the contract in-house 
during the first round, major concessions were made by the unions, which sacrificed 
national terms and conditions, cut jobs and raised work rates. This development has 
merely been extended in the second round as part of the competitive process 
introduced hy CCT.
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To retain the contract, County Cleaning would probably have had to introduce 
variable wage rates within the County itself and without such dramatic concessions it 
seems unlikely that the Authority will be able to mount a viable challenge to retain 
control of the service, unless there is a change in the legislation or a dramatic failure 
on the contract by Taylorplan.
Section 9: Case Study VITT Refuse Collection in Glasgow 
Introduction
Situated on the western side of Scotland's central belt, Glasgow District Council 
administrates the civic functions of Scotland's largest city, with a population of over 
700,000 people.
The City Council has a long history of association with socialist politics and remains 
heavily dominated by Labour Party councillors who take up well over three quarters 
of the seats in the City Chambers.
Preparing for CCT
The Authority made its opposition to the CT process quite clear once it became 
obvious that the Government was going to introduce the legislation. In reflection of 
this position the Council decided to establish a 'Sub Committee on Anti-Privatisation’ 
within its Policy and Resources Committee in May 1988.
The Sub-Committee was to consider all aspects of CT within sub-groups for each of 
the defined activities, in order to assist individual departments in the preparation of 
strategies, specifications and tenders. From the start there were representatives from 
the affected departments, the finance department, personnel and the trade unions.
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The trade union representatives were not formerly appointed until August though, 
when the individual unions were given representation in line with their memberships. 
The GMB was given three places, NALGO two and the AEU, TGWU, MATSA and 
the EETPU one each.
At that time it was recognised that certain concessions would have to be made if the 
services were to be kept in-house. In particular, that was likely to involve job losses. 
As the GMBs officer responsible for Glasgow City Council puts it:
"There is no doubt that before CCT there was a lot o f slock in the 
workforce”.
In recognition of this it was decided to secure reductions in the workforce on a 
voluntary basis by encouraging early retirement. At the Personnel Committee 
meeting on 17 August 1988 it was decided to reaffirm the Council's commitment:
"(I) to a policy o f no compulsory redundancy
(2) to a policy o f allowing individuals to retire prematurely ... providing 
the employee was aged 50 years or over and had not less than five 
years reckonable service with the Local Government Superannuation 
Scheme".
These provisions were extended in the light of the developments being forced on the 
Authority by the CCT legislation, such that:
"employees who are under 50 years o f age or who are over 50 years o f 
age with less than five years reckonable superannuation service 
(would be entitled to]
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(a) a redundancy payment o f up to the permitted maximum o f 30
weeks pay, and
(b) a lieu notice payment o f up to 24 weeks pay"
(Glasgow District Council, 1988)
Despite these provisions and the Council's genuine desire to keep all services in- 
house, the preparations for CT did not run entirely smoothly, particularly on the 
refuse collection contract. The contract was due to be awarded in September of 1989 
for a start date of 1 January 1990, and in relation to this development the City's 
Director of Cleansing made various proposals for the reorganisation of the service 
which would get it into a more competitive state.
The GMBs refuse collection Convener, who is responsible for all of the Council's 
loaders (the TGWU organises the drivers) was not interested in making any 
concessions to the management and consequently the reorganisation proposals were 
put on hold throughout November and December 1988. During that time it came 
down to the Union's full time officer responsible for Council employees, to convince 
the men that changes had to be made. He explains:
"In the past, management thrived on conflict in the same way as the 
men did. It was a total them and us situation. Now that the private 
sectors involved we have to make a return on the contract or we will 
lose it. It's not a case now o f the work having to be done in the end 
anyway, so the lads still get paid, i f  it's not done we'll all be out o f a 
job. That's the bottom line".
The election of a new Vice Convener, who shares this attitude, helped to smooth out 
the transition and by early 1989 the reorganisation was coming into effect and the 
potential for conflict had subsided. One union officer said:
*There was no Liverpool situation here. That's not the way to do 
things".
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The Glasgow Cleansing DSO decided to split the City into four districts, North, 
South, East and West, as a way of introducing the required job losses. The decisions 
were made unilaterally by management with the excuse that they had to be made 
quickly due to competitive pressures. This was a repeat of the experience on the 
street cleansing contract which was awarded to the Council's DSO in May 1989, after 
virtually no joint consultation at all, according to GMB officers.
This experience runs in the face of the Council's Convener of the Environmental 
Protection Committee who claims that the formula relied on:
"close co-operation between councillors, trade unions and workforce to make 
sure that working practices and productivity provide a quality service at the 
right price".
The Tenders
When the street cleansing service was put out to tender the Council received quite a 
shock when it found that the DSOs bid was not the cheapest. The decision to award 
the contract in-house, rather than to the lowest tenderer, Lilley Ventures Ltd, was 
only taken after the cost of redundancy payments was taken into consideration.
The success of Lilley Ventures was certainly noted by one of the largest multinational 
contractors, Sitaclean Technology. Sitaclean decided to launch a joint venture with 
Lilley Ventures, called Lilley Sitaclean (Scotland) Ltd, in order to secure the refuse 
contract in Glasgow, which is the largest of its kind in the UK. Such a move would 
combine the local knowledge of Lilley Ventures with Sitaclean's enormous financial 
backup and experience in providing local authority cleansing services (See Chapter 4, 
Profile Iii).
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Other than the DSO, there were a total of eight contractors who expressed an interest 
in the contract. L&C Waste-Tech Ltd, FOSCA Services, Lilley Sitaclean, BFI 
Wastecare, Town&Country Community Services Ltd, Leigh Environmental, UK 
Waste control and Cory Onyx. Three of them (BFI, Town & Country and Leigh 
Environmental) withdrew their interest and in August 1989, from the remaining five, 
the Council’s Environmental Protection Committee invited Lilley Sitaclean, FOSCA 
and L&C Waste Tech. to tender, in addition to the DSO.
In the event L&C Waste Tech. also withdrew their interest before the tender 
submission date, leaving three competitors who placed the following bids:
Lilley Sitaclean (Scotland)Ltd £9,729,534 
FOSCA Services (UK)LTD £9,064,758
Glasgow City Council Cleansing DSO £8,300,314
Having received the tenders, and with the DSO bid over £700,000 cheaper than the 
next tender and £3.5 millon cheaper than the previous year, a strong recommendation 
was sent from the Environmental Protection Committee, to the full Council meeting 
that the DSO bid be accepted. The Council meeting, held on the same day, 21st 
September 1989, approved the recommendation and awarded the refuse collection 
contract to the DSO, to run for Five years, beginning on 1st January 1990.
The convener of the Council's Environmental Protection Committee said:
"It proves...that management and the workers, through their trade unions, at 
local atid national levels, realise exactly the implications o f compulsory 
competitive tendering, and are prepared to work together to provide the best 
possible service to the citizens o f Glasgow.
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"The District Council believes in-house refuse collection is the best method. 
We are not in it to make a profit but to provide the best possible service to the 
public".
The Impact on the Workforce
Prior to the introduction of CCT, Glasgow City Council's Cleansing Deparment 
employed around 1400 workers with between 700 and 800 employed on the refuse 
collection service. Those totals have since fallen to a total departmental workforce of 
between 1100 and 1200, around 500 of whom work on the refuse service.
Each collection crew was reduced from five men to four men plus a driver, but the 
Authority managed to stand by its commitment to avoid compulsory redundancies. 
The offer of early retirement was readily accepted by many of the men aged over 55 
who feared a dramatic increase in their workload. As one refuse loader explained:
"Before all this [CCT] they'd been carried by the younger guys who knew it 
would be their turn one day so [didn't] mind, but that [can't] go on now, 
every ones got to grafi".
Anyone that did get dropped from the crew, but did not want early retirement, was 
given nine months protection. Men who were left without a beat became 'spare' men 
but kept their grade and their bonus for nine months. During that period the men who 
were not required were expected to seek redeployment. Once a transfer was made, 
the grade and bonus scheme going with the new job were applied.
Most of the redeployment has been kept within the Cleansing Department, due to an 
anomaly applying to Glasgow. In the City, the prevalence of tenement blocks as the 
predominant form of housing, until recently largely owned by the Council, meant that 
there has been a departmental provision for 'back court sweeping’. This service is not
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covered by the Government's CCT legislation and has been used as a temporary 
means of soaking up the spare labour released by rationalisation in other areas. As 
the GMBs full-time officer dealing with the Authority says:
"If that [backcourt sweeping] becomes covered by the legislation then we will 
be in a mess, because thats where all our slack has gone".
Pay and conditions for the workforce that remains, have been unaffected by the 
changes other than an increase in bonuses provided when a collection run is 
completed. The Authority has also introduced an additional bonus of £4 per week for 
a "depot clearance". If one crew cannot finish its run due to a vehicle breakdown or 
some other problem, the other crews are expected to pick up the work. There is some 
suggestion that this practice is being used by management to overcome administrative 
and directional inefficiencies. As one worker put it:
"If a job doesn't get done because we've not been told to do it they can just 
get us to pick it up at the end o f the day as part o f the depot clearance."
Industrial Relations
All of the unions retain full recognition rights with the Authority, with appropriate 
time off for union duties for each of the major unions' (GMB and TGWU) 
representatives. The Convener and Vice Convener are full-time representatives and, 
in addition, whenever a dispute arises on a particular beat then one man from the 
crew remains behind to represent the others and sort the grievance out, whilst his 
place is take by a spareman.
This practice prevents the breakdowns in the service which used to be commonplace. 
In the past, any dispute resulted in the placing of a picket which could stop the whole 
service throughout the City inside a few hours. The men knew that the work would
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backlog of work so that a strike cost them nothing in their wage packet, the GMBs 
full-time officer believes that:
"It would now cost them their jobs."
The main industrial relations problems seem to arise from a division within the 
workforce. Refuse vehicle drivers are organised in the TGWU and loaders in the 
GMB. The two sets of workers have been treated differently due to management’s 
perception of which workers have the most power. This has resulted in the drivers 
having different agreements in the various districts of the contract, whilst the loaders 
are all covered by one agreement. Problems can consequent arise when changes are 
introduced as they can affect drivers in certain areas differently than others.
The GMB has asked for all meetings to involved the management and unions from 
each of the four districts to overcome this problem, but agreement has not been 
reached. There is a suspicion that the divisions within the workforce are being used 
to management's advantage. Credence is given to this assertion following the 
experience of a dispute in 1991 concerning working in snowbound conditions.
The workforce is expected to turn up for work in the event of bad weather conditions 
and if a refuse service is inoperable then they will be allocated alternative work, 
generally snow clearance. On this occasion the TGWU placed a picket at one of the 
depots, refusing to take alternative work, but the picket was broken in unprecedented 
fashion by the GMB loaders who took up snow clearing duties. This broke the 
dispute with a return to work by the drivers who then claimed payment, since they 
regarded themselves as 'unable to work' in the conditions which were too treacherous 
for driving. This merely provoked a counter claim for double pay amongst the 
loaders. Both claims were rejected.
The real test of how far the balance of power has shifted will come with the 
Authority's pursuit of further savings with its declared intention of introducing a 
wheelie bin system, during the course of the contract. The unions would rather see 
the contract out but can see the opportunity of securing an enhancement of bonus 
payments if they co-operate.
Concluding Comments
The success of private contractors during the first round of the CT process has been 
virtually non-existent in Scotland. That does not mean that the workforce has been 
left unaffected though. Job cuts, work intensification and reduced industrial muscle 
have been quite clear consequences of CCT in the Glasgow refuse collection service, 
even with an in-house win.
There is a feeling of great certainty that the second time around CT will bring with it 
an even more determined effort from private contractors to win contracts in Scotland 
and consequently, cleansing workers will be faced with continued pressure to make 
concessions on the terms and conditions they have built up.
Seel ion 10: Case Study IX Building and Housing Estate Cleaning in Ealing 
Introduction
Ealing is a London borough, with a population of around 300,000 people, situated on 
the western side of the City. Political control has fluctuated over the past decade, 
with Labour wresting control from the Conservatives in 1986 and the Conservatives 
returning to power in 1990.
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A History of Privatisation
Competitive tendering is not new to Ealing. In 1983, the Authority, under 
Conservative control, decided to invite tenders for the delivery of its street cleansing 
service. This contract was eventually awarded to Exclusive Cleaning. The company 
continued to provide the service until 1987, when the new Labour administration 
decided to return to the use of direct labour.
The experience of privatisation on the street cleaning service was not encouraging. 
Standards fell, as even the contractor admits, and there was an erosion of workers' 
terms, conditions and trade union rights (see LGIU, N.D.). Wages were reduced by 
25-30% and the contractor refused to allow the deduction of union subscriptions at 
source, which resulted in a dramatic decline in membership levels.
The new in-house service led to the recruitment of more staff on better terms and 
conditions, but as Donald McGregor, the GMB's national local government officer 
stated:
"The Ealing experience is a grim warning. People should not have to 
see their services dragged down to this level. Councils should not 
have to go through the painful and fruitless experience o f rebuilding 
services that private contractors have laid to waste".
(LGIU, N.D.)
Out of this experience and the election of a Labour administration came a fresh 
approach, based on a firm commitment to keeping services in-house.
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CCT and the Cleaning of Schools
The widely held belief that quality is the key to retaining services in-house, 
encouraged Ealing Council to promote a training initiative for its workforce. Faced 
with CCT for the Council's building cleaning services, a series of courses were 
established for cleaning staff in the Education department, which were later expanded 
into other areas.
Training, recognised by the British Institute of Cleaning Science, was given in the 
safe and efficient use of new machinery and various methods of cleaning. 
Environmental health experts provided health and safety training. The reasons for 
CCT and the procedures involved were explained, along with the activities and 
structure of the Authority itself. Finally, communication skills were taught, so that 
cleaners could better articulate their grievances, problems and ideas. As much as 
helping to improve the quality of service delivery, the training programme was 
designed to improve opportunities for the Council's workforce (The attempts of 
Ealing Council to improve cleaners' conditions and status is discussed further in 
Chapter 7).
This developmental initiative continued alongside the more immediate attempt to 
prepare a specification and in-house bid for the cleaning of buildings contracts. 
However, the approach that was adopted did reflect the Authority's commitment to its 
workforce. The trade unions, and particularly the GMB, were fully involved in the 
preparations. Indeed the influence of the GMB at this time cannot be overstated. As 
the Union's Secretary of the Joint Works Office points out:
"The GMB was regarded as a kind o f Mafia in Ealing, dominating the
union side and Council policy".
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The unions used this status to extend their sphere of influence. There was an initial 
insistence that the client departments dealing with CCT should have at least one full­
time seconded trade union representative. These secondees were meant to gather 
information for the Joint Works Officers, so that the union negotiators could make 
informed and effective decisions. In reality, they did much of the Authority's work, 
in terms of taking measurements and identifying service requirements. On the 
education side, which forms the bulk of the building cleaning service, union officers 
argue that they effectively wrote the specification. This was useful to union officers 
who wanted to make the specification so tight that private contractors would not be 
interested in the contracts.
The unions were also represented on the contractor side which determined how the 
specifications were to be met. But there was still strong pressure from the Authority 
to break with national terms and conditions. This pressure was successfully resisted 
but concessions had to be made on productivity levels.
The Council initially wanted a productivity rate of 750 ft2 per hour, which was 400 
above the nationally determined rate of 350 ft2-. Recognising that productivity levels 
equate with jobs and consequently members, attempts were made by the unions to 
bring this figure down. Firstly, it was pointed out that all workers employed on the 
contract were trained, since 80% of the in-house workforce already was. The 'price 
of industrial peace' was quoted to officers who were sympathetic to such notions. 
The unions also pointed out that some buildings need higher standards of cleanliness 
than others. So an agreement was reached that specifications would be raised on 
certain sites, with a subsequent redefinition of productivity levels. With a non 
uniform service requirement, most schools naturally sought classification at the 
highest levels which correspondingly had the lowest productivity rates.
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Following a series of pilot schemes all operating at different productivity, the 
Authority proposed a figure of 600 ft2 which was eventually bargained down tc a 
450 ft2 ceiling. Whilst the existing rate was 350 ft2, in practice this had fallen to 
around 200 ft2 in some schools. The onus was put on the unions to ensure that the 
new rates would be met. In terms of jobs, the r.ew figures meant around 90 
redundancies out of a workforce of about 350 cleaners.
Resentment amongst the Workforce
The cleaning workforce was not at all happy with the proposed changes and many 
cleaners fell that the unions had been doing management’s job for them. The attitude 
was that if there were going to be changes it was up to management to suggest them 
and up to the unions to resist them. Eventually the offer was accepted but only when 
the union representatives put it in terms of 'accept the offer or lose your job'. The 
Secretary of the Joint Works Office feels that this was the wrong approach:
"We should have had a much closer liaison with the workforce, 
throughout the preparations. I  suppose we just didn't have the time or 
resources and yet we are better resourced here than in most places".
The problems associated with the workforce’s resentment became more apparent once 
the contract was awarded. The service was kept in-house, but due to the new 
conditions, there was a mass exodus by the workforce. Very quickly, the unions lost 
any control they had had over the contract. The situation was not helped by the 
presence of a DSO manager with no knowledge of the service he was running. The 
unions felt that whilst the workers were gaining short term benefits from his 
inadequacies, due to their superior knowledge of the work, this was not in the long 
run interests of the contract. A demand was made that he be removed and shortly 
afterwards, the manager was redeployed, back to his old job in the Highways
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department. This illustrates very clearly the influence that the GMB had over the 
Authority at this time.
The loss of control had also resulted in management abuses and opportunism on the 
part of the client. There were demands that rooms, not even included on the 
specification, should be cleaned. Consequently, individual workloads were being 
increased without prior consultation. Once this question was addressed, union 
representatives got round to the different sites and challenged management. This led 
to the granting of an automatic right to time remeasurement and the awarding of 
additional resources from the client for the extra work.
Changes in the Workforce
There has been a dramatic shift in the structure of the cleaning workforce. The older 
members of staff have tended to leave, being replaced by younger women, who are 
often supporting a family. Consequently, the workforce's commitment to their work 
has been undermined. Long established ties between cleaners, other members of staff 
and students have been severed. Workers prime concern is now to work the hours 
they are contracted for rather than to complete the tasks they are employed to 
perform.
The monitoring of the contract is largely done by the caretakers, who used to be fully 
involved in cleaning duties themselves. “This has resulted in 2 more significant 
changes. Firstly, the caretakers have traditionally been the unions' representatives on 
site, but with the shift to a more supervisory role, this has become more difficult. 
There is a feeling amongst these workers that their 'kingdoms' have been broken up 
and as a result, they feel less inclined to keep things under control or to engage in 
union activities. Secondly, the change in the nature of caretakers' work, threatens to 
take away their whole purpose. Many caretakers have adopted a managerial
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approach which has led the Authority, now under Conservative control, to question 
the reason for their existence. Head teachers see themselves as the managers of 
schools and 24 caretakers' jobs have already been lost as a result of the coincidence of 
duties. It is now being proposed that caretakers' job descriptions be changed to 
include a direct supervisory role. The unions have been forced to support this move 
in order to protect the jobs that remain.
Conservatives in Power - A Change of Style
In the London borough elections of May 1990 the Conservative Party took control of 
Ealing Council. This led to a change in the relationship between the authority, its 
officers and the unions, and in the Council's attitude towards CT.
The feeling amongst Conservative councillors is that the GMB has had far too much 
power in Ealing and that the Authority needs to reassert its control. Whereas the 
Labour administration recognised and respected the GMB's 'price of industrial peace', 
the new leaders of the Council are not willing to pay up.
As a result, monitoring of the Council's DSO has been stepped up. Defaults are 
strictly monitored regardless of how much damage is caused to the contracts or the 
in-house workforce. Union officers feel that councillors are hoping to undermine the 
contracts, so that they have to be privatised, in the full knowledge of the devastating 
effect this would have on union organisation. The Secretary of the Joint Works 
Office believes that monitoring is in fact being used to control the workforce and the 
town hall unions.
The nature of management - workforce relations has also been transformed, 
providing the unions with constant ar.d time consuming hastles. Co-operation has 
been replaced by confrontation. The personalised negotiations, with concessions on
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both sides, which characterised work relationships before CCT, have been replaced 
by a direct style of management. Managers now make decisions and give instructions 
without consultation. The unions have to deal with the problems once they have been 
created, rather than helping to prevent them occurring.
These difficulties are accentuated by the decentralisation of operations associated 
with CCT. The unions have limited information on who their members are and 
where they work and there is no easy solution to this problem. Union Officers 
recognise the need to change the pattern of activity to become more workplace 
orientated, but they do not have the resources to respond in this way.
The main problem is associated with the adoption of a new approach following the 
change in political control. In short there is no longer any commitment to retaining 
services in-house. This is best illustrated by the Authority’s decision to subject its 
housing estate cleaning to voluntary competitive tendering (UCT).
Housing Estate Cleaning and UCT
In January 1992, Ealing Council put its 'UCT programme' into action with a proposal 
to subject the cleaning of its housing estates to CT. A specification was prepared by 
the Management Services Officer, without any trade union involvement. The unions 
only got to see the document once the final version was prepared. The specification 
was based on that used for the building cleaning contract and did not involve any 
specific assessment of needs on the estates themselves.
Issued in conjunction with the specification was a new job description, once again 
prepared without any union or workforce input. Indeed union officers only received 
this document at the meeting arranged to discuss it. The GMB's full-time officer 
responsible for Ealing believes this illustrates the Conservatives' attitude:
"This is symptomatic o f Tory behaviour, the attitude is one o f reluctant 
disclosure o f information rather than involvement".
The whole approach has centred around local authority officer decision making, in 
isolation from trade union influence. This is despite the impact that the proposals 
would have on the workforce. The number of caretakers was to be cut from the 
current official total of 88 to 44.
It became apparent that the information on which these proposals were based was 
extremely shaky. But the unions' protests were ignored and negotiations on the 
content of the specification and job descriptions failed to result in any changes. In 
contrast, negotiations on the wages element moved along in an entirely different 
manner, and resulted in a package worth around £400 per week. The unions had no 
intention of pursuing this claim since the elected members would never agree to it 
anyway. The package was negotiated in order to illustrate the incompetence of the 
Authority’s negotiators, in the hope that this would change the Council's approach on 
other issues.
Once the details of the pay negotiations become apparent there was a change of 
tactics. Both the Head of Industrial Relations and the Assistant Director of Personnel 
were brought in to lead the talks. These were officers that the unions respected and 
were used to dealing with. The change illustrates how the unions still retain 
considerable clout, despite the Conservatives being in power.
The agenda immediately shifted back to the unions' objective of getting £200 per 
week for double the number of staff. There was still no agreement though and so the 
Director of Housing went on site with the trade union secondee to check the 
information contained within the specification and job descriptions. Cnee it was 
established that the information was hopelessly inaccurate it was hoped there would
be a change of heart by the Council. However, this did not materialise and the 
Authority decided to stick by the specification, arguing that it was the contractor's job 
to check the work requirements. Even after threatening to go public on the 
incompetence of the Council's preparations, concessions were limited.
The unions have now been offered 50 resident caretakers and 5 non resident reliefs. 
In return for agreement to various flexibility arrangements, various financial benefits 
have also been negotiated. The average wage is to be about £280 per week over 7 
weeks, including a £20 fixed payment for stand-by availability, free accommodation 
and other bonuses.
The central problem remains the level of the in-house bid. The feeling is that private 
contractors will submit tenders on the basis of the specification and will then 
legitimately negotiate extensions with appropriate payments if they win. The DSO is 
expected to put in a bid showing a true reflection of the cost of work to be done. In 
these circumstances private contractors are very likely to come in with a cheaper bid. 
Furthermore there are no equivalent Drevious experiences on which to base an in- 
house bid and even if there were they would be meaningless without a similar 
specification. Finally, there is no time, at the time of writing, for the Authority or 
unions to check the estates and prepare a new specification.
All these factors demonstrate the importance of union involvement in, and 
monitoring of, the preparation of specifications. The feeling amongst union officers 
in Ealing is that the lack of involvement in this case will result in privatisation. They 
suspect that this was the Council’s original objective.
It is feared that the CT process will result in a charge in the character of the 
workforce on the housing estates and will undermine union organisation, The 
increased workloads imposed on caretakers are expected to encourage them to leave
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their jobs en masse even if the service is kept in-house. If this occurs, or if the 
contract is privatised, then it is likely that the new workforce will be drawn from 
amongst women residents on the estates, who will be unaware of the additional work. 
The duties would take on the character of extended housework, leading to the 
creation of an extremely peripheral labour force, with all the problems for 
unionisation that that would imply (see Chapter 7).
Concluding Comments
The pattern of responses to CCT in Ealing provides some interesting contrasts. The 
significance of an authority's political objectives to the effect of CT on trade union 
influence cannot be overstated. Under Labour control, preparations fcr CCT 
involved the unions to such an extent that they directed elements of the Council's 
response. Under Conservative rule, the unions have been isolated from preparations 
for CT and the Authority has, in any cases shown no desire to keep sendees in-house. 
Indeed one of the aims of the CT initiative in Ealing has been to reassert the 
Council's control over its workforce and undermine trade union influence.
Involvement in the building of specifications and negotiations over job descriptions 
and productivity rates was not sufficient in itself to defend the unions' position 
though. The failure to involve their members in preparations for CT on the building 
cleaning contracts ultimately led to resentment and a changing workforce structure. 
This has significantly reduced trade union authority and levels of organisation. It 
remains to be seen whether this pattern wall be repeated on the housing estates 
contract.
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Section 11: Summary
In my first case study I investigated a Labour authority, committed to keeping its 
services in-house, which has experienced significant difficulties as a result of CCT. 
The refuse service remains in-house, but at the expense of the workforce. The street 
cleansing service was privatised with even more dramatic effects. Job losses were 
accompanied by a significant deteriorating in terms and conditions. Trade union 
organisation was threatened by the contractor's refusal to recognise any union. 
Following a long dispute, one union was recognised and a new period of industrial 
peace has followed on the basis of heightened management control.
The second study looked at the privatisation of a refuse service in a Labour authority 
already surrounded by industrial and political divisions. A lack of co-operation 
between the authority and unions resulted in a seriously uncompetitive DSO bid and 
the award of the contract to a private firm. This led to devasting cuts in jobs, terms 
and conditions and has seriously weakened trade union organisation. Again, one 
union has subsequently been recognised but this has not prevented the deteriorating 
of worker's conditions of employment or the shift in control to management.
Case study III is concerned with a Labour authority which lost 3 of its building 
cleaning contracts to a private contractor despite its commitment to direct provision. 
The privatisation of the contracts led to a deterioration in the conditions of 
employment and heavy rates of labour turnover. Consequently trade union 
organisation has been wiped out.
The fourth investigation studied a Conservative authority where the refuse collection 
contract was privatised. There is a concentration on the approach of the relevant 
union following privatisation which identifies some interesting developments. Anti­
union attitudes were successfully resisted, and terms and conditions have been
established, which are comparable to local government rates. The relevance of single 
union deals to this outcome is also addressed.
Case study V looks at a Liberal Democrat led authority which privatised its cleansing 
contract in the face of union resistance to cuts in jobs and conditions. The impact 
that this had on union organisation is analysed along with the significance of inter­
union rivalries to the outcome.
The sixth study is concerned with a major Labour authority which has managed to 
keep all of its services in-house. The involvement of the unions and approach of the 
authority to CCT is analysed, and consideration is given to the changes in patterns of 
work, conditions and control that have emerged.
Case study VII investigates a Labour County Council that has been through the 
tendering process on its building cleaning contracts twice. First time around the 
service was kept in-house but on the second occasion it was privatised. The approach 
of the authority and how it changed is described along with an analysis of the 
different effects experienced by the workforce.
Case study VIII looks at a Scottish Labour authority and its approach towards CCT 
on its refuse collection contract. The impact on the workforce and the changing 
balance of power between management and unions are investigated.
The final study considers a London borough which has seen Labour and Conservative 
control during the period of CCT's existence in local government. The different 
approaches are described along with an analyses of the significance for trade union 
influence in the borough.
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Chapter 7
Trade Union Responses
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C hapter 7: T rade Union Responses
Section 1: Introduction
In Chapter 2 of this thesis we saw how public sector trade unionism expanded in the 
post war period and how the consequent perception of excessive power amongst 
certain groups of workers encouraged the development of the CT initiative. As 
Ascher (1987) points out:
*Without the industrial action o f the 1970s and early 1980s, the policy 
of compulsory tendering woud not have become nearly so popular 
within the Conservative Party."
(Ascher, 1987)
A trade union's bottom line objective is to protect and enhance the jobs and conditions 
of its members, regardless of prevailing economic conditions. It is the role of the 
service provider to ensure value for money and organisational efficiency. This 
situation creates an inevitable hostility amongst trade unions to the very essence of 
privatisation.
Privatisation, particularly when it involves competitive tendering, involves the 
introduction of competitive forces which undermine trade unions' ability to perform 
their functions. Competition and the tendency towards lowest cost provision means 
that a successful private contractor is forced to cut its labour costs (which in the 
cleansing services can account for between 60% and 90% of total costs), through 
reductions in staffing levels, increased productivity and reduced wages and 
conditions. Successful trade unionism relies upon the minimisation of those 
competitive pressures.
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Expanding public sector employment, along with a Government commitment to 
provide full employment in the post war period, enabled trade unions to encourage 
service providers to concentrate upon their role as stable and 'fair' employers. As 
Femer and Colling (1991) argue:
"In the public sector, the unions hand was stengthened by the absence
of the threat of bankruptcy."
(Femer and Colling, 1991).
That capacity has been undermined by the introduction of competition into the 
provision of local government services and the requirement that council DSO's make 
a 5% return on their activities. With that thought in mind the question of how the 
trade unions have responded to the experience is of fundamental importance. CCT 
has come to be viewed as an outright attack upon public sector unions, a policy which 
will be extended across the entire range of public services with the explicit puipose of 
reducing employee influence and control. In these circumstances it would have been 
surprising if those unions under threat did not launch a determined campaign of 
resistance to the CT programme.
The main restriction on the extent of that campaign has been the Government's 
simultaneous and direct attack upon trade union power through its concerted 
programme of labour legislation. This has effectively outlawed the closed shop, 
placed severe restrictions on the organisation of industrial action with the narrowing 
of immunity rights, put restrictions on secondary action and picketing and enforced a 
requirement for membership balloting prior to any action (see Gamble 1988, 
Maclnnes 1989, Wedderbum 1986).
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Section 2: Earlv Responses
National Policies
In her book, the 'Politics of Privatisation', Kate Ascher (1987) outlines the main trade 
union responses to CT prior to the introduction of the 1988 Local Government Act 
Her observations are summarised below.
In general the unions concentrated on two key dangers which were presented by CT, a 
deterioration in the terms and conditions of employees and a reduction in the level of 
service provided. In describing how these concerns were presented, Ascher makes a 
distinction between internal union initiatives and external strategies.
The unions most concerned with CT during the early and mid 1980s were the main 
health service unions, NUPE and COHSE. They introduced three key organisational 
changes. Firstly a decision was taken not to launch a national campaign of resistance, 
but to distribute national policy lines which provided recommendations on how to 
respond to CT. Local branches were encouraged to take the initiative and official 
backing was given to local actions which followed the unions' policy lines (for 
examples of local actions see Wandsworth Trade Union Publications, 1983; 
NUPE/IWC, 1984; and Centre for Public Services, 1991). Secondly, educational 
activity was stepped up, with the aim of improving the training and education of local 
officers and shop stewards, and large quantities of educational materials were 
distributed. Finally, communications networks were established within the unions 
affected, so that knowledge was obtained of local experience and lessons passed onto 
other areas, reducing the isolation of workers in particular authorities. Union research 
departments became central information teiminals out of which came the Joint NHS 
Privatisation Research Unit and Public Services Privatisation Research Unit (PSPRU) 
based at NUPE headquarters (see below).
321
These changes were used to conduct a major public campaign against the use of CT in 
public service provision. Ascher identifies four mechanisms by which the campaign 
was run. The most visible and arguably the most effective strategy was the smear 
campaign, designed to show up the inability of contractors to provide adequate 
services, based on practical evidence drawn from the experience on contracts that had 
already been privatised. Companies were attacked for providing poor services, 
financial weaknesses were exposed and the network of links between the contractors 
and the Conservative Party revealed (see Chapter 2). The second line of approach 
was the use of industrial action in the areas affected, with official support from head 
office, such as the Barking and Hammersmith Hospital domestics disputes (see Huws 
and de Groot, 1985). Links with other organisations in the public domain were made 
to increase the campaign's visibility and to broaden its appeal; and finally legal 
rulings were sought on matters related to CCT, in defence of workers terms and 
conditions and in an attempt to undermine Government policy.
There seems little doubt that the unions' campaign did have a profound effect on the 
companies involved in the early CT exercises. The smear campaign in particular, 
encouraged a lot of media interest in the whole issue of CT, and an impression of 
private contractors as 'cowboy' operators certainly developed. However, the unions 
were racked by internal political divisions over appropriate strategy. Divisions also 
prevailed between the various unions, depending upon the policy line they adopted. 
NUPE saw itself as holding a far more principled line than its rival COHSE.
The combination of these problems with the Government's determination to press 
ahead with further privatisation initiatives, ultimately led to a softening of the unions' 
stance and a more pragmatic approach towards CCT in local government
322
Fighting Privatisation in Scotland's Health Service
The reluctance to organise a national campaign of action against CT was not so 
strongly demonstrated in Scotland. The 1983 circular (DHSS,1983) instructing 
health authorities to put ancillary services out to competitive tender led the Scottish 
Trades Union Congress (STUC) to launch a campaign in November 1983 at a crisis 
conference on the NHS, held in Glasgow. The conference was attended by 681 
delegates from 147 different union, political, religious and community organisations.
A national steering committee of the Scottish Health Campaign was elected and a 
full-time worker financed to serve the campaign. Eighteen local health campaign 
committees were organised in towns throughout Scotland, after a series of local 
public meetings. Furthermore, the STUCs President and Secretary visited every 
Scottish health authority personally and successfully sought their opposition to CT.
This approach initially proved more successful than the campaign in England and 
Wales but more recently a toughening of the Government's stance has brought the 
situation in the Scottish health service more into line with the rest of Britain (see 
Chapter 2)
Section 3: National Trade Union Responses to CCT in Local
Government: A Joint Approach
All of the unions affected by the 1988 Local Government Act are opposed to the 
legislation, as stated in the unions’ joint document 'Who Cares Wins' (NUPE, 
NALGO, GMB, TGWU, 1988)
'The unions are strongly opposed to competitive tendering. We think 
that it will mean: lower standards o f service where contractors take 
over, pressure to cut pay, jobs and conditions for dedicated,
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experienced and often low paid council staff; elected councillors will 
lose control over services; a huge waste o f time and money, awarding 
contracts and monitoring them; attempts to weaken trade union 
organisation; [and] services run increasingly for profit and not to 
meet social needs.
(NUPE, NALGO, GMB, TGWU,1988)
Bearing in mind the compulsory nature of CT under the provisions of the 1988 Local 
Government Act much of the union response has been of an extremely practical 
nature, designed to ensure that services are kept in-house during and after the 
competitive process. There have been regular denunciations of the legislation and the 
unions campaigned vigorously against its introduction, as illustrated by the GMBs 
detailed response, Evidence Against Privatisation' (GMB ,1987), to the Government's 
consultation paper 'Competion in the provision of local authority services’ 
(DOE,1985), but the emphasis was placed on 'being prepared’.
In 1988 the major local government unions, the GMB, NALGO, NUPE and the 
TGWU, came together to produce 'Who Cares Wins - A trade union guide to 
compulsory tendering for local services' (NUPE, NALGO, GMB, TGWU, 1988). 
The publication provides general guidance on the details of the legislation, the unions 
views about it, and their aims of how to use it  Advice is given on how to draw up a 
service profile; the setting of specifications; the questions that can be asked of 
contractors; how to vet contractors; and what to do if the contract is eventually lost. 
This was followed, after the first two phases of tendering, by a series of supplements 
addressing each of the individual defined activities titled, Tender Care' (GMB, 
NALGO, NUPE, TGWU, N.D.). The’Tender Care' documents provide detailed and 
easy to follow guidance on how to prepare for CT, whilst making things difficult for 
contractors and protecting members terms and conditions. The papers are regarded as 
a sign of 'new realism' amongst the unions, placing the emphasis on the value of 
public services.
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In order to gain more information about the affects of CCT several of the unions 
affected, NALGO, TGWU, COHSE, NIPSA, NUCPS, have joined NUPE to sponsor 
the PSPRU. The Unit, which is based at NUPEs head office in London monitors the 
progress of CCT through a national network of NUPE officers, gathering information 
so that the unions can be informed about what is going on in terms of contracts, pay 
and conditions. Information that might be of use to union negotiators is then collated 
and circulated back down the network. The GMB has refused to involve itself in this 
joint body, preferring to commission its own research using its representatives in 
local authorities as sources of information.
Outside of these joint activities each of the main unions has developed its own 
individual policy in relation to CCT. The main feature of these are outlined below.
NALGO
Following on from NALGOs 1986 policy statement, 'Fighting Privatisation in Local 
Government' (NALGO, 1986), which articulated similar policies to those outlined 
above, an updated policy was adopted in 1988 with the same title (NALGO, 1988). 
The document notes NALGOs:
"Complete and unequivocal opposition to compulsory competitive 
tendering"
(NALGO, 1988)
The statement recognises that this is not in itself a strategy for dealing with CCT and 
states three basic objectives to be pursued during the tendering process:
"To keep services public;
To maintain and improve the quality o f local services;
To defend the jobs, pay and conditions o f our members."
(NALGO, 1988)
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In pursuit of these objectives the paper outlines the areas of trade union intervention, 
which closely resemble those listed in the previously cited joint union documents. 
These have been supplemented by a set of bottom line demands laid out in the 
Union's 'Strategy for the Campaign Against Cuts' (NALGO, 1990).
"a) full consultation and negotiation;
b) no compulsory redundancy;
c) protection of contractual conditions o f service
d) maintenance of local and national agreements".
(NALGO, 1991)
The combination of advice on how to prepare a bid and defensive demands, is seen as 
the best way to respond to the challenge of CCT:
*There is no point in arguing that all we need is a strategy for 
industrial action, publicity and information when the branches in the 
thick o f the fight are telling us that they need help on 'nuts and bolts' 
negotiating tactics as well.
(NALGO, 1991)
The Union believes that the emphasis should be placed on the defence of services, 
identifying the danger of DSOs beginning to behave like private contractors, with 
drives for 'efficiency' becoming exercises to cut jobs, earnings and conditions. The 
Unions National Local Government Officer, Keith Sonnet argues that:
"Specifications are the best defence in protecting jobs and these 
should be determined locally in consultation with the unions."
Although he added that:
"We cannot defend the indefensible. If services are poor and over 
expensive we will not get public support in defending them"
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NUPE
The NUPE approach towards CT was initially developed in response to the 
privatisation initiative in the NHS during the early and mid 1980s. The increasing 
use of CT in local government led to the development of a seven point strategy for 
the defence of public services in general, which was outlined in the 'NUPE Action 
Pack, Campaigning for Care' (NUPE , 1985). The strategy was based on the 
following points:
"1. developing alternative ideas and demands to improve services
2. education and propoganda.
3. building stronger workplace organisations and making links with 
workers in other places
4 . developing joint action and user committees
5. tactical use of industrial action and negotiating machinery
6. direct action by workers and users.
7. counter offensive against contractors in public services."
(NUPE, 1985)
The introduction of proposals for CCT in local government lead to an updating of 
this policy and the development of 'The Campaign Against Privatisation in Local 
Government' (NUPE, 1987). It was felt that the proposals posed.
"the greatest threat to the livelihood of our [NUPEsJ members that the 
union has had to face in recent years.”
(NUPE, 1987)
The campaign was split into three phases; Phase 1: the campaign against the 
legislation; Phase 2: opposing tendering; and Phase 3: opposing the contractors. 
Phase 1 outlined a detailed strategy of opposition to the passage of the legislation, 
built around four general aims. Firstly, to increase members awareness of the threat,
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secondly, to promote public concern and build a coalition of opposition, thirdly, to 
encourage responsive and efficient local public services and finally, to "obstruct, 
amend, delay or defeat the legislation in parliament". The objective of Phase 2 was 
to persuade councils to "obstruct delay and minimise the scope of the legislation" 
should it be enacted, although it was determined that such action should avoid 
defiance of the law. Phase 3 of the campaign is perhaps of most relevance in the face 
of the failure of Phases 1 and 2. In the event of the legislation being in place and 
councils deciding to comply, the aim was to keep services in-house and to minimise 
any loss of jobs or pay and conditions.
Phase 3 of NUPEs campaign was built on the Union's experience of fighting 
privatisation in local government and the Health Service and was based around six 
plans of action:
a) Insisting on full information and consultation with employees.
b) Negotiating on specifications to ensure they are as tight as possible 
with requirements on penally clauses, fair wages clauses, health 
and safety provision, trade union recognition and a block on the 
use of council facilities by contractors.
c) Non-involvement in tendering with an acceptance that some 
branches may wish to enter negotations on in-house tenders in the 
light of local conditions.
d) Discrediting private contractors.
e) Taking industrial action where necessary to deter authorities from 
tendering, or to block private contractors.
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f) Recruitment of contractors staff into membership and negotitations 
on their behalf.
The nature and development of the CCT process has seen a moderation of this policy. 
The detail of the legislation has prevented the inclusion of fair wages clauses, 
requirements on contractors to recognise trade unions and blocks on the use of 
council facilities, from being included in tender documents. Likewise, the 
compulsory nature of the Act's provisions, renders pointless the taking of localised 
industrial action to deter authorities from tendering. These realities have also forced 
concessions on the Union's position of non-involvement in the preperation of tenders, 
although the in-house bid itself is always drawn up by management. This strategy 
had been based on a belief that such involvement would result in major concessions 
to management, the compromising of union positions and divisions between various 
sections of the workforce and wider community. However, where authorities have 
been willing to involve unions fully in the tender process, as in Manchester and 
Newcastle, the most attractive outcomes have been achieved (see Chapter 6, Case 
Study 6 and Section 4 of this Chapter).
NUPE's advice on dealing with CCT is now largely drawn from the joint union 
Tender Care' publications, which have specific sections on the preparation of the 
DOS tender, the sucess of which is the Union's prime concern.
With their memberships concentrated in the public services most affected by CCT, 
the health service and local government, NALGO and NUPE have probably been the 
most active in preparing policies to counter the initiatives. The two unions have also 
been in close co-operation with one another, combining research resources and 
running joint campaigns. With similar industrial outlooks and membership bases in
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the same sectors it is not surprising that negotitions are well under way for a merger 
of the two unions, along with the health service union COHSE.
om
The GMB prepared a detailed response to the Government’s CCT proposals in its 
publication 'Evidence Against Privatisation’ (GMB, 1987) and was a key driving 
force behind the joint union ’Who Cares Wins' and Tender Care' documents.
The main focus of the GMBs policy, as described by National Officer, Donald 
Macgregor, is the promotion of co-operation between town halls unions and 
management Evidence from the Union's own CCT surveys shows that the GMB and 
local authority management have worked well together in the preperations for CT. 
Union representatives in over three quarters of the authorities questioned in 1989 
described relationships as either 'good' or 'excellent' (Macgregor, 1989).
The emphasis is placed on the Union's part in preparing specifications for DSO 
tenders, which Macgregor describes as:
"Perhaps the most crucial stage in the whole process o f preparing for  
CCT. It has been very clear that those capable o f defining the work 
that is done and the standards that are required have been trade union 
members. That involvement, and the knowledge it brings, is borne out 
in the results".
N.B. GMB survey revealed that 77% of contracts put out in CCTs 1st phase were 
won in-house (Macgregor, 1989).
From this co-operative appoach it is hoped that CT will provide the opportuinty for 
GMB members to obtain a greater involvement in the decisions made about their jobs 
and the services they provide. Where services are won in-house, with an associated
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deterioration in pay and conditions for the remaining staff, the emphasis is placed on 
working towards improvements in pay and conditions. As Macgregor states:
'The dual challenge, o f  eradicating low pay and increasing co­
operation, will form the central plank o f our developing response to 
competitive tendering."
However, there is a recognition amongst union officers that private contractors are 
now going to be permanendy involved in the provision of public cleansing services. 
Macgregor believes that private contractors will hang on to what they have got and 
will continue to expand their market share. In addition, local authorities will be 
increasingly unable to provide the services required, due to the need for extensive 
capital investment which only the multinational contractors can afford. He believes 
that local authorities will increasingly rely on private sector support and funding in 
partnership, or through the full privatisation of services.
From this oudook develops a 'new realism' which regards it as absurd to ignore the 
contractors, in the hope that they will go away. The Union has actively sought to 
organise workers employed by private contractors, particularly in the refuse 
collection and street cleansing services where its local government membership is 
concentrated, seeking recognition agreements wherever possible. As Macgregor 
explains:
"We have gone in, using whatever means, to try and secure a basis for  
recognition with these firms and we have had varying degrees o f  
success and hostility from the contractors
The GMB has tended to go about things in a more independent fashion than the other 
unions, avoiding involvement in the joint research unit, the PSPRU. They have 
continued to produce advice on how to cope with CT though, drawing from the early 
experiences of the process in the document titled, 'Lessons Learned' (Swallow, 1991)
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TGWU
Prior to its involvement in the PSPRU, the TGWU produced a monthly bulletin 
called the ’Local Government Privatisation Bulletin'. The publication concentrated 
on explaining the Local Government Bill, the problems associated with it and the 
distribution of information on the experience of local government CT to date. With 
the movement of legislation onto the statute book the Union became wholly 
committed to the joint union initiatives in response to CCT. The TGWU is now a 
sponser of the PSPRU and had a full input into the Who Cares Wins' and Tender 
Care' publications.
These commitments have been maintained alongside the Union’s Living Wage' and 
Link-Up’ campaigns. Recognising the problems faced by local government workers 
and the limited representation of various sections of the workforce, the Living Wage' 
campaign has focused on obtaining a minimum wage, a minimum of four weeks 
annual holiday, full sick pay and other benefits for low paid and part-time workers. 
This has been accompanied by a massive recruitment campaign, targeting the 
estimated quarter of a million, mainly women, part-time council workers, utilising 
European legislation to press for equal pension rights. This represents a significant 
organisational shift by the Union, as Jack Dromey, National Local Government 
Secretary, says:
*The campaign represents a major image change for the male 
dominated TGWU. Only a quarter o f  our 120,000 local government 
members so far are woman".
As far as the direct response to CT is concerned the Union is increasingly turning its 
attention towards quality and participation issues. The promotion of a commitment 
to quality is seen not only as a means to protect jobs but as a way of securing greater
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employee involvement in decision making structures. As a TGWU research officer 
explains:
"For trade unionists a commitment to quality is a logical extension of  
a long standing commitment to public provision o f the range o f local 
government services. For local authority employees, the benefits of  
being part o f a quality service are may fold ... but to really carry the 
workforce, to build their enthusiasm and support for quality 
programmes, officers and members need to ensure their regular and 
systematic involvement in all aspects o f the programme including 
programme development and service specifications".
There are problems with this approach as defined by Jack Dromey:
''We believe in efficient and well run services to the community. The 
problem is that Ministers have rigged the rules o f CCT in favour o f the 
contractors. And the obsession has been with what is cheap, not what 
is best. Quality and Community have been sacrificed to ideology.
In an attempt to overcome these problems, whilst maintaining the Union’s 
commitment to quality, the TGWU has been developing research into the extent and 
scope of employee involvement in existing programmes and the development of 'best 
practice' policies for authorities and trade unions in employee involvement At the 
same time, the Union has fully utilised the advice contained within the joint union 
documents, cited above, in order to keep local services in-house.
Depend
The experience of CCT has led to a revision of established trade union thinking on 
the provision of public services. In a policy paper published by the TUC and the 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR, 1991), Bill Callaghan, Assistant General 
Secretary of the TUC, argues that the trade union movement's commitment to in- 
house provision of public services is breaking down:
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"It can no longer be taken for granted that there is a wholehearted 
commitment to public sector provision. Even within the labour 
movement, it is increasingly common to hear ideas discussed about the 
'enabling state' and plurality of provision”.
(IPPR, 1991)
The paper argues that unions should accept that CT can be good for services. In his 
contribution, John Stewart, who is head of the School of Public Policy at 
Birmingham University, talks of the need for a 'learning, innovating and involving' 
public service which does not waste resources and which requires:
"a degree of flexibility amongst the staff that we have not been used to.
It requires negotiating terms and conditions appropriate for those 
circumstances. The positive aspect for trade unions is that it implies a 
way of working that will realize the full potential of the staff."
(IPPR, 1991)
Much of the revised approach has been built around an increasing commitment to 
quality, based on the possibility of using the British Standard for Quality Assurance, 
'BS5750', to maintain and raise the quality of local services, especially in the context 
of CCT. In 1988 the TUC commissioned research on the issue, which resulted in a 
report, 'Quality in Public Services: Quality Assurance in a Trade Union Perspective' 
(TUC, 1990), considering a variety of quality assurance issues of interest to trade 
unions. From this report Bill Callaghan (IPPR, 1991) concludes that:
"To achieve real quality of services delivered, adequate resources 
must be available...there must be real political commitment to quality, 
including good specifications and sufficently ambitious targets...[and] 
there must be measures to make services more accessible, and to 
improve the ways in which services are delivered".
(IPPR, 1991)
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The commitment to quality has been established in union circles since CCT was first 
introduced, due to the desire to move away from bare cost considerations explained 
earlier. Painter (1989) quotes one full-time union organiser
"Competition has got to be on the basis o f  quality rather than cost, 
because we can't compete on cost (certainty in building cleaning). 
Because there will always be people prepared to take jobs fo r £1.60 an 
hour or even less."
(Painter, 1989)
Until recently, the specification was regarded as the tool for improving quality in 
service provision. The specifiction can detail the tiniest aspects of the service and 
can insist that employees have a certain level of training or qualifications. The 
authority needs to ensure that its own workforce meets the criteria, but the unions 
hope has been that by setting their standards high enough, the in-house bid will be the 
only one which can fulfil the contract
In 1992, the TUC encouraged a shift in approach and launched a campaign for a 
'Quality Work Assured Servicemark’ (TUC, 1992) in the public services. The QWA 
servicemark sought by the TUC would represent the standards and practices to which 
organisations could aspire, behind the scenes and at the point of service delivery. 
The servicemark would aim to:
"-inform the customers about the process and conditions o f a service.
-reuse awareness o f the service and broaden choice.
-develop quality standards and objectives.
-enhance relationships with service users.
-tell customers about staff skills and commitment.
-extend the reach o f existing quality initiatives.
(TUC, 1992)
The unions believe that seeking QWA accredition would help to reinforce workers 
pride and commitment improving staff recruitment and labour relations at the same
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time, which would also improve the image of public service organisations. An image 
damaged by union claims that CT has been a disaster for quality on several fronts. 
Service standards have fallen, workers terms and conditions deteriorated and 
company losses escalated due to enforced tendering in the NHS and local 
government, according to the PSPRU (1992).
There is some support for this position in the private sector, with BET declaring its 
support for the Labour Party's proposed Quality Commission and some of the TUCs 
ideas (BET, 1990). BET noted in its 1991 Annual Report (BET,1991) that contracts 
are invariably awarded to the lowest bidder and that this inevitably affects the quality 
of services, along with other areas with savings potential such as workers conditions 
and profit margins. It seems that private contractors are being drawn towards the 
idea of competing on quality, due to falling profits during the first few years of local 
government enforced tendering (see PSPRU, 1992). A commitment to higher 
standards and a capacity to provide the levels of service required, would allow the 
major contractors to shift the basis of competition away from price and exclude 
"cowboy" operators from the process altogether, allowing them to achieve a greater 
return. The TUC campaign illustrates this potential with the statement from TUC 
General Secretary, Norman Willis that:
"charters without cash are not worth the paper they are printed on"
(TUC, 1992)
The potential for continued conflict under different competitive conditions lies in the 
union's alternative attitude to where the extra cash should be invested. Norman 
Willis argues that*
"The goal o f quality services will not be achieved with poor working 
conditions, low pay, hostile management and the ethos o f  "more from  
less". Customer care, citizens charters and systems o f  quality
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I
j management require good employment practices, investment in
training, employee involvement and partnership".
(TUC,1992)
The experience of contractors employment practices in this Country and overseas, 
raises the question of whether they will share the TUC General Secretary's view.
Section 4: Local Responses 
Newcastle
In Chapter 6, various case studies looked at the impact of CCT on workers terms and 
conditions and trade union organisation on individual local authority cleansing 
contracts. Further consideration was given to local union responses to the difficulties 
encountered. One region not represented in those studies was the North East of 
England, where Joe Painter (1989) made an investigation of trade union responses to 
CCT in 1989.
In his study of the City of Newcastle, Painter identifies attempts by:
"A number of trade unionists to break with the past and develop 
radically different forms of trade union organisation."
(Painter, 1989)
These developments, in an area with a traditionally conservative labour movement, 
were based around the City's Corporate Joint Trade Union Group, which brings 
together all the unions with members employed by Newcastle City Council. 
Following pressure from the Group, the unions managed to secure an agreement from 
the Council that they would have a serious input into preparations for CCT and be
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allocated facility time and resources to support that input. This enabled the unions to 
generate their own initiatives and proposals which have since been adopted by the 
Authority. These initatives came from the Joint Trade Union Group's, Anti- 
Privatisation Working Group, made up of a Convener and Deputy Convener (both 
senior shop stewards) from each of the services affected.
For each of the activities being put out to tender an individual response was made, 
taking account of the interests of employees and service users on the basis of a joint 
union approach. This policy is illustrated by the fact that joint shop steward 
committee convenors in services dominated by women workers, were themselves 
women, in order to improve communications and responsiveness to members 
demands. As for service users, when the street cleansing and refuse collection 
contract came up, the Working Group carried out a survey of twenty six tenents 
associations, across the City, to ascertain the public's views on the present service 
(Newcastle Tenants Federation and the Anti-Privatisation Working Group, 1990). 
Similar practices have been used prior to tendering in the other defined activities (see 
Painter, 1989 on preparations for the school and welfare catering contract). These 
initiatives represent the practical implementation of national union calls for the 
involvement of service users and provided a basis for demands on the Authority to 
make improvements in services when specifications were drawn up.
The approach has proved very sucessful in as far as the broad base of the campaign 
has allowed the unions to set the local agenda for CCT. Painter quotes the Senior 
Convenor in Newcastle:
"All the initiatives have come from the trade unions...what we learned 
from the start is that within this Authority there was a massive 
vacuum. People did not have ideas on what to do. We had ideas.
And we never waited. We decided from the start that it was not a 
matter of responding to what management were proposing, we would 
actually take the initiative and fill the vacuum...You don't give them
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time to think out their ideas. We were able to say 'that is what we 
think '  and win people to that view, because there was nothing else on 
the table."
(Painter, 1989)
The strategy seems to rely on an absence of clear policy direction from the Authority 
itself; the involvement and participation of all groups of workers and service users, 
through localised joint trade union structures; and the provision of resources which 
allow the unions to prepare their own lines of intervention. These are innovative 
developments indeed, in an area characterised by traditional, masculine forms of 
trade unionism, conservative attitudes within the local authority and powerful 
divisions between the two main unions the GMB and NUPE. The strategy adopted 
now provides the basis for the North Eastern Region's joint trade union strategy for 
combating statutory tendering (North Eastern Region Joint Trade Union Co­
ordinating Group, NX).).
Section 5: Organising Cleaning Workers
Many contract cleaning firms feel that they were used by the Government to break 
trade union control in the public sector (Coyle, 1986). The Government's ability to 
use contractors in this way is only possible because of the existence of a huge private 
sector industry whose workforce is largely unorganised. So why do trade unions 
have such difficulites in organising contract cleaning firms?
Case study 3 in Chapter 6, illustrated some of the problems associated with 
organising cleaners in the private sector. The attitude of employers, the organisation 
of work, the predominance of women part-time workers and high rates of labour 
turnover have all been identified as hazards encountered by recruitment officers.
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A District Officer of the TGWU, based in London, argues that contract cleaning 
firms are:
"without exception... the most unprincipled employers that I have ever 
come across. Many other employers will establish some sort of 
working relationship with trade unions, but cleaning companies do not 
have this attitude ."
This situation is compounded by the fact that cleaning workers are not concentrated 
on any particular site, creating logistical problems in physically meeting the workers 
concerned:
"In a conventional factory situation where we have achieved the magic 
figure of 51 percent membership and we have approached the 
employer to discuss recognition we can get into the factory to talk to 
the people.
,rWe cannot assume that this is the case with contract cleaners. They 
are working difficult hours for a union organiser to meet them and 
they are very scattered. A company may be employing hundreds of 
people, but they may only have a few people in each building and 
these may not be the same group of people every night.
"So getting in touch in the first place is difficult and so is maintaining 
contact, especially if the employer realises the union is sniffing about.
They will then take steps to move people about.
"It also makes it difficult for us to identify potential shop stewards who 
are the key to local organisation. Without people on the ground ready 
to do the work, organising becomes difficult. All of these factors work 
against effective union organisation."
Cleaning work is traditionally done by women who have a long history of 
employment in low paid, sexually segregated occupations. Cleaners tend to be 
middle aged and often came from ethnic minority groups. So it is clear that the 
cleaning industry draws upon a labour supply with few opportunities to secure better 
forms of employment, due to family responsibilities or racial and sexual 
discrimination. (See Coyle, 1986; Sullivan, 1977; and West, 1982).
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Trade unions have, until recently, regarded this section of the labour force as being 
hard to recruit due to low levels of trade union consciousness as much as to the 
practical difficulties of organising (Coyle, 1986; Morton, 1987; Sullivan, 1977). Yet 
the experience of womens struggles against privatisation, particulary within the 
Health Service, as seen at Barking and Hammersmith hospitals, shows that there is 
nothing intrinsically passive about female labour. The problem, as Angela Coyle 
sees it, is that:
"they lack organisation both for action and for developing their 
consciousness of themselves as workers. To build this trade unions 
cannot expect to 'tack' woman onto their existing practices."
(Coyle, 1986)
Neither can the nature of the industry be blamed for low organisation rates, since 
amongst those cleaners specialising in 'heavy1 cleaning, where there is a large male 
workforce, trade union organisation is the norm.
Trade unions have been responding to these issues over the past few years, 
recognising the threat to membership levels posed by privatisation and also the 
potential for new members, in the vast and largely unorganised contract service 
industries. The TGWUs 'Link-Up' campaign and current recruitment drives amongst 
part-time workers in the TGWU, NUPE and GMB illustrate the point.
These campaigns will not alter the nature of this industry though, and hostility 
amongst employers, scattered employment patterns and high turnover rates are likely 
to remain. These factors, coupled with the low pay of cleaners and an inevitable 
personal detachment from the work which goes with low status employment, will 
require innovative and ground breaking responses from the trade unions. The 
question of recruitment is only a first step, in an industry increasingly dominated by 
multinational companies, who will use their international operations to undermine the 
effectiveness of organised trade union action, should it develop.
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The experience of the trade union response to CCT in Newcastle demonstrates just 
how far traditional union attitudes towards organising and involving members in a 
campaign can be transformed In an area with a trade union history built around male 
industrial employment it was significant that the Anti-Privatisation Working Group 
adopted a strategy which involved women as representatives of female workers and 
extended its scope beyond the traditional confines of trade union activity.
Innovative and determined efforts to organise cleaning workers and to challenge the 
problems that they face have been made in other areas. One such example is the 
response of the London Borough of Ealing and the local TGWU office to the lack of 
organisation and exploitation of cleaners at Heathrow Airport. The rest of this 
chapter is devoted to a consideration of their efforts.
Organising Cleaners at Heathrow
Employment at Heathrow
Heathrow Airport, based to the South West of London, is the World's busiest 
international airport and is a major source of employment in West London. Some 
51,000 people work at the airport and around 25,000 jobs within a ten mile radius 
depend on it (TICL and SCAT, 1989). Over 5000 of these workers are employed by 
concessionaries and contractors, following pressure from the Government on the 
British Airports Authority (BAA) to put cleaning and catering contracts out to tender 
in the late 1970s and early 80's. There are currently up to 1000 cleaners working for 
the contractors at the airport
As in the Health Service and local government, BAA's tradition had been to employ 
workers directly to provide these ancillary services. During the 1960's, labour
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shortages meant that the lower status jobs were taken up by Asian woman who had 
settled locally in the Southall region of Ealing, in West London. Whilst these 
workers were heavily exploited at first, receiving conditions for less favourable than 
workers doing different but equivalent jobs for the same company, the stable 
employment situtation allowed them to organise gradually, which led to significant 
improvements.
Competitive Tendering and Working Conditions.
One TGWU Civil Aviaition Transport Officer claims that the difficulties began when 
the Government instructed BAA to franchise cleaning and catering contracts. He 
argues that the renewal of contracts every two years made it extremely hard to 
organise properly due to the two year employment qualification required for 
entitlement to an industrial tribunal. The lack of organisation was accentuated by a 
movement of the established and union conscious workers into the better protected 
catering sector, which left a majority of first generation immigrants in the cleaning 
jobs. These workers were more open to exploitation. As one former Heathrow 
cleaner reported:
"We were constantly reminded we could lose our jobs if BAA was not 
happy, because the contract would be lost. This was used as an excuse 
to get us to work even harder or to do things it was not our job to do... 
Supervisors pretended it was not up to our company but up to BAA."
(TICL & SCAT, 1989)
According to a report in Trade Union Briefing' (LGIU, 1990), cleaners at the Airport 
receive similar rates of pay to local authority employees, but earnings are much lower 
due to minimal sick pay and holiday schemes, cuts in shift payments and sudden cuts 
in earnings to ensure a contract is won. Cleaners have been injured by vehicles and 
machinery at the airport, with official statistics showing the sector to have one of the
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highest death and major injury rates. Workers suffer from both sexual and racial 
harassment and rarely receive training even on basic health and safety, fire 
procedures or accident reporting, and the Health and Safety Executive produces no 
appropriate material in languages relevant to the employees working there. 
Companies also try to avoid redundancy pay when they lose contracts by bullying 
workers into giving up their job or offering a small payment in the hope that it will 
not be challanged. It is also alleged that the DHSS is given false information about 
them, that workers are dismissed arbitrarily, forced to change shifts at short notice or 
made to sign new contracts when returning from holidays. These trends were 
confirmed by research commissioned by the London Borough of Ealing in 1988 
(TICL & SCAT, 1989).
The Ealing Initiative
The report commissioned by Ealing Council, on the impact of Heathrow Airport as a 
major center of employment for people in the Borough, was designed to help the 
Authority develop a strategy to improve the terms and conditions of employment for 
workers in the cleaning and catering sectors. The strategy also aimed to improve 
access for these workers to other sectors of industry which are better paid and facing 
shortages, in line with the Council's approach towards its own cleaners in the run up 
to CCT.
In the summer of 1988, Ealing started to run a series of courses for its cleaning staff. 
Training in cleaning skills was given, showing how to use new machinery and 
different methods of cleaning with recognition from the British Institute of Cleaning 
Science, health and safety issues were taught, the CCT legislation was explained 
along with the operation and structure of the Council; and communication skills were 
taught so that workers could articulate problems and opinions about the service they 
provide. Following on from this training the Council launched a general manual
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worker training programme in 1989, with the aim of improving the quality of work 
done and the status and sense of value amongst the workforce.
To extend such practices to the private sector was not as straightforward. The 
Council recognised that in order to improve cleaners conditions at Heathrow Airport 
it was necessary to activate their collective strength and provide structured support 
through the trade union movement:
"The role of the Economic Development Division was to act as a 
catalyst, a bridge between the cleaners and the TGWU."
(London Borough of Ealing, 1990)
A steering committee was established which included a Council representative, a full­
time officer from the TGWU, cleaning and catering workers, representatives from the 
Hounslow Trade Union Support Unit, the Indian Workers Association, Southhall 
Trade Union and Employment Advisory Services (STUEAS) and legal advice from 
various agencies. In this way, it was hoped the different sections of the community 
could be brought together, easing lauguage, cultural and religious barriers. The 
TGWU had to overcome the lack of trust felt towards the Union which resulted in 
cleaners problems being taken to local voluntary sector advice agencies and 
traditional community organisations, such as places of worship. The TGWU has 
been seen as a 'white' institution. Lauguage barriers and the failure of the Union to 
support and win the confidence of those cleaners who were members, added to the 
impression that the TGWU did not serve cleaner's interests.
The Campaign and Conference
The project led to mass leafleting in various languages, to identify cleaning workers 
in the area. This was supported by information and advice sessions held every 
fortnight at the Southhall TGWU offices. A group of volunteers carried out a weekly
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recuritment drive in all four airport terminals on each shift, as well as at bus stops and 
on buses (taking workers to the airport), at local meeting places and through 
voluntary organisations. The TGWU established a new branch 1/1952, specifically 
for cleaners at the Airport This was placed in the Union's General Workers group, 
which organises cleaners in other parts of the private sector, rather than in the Civil 
Air Transport group, which organises the other airport workers.
On the 27th April 1990 a Conference for Heathrow Airport Cleaners was held, in 
order to highlight the situation faced by cleaners at the Airport, to establish new 
methods of recruiting workers into the TGWU and of tackling racism, and to launch 
the Council's report on cleaners at Heathrow. The growing commitment of the 
TGWU to the campaign was illustrated by the presence of the Union's Deputy 
General Secretary (now General Secretary), Bill Morris, and 13 other full-time 
officers.
The Conference recognised that recruitment of cleaners could not be achieved 
without the involvement of the local community, the voluntary and traditional 
organisations, support networks and structures which have served the black 
community since the 1950s. Following from that point it was argued that the policy 
and practice of the Union should be identified with broader issues affecting the 
community and not just employment related issues. The Union had to be seen to 
actively support the community and to challenge racism. To build up the trust and 
confidence of cleaners, individual case work has to be instigated, with every lead 
followed through. This approach, whilst time consuming, enables non unionised 
cleaners to see the benefits of a union. Crucially it was recognised that the local 
union structure and organisation should be accessible and responsive to the cleaners, 
with Punjabi speaking office workers at the Southall TGWU offices and venues for 
and timing of branch meetings suitable for cleaners.
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In line with Ealing Council's approach towards its own workforce it was recognised 
that changes would have to be accompanied by education and training. Training for 
cleaners on how to obtain information on and increase their participation in the 
TGWU. Training courses for TGWU, Heathrow Airport and Southall Office full­
time officers, to increase their understanding of racism, how to tackle it and the 
recruitment of black workers.
The TGWU
The responsiveness of the TGWU to these ideas was demonstrated with the Deputy 
General Secretary’s own out line agenda for increasing black workers involvement in 
the Union, which included:
Producing recruitment material and information in both English 
and Punjabi
- Putting religious and cultural needs on the collective bargaining 
agenda
- Adopting union education programmes to cater fo r  the needs of 
Afro-Caribbean and Asian workers
- Employing professionals, such as solicitors, from the Asian 
community, creating a legal representation service that cuts through 
language barriers".
(LGIU, 1990)
Following the conference, in the May 1990 local government elections, the 
Conservatives took control of Ealing Council and stopped all work on the project 
This was followed by the closure of the main voluntary support group, STUEAS, 
casting some doubt over the future of the exercise. However, the TGWU decided at a 
meeting of its Contract Cleaning Campaign Committee to make a long term 
commitment to the campaign with the aim of organising the 500 to 1000 cleaners at 
Heathrow Airport, using a two pronged approach (TGWU, 1990). The first pan was 
the organisational approach which sets out what the Union stands for in a TGWU
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Charter, which includes commitments to fight for a minimum hourly rate, a 
maximum hours limitation, holiday pay, sickness pay, pension rights, union 
recognitition and bargaining rights, agreed grievance and disciplinary procedures, 
elected TGWU representatives, an Airport joint industrial council and BAAs 
agreement on minimum terms to be offered by contractors.
The Charter forms the focal point of the campaign and was launched at the TGWU 
offices in 1991, utilising the local press and media, including sympathetic local radio 
station and black celebrities. All supporting materials were written in three 
languages.
The second part of the campaign was the recruitment drive designed to continue the 
building of Branch 1/1952 with the full involvement of the local community. Central 
to this drive was the employment of Bashir Bhatti as a full-time Stand Down Officer. 
He was responsible for the organisation of catering and cleaning workers at the 
Airport prior to privatisation and has a formidable reputation amongst the 
community, the trade unions and management. He describes how slow the process of 
organising can be:
"Everyone is scared to join the union in this non-union sector but I am 
succeeding very slowly. I have lists of names and addresses of 
cleaners, gained by having a meeting with one cleaner who speaks of 
another and so on. Nearly everyone I approach joins but sometimes it 
takes many meetings. All recruitment is done door to door as the 
companies do not allow me to reach the workers during their breaks 
and I can not interrupt their work. Many workers don't return home 
until after 10p.m., so to do my job I had to be out seeing them then. 
Yesterday I spent four hours seeing one man and failed to recruit him 
but I don't get depressed, I will just visit him again. I have broken 
through the barriers by visiting them so many times and so I will 
recruit the other workers.
"We produce leaflets in Hindu and Punjabi and this helps but I believe 
people need to talk, not the paper. Personal presentation is important.
If we started hiring young dedicated officers, white and black, they
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could recruit many more members but I  still hope to recruit 500 
during the year".
At the beginning of the campaign the TGWU had no members amongst the contract 
cleaning workforce at Heathrow, but there is now a strong base. In the six companies 
being dealt with at the time of the research in April 1991, three were fully organised 
with recognition agreements in two.
Conclusion
The experience of trade union activity amongst contract cleaning staff at Heathrow 
Airport demonstrates the difficulties that are encountered by old trade union 
structures in organising new types of workers. But the awareness of the problems 
and the degree of success associated with the campaign illustrates what can be 
achieved if the necessary resources and commitment are applied to the task. Indeed 
similar campaigns were run by the Hotel and Restaurant Employees union in the 
USA in the early 1980s with even more successful outcomes (Green & Tilly, 1987).
It will be interesting to see whether the impact of CCT on union membership levels 
nationally, encourages a more widespread commitment to organising the unorganised 
and the development of the new approaches that such a commitment would require. 
The biggest obstacle will probably be the lack of finance in the trade union 
movement, but if unions are serious about organising cleaning workers they will have 
to address their specific concerns in the workplace and in a social context. We will 
return to this issue in the following concluding chapters.
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Chapter 8
The Industrial Relations Consequences of CCT: 
Analysis and Observations
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Chapter 8: The Industrial Relations Consequences of CCT: Analysis and
Observations
Section 1: The Pre - CCT Experience
Prior to the introduction of the 1988 Local Government Act, various studies had 
drawn attention to the impact that CT was having on workers jobs, conditions and 
trade union organisation, in local government and the Health Service. Various 
articles and reports revealed significant job losses, worsening conditions of 
employment and a weakening of union organisation (Ascher, 1987; Coyle, 1986; 
LRD, 1986; Sheaff, 1988; Sheffield City Council, 1988; Walker and Moore, 1987).
A report by Sheffield City Council (1986) highlighted the fact that the voluntary 
introduction of CT by local authorities in the 1980s, resulted in job losses averaging 
nearly 40% in the cleansing services. Coyle (1986) points to the contract cleaning 
firms' practice of hiring labour on terms and hours, which ensure workers rarely meet 
the requirements for statutory employment protection. They also avoid having to 
make national insurance contributions, depriving cleaners of rights to holiday pay, 
sick pay and pensions. Whilst basic rates of pay had largely kept in line with those in 
the public sector, following the CCMA's (now CCSA) decision to respect Whitley 
rates of pay in the NHS, Ascher points out that:
'The impact of revised work schedules and bonus schemes upon 
employees is straightforward: less pay for the same work or more 
work for the same pay".
(Ascher. 1987)
The reorganisation of worker's hours has come about through reductions in holidays, 
lengthened basic hours, reduced access to overtime and the falling number of full­
time employees. Walker and Moore (1987) relate these developments to a process of 
deregulation in the labour market.
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As far as trade union activity is concerned the Sheffield City Council report lists a 
series of attempts by private contractors to resist organisation. Coyle argues that the 
sub-contracting of cleaning work has created a crisis situation for trade unions 
affected, and Sheaff (1988), whilst not going as far as this, believes that:
"the major consequence o f CT has been a further movement towards 
local bargaining and a shift in relative bargaining power".
(Sheaff, 1988)
On a more hopeful note for the trade unions, the LRD (1986) points to extensive and 
successful actions by cleaning workers, resisting cuts in pay by private contractors on 
a range of Government contracts.
However, it was the power of trade unionists, and particularly the power of local 
government manual workers, that the Government was seeking to address with its CT 
initiatives. We saw in Chapter 7 how privatisation represents a fundamental 
challenge to basic trade union objectives. In this Chapter I will consider the extent to 
which local authority trade unionism has been checked by the 1988 Local 
Government Act I will be drawing on the results of my own research, as laid out in 
Chapters 4 ,5 ,6  and 7, and other studies considering these issues.
Section 2: Impact on the Workforce
Over half a million local government workers have been directly affected by the 
Government's CCT legislation. The emphasis placed on cost in the allocation of 
contracts has put severe pressure on their jobs, wages and conditions. Since labour 
costs form the overwhelming proportion of a contract price, the ability to compete in 
the tendering process has been largely reliant on cuts in worker's terms and conditions 
(this issue is discussed further in Section 5). As pay and benefits in the public sector
352
often act as a benchmark for those in the private sector, the labour market 
implications of CCT are potentially far reaching.
Jobs
When considering the issue of job losses it must be remembered that job cuts 
imposed by private contractors come on top of those made during local authority 
preparations for CCT. In Liverpool, the refuse collection workforce was reduced 
from around 600 to 415, prior to the award of the contract to Onyx, who now employ 
only 208 workers. In Rotherham the number of building cleaners was reduced from 
900 to 650 before Initial won 3 of the Council’s 4 contracts. Even where contracts 
have been kept in-house, as with the refuse collection services in Glasgow and 
Manchester, job losses have been heavy due to DSO restructuring. These labour 
reductions are additional to those brought about by cuts in local authority funding 
over the past twelve years.
In twenty two of the privatised local authority cleansing contracts reviewed in the 
company profiles in Chapter 4, contractors imposed job cuts in all but three, with an 
average job loss of 25% (See Table 50). Consistently heavy job losses were recorded 
on building cleaning contracts, with an average on the five contracts investigated, of 
30.25%. There were net losses of 300 jobs in Tayside, 190 in Gloucestershire, 250 in 
Rotherham and 400 in Mid Glamorgan. There is some evidence that job cuts have 
been so heavy as to make contracts unworkable (Initial's contract in Tayside was 
terminated due to poor performance) and consequently, cutbacks are now proving 
less drastic. On refuse collection and street cleaning contracts, the picture was less 
uniform, with average job losses of 20.65%, but ranging from none in Babergh and 
Erewash to a massive 66% reduction in Liverpool.
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Type of 
Contract
% of cases 
with job 
losses
Average
job
losses
% of cases 
where 
income 
reduced
% of cases 
where hours 
changed
% of cases 
where sick 
pay reduced
% of cases 
where 
leave 
reduced
% of 
cases 
with no 
pension 
100%Building
cleaning
100% 30.25% 60% Reduced in 
80%
None in 60%. 
Reduced in 
40%
100%
Refuse 
collection 
& street 
cleansing
80% 20.65% 76.47% Increased in 
76.47%
Reduced in 
100%
70.5% 76.4%
Table 50: The Impact of Privatisation on Jobs. Pav and Conditions on 22 Local 
Authority Cleansing Contracts
These figures are generally consistent with other surveys such as the LRD's 'CCT 
Bargaining Report* (LRD, 1990), which revealed that 70% of all building cleaning, 
refuse collection and other cleaning contracts had experienced job cuts. The PSPRU 
report ’Privatisation - Disaster for Quality' (PSPRU, 1992) suggests an average jobs 
cut by private refuse collection and street cleaning contractors of 31%. A report by 
Kieran Walsh, for the DOE (Walsh, 1990), indicates slightly lower figures, pointing 
to a reduction of manual workers of 25.7% in street cleansing, 16.9% in refuse 
collection and 18.5% in building cleaning. The Manchester City Council study, 'The 
Price of Winning' (SCAT, 1990) found a reduction in employment of 21% on refuse 
collection and street cleaning contracts, between 1988 and 1990.
The initial heavy losses on building cleaning contracts contributed to the loss of 
35,000 part-time local government manual workers jobs between 1989 and 1992. 
The total job losses attributed to the introduction of CCT amount to 59,000 according 
to a report by ADLO (1992), with 9,000 refuse workers also being made redundant 
ADLO estimates that CCT, introduced under the Local Government Act 1988, will 
result in a further 50,000 job losses by 1997. It should be noted that these figures 
relate to redundancies made by local authorities and do not take account of the jobs 
subsequently created by successful private contractors. A survey done by SCAT 
(1990), drawing on information from the 'Price of Winning' (Manchester City
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Council, 1990) indicates a net loss of over 5,000 refuse collection and street cleaning 
jobs, and a further 5,000 building cleaning jobs, based on nearly 450 contracts put out 
to tender by the end of 1989.
The loss of full-time jobs is significantly lower in Scotland, a reflection of the low 
incidence of contracting out of services, north of the border.
Pay and Conditions
On the question of the impact of CCT on worker's terms and conditions, the picture is 
not entirely uniform. Workers employed on building cleaning contracts appear to 
have fared worst Of the five local government privatised building cleaning contracts 
considered in the survey, pay rates were cut on four (although recruitment problems 
led to a subsequent rise in one), sickness benefits were withdrawn on three and 
reduced on the other two, hours were cut on all five and the working year reduced on 
two. Annual leave was reduced and pension schemes were scrapped in all cases. 
Even where contracts were secured in-house, as in Mid-Glamorgan, working 
conditions came under attack, with a freeze in pay rates, a reduction of annual leave, 
sickness and maternity benefits to statutory minimums, and a reduction in the 
working year, all accompanied by a significant increase in productivity requirements. 
In Manchester, national conditions have been protected but cleaners bonuses were 
scrapped and work rates have intensified.
On refuse collection and other cleaning contracts a similar, if less dramatic, pattern 
has emerged. On a total of seventeen contracts, workers earnings have been cut on 
fifteen. Direct pay cuts were limited to seven and were concentrated on contracts 
held by BFI Wastecare and Onyx UK. In other cases, pay freezes have been 
implemented, a practice favoured by Sitaclean Technology. In one case, this 
company adopted the novel idea of paying two separate rates of pay, for ex-authority
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workers and for new recruits, although the idea was abandoned following resistance 
from the workforce. Another more common approach, which is widely used by 
FOCSA Services, is to keep pay rates at a similar level whilst making drastic 
reductions in bonuses, which form a significant part of local government refuse 
worker’s earnings.
Hours have been increased to 40, 42 or 45 per week, with drivers generally working 
the longest, on thirteen of the contracts considered, with compulsory weekend 
working introduced on three others. The task and finish method of organising refuse 
collection has been abolished by several contractors, which has had an even more 
significant impact on the number of hours actually worked. Sickness benefits have 
declined and qualification requirements been tightened. Entitlements have been 
reduced on ten sickness schemes, only statutory benefits are being paid on a further 
five and two schemes require employment with the company for one year before they 
become operational. Annual leave has been reduced on twelve of the seventeen 
contracts, with only FOCSA Services consistently granting local authority 
entitlements. Company pension schemes are largely non existent On the contracts 
considered, BFI provides a scheme in Wandsworth, after employees have been with 
the Company for over a year, and FOCSA in Stockport and Cory Environmental in 
Bromley and Tower Hamlets organise a scheme linked to SERPS.
Employees who still work for in-house service organisations have largely continued 
tx> be covered by nationally agreed terms and conditions. In Manchester and Glasgow 
the worker's bonus schemes and other benefits have also been protected, with the 
only real deterioration coming from a reduction in staffing levels which has resulted 
in an intensification of work rates. National rates have been retained in Conservative 
run councils, such as Ealing, but aggressive monitoring and opportunist client 
departments, have increased work requirements even further.
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These findings are largely in line with those of other surveys which have identified a 
widespread deterioration in worker's terms and conditions of employment, as a result 
of CCT. In a survey covering contracts held in-house and by private contractors, the 
LRD (1990) points to pay cuts (as opposed to reductions in earnings as identified in 
Table 50) in 29.2% of building cleaning contracts, 6.9% of refuse collection and 8% 
of other cleaning contracts. 51.2% of building cleaners saw a reduction in their hours 
of work, 19.5% saw cuts in holiday entitlements. 13.9% of refuse collectors also saw 
reductions in their annual leave allocation. The survey also identified cuts in holiday 
pay, bonus pay, sick pay, shift and overtime pay. Of the contracts surveyed, only 
4.9% of the building cleaning, 12% of the other cleaning and 27.9% of the refuse 
collection contracts were held by private contractors. This explains the variation with 
my own figures, which are based exclusively on privatised services.
The LRD survey suggests that there are several examples o f councils breaking with 
National Joint Council (NJC) agreed rates of pay and that it is building cleaning 
workers who have been the main victims of this trend. IDS (1991) found nine local 
authorities who have moved away from national bargaining arrangements for manual 
workers in response to the CCT legislation, varying the pay, sick pay and holiday 
entitlements of their employees. According to a report by IDS titled 'Public Service 
Employment' (IDS, 1990), Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council has negotiated 
revised terms and conditions of service for its refuse collectors, cleaning, catering and 
grounds maintainence staff. The revisions include increased hours, reduced pay, 
bonuses and other increments.
The PSPRU (1992) survey argues that nearly all contractors, and some councils, have 
cut the pay rate of cleaners below nationally agreed levels. It is also noted that 
contractors have not even made a theoretical commitment to follow national rates, as 
they did in the NHS. On the question of hours, contractors have invariably cut those 
of part-time workers to under 16 hours a week. Below 16 hours a week workers lose
nearly all statutory employment protection rights such as the right to claim unfair 
dismissal, the right to redundancy pay, the right to maternity pay and leave, and the 
right to time off for public or trade union duties. The PSPRU survey points out that 
part-timers employed for less than 15 hours a week also fall below the lower earnings 
limit (£54 a week from April 1992) unless their pay is at least £3.60 per hour (there 
are no such examples). This means they have no rights to contributory state benefits 
such as statutory sick pay, state pensions and unemployment benefit Most 
contractors have limited cleaners hours to between 10 and 12 hours a week.
In contrast to this situation, the PSPRU survey confirms the trend towards increasing 
hours for full-time manuals working for contractors. It is reported that nearly all 
refuse collection contractors have imposed a working week of 40 hours instead of the 
nationally agreed 37. Biffa Waste Services require their HGV drivers to work 45 
hours and BFI expect their drivers to work 42 hours. Even the in-house DSO in 
Kirkless has introduced a 42.5 hour week. The PSPRU report also confirms the trend 
towards the suspension of school cleaning duties during holiday periods and points 
out that this is equally common on services run by DSO's and by contractors. This 
practice has resulted in cleaners being laid off for up to 14 weeks of the year and in 
the case of Avon County Council resulted in such serious recruitment problems that 
the arrangement has been abandoned.
The most dramatic effects of CCT have certainly been felt by workers now employed 
by private contractors, although staffing levels and the terms and conditions of 
cleaners have been reduced across the board. This is confirmed by the results 
illustrated in Table 51, which summarises the changes made to terms and conditions 
of employment, by local authorities, on 27 cleansing contracts, based on research by 
Kieran Walsh (1990):
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Changes made to terms 
and
Refuse
Collection
Street Cleaning Building Cleaning
conditions by local 
authorities
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Rearranged hours of work 1 11 2 7 2 4
Changed bonus scheme 6 6 3 6 2 4
Abolished bonus scheme 0 12 1 8 3 3
Increased basic wage rates 1 11 1 8 1 5
Reduced basic wage rates 0 12 0 9 3 3
Reduced numbers 
employed
10 2 6 3 5 1
Increased numbers 
employed
0 12 0 9 0 6
Changed shift system 1 11 4 5 1 5
Altered approach to side 
pay
5 7 0 9 2 4
Altered approach to 
holiday pay
2 10 0 9 2 4
Table 51: Changes Made by Local Authorities in the Treatment of Cleansing Staff 
Source: Walsh, 1990
It is clear from Table 51 that building cleaning workers have suffered most, not only 
from privatisation, but from the CCT process in general. The Table shows high 
proportions of yes responses to all the negative changes listed, such as abolished 
bonus schemes, reduced basic wage rates and reduced numbers employed. These 
results also justify Painter's claim that:
''While nationally agreed levels o f pay and service conditions for 
council workers have been retained in many authorities, they have 
rarely been enhanced. Where change has come it has generally 
involved deterioration in employment terms and conditions. By the 
same token, the numbers employed in tendered services have only in­
frequently been increased following CCT. In general, changes in the 
numbers o f jobs have meant cuts".
(Painter, 1990)
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Equalities
A major objective of the 1988 Local Government Act has been to prevent the use of 
"non-commercial considerations" in the awarding of council contracts. In particular 
this centres around local authority attempts to address social injustices and 
inequalities by utilising their own economic power. In the past, contract compliance 
was used to ensure that local authority contracts were awarded to companies who 
were committed to good standards, in terms of employment conditions, trade union 
recognition, health and safety and equal opportunities. The 1988 Local Government 
Act placed specific restrictions on these activities which were upheld in a test case 
taken by the Building Employers Confederation against Islington Council in 1989. 
The case clarified that:
"Non commercial considerations, including questions relating to terms 
and conditions o f employment, the composition o f the workforce (by 
race, gender and disabilities) and arrangements for promotion, 
transfer or training cannot be used as criteria for excluding 
contractors
(SCAT, 1990a)
CCT has brought traditionally ghettoised women’s work areas, such as cleaning and 
catering, to the forefront of councils attention. The legislation has forced officers to 
consider issues such as the size of budgets, the numbers of staff employed, pay, 
conditions, productivity and the type and range of service on offer. Unfortunately, 
the concentration on financial considerations that is forced by the CCT process, has 
resulted in the cuts in jobs, hours, pay and conditions outlined above. When this 
happens it is often women, black and other disadvantaged groups of workers who 
bear the brunt Most of the jobs currently affected by CCT are done by women and 
are generally part-time or part-year in nature. As we have seen, these types of jobs 
are particularly vulnerable to changes in terms and conditions.
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The increasing emphasis on cost factors could potentially marginalise the work of 
local authority equal opportunities units, as equalities work is increasingly regarded 
as an ’unnecessary cost1. Furthermore, the isolation of jobs within the new 'defined 
activities’ might result in a loss of access to training, which could otherwise have 
increased the opportunities for securing alternative better paid jobs. For those 
workers whose jobs are privatised, it seems unlikely that private contractors will have 
much commitment towards equalities issues beyond the statutory requirement to 
comply with the 1976 Race Relations Act
The nature of the legislation seems to force something of a damage limitation 
exercise on to those authorities who are genuinely committed to equal opportunities. 
Both the LGIU (Lucy de Groot and Wright 1990) and SCAT (1990) have produced 
best practice advice on the issue, but it seems clear that CCT is likely to further 
undermine, rather than enhance, equality in the labour market
Health and Safety
Local authorities have been at the forefront of developing safer working procedures 
and better working environments for their employees. Generally these efforts have 
been rewarded with lower accident rates in the public sector than in equivalent 
private sector environments, but only because the public sector has been prepared to 
devote a higher share of resources to health and safety than their private sector 
counterparts.
The introduction of CCT into the provision of local authority services might be seen 
as a threat to these developments, due to the limitation the process places on cost, and 
the different attitudes that might be held by private contractors towards the 
importance of health and safety.
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A report by Mick Wright (Wright, N.D.), TGWU senior shop steward for Luton 
Borough Council, on three cleansing contracts held by UK Waste Control prior to 
their takeover by Onyx UK, puts the question into focus. Reporting on two refuse 
crews working on a Three Rivers District Council contract, it was noted that the 
audible reverse warning devices on the refuse vehicles were not working and that 
none of the employees were wearing gloves, safety footwear or high visibility 
workwear. In Broxboume Borough Council, street cleaning workers were observed 
as having no gloves, safety footwear, overalls or high visibility clothing. The report 
concludes that:
"the reality o f their [UK Waste Control] existing contracts shows that 
the quality systems, health and safety procedures and employment 
policies that they highlight in the bid process are worthless".
(Wright N.D.)
Labour Research (1991) highlights the case of a young temporary refuse worker 
whose foot was amputated after being crushed by a refuse wagon operated by the 
DSO in Berwick upon Tweed. The Union believes the accident was caused by 
changes introduced to make the DSO more competitive in preparation for 
competition. A local NUPE representative said:
"The time specification had been narrowed which meant that the 
wagon could no longer stop, but had to crawl along with the refuse 
workers running behind it. When the workers foot was crushed he was 
wearing training shoes because safety boots were only issued to 
workers on temporary contracts after six months",
(Labour Research, 1991)
Health and safety is not regarded as a "non-commercial matter" though, and can be 
taken into consideration in the tender evaluation process. ADLO, the ALA and AMA 
have produced an information pack Health and Safety in the Competitive Tendering 
Process' (AMA, ALA, ADLO, 1989) with individual guidance booklets on each of
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the defined activities. The point is made, that maintaining health and safety standards 
should not be seen as a means of ensuring fair competition between DSOs and the 
private sector, since it is a central part of a local authority's social and legal 
responsibility to its employees and the public. Unless an authority itself achieves a 
high standard in its systems and procedures, it will not be able to demand those 
standards from the private sector. The evidence provided by Mick Wright's report 
also suggests that monitoring of the procedures outlined in tender documents should 
be a central consideration.
Competing Downwards?
The experience of union officers in Liverpool, where the refuse collection workforce 
was particularly hard hit by the CCT process, suggests that the whole activity is about 
obtaining savings at the expense of the workforce. In the eyes of Bill Smith, the 
GMB's Merseyside Regional Officer, CCT is about competing downwards on 
workers terms and conditions. Other examples in this thesis give support to that 
position, suggesting that local authorities who want to keep their services in-house 
will have to match private contractors practices. Indeed Painter (1990) argues that:
"some authorities are using compulsory competitive tendering.... as a 
way of introducing organisational changes which would otherwise 
have been more strongly resisted by the workforce".
(Painter, 1990)
This would seem to be particularly apparent where authorities have already lost one 
service to a private contractor, as in Liverpool and Stockport, and respond by making 
drastic changes to the organisation and terms of employment on other services.
The undisputed basis for this development is the competitive nature of the process, 
where some contractors appear ready to stand losses in order to build up a market
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share. In these circumstances, authorities who are committed to in-house provision, 
feel they have no option but to cut their own services to the bone in order to remain 
competitive.
This is not an ideal situation for the private sector either, whose profits are being 
squeezed in the competitive struggle for early market domination. Some doubt has 
been thrown on the process by the Transfer of Undertakings Regulations (TOUR). 
These regulations are based on European legislation and state that if an undertaking is 
transferred to a new employer, the workforce must be employed on the existing terms 
and conditions or they may make claims for unfair dismissal. If the regulations can 
be applied to the provision of local authority services then many of the fears which 
surround CCT will evaporate.
In 1991 the TGWU brought two industrial tribunal cases, seeking to apply the TOUR 
to the award of a refuse collection contract to Onyx, and the sale of a council DSO to 
Serco. In the first case, the Court found that there was no transfer, since existing 
arrangements were terminated, and fresh ones made with Onyx. An appeal has been 
made and it is expected that this will be dealt with before any decision is made on the 
second case.
The TOUR have already been applied to at least two local authority contracts. In 
February 1992 Gloucestershire County Council sold its school meals and school 
cleaning DSO to BET on the basis of the regulations. BET have recognised the 
unions and come to an arrangement with the Council to continue contributions to the 
Council’s pension scheme (pension schemes are not actually covered by TOUR). In 
March 1992, Wockingham District Council transferred its DSO, which provided 
street sweeping, highway maintenance, grounds maintenance and office cleaning 
services, to OCS on the basis of TOUR and the Company has since recognised 
unions.
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BET and others have already indicated an interest in offering quality no cuts deals, as 
a way out of the competitive zero-sum game that CCT has become. The application 
of TOUR to local authority services, seems to be an avenue through which this new 
approach can be adopted. Negotiating a deal direcdy with an authority can bypass 
the CCT process, since it does not apply to councils where work is already privatised. 
In these circumstances, the company can secure a deal on the basis of identifiable 
costs, and can simply calculate its profit margin and adequate resources to do the job, 
without having to pursue profits and cost cuts by savaging jobs, pay and conditions.
Concluding Comments
There is no question that CCT has had a dramatic effect upon workers employed in 
activities covered by the legislation. Jobs have been slashed, work rates intensified, 
working practices transformed, employment casualised, earnings reduced and 
benefits removed in varying degrees. The PSPRU estimates that the total cost to the 
workforce has been £150 million per year in lost jobs, £100 million in lost hours and 
£125 million in lost pay and conditions. Councils have generally been successful in 
retaining a high proportion of contracts in-house (an average of 67.1% of all 
cleansing contracts [LGMB, 1992], but the success has relied upon the deterioration 
in working conditions outlined in this section.
The irony of the whole process is that the main casualties of the legislation have been 
the least organised, least militant and most disadvantaged groups of council workers, 
such as cleaning and catering workers. The highly organised and militant refuse 
collectors, whose actions helped provoke the legislation, have got off comparatively 
lightly, particularly where services have been kept in-house.
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Section 3: The Structural Impact on Local Government Industrial Relations.
Non Unionism
There can be no question that one of the key driving forces behind the Government’s 
CCT legislation was the desire to restrict the power and influence of public sector 
unionism. The extent to which that objective is achievable is tied in closely with the 
prevalence of an unorganised workforce, and anti-union attitudes, in the private 
sector public service industry.
The hostility shown towards trade unions in the contract cleaning industry, and the 
difficulties associated with organising workers in this sector, have been evident for 
some time and are referred to in other parts of this thesis. What is significant about 
the impact of CCT on trade union organisation, is that the process has transferred 
whole groups of public sector workers, with a strong trade union history and 
consciousness, into an alien and often hostile private sector environment.
Table 52 shows that of the twenty two privatised contracts considered in Chapter 4, 
unions have only been recognised on nine. In three of these cases recognition was 
resisted by contractors and was only granted after industrial action by the workforce. 
Where trade unions do have negotiating rights it is generally on a single union basis. 
Of the nine contracts where rights have been secured, the companies concerned have 
only recognised one union on six, in five of those cases the union was the GMB. The 
workers involved were sometimes organised by one union prior to privatisation, but 
all unions have negotiating rights with local authorities. The non-union trend is 
confirmed by the PSPRU which reports that:
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"Nearly all o f the contractors involved in services such as cleaning, 
catering, laundry, refuse collection are anti-union, only one or two 
have been persuaded to recognise unions".
(PSPRU, 1992)
Type of contract Number of 
contracts
Union recognition 
secured
Recognition 
secured following 
resistance
Only one union 
recognised
Building cleaning 5 1 - Under negotiation
Refuse collection 
& street cleaning
17 8 4 6
Table 52: Incidence of Union Recognition Agreements on 22 Privatised Cleansing 
Contracts
One of the contractors which has been more ready than most to co-operate with trade 
unions has been FOCSA Services. The case studies in Chapter 6 illustrate the 
reluctance with which that position was adopted. Despite the fact that FOCSA 
recognises trade unions in Spain (home of the Company’s parent), when they started 
to win contracts in the UK their approach did not remain consistent, and there was an 
initial refusal to negotiate with any union. During the struggles for recognition in 
Brighton and Stockport, union officers indicated that they felt the Company was 
’’weighing up” the different unions, before deciding who to recognise. If this was the 
case then it appears that FOCSA chose the GMB, since of the three contracts 
considered in the survey, only the GMB was recognised in two and , whilst a general 
recognition agreement was signed in Stockport, there is evidence to suggest that the 
Company would have favoured an exclusive deal with the GMB on this one too.
No consistent pattern has emerged other that the fact that some contractors are more 
determinedly hostile than others. BFI and Initial appear to be totally uninterested in 
having relations with trade unions, whilst FOCSA and Cory Environmental seem to 
be more co-operative. Other contractors, such as Onyx, Sitaclean and Taylorplan do 
not have a standard approach but judge the conditions on each contract separately. 
As the GMB's National Officer confirms:
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"There is no tendency towards giving full recognition rights across the 
hoard because the company gives way in one location. It all depends 
on the local basis o f organisation and trade union history".
On most building cleaning contracts it seems that the basis of organisation and trade 
union history is not sufficient to secure union rights. The fierce competitiveness in 
this sector has been taken out on the workforce. The direct attack on pay and 
conditions by contractors has been accompanied by a reduction in hours which 
disqualifies the workers from statutory rights to sick pay, pensions and other benefits. 
The nature of employment on these contracts has deteriorated so far, that 
tremendously high rates of labour turnover have developed. This is what undermines 
trade union organisation more than any other factor, as was illustrated by case study 3 
in Chapter 6. The result is a casualisation of employment, moving what were secure 
and well protected, if low paid, jobs in the public sector, into an entirely different 
labour market, characterised by a new set of conditions and practices.
A high rate of staff turnover undermines trade union organisation on three fronts. 
Firstly, the instability of the workforce means there is no permanent base around 
which to focus activity. Unionisation cannot take place exclusively on the basis of 
one on one recruitment by full-time organisers, activists must be drawn from the 
workforce around which the union can build. If no-one stays in the job longer than a 
few months, then it is very difficult to recruit or motivate even those workers with a 
strong commitment to trade unionism. Secondly, the transitory and part-time nature 
of employment means that workers do not have any statutory employment rights, and 
can be dismissed without redress at any moment With employers openly hostile to 
trade unions, this represents a strong disincentive to involvement in organisational 
activity. Finally, this type of employment, which is very much on the periphery of 
the labour market, does not encourage any sense of job commitment amongst the 
workforce. When workers are resigned to their condition, with a low sense of 
commitment to the job, they are less inclined to address their own dissatisfaction. In
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these circumstances, and with workers isolated from each other, common complaints 
are rarely advocated and so there is little basis for instinctive trade unionism.
Where unions have managed to maintain organisation in the face of privatisation, 
then recognition and concessions from contractors have been more forthcoming . On 
the refuse collection contract considered in case study 4 in Chapter 6, the unity and 
strength of organisation maintained after privatisation, has led to the achievement of 
union recognition and satisfactory terms and conditions, despite the Company's initial 
hostility. The continued commitment to trade unionism of refuse collectors in 
Liverpool, has resulted in a recognition agreement, despite the devastating blow that 
CCT represented to the workforce in the City. The trade unions' ability to organise 
industrial action in Brighton and Stockport, forced FOCSA into recognition 
agreements which now seem to have set a precedent for the Company's other 
contracts. It will be interesting to see whether union organisation amongst cleaners in 
Mid Glamorgan is maintained now that Taylorplan has won the building cleaning 
contracts, or whether the experience of other privatised cleaning services, such as 
Rotherham, will be repeated
Trade Union Involvement in the CCT Process
A notable feature of the introduction of CCT into local government cleansing 
services has been the lack of direct resistance to the process from the trade unions. 
There has been a certain amount of resignation to the inevitability of the legislation's 
progress and implementation. Consequently, unions have tended to seek involvement 
in the preparations for competition, rather than confrontation. The extent to which 
such an involvement developed, was largely dependent upon the political complexion 
of the authorities concerned Painter (1990) distinguishes between four different 
types of authority.
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1 New Right
Councils who aim to move towards the employment of a very small core staff, whose 
function is to award and monitor contracts run by private firms. Almost always 
Conservative controlled, they include 'keen privatisers' like the London boroughs of 
Wandsworth and Westminster.
2 Non-committal
Councils with no strong ideological commitment to privatisation but with no 
particular desire to keep services in-house. These authorities also tend to be 
Conservative. At the time of the refuse collection contract award, the council 
considered in case study 4, Chapter 6 fitted into this category, as does the London 
Borough of Ealing.
3 In-house commitment
Councils in this group are committed to keeping services in-house but are prepared to 
make cuts in jobs and conditions to secure that outcome. This category contains both 
Conservative and Labour authorities and would include Mid Glamorgan County 
Council.
4 In-house commitment without cuts
Councils with a political commitment to public sector provision coupled with a 
determination to protect the employment levels, wages and conditions of their 
workforce. These authorities are largely Labour controlled and include Manchester 
City Council.
370
Unions and staff have been most involved in the preparations for tendering when the 
Council's commitment has been greatest. Conservative authorities in particular are 
less likely to involve employees early on in the process, and are more likely to 
involve them on the basis of consultation rather than negotiation. This is reflected in 
the approach adopted by the Conservative administration in the London Borough of 
Ealing.
In contrast, the experience in Manchester appears to have been more union led. The 
formation of service groups, .with full-time union representation and a Council 
commitment to protecting the workforce, allowed the unions to dictate the majority 
of the changes made by the Authority. A similar approach was adopted in Newcasde, 
where the Council agreed to the granting of facility time to trade unionists, in order 
that they could work on the development of CT policy. The extent o f trade union 
influence that emerged, has completely shifted the nature of industrial relations on 
the City Council. The involvement in areas of local government activity, which were 
previously not regarded as trade union concerns, has, if anything, extended the 
influence of the town hall unions in the City,
Trade union involvement in the preparation of specifications, determination of 
service requirements, development of contract monitoring procedmes and 
consultation with sendee users has created a whole new role for the unions, extending 
the influence of council employees over their working lives. The progressive manner 
in which this potential has been exploited in Newcastle, addressing the issues of 
sexual discrimination (in the Council and in Union hierarchies), community links and 
inter-union rivalries, offers much encouragement At the same time, such 
developments run the risk of becoming localised experiments in corporatism, which 
raises the possibility of 'incorporation', neutralising the independence of trade union 
activity.
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Incorporation into local authority structures is not a problem as long as unions retain 
the capacity to direct the outcomes generated by those structures. With a more 
motivated input from an authority than was evident in Newcastle, the same outcomes 
could not be guaranteed. In those circumstances, the increasing trend towards 
commercialism in local government would become a more potent threat Trade 
unions need to ensure that in defending the in-house provision of services, they do it 
from the standpoint of their members interests and not those of the authority, which 
might be quite different Painter (1989) quotes the senior convenor in Newcastle on 
the issue:
"In other authorities, like your Sheffields and North Tynesides, most o f  
those initiatives have been taken by either the Labour group, or left 
Iwing]  officers.... I  actually believe there is a difference in what you 
end up with in terms o f trade union structure where it has been led by 
left officers or Labour councillors. You are waMng a fine tightrope 
between building a strong independent trade union structure, and 
incorporation .... It is very easy if stewards are in offices day in, day 
out with managers, to get sucked in. You become part o f it.... and 
when the workforce turn on you, you say, 'Sorry, but this is what it is 
going to b e /  Because it was led by the trade unions in Newcastle, and 
because everything goes through the joint shop stew&rcts' 
committees....you can't get incorporated in the same way. I f  you are 
working through the joint shop steward's committees, who arn't 
working full-time [on union business] they keep you much more in 
line."
(Painter, 1989)
Local Bargaining
One of the other central objectives of the CCT legislation was to breakdown the 
influence of national collective bargaining on local government workers terms and 
conditions. The CT process necessarily involves local negotiations on changes to the 
structure of work, job cuts and various other conditions in order to make DSO's 
'competitive1. What the unions, nationally, were determined to preserve, were the
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National Joint Council (NJC) wage rates and service conditions, covering wage rates, 
shift rates, leave and sickness leave entitlements (See Appendix 1).
Increasingly, some local authorities are moving away from national bargaining and 
there are signs that national agreements themselves are being altered to allow greater 
local flexibility in the determination of council workers pay and conditions. Mid 
Glamorgan County Council abandoned national conditions for its building cleaners in 
1989 and has been followed by a stream of other authorities since. The National 
Public Services Secretary of the TGWU estimates that around 80% of DSO’s have 
stuck with national rates but that this has not prevented substantial changes to 
bonuses, numbers employed and the introduction of flexible work patterns. A survey 
by the Association of District Councils (ADC), in 1990, similarly found that around 
80% of councils had stuck with national terms and conditions. 4.7% of manual 
workers were covered exclusively by local conditions and 12.7% by local conditions 
with some reference to national conditions. However, 46% of authorities indicated 
that they had made local modifications to national conditions. The main variations 
from national agreements were on pay and grading benefits (23%) and hours and 
leave (25.8%) (IDS, 1990). CCT was identified by 25.5% of authorities as the main 
reason for introducing local pay and conditions.
The trade unions are caught in a trap, whereby officers often feel it is necessary to 
make considerable concessions on pay and conditions, including the introduction of 
local pay bargaining, in order to secure contracts in-house. Whilst such concessions 
mean that the central motivation for keeping services in-house, the defence of 
nationally agreed terms and conditions, is surrendered. To resist the cuts will do 
nothing to prevent the CT process, and invariably results in the privatisation of 
services, as witnessed by refuse collectors in Liverpool, with the consequent removal 
from national bargaining structures altogether.
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Trade Union Practice Under the Conditions of CCT
As I have demonstrated, the impact of CCT on trade union organisation is closely 
tied to the trade union history and strength of organisation already prevailing. In this 
context, the devastating impact of the process on union membership in Rotherham 
must cast some doubt over the nature of union activity amongst cleaners in the 
borough. Traditionally, council cleaners, who normally work in schools and a variety 
of other authority buildings, are organised by male caretakers. Women shop stewards 
are extremely rare, despite the fact that the vast majority of cleaners are women. 
Consequently, a question mark remains over how well union structures have serviced 
the needs of this marginalised sector of the workforce.
Whilst I have already outlined the problems associated with organising cleaners 
employed by private contractors, the movement in Rotherham from a union 
membership base of 900 to none, in a matter of months, is particularly dramatic. 
Despite the deterioration in the terms and conditions of employment, the loss of jobs 
and the contractor's failure to recognise unions, it is surprising that, from such a large 
number, nobody remained in the union, let alone attempted to organise others. This 
highlights the problem of building an organisation structure around caretakers, who 
are now contractually separated from the cleaners and perceive no common interests. 
The most basic requirement for organising these workers must be that they are 
represented by women, drawn from their own ranks. Only then will the workers 
interests be properly reflected in union demands, and a genuine, sustainable union 
consciousness emerge amongst the workforce.
The loss of 900 members represents a significant blow to the trade union movement, 
and is a pattern that could not be allowed to repeat itself up and down the country. 
However, the response of male dominated municipal union structures, has not been to 
address the reasons for the lack of real trade union commitment amongst council
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cleaners. Instead, the fact that cleaners do tend to remain union members when they 
are employed by local authorities, has often been identified as the only significant 
factor. The union officer in Mid Glamorgan responsible for preparing for the 
building cleaning contract, was instructed to:
"Win that contract. Don't lose those members
The implication being that if the contract was lost the members would go with it
Whilst this has not always been the practice (Newcastle provides a good example of 
an alternative approach), it does raise the question as to whether unions have been 
more interested in protecting membership levels than membership interests. Without 
securing a commitment to collective organisation, sustainable throughout the CT 
process, regardless of outcome, trade unions will become increasingly committed to 
winning contracts 'at any cost1. This would inevitably involve greater 
commercialisation of DSO operations. DSO's would be treated as separate 'business' 
organisations, using efficiency and financial criteria to follow private contractors 
costs, productivity levels, wages and conditions (see Whitfield, 1992). The interests 
of service users and providers would be increasingly marginalised.
Already, inter-union rivalries have taken precedence over union principle, in the 
pursuit of members. It is clear that the private contractors preference for reaching 
recognition agreements with one union, rather than several, has undermined trade 
union unity in a number of areas. It is difficult to prove the incidence of 'back room 
deals' and unprincipled manouvering, but there is clear evidence that such activity is 
taking place. In four of the case studies considered in Chapter 6, there is the 
suggestion that agreements have been discussed, which various parties would prefer 
to keep quiet. Even if no wrong doing has occurred, the suggestion that it has, by
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respected trade union officers, creates an atmosphere of distrust and sectionalism, 
which will be readily exploited by private contractors.
Regardless of whether any specific single union agreements have been signed or not, 
the contractor’s preference for such agreements raises another concern. Where a 
union secures sole negotiating rights with a contractor, the potential exists for the 
union to become entwined in a co-operative relationship, which does not necessarily 
best serve the interests of its members. The union will have a bureaucratic interest in 
keeping the contract with the company, since, having secured a recognition 
agreement, this would be the most certain way of protecting its membership levels. 
This could lead the union to neglect its members interests, in relation to their terms 
and conditions of employment, the use of industrial action and attempts to secure a 
return of the service to public sector provision.
These fears tie in with the declaration of common interests and joint agreement on 
press releases, which have appeared on several procedural agreements. The fact is, 
that public service cleansing workers do not share a common interest with private 
contractors. Their interests are at all times divergent, since once a price is fixed for a 
contract, the contractors' pursuit of profit, which is their reason for being in business, 
is dependent upon the minimisation of labour costs, which form up to 90% of total 
costs. Increased profit necessarily requires job losses or reduced terms and 
conditions. Hardly a coincidence of interests.
The irony is that, in some respects, this situation offers greater power to a well 
organised workforce employed by a contractor, than to one employed by a DSO. 
Local authority DSO’s are required to show a 5% return in their accounts, on each 
contract they operate. Consequently, if a council workforce takes industrial action, it 
threatens to impose penalty payments on the DSO, which will undermine its ability to 
achieve a return on the contract and could result in the whole organisation being shut
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down. In these circumstances it is likely that a private contractor would take over 
responsibility for the work. In contrast, if a contract is being run by a private firm, 
any penalties imposed on the contractor, due to industrial action by the workforce, 
would be an addition to costs and would undermine profitability, and the company's 
ability to fulfil the contract This would increase the chances of a return to in-house 
provision. However, this scenario does not take account of contractor's willingness to 
counter industrial action by dismissing the workforce, as occurred in Brighton and 
Stockport
The limitation placed on the freedom of council workers to take industrial action, or 
even restrict their workload, will be enforced. There are already signs that workers 
will be expected to pay for service failures. There is the ever present reality, that if 
workers do not perform to the contract specification, then the DSO will not be 
financially viable because of default penalties. Management may use this threat to 
try and get productivity increases and unpaid overtime out of DSO workers. 
Glasgow refuse collectors experience of the 'depot clearance’ is a case in point (case 
study 9, Chapter 6).
One positive aspect that has come out of the CCT process, is the increased profile and 
activity that town hall unions and council employees have enjoyed. Despite the 
unions’ lack of ability to do much about preventing the implementation of CCT, there 
has been a great deal of educational activity and consultation with local authority 
workers in the run up to CCT. Some union officers, in Manchester for example, feel 
that the whole exercise has positively strengthened union organisation, but the same 
could not be said for some other groups, notably building cleaners in Rotherham. 
The main problem is that the level of activity generated in the run up to CCT has not 
been maintained after the award of contracts. This experience was particularly 
apparent in Mid Glamorgan, where half the building cleaning workforce lapsed its 
membership during the life of the three year contract, without the unions noticing!
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Conclusions
It is apparent that the CT exercise has generated very varied experiences for workers 
engaged in different activities and working in different parts of the country. The 
degree to which individual workforces have suffered, in terms of job losses and cuts 
in pay and conditions, is intamately tied up with the commitment displayed by 
individual local authorities and tiade unions towards keeping services in-house and 
protecting the status of their employees and members.
Within the cleansing sendees it is clear that workers employed on building cleaning 
contracts have had to contend with the most severe attacks upon their jobs and living 
standards. This is symptomatic of the marginalised status that cleaners already had 
within the hierarchy of local government workers, both from a managerial and trade 
union perspective. Prior to CCT, local government officers were often not even sure 
how many cleaners they employed, or which department was responsible for them. 
The town hall unions have tended to neglect their concerns, communicating their 
interests through unrepresentative male caretakers and allowing more organised and 
powerful groups of workers to dictate the negotiating agenda. These factors have 
combined with the high incidence of competition in this sector, and the natural 
vulnerability of part-time, isolated workers to seriously undermine the employment 
status cf local authority cleaners.
Where these issues have been properly addressed the most satisfactory outcomes have 
emerged. The trade unions’ decision in Newcastle to ensure that women workers 
were represented by women stewards, was a significant step forward in an area 
characterised by conservative, masculine forms of union structure. This step in itself 
would have been worthless without the wider influence over preparation for CCT that 
the unions secured.
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In cities like Newcastle and Manchester the local authorities commitment to retaining 
public provision of services, whilst protecting the interests of their employees, has led 
to some progressive developments. Structures have been created, which have 
allowed the unions to direct the nature of the response to CT, exerting an influence 
over whole new aspects of service delivery and community relations. The unity of 
puipose and coincidence with union objectives displayed in these authorities, has 
resulted in very positive outcomes. Public provision has been retained, without 
recourse to attacks upon workers conditions of employment. Where the commitment 
of councils has not mirrored that of the trade unions, the results have been less 
encouraging. In Liverpool, despite the strength of union feeling, no co-operative 
approach was adopted and CT has wiped out hundreds of jobs, and, in the case of 
refuse collectors, conditions of employment have been devastated.
Prior to CCT, local authority refuse collectors and other well organised groups, such 
as street cleaners and grave diggers, had a high degree of local bargaining power. In 
a sense, the workers were aware of the fact that their work had to be done, so that if a 
refuse gang went on strike, they knew that when the dispute was settled, the work 
would have to be 'picked up1, ensuring they would still get their wages, possibly even 
at the overtime rate. There was no threat of bankruptcy hanging over authorities, and 
the prevailing nature of local government industrial relations meant there was little 
chance of dismissal. This power has been undermined by the CCT legislation.
Accepting that effective local resistance to the requirements of the legislation is only 
likely to result in the closure of a council's DSO, industrial action to protect the jobs 
and conditions of employees can only be expected to reduce the competitiveness of 
in-house bids, defeating the object of the exercise. Once a contract has been 
awarded, then the threat of bankruptcy and contract failure are all too apparent The 
result is a more authoritarian form of management and a greater reluctance on the 
part of the workforce to engage in industrial action over any issue.
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The powerlessness of independent local union resistance, illustrates the importance of 
aligning local authorities with trade union interests. Whilst many authorities have put 
a good deal of resources and commitment into keeping services in-house up to now, 
the danger is that this commitment might decline. In Mid Glamorgan, where the 
building cleaning contracts were kept in-house during the first round of tendering, the 
service has now been privatised. Union officers claim that prior to the second round, 
their role was marginalised and the resources committed to the exercise by the 
authority were reduced. In Manchester, trade union influence on the enforced 
tendering unit is increasingly bypassed, as management reacts against the unions' 
domination of the initial preparations for CCT. It would seem that even in the 
authorities with a strong commitment to the public provision of services and defence 
of workers interests, that management is now extending its control over service 
provision and the preparations for competition. This puts in doubt the few 
encouraging developments that trade unions have secured as a result of CCT.
The gradual privatisation of services (which has spread from Conservative run 'shire 
authorities into Labour controlled cities and heartlands), the apparent decline in local 
authorities' commitment to involving trade unions in organisational structures, the 
resignation in the trade union movement to the inevitability of sustained private 
sector provision, and the increasing incidence of localised bargaining in local 
government, all point towards the European, and particularly the French, model of 
service provision. There is a very real danger that once private provision becomes 
prevalent, that trade union and local authority support for publicly run services will 
be one of principle rather than practice, and that publicly provided services will be 
organised on the private model rather than the other way around.
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Section 4: The Impact of Multinational Companies Involvement in Public Service 
Provision
So far, most of the contracts put out to tender as a result of the 1988 Local 
Government Act, have been kept in-house. However, the three services in which 
private contractors have won the largest proportion of contracts are building cleaning, 
refuse collection and ground maintenance. These are the same three activities in 
which multinational service companies have been most active. In building cleaning, 
BET, ISS Servisystem and the Swedish manufacturing and service group, Electrolux, 
have won 8.4% of contracts put to tender, which represents 20.3% of contracts won 
by the private sector (LGMB, 1992). In refuse collection and street cleaning, CGE, 
Lyonnaise des Eaux and Bouygues of France, FOCSA of Spain, BFI and 
Wastemanagement Inc. of the USA and Britain's BET and Severn Trent have secured 
11.3% of contracts won, 41% of those privatised (LGMB,1992).
The attention that these giant companies are paying towards UK local government 
contracts has some important implications for the workers affected by CCT. Many of 
these companies only became involved in public cleansing services during the 1970's 
and 1980's. Companies with manufacturing and other interests, such as BET and 
Electrolux, shifted into the provision of cleansing and other support services, 
recognising the opportunity for quick profits. The three French multinationals 
diversified out of water interests, into a range of municipal activities across Europe, 
creating local monopolies in service provision. The American waste management 
companies exploited the shift away from direct provision of refuse services in the 
USA during the 1970's and are seeking to repeat the process in Europe.
The common factor in the activities of these transnational service companies, is their 
recognition that urban cleansing services are dependent upon a highly labour 
intensive mode of production. Labour intensive work patterns mean that labour costs
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necessarily account for the bulk of total costs. Since local authority workers have 
traditionally been relatively well paid and protected, private operators recognised that 
there was room to attack workers conditions, cut total costs and provide services 
more cheaply, whilst still making a profit
The capacity to fully exploit the market is dependent upon increasing 
monopolisation, which limits the potential for competition. This process takes a 
number of forms. Most of the major service companies have engaged in predatory 
takeovers buying up smaller companies who already have contracts or who might be 
offering competition, (I illustrated earlier in the thesis how this process has resulted 
in a virtual duopoly in the private provision of NHS cleaning services). In France, 
this activity is accompanied by the building of 'co-operative* relationships with local 
authorities, which tie councils to particular contractors financially, limiting their 
choice in future competitive situations. This development has been taken even 
further on the Continent, with the heavy investment in public cleansing services. 
This has resulted in the use of expensive new machinery and equipment, which only 
the giant companies can afford to provide. The greater the emphasis on high 
standards and quality, the more that small scale 'cowboy' operators are squeezed out 
of the market.
The market concentration that results from these pressures, reduces the competitive 
nature of public service markets, questioning the motivation behind the CCT 
legislation, but does not lead to better conditions for the industry’s employees. The 
evidence laid out in this thesis, demonstrates that whenever multinational service 
companies secure responsibility for local authority cleansing contracts, a deterioration 
in workers terms and conditions results. The fact that competition is gradually being 
reduced does not alter the contractors' desire for profits. If prices rise, then the extra 
revenue will be used to write off debts accumulated whilst establishing market
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domination, and, ultimately, to increase profits, which was the initial motivation 
behind the contractors' entry into the market
Decreased competition can also result in more cost cutting rather than less. In 
competitive sectors, contractors have to look to the long term and consequently to 
investment and innovation. In less competitive markets, companies can survive by 
cutting costs through the reduction of wages and conditions. The lack of capacity for 
investment in British public services, due to the increasing financial pressures on 
local government, might contribute to this trend. It is encouraging to note that BET 
has indicated its desire to move away from this approach, but this may result in the 
Company having to withdraw from the competitive process altogether, thus 
intensifying the pressures towards centralisation of capital.
In markets opened up to the private sector by the CCT legislation, it will be 
increasingly apparent that only the transnational service giants have the capacity to 
exploit the situation. Their experience of contracting, enormous financial and 
technical resources, and capacity to extract greater returns from customers and 
employees, will enable them to gradually dominate the market The first rounds of 
tendering have provided these companies with the opportunity to establish 
operational bases, recruit and train new workforces whilst gaining a familiarity with 
industrial relations practices, and accumulate capital for future investments. In 
subsequent rounds, they are likely to be even better placed to expand their contract 
base.
The increasing domination of public cleansing markets by transnational operators, 
poses perhaps the greatest threat to local authority control over the services they 
provide and workers control over their own labour. As services are privatised and 
control shifts, in many cases, overseas, there is a loss of democratic control over the 
way in which services are produced and the rewards that workers receive for
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producing them. As the authorities’ capacity to provide in-house services declines, as 
costs become more prohibitive, contractors will have an even greater influence over 
the type of services that will be provided, and the prices that are charged for them.
The experience of privatisation in France, outlined in Chapter 5, suggests that the 
influence of multinational contractors will grow, with scant regard for the interests of 
public service workers and their trade unions. The sophistication of cleansing 
methods and equipment used in France does not hide the fact that cleansing workers 
are an increasingly marginalised and peripheral section of the workforce, with little 
direct trade union representation. The problems faced by building cleaners in Britain 
have been faced by all sections of the public cleansing workforce in France. With 
this thought in mind, it should be noted that it is the same companies which dominate 
cleansing services in France, that are leading the way in private sector provision in 
the UK.
Sections: Public v Private. The Case for Efficiency Gains
The issue of competitive tendering has created an inevitable and highly politicised 
debate. Advocates have presented the potential for cost savings and improved 
technical efficiency as the central benefit of the process (Hunt, 1990). Opponents 
have concentrated on the tendency towards a deterioration of service standards, the 
price paid bv the workforce and the cost of administrating the procedure (Ganley and 
Grahl, 1988; Manchester City Council, 1989; PSPRU, 1992).
The economic case for CT derives from local authorities' traditional status as 
monopoly service providers, who, in the absence of competition, have no means of 
assessing the efficiency of their services. CT leads to cost savings because it works 
against the tendency of public service bureaucracies to address the interests of the 
bureaucracy by over suppling services. The necessary commercialisation of service
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provision that follows, is seen as leading to improved management procedures and, 
consequently, greater efficiency.
Empirical Evidence
On the question of cost savings, work by Hartley and Huby (1986) based on a survey 
of 410 authorities, identified average savings of 26% from CT. A study by 
Domberger et al (1986) suggested cost savings of 22%, with no apparent 
deterioration in service standards. The results indicated that these savings could be 
achieved whether contracts were won by a private contractor or by an in-house unit. 
The more recent analysis by Walsh (1990), which is specifically concerned with CT 
following the introduction of the 1988 Local Government Act, found an average cost 
saving of 5.7%.
The Audit Commission (1984) argues that those authorities who privatise their refuse 
collection services "enjoy relatively low costs" but that many authorities continuing 
to use direct labour "are achieving costs as low - or even lower." In relation to these 
findings it should be noted that the Hartley and Huby, Domberger et al and Walsh 
figures all relate to average savings and do not preclude the possibility of low cost 
publicly provided services.
Furthermore, the Audit Commission report on improving refuse collection services, 
states that the service is already "a local government success story" with productivity 
increasing by 25% between 1978 and 1984. The report says that:
"Privatisation does not appear necessary to securing competitive 
performance provided that the DLO is well managed and the 
workforce suitably motivated. A quarter o f  direct labour 
organisations have refuse collection costs as low or lower than the
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average privatised service, taking all relevant local factors into 
account".
(Audit Commission, 1984)
The difference in findings between the earlier studies of Hartley and Huby (1986) 
and Domberger et al (1986) and the more recent work of Walsh (1990), suggests that 
the highest cost public services have pulled themselves into line, or been privatised 
already. As Hughes notes:
"Contracting out has reduced the average cost o f the services 
concerned by displacing a small number o f very high cost local 
government operations".
(Hughes, 1990)
Sources of Savings
Uttley and Hooper (1991) argue that cost savings have been obtained from a mixture 
of technical efficiency improvements and changes in employment patterns and 
practices. They point to academic research, indicating that the bulk of savings are 
attributable to improvements in technical efficiency (Domberger et al, 1986) and 
improved management structures (Sheaff, 1988; Walsh, 1990).
Criticisms of this position, which centre on the loss of jobs and the deterioration of 
employment conditions and service standards, are refuted by Cubbin et al (1987), 
Domberger et al (1988) and the Audit Commission (1989). The Audit Commission 
report, points out that "there is no need for competition to lead to a deterioration in 
service", since control over the definition of service requirements (the contract 
specification) remains with local authorities. Cubbin et al (1987) and Domberger et 
al (1988) argue against the view that the bulk of recorded cost savings arise from 
lower wages and fringe benefits. In a response to Ganley and Grahl's (1988) critique 
of their position, Domberger et al (1988) identify three possible sources of cost
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savings. First, the inappropriate selection of production techniques. Second, the 
payment of non-maiket factor prices for capital or labour. Finally, production may 
not be technically efficient, so that greater amounts of factor inputs are used than the 
minimum required, due to ’slack’ or ineffective use of factor inputs.
This thesis does not concentrate on the impact that CT has had on service standards, 
but there are clear indications, both within this study and in other pieces of research 
(PSPRU, 1992; JNHSPRU, 1987), that performance levels have been affected. As 
for the impact of CT on workers jobs and conditions, the evidence is even more 
compelling. The results of this research show a consistent decline in the numbers
employed in occupations affected by CCT and a significant deterioration in the terms
/
and conditions of employment of those workers retaining their jobs. Whilst Walsh 
(1990) identifies cost savings of 5.7% in his analysis, he reveals that job losses in the 
cleansing services ranged from 16.9% in refuse collection to 25.7% in street cleaning. 
Whether this is the result of the removal of 'slack' in the workforce, better 
management practice or direct cost cutting, it is clear that council employees have 
paid a heavy price for any savings achieved, particularly when the deterioration in 
pay and conditions, identified in Section 2 of this Chapter, are considered.
For employees, the switch from direct public sector employment to employment by a 
private contractor, is highly unlikely to result in anything but a decline in their 
conditions of employment The decision to award a contract is taken on the basis of 
price. With between 70% and 90% of total costs being accounted for by labour in the 
cleansing sector, the success of a contractor is dependent upon how effectively he can 
exploit his workforce. The higher the rate of exploitation the lower the cost of 
service provision and more viable the tender. A worker’s own job security becomes 
dependent upon his willingness to be exploited more intensively. Even then, job 
security remains tenuous, since employment is based upon a fixed term contract, and
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employers are often reluctant to maintain stable employment, since this would lead to 
the award of statutory employment rights to the workforce.
The temporary duration of employment, or even the realistic prospect of it being of 
temporary duration, inevitably affects the relationship between workers and their 
employer. An employer will seek to intensify his control over the labour process, so 
as to extract the maximum labour from each employees period of employment At 
the same time, employers will limit their employees renumeration to an immediate 
payment for labour actually given, rather than to forms of payment which affect the 
reproduction of labour in the long term, such as pension schemes, sick pay and 
maternity leave. The temporary nature of employment severely inhibits the ability of 
workers to organise effectively and to define their own understanding of their needs, 
which would include not only adequate pay, but also rest, physical well being and 
security in old age.
Even under capitalist property relations the worker in direct employment will have a 
long term relation to profitability and will be employed to perform a task, which, in 
its own right, may make no contribution to profits but which may make an essential 
contribution to an environment in which profits can be generated. In contrast, labour 
employed by a contractor is hired for the sole purpose of being sold to a third party, 
at an immediate gain to the contractor. The desire of private contractors to win 
contracts, whilst maximising profits, forces them to find workers from which the 
maximum labour can be extracted for the minimum return, in terms of wages and 
benefits. This situation means that under conditions of competitive tendering, 
cleansing workers are faced with the extraction of more labour in a given period of 
time than would have been extracted under more relaxed circumstances. In short, 
savings are achieved on the basis of increased exploitation of the workforce.
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This analysis is supported by a study on the intensification of work in the 1980s by 
Edwards and Whitson (1991). The study was concerned with the attitudes of 
workers, towards changes in their effort levels, in four different areas of employment: 
a manufacturing company; British Rail; a large hospital; and a large financial services 
company.
Once consideration was given to the different types of occupation in the four sites, 
ten different groups of employees were identified. These groups were then asked 
whether they felt they were working harder than a decade ago. One of the groups 
was hospital ancillary workers who have been subjected to the pressures of CT for 
most of the last decade. 69% of these workers said they were working harder, and 
none said that work was easier. Of the ten groups interviewed this was far and away 
the most conclusive response.
This kind of evidence, coupled with the loss of jobs experienced as a result of CCT, 
points to an undeniable increase in individual workloads. This combines with the 
deterioration of pay and conditions imposed by private contractors to illustrate how 
exploitation rates have accelerated as a result of the CCT process.
The debate over the merits of private and public provision is itself premised on a 
narrow definition of the term value. Good value services are regarded as those which 
are provided at a low cost. In the cleansing industry, low cost means low labour costs 
and so takes no account of the value of work itself. The Conservatives need to 
address the power of public service trade unions, is an illustration o f the high value of 
work in this sector. It demonstrates the State and Capital’s need to regain control 
over ’essential services'.
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Rather than recognise that value and address the problem with a community based 
approach, built around objectives and measures with mass approval, CCT seeks to 
re impose monetary based valuations of work, drawn from a class structured labour 
market, which weighs heavily on workers employed in the cleansing services.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Recommendations
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C hapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations
Introduction
This thesis has attempted to widen the debate surrounding the introduction of CCT, to 
incorporate a full consideration of the impact upon local government cleansing 
workers and their trade union organisations. This has involved analysis of the 
legislation, the forces that gave rise to it, the nature of the private contract service 
industry, the continental experience of CT, specific casework in individual authorities 
and the nature of trade union responses.
In Chapter 8, much of the research on these issues was drawn together and various 
conclusions were reached. It is the aim of this final chapter to develop those 
conclusions and arrive at some recommendations on how trade unions should deal 
with the CT programme. In some areas this will inevitably require further research, 
but it is my hope that this study will provide a foundation for the development of the 
investigation and generation of new initiatives.
Section 1: Privatisation and Multinational Contractors
Of the contracts put to tender as a result of the 1988 Local Government Act, a healthy 
majority have been kept in-house. With this in mind, it might be felt that the fear of 
privatisation amongst trade unions and local government workers is itself 
ungrounded. Services might be regarded as only vulnerable to private contractors 
where the worst excesses of local government, in terms of restrictive practises, 
inefficiency and poor service, are in evidence. Analysis of the contract service 
industry and the companies that dominate it, demonstrates that this is not the case.
Whilst the private sector market for support services was expanding rapidly through 
the 1970s and 1980s, the current recession has limited the flow of new work and
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tightened profit margins. Customers have themselves been going bankrupt and those 
firms still providing business have been demanding more competitive rates from the 
contractors. In these circumstances, the public sector has increasingly been identified 
as a rich source of potential new business. This has combined with the Government's 
almost obsessive commitment to the CT principle, to threaten more and more public 
services with privatisation.
The fact that around 70% of all local government contracts have been kept in-house, 
is more a reflection of the sheer volume of work on offer than any lack of interest, or 
ability to secure the work, on the part of private contractors. Council services, and 
even private sector support services, have only recently been regularly contracted out 
to private firms. Consequently, the private contract service industry is still relatively 
underdeveloped. This is illustrated by the way in which overseas based 
multinationals have managed to dominate the market for those contracts that have 
been privatised.
Without much experience of providing local authority services in Britain, private 
contractors have been happy to bide their time, gradually building up an operational 
base, in the secure knowledge that legislation guarantees a regular flow of new 
contracts. They have been testing the market, judging the types of authority best to 
work with, the most lucrative contracts to operate, the nature of the competition, and 
labour market and industrial relations patterns, amongst other factors. In a sense the 
contractors cannot lose, there are too many contracts to take on at once, so they can 
pick and choose, developing a strategy out of their experiences. This is in stark 
contrast to the situation faced by local authority DSOs. They must win every contract 
or face a severe blow to their operational capacity and their ability to win contracts in 
subsequent rounds of tendering. Most DSOs have gone all out to win every contract 
during the first rounds of CCT and in these circumstances it is hardly surprising that 
they have won the majority of contracts. Anything less would have been a disaster.
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Under present conditions it is likely that the proportion of contracts held by the 
private sector will continue to grow, albeit gradually. The vast sums of money being 
committed by the leading contractors and the significant losses incurred, does not 
indicate a short term approach. On the Continent the companies now leading the 
market in Britain established a dominance over long periods, using their immense 
financial resources to exploit opportunities deriving from both national and local 
developments. Similar practices will be adopted here.
The market for services such as cleaning is becoming increasingly global. This is due 
to the widespread support for privatisation initiatives amongst the World's 
governments, the growing dominance of the service sector over the World economy 
and the removal of trading barriers in Europe and the Americas. The major service 
contractors have responded to these developments with a globalisation of their own 
activities, designed to exploit markets opened up by privatisation and the increasing 
freedom of capital to move around the world and across sectors.
Multinationals are committing their resources on the basis of well thought out 
strategies. The growing public sector markets are being targeted as private sector 
work contracts, and as the contractors respond to lower profit margins by expanding 
operations, in order to achieve greater economies of scale. Many of the companies 
have developed integrated support service networks. These will be used to establish 
long term 'co-operative' relationships with local authorities, undermining the 
competitive element of the privatisation process. Competition may help to justify the 
CCT legislation but it does not encourage high profits. Once a local authority loses 
control of one or two of its services to a private firm, they may find it more 
convenient to transfer the whole service range, and the administration of the 
competitive process that goes with it. The large multinational contractors will be in 
an ideal position to exploit these developments.
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So, whilst services continue to be delivered in the same location, often employing the 
same workers, the ownership and management of service facilities and control of 
service delivery will shift into the hands of private contractors, often based overseas. 
This is likely to result in the development of a uniform approach towards service 
provision, throughout the contractors' markets. Rather than being geared to the needs 
of local communities, services will be designed to facilitate their transferability and 
'mass production', in order to exploit economies of scale. Innovation and local 
initiative will be stifled by corporate demands for structural efficiency and lowest cost 
delivery. It seems that multinational contractors will continue to operate through 
local subsidiaries though, rather than attempting to tender for and service contracts 
from their base countries.
The industry itself is becoming more concentrated as a result of takeovers and 
mergers by the major operators. The surplus capital accumulated by the largest firms 
is allowing them to pump virtually unlimited funds into acquisition programmes, 
designed to carve up the market. Investment in new equipment and the movement 
towards integrated support service contracts will reduce the smaller companies' and 
DSOs’ ability to compete even further.
Having said this, up to now there has not been much indication of plans for heavy 
investment in new technology and new methods of service delivery by the major 
contractors. They have tended to adopt a fairly uniform approach, which normally 
parallels the methods used by in-house teams, but using fewer resources. CCT in 
local government is in its early stages though and leading companies may still be 
feeling their way into the market before over committing themselves. There is also 
an obvious lack of finance in UK local government to fund such investment. 
Considerably more money is put into public cleansing on the Continent than in the
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UK, and the contractors will be looking to central government to balance these 
resources.
The development of the Single European Market will increase the multinationals' 
choice of services and the geographic distribution of markets in which they can 
compete. Perhaps more significantly, contractors will be looking at the opportunity 
to shift the basis on which they compete. The terms of EC public procurement 
legislation and the established practice of contractors in France, suggests competition 
may take place on the basis of quality, technical superiority, price, the packaging of 
services or even the ability to fund capital investment.
Companies such as CGE, Lyonnaise des Eaux and BET already operate on a number 
of levels, in Britain and elsewhere, but we may not have seen the limit of their 
expansion. Whitfield (1992) suggests that if the trend towards privatisation, 
deregulation and commercialisation of public services continues, within the context of 
growing political and economic alliances, then international social service 
corporations are likely to emerge. Such companies would not only be engaged in 
environmental services, but health, social services, education and others as well. 
CGE has already bought up the AMI chain of UK private hospitals.
With this growth comes power. The tendency towards concentration and the gradual 
decline of public sector provision will reduce local authorities control over their 
services and reduce their ability to influence the local economy. The financial 
savings that they secure in return, will become increasingly tenuous, as contractors 
use their power and the authorities’ dependence, to alter the style of service delivery 
and the prices charged to suit their own interests.
Section 2: The Impact of CCT on Public Service Workers and Trade Unions
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Jobs. Wages and Conditions
This thesis makes it quite clear that CCT has had, and will continue to have, a 
profound impact upon the jobs, wages and conditions of those workers affected by the 
legislation. I have already described in detail the job losses associated with CCT and 
the deterioration in workers conditions of employment, but it must be understood that 
these changes do not derive from the presence of uncaring Dickensian private 
employers, they are endemic to the very notion of CT.
To compete on the basis of price is to compete on the basis of lowest labour cost. 
Whether cheaper labour costs are achieved through greater technical efficiency, 
improved management structures or direct cost cutting it is the workforce that pays 
the price. A cheaper service invariably means one that is provided by fewer workers, 
working harder for the same or less pay. But there is no other avenue to cost 
reductions, since labour is the overwhelming cost factor in the provision of cleansing 
services.
Under these conditions the protection of workers from increased exploitation requires 
a redefinition of the terms for the award of contracts. Ultimately, it requires public 
service provision, where value is judged on criteria other than monetary cost.
Privatisation and the Decline in Trade Union Authority
Market pressures bring with them a challenge to trade union influence. The 
effectiveness of trade union organisation can be judged on how well the free 
operation of market forces is restricted. The adoption of national collective 
bargaining structures represents the denial of local labour market and local economic 
pressures in the determination of workers terms and conditions. Where services have 
been privatised, that denial has been swept away in the face of very little resistance.
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In most cases, national bargaining has not even been replaced by local bargaining ,but 
by management decree.
Privatisation represents a redefinition of the balance of power between labour and 
capital, on capital's terms. It is the belief in individualism and atomistic economic 
activity which motivates the advocates of privatisation. In contrast, independent 
workers organisation only emerges as a collective response to the power imbalances 
created by individually motivated economic activity. The free market gives rise to an 
efficiency based upon the minimilisation of costs in pursuit of profit But what stands 
as a cost to the enterprise can be seen as potential earnings for labour. To labour, the 
reduction of costs represents a hightening of exploitation. It is only with the removal 
of market forces from the employment relationship that workers can develop the 
potential to avoid exploitation.
The particular conditions of contract cleaning, leads privatisation to result in an even 
more dramatic shift in power balances in building cleaning services, associated with 
the collapse of trade union membership. Where a service which is provided by a 
public authority is privatised and incorporated into a market with entirely different 
industrial relations traditions, the impact can be dramatic. I have demonstrated how 
the contract cleaning industry mitigates against trade union organisation, and this 
tendency has been confirmed by the unions' inability to protect their membership 
levels, amongst cleaners, on privatised building cleaning contracts. This follows the 
pattern established in British Rail, when the Corporation's hotels were sold off in 
1983. Within two years, 80% of the workforce had left the NUR (as it was then) 
reflecting the pattern of union organisation in the wider hotel industry (see Terry, 
1990).
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There is no question that a major, if not the major motivating force behind the CCT 
initiative was the Government's desire to restrict trade union power in the public 
services. Elected in 1979, on the back of the Winter of Discontent’, the Thatcher 
government was determined to ensure that control of the public services was placed 
very firmly in the hands of managers sharing their perspectives. The distrust of 
management in Labour local authorities, hardened by battles over rate support grants, 
council house sales and rate capping, meant central government control or 
privatisation were the only alternatives. CCT provided the perfect solution. A policy 
processed by local government, but initiated and policed by central government, 
promoting market forces and forcing trade union acquiescence to cuts where public 
sector provision is sustained.
Trade union organisation and resistance to private contractors remains the most 
effective means of protecting jobs and conditions though, as was illustrated by the 
varying outcomes to the case studies in Chapter 6. It is clear from the experience of 
the CT process that the workers who have fared worst are those with the least 
economic muscle and the most precarious forms of trade union organisation. It was 
not school cleaners that created chaos in Britain's public services in the winter of 
1978-79, but it is they that have experienced the most savage job cuts and attacks 
upon their wages and conditions. These workers were not responsible for the 
restrictive practices and abuses used to justify the legislation, indeed they tend to be 
workers suffering from a ghettoisation of job opportunities, due to their gender and 
race. Cleaners are the lowest paid local authority workers (Pond, 1985; 
Rahman,1985) and the further deterioration in their terms of employment has placed 
them into an entirely separate, causualised and unorganised labour market.
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Refuse collectors and other groups at the centre of the disruption of local authority 
services in the late 1970's have not fared quite so badly. Conditions for those workers 
now employed in the private sector have undoubtedly declined and job losses have 
been experienced across the board, but the status of refuse collectors' employment has 
not been destroyed. Workers have demonstrated that where organisation remains 
strong and a belief in trade union values is sustained, they can continue to exert 
considerable influence. Where there is a local authority commitment to the 
maintenance of public service provision, CCT can lead to an extension of that 
influence into a wider sphere.
These distinctions should not allow the argument about the employment 
consequences of CCT to be confined to a debate about core and periphery workers. 
As Whitfield (1992) points out, this would obscure the extent of the impact that 
public sector restructuring has had on workers and the labour market The 
contradictions and clash of interests involved in working for the State within a 
capitalist society are every bit as apparent and relevant in the 1990s as they were in 
the 1970s. What CCT has done is change the conditions under which those conflicts 
are fought out This has resulted in fundamental changes to the nature of local 
government employment. I will return to this question in Section 4.
The Impact on Trade Union Power Within Local Government
What has been undermined by the CT process is the capacity of local government 
workers to engage in strike activity and other industrial action. The requirement that 
council DSOs show a 5% return on their contracts, means that the disruption of 
services is only likely to result in the closure of in-house units. In these 
circumstances, other means have to be found to secure a local authority commitment 
to union goals.
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Whilst national collective bargaining remains in place and continues to establish the 
terms and conditions for around 80% of local government workers, CCT has taken 
the bite out of the unions’ bargaining position. Local government officers are well 
aware of the trade unions' fear of privatisation, and their consequent reluctance to 
organise any national programme of action which could result in a wave of contract 
awards to the private sector. This shift in the power balance has been reflected at the 
local level, where privatisation can be seen as a 'lever' deployed by management to 
help them achieve their own agenda of cutting costs and raising productivity (Painter, 
1990; Sheaff, 1988). Trade unions accept the need for change and increased 
competiveness but tend to regard its achievement as a management problem. This has 
left them open to over zealous management inspired cutbacks, where the maintenance 
of public service provision is regarded as an end in itself and worth protecting at any 
cost.
It is important that trade unions continue to identify goals other than the competitive 
success of in-house service teams. If the outcome of the competitive process if 
determined on the basis of price, then a local authority DSO will be subject to the 
same pressures to peg back employee conditions and extract greater labour in return 
for its remuneration as any other competitor. Whilst the exploitation of workers by 
contractors in pursuit of profit is prevented, it is merely replaced by the 
minimilisation of conditions and services in the name of public enterprise.
The generator of the exploitation of labour in the market place is not any particular 
employer, but the competition inherent to the market In attempting to preserve their 
own job security, workers in council DSOs are forced to compete in the same way as 
any transnational contractor, resulting in the expropriation of labour by the authority 
getting the cleansing service on the cheap, rather than by a private contractor earning 
unwarranted profit.
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Conclusions
CCT has undoubtedly contributed to a fundamental shift in the balance of power 
between public service workers and their employers. That shift has derived from 
class defined definitions of the value of work. Consequently, it has reinforced rather 
than moderated distinctions between different groups of local government workers. 
Those workers with the weakest trade union traditions and least economic power, 
have become fully exposed to employer dominated, labour market definitions of work 
value. Workers who are better organised have been more able to resist those 
pressures.
There has been a shift towards local bargaining which is set to continue, and which 
will result in varying conditions of employment, based more upon the degree of union 
organisation than local labour market pressures. In this sense, CCT has been an 
inappropriate method of dealing with trade union militancy, since, whilst the 
bargaining power of pubb'c service workers has been restricted, the workers who have 
suffered most are those who were already weak and unable to defend themselves.
Section 3: In Defence of Public Provision
The academic and economic arguments used to justify the use of CCT, rest on the 
assertion that there are efficiency gains to be made by testing local authority services 
against the market. The implicit assumption is that the public provision of services is 
inherently inefficient It is felt that the lack of any threat of bankruptcy allows 
authorities to serve their own bureaucratic interests ahead of those who pay for the 
services. The experience of contracting out in the private sector also points to the 
cost and efficiency benefits of allowing service specialists to look after an
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organisation's non-core activities. Presumably, it is felt that local government can 
obtain similar benefits from CCT.
The realities are very different. Local government officers have never had anything 
like the freedom to protect bureaucratic interests that exists within major private 
companies. Local government spending and activity is restricted by central 
government financial constraints and definitions of legitimate local authority 
spending, local political priorities, trade union power and ultimately, by the 
democratic process. Local authority officers are responsible not only to the holders of 
the purse strings, ie. central government and rate (community charge) payers, but also 
to the constituents and service users that elect the councillors who determine policy 
and appoint key personnel. The staffing decisions, commitment to national collective 
bargaining and levels of service provision which prevailed prior to the introduction of 
CCT, must be considered within this context.
The voluntary introduction of CT in some authorities and its outright rejection in 
others, demonstrates how the variety of pressures on local government genuinely 
come into play. Where staffing ratios and workers remuneration were set at higher 
levels, this is more likely to have been a reflection of the authorities' political 
complexion and trade union strength, than a failure of management direction. If the 
issue at stake was purely one of ill defined management objectives, why did the 
legislation not restrict itself to the contracting out of management in the defined 
services, as is common within the American health service?
The suggestion that the activities referred to in the legislation would be more 
effectively delivered by private support service specialists is also dubious. A local 
authority's refuse collection or street cleaning service cannot be defined in the same 
way as the cleaning services required by a private company, engaged in an entirely
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separate line of business. A local authority provides cleansing services, not in support 
of its other activities, but as a central service to its constituents.
For many people, refuse collection would be regarded as a local authority’s core 
activity. There is no question that some private operations can provide a refuse 
service more cheaply than some council DSOs, just as some catering contractors 
could purchase and merchandise food more cheaply than Marks and Spencers. Marks 
and Spencers would never surrender control of such a central service though, 
regardless of how tight the specification could be written and despite the company’s 
willingness to contract out the technical maintenance of its stores to BET. Many local 
authorities feel the same way about their services and believe that their value should 
be judged on a wider criteria than price alone.
It is surely up to the authority with responsibility for ensuring the provision of a 
service to decide how best to achieve that objective. The fact that councils of varying 
political compositions have generally been reluctant to contact out their services, 
suggests that there are genuine concerns about the effects of privatisation. 
Essentially, these concerns centre around the loss of local control. Firstly, on a 
democratic level, over purchasing and employment practices and secondly, on an 
economic level, over investment strategies (Painter, 1990). Flexibility is also 
reduced, as strict monitoring procedures must be followed before contract failures can 
be put right, and the potential for shared resources across the defined activities is 
eliminated.
CCT has led to a radical slimming down of council direct service units and the 
adoption of a more commercial approach towards service delivery. This pattern was 
already developing prior to the legislation but has accelerated since its introduction. 
Most authorities already had a fundamental commitment to the effectiveness of their 
services, if only because they are such high profile activities on which politicians can
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be judged. That commitment is not necessarily shared by private contractors, whose 
main interest is the pursuit of profits. If a particular contract is not providing a 
sufficient return, a private company might easily decide to cut its losses and 
concentrate on more lucrative work elsewhere. Council DSOs do not have this 
freedom, nor did they ever have the financial freedom to pump unlimited resources 
into inefficient services, as some observers might suggest
What local authorities did have, was the capacity to perform as 'good' employers, 
providing secure employment, full recognition of trade unions, decent health and 
safety procedures and a commitment to equality of opportunity. Even then, this 
capacity did not over extend itself, since most local government manual workers have 
consistently remained in the lower reaches of the industrial earnings league. 
Competitive pressures are now beginning to bring other conditions down to the same 
levels.
Section 4: The Attack Upon 'Safe Employment Territory'
The combination of central government financial constraints, CCT and the 
commercialisation of local government activities is generating a transformation in the 
nature of public service employment. In the 1960s the growth of public expenditure 
provided a sheltered bargaining context, with secure employment and rising wages, 
creating stable industrial relations (Winchester, 1984). At this time, local authorities 
provided what might be termed 'safe employment territories'. Unskilled and 
unqualified workers could obtain stable, permanent jobs, with nationally determined 
conditions providing generous sickness and leave allowances. This status was 
strengthened by a growing acceptance of responsibility for the local economy and 
employment, by local authorities during the 1970s (Robertson, 1985). The notion of 
the 'good' employer emerged, as authorities took it on themselves to alleviate the
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impact of industrial decline by assisting with the employment of disadvantaged 
groups and the long term unemployed.
By the end of the 1970s, it was the relationship between public sector trade unions 
and government authorities that was regarded as the major source of instability in 
British industrial relations. The assumption that public sector wage claims were 
fuelling wage inflation, the incomes policies used to counter this development and 
cuts in public expenditure, led to growing conflict (Thompson and Beaumont, 1978), 
which culminated in the ’winter of discontent1.
Winchester (1984) argues that changes in the political and economic context which 
arose out of those conflicts, have led to significant shifts in patterns of bargaining and 
new mechanisms of control. However, there is some debate about the extent to which 
much has really changed as a result of the Conservative government's new approach 
to the public sector. Certainly Maclnnes (1989) believes that there has been minimal 
change, with no major shift in the balance of power between labour and capital. This 
position is supported by Batstone (1988), who argues that there is a danger of 
exaggerating the impact of government policies and priorities in the public sector.
The arguments presented in this theses adopt the line taken by Fairbrother (1990) that 
the restructuring of work and employment relationships in the public sector amounts 
to a challenge to the very basis of trade unionism. The commercialisation and 
rationalisation that comes with CCT is eroding the distinctiveness of public sector 
employment that had underpined trade union organisation in the public services.
Fairbrother (1988) points to a two pillared programme of restructuring, built on a 
change to patterns of ownership and a reorganisation of managerial and financial 
structures. It is these changes that have broken the concensus and co-operation which
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previously characterised industrial relations in the public services, by invading the 
'safe employment territory' of state authorities.
Rather than having secure, well protected jobs, local government workers are 
increasingly employed part-time and on temporary contracts. The move is towards a 
low wage, numerically flexible labour force, with conditions determined by 
decentralised bargaining structures, where numerical flexibility is used to undermine 
the conditions of permanent workers. The alternative is a transfer of employment 
into the private sector where union organisation is largely absent and employment 
protection minimal.
Kessler (1986) continues to talk about the distinctiveness of trade unionism in the 
public services but he did not consider the impact that restructuring has had. Stieber 
(1989), whilst not referring directly to the UK, offers an alternative view with his 
conclusion that the distinctions between labour - management relations in the public 
and private sectors, have decreased so far that it is probably no longer appropriate to 
have separate systems. Fairbrother (1988) points out that things may even be worse 
for public sector workers as the 'good' employer concept comes full circle, and the 
state attempts to set an example of flexible specialisation to other employment 
sectors. Just as Thompson and Beaumont (1978) argued that the conflicts in the 
1970s signalled the arrival and not the breakdown of collective bargaining, the 
present lack of overt conflict and trade union acquiescence to local authority cuts and 
attacks on national collective bargaining, indicates that trade union authority and 
bargaining power has been seriously undermined by the introduction of CCT.
The most determined opposition to the contracting out of local authority services 
comes from those councils who see their position as major employers providing the 
opportunity to have a wider influence over local employment practices. The effect 
that CT has on jobs and workers conditions does not provide much of a model. In
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this context it would seem that CCT is the result of a political exercise, designed to 
restrict local government autonomy and bring the Government's own notions about 
the nature of service provision into the ascendency. Those notions are firmly rooted 
in the redefintion of power balances and pursuit of cost savings referred to in Section 
2 of this chapter. They have little to do with local needs or democratic accountability. 
The extension of the CT initiative into white collar professional activities, suggests 
that the Government ultimately wants local government structures with no direct 
input into service delivery or local economic structures. As the TGWU's Jack 
Dromey puts it:
"John Major's vision for local government in the '90s is authorities 
meeting once a year to let contracts to the private sector".
Section 5: How To Respond
Resignation and Defeat?
The introduction of CCT and its effects on jobs and conditions of employment might 
already be regarded as a major defeat for the trade union movement. But the erosion 
of workers' organisation, the weakening of their control over their labour and the 
returns they get for it, are only possible when the working class in general is losing 
ground in relation to Capital and the State. A large Conservative parliamentary 
majority meant that the arguments presented by trade unions and local authorities in 
opposition to CCT, were largely futile. The climate of industrial relations in Britain, 
following extensive anti - union legislation during the 1980s and defeats for workers 
involved in high profile industrial disputes such as the 1984-5 miners strike and 
Wapping, meant there were few demands, and even less support amongst national 
officers, for a national campaign of industrial action against the legislation.
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In isolation , the CCT proposals might have been fought off, but like so many other 
initiatives over the past decade, the piecemeal development of CT in the public 
services, within an economic situation heavily weighted against effective trade union 
resistance, has seen the legislation successfully implemented With no immediate 
prospect of a Labour government, the trade unions are having to come to terms with 
the prospect of continued CCT for several years to come. This raises the question of 
what is the most appropriate strategy for dealing with its existence.
On the Continent, trade unions have fallen into the trap of stating their opposition to 
local government privatisation, whilst accepting that there is nothing that they can do 
to prevent it Consequently, despite the lack of compulsion on authorities to engage in 
CT, private contractors continue to expand their operations, undermining any 
potential for a widespread return to in-house service provision. Public service 
workers are increasingly marginalised, as the influence of national collective 
agreements and trade union organisation continues to decline.
Whilst trade unionism is more firmly rooted in organisational structures in this 
country, initial experiences of CCT in Britain suggests that there is a very real danger 
that developments will follow the pattern established in France and elsewhere. The 
bargaining power of trade unions has already been seriously undermined at a national 
and local level. Indeed CCT necessarily requires trade unions to negotiate more 
extensively at a local level, in response to local competitive conditions, threatening 
the very existence of national collective bargaining. The negotiations that do take 
place, are invariably about employee and trade union concessions. Authorities 
preparing for competition are not normally in the habit of enhancing the benefits of 
their employees, and trade unions seeking the retention of services in-house are not in 
a position to argue.
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In these circumstances, trade union responses cannot be based upon traditional forms 
of local government militancy, which centre on the identification of the local 
authority as the focus for opposition and resistance. Within the present industrial and 
political climate, such a strategy would prove counter productive, accelerating the 
movement of work into the private sector.
Current Initiatives
Much of the trade union movement’s current response to CT is centred around 
encouraging local authorities to concentrate on quality issues. The aim is to get a 
move away from price criteria in the award of contracts, so that more resources can 
be committed to the provision of services, relieving the pressure on jobs and 
conditions. There is also a school of thought which argues that if standards are set 
high enough, then only the in-house service organisation will be able to meet them.
There are a number of problems associated with this approach. Firstly, if standards 
are raised to a level which contractors find it hard to achieve, the question must be 
asked as to whether DSO's will find it any easier. As technical innovations develop 
within the cleansing services, it is likely that the multinational contractors will invest 
heavily, and consequently, will be better able to meet the service requirements, using 
fewer employees.
Secondly, it is unrealistic to expect there to be no price consideration in any 
reformed, quality based, CT procedures, so the same pressures on staffing levels, 
wages and conditions will be present. Indeed, employees would be subject to 
additional workloads as pressure to achieve the required standards is brought to bear 
in conjunction with attempts to keep costs down. The simultaneous pursuit of high 
standards and low cost is only likely to result in an intensification of work rates with 
no corresponding increase in rewards.
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Finally, increased resourcing of contracts does not necessarily mean more jobs or 
improved conditions of employment. The major contractors have themselves been 
calling for a movement towards quality services, based on a relaxation of the price 
criteria in the CCT procedures. This is not surprising, increased resourcing would 
allow heavy investment, which would squeeze out the smaller operators and local 
authority DSO's. With a relaxation of competitive conditions, contractors would be 
free to demand higher and higher prices for their services. Since private firms are 
driven by the profit motive the highest possible proportion of these returns would be 
drawn off to satisfy shareholders demands. There would be no relaxation of the 
pressures on employment levels and workers remuneration and the increasing 
privatisation of services would further undermine national collective bargaining 
structures. It is quite apparent from experience in France, that, with extensive 
resourcing of cleansing services, multinational contractors can provide high quality 
and continue to employ an underprotected, low paid, peripheral labour force.
With trade unions and multinational contractors both making demands for a 
movement towards the inclusion of quality criteria in the CCT process, there is 
clearly more than one possible outcome from such a development. Trade unions seek 
high quality services coupled with ’good’ employment practices, contractors seek high 
quality services coupled with high rates of return. It is fairly certain that a 
Government which introduced CCT in order to reduce the authority of trade unions, 
will encourage a movement towards the second option if they make any changes at 
all.
Leaving these points aside, there is a more fundamental danger associated with a trade 
union commitment to campaigning on quality. The question of quality is concerned 
with consumers interests rather than the production of services. As Whitfield (1992) 
points out, this has already resulted in talk of removing the ’Jobs’ from local authority
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and trade union 'Save Jobs and Services' slogans. In reality, the quality of services 
and employment levels are inseparable issues. The labour intensive nature of council 
services requires adequate manning. The range of services and choice available is 
dependant upon staffing levels. The non-postponable nature of services requires 
permanent cover facilities. Consequently, the jobs and conditions of public service 
workers must reflect the centrality of employment levels to the quality of services. 
These issues must also remain at the heart of trade union strategies towards the future 
of public services.
Demands must be made for high quality service provision, but this can only be 
guaranteed by direct employment relationships. Only under those conditions are 
workers employed to fulfil the particular task by the agency wanting the task fulfilled. 
Within such a framework there emerges a real opportunity to involve the workforce 
in the direction and planning of the work in question. Indeed the involvement of 
workers and service users in the design and application of the work, will be the best 
way of securing a commitment to the service and opposition to its privatisation. The 
contracting out of work will only reduce job control and commitment, since workers 
are isolated from the decision making centres which determine their work 
requirements.
A New Radical Response
CCT has totally shaken up patterns of service provision in local government and 
transformed the nature of industrial relations. In most cases, the agenda for that 
transformation has been set by central government and by management. Where the 
unions have been involved it has generally been on the basis of concession bargaining 
and as a means of persuading the workforce of the need for cuts. Three years into the 
CT exercise, it is time for the unions to address the new problems that have emerged
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and to establish their own agenda for the provision of public services, based upon a 
consideration of service producers and service users interests.
There are three levels on which the unions should base their response.
1 Organising the workforce.
In many ways, trade unions and local authorities sympathetic to their employees 
interests, have been paralysed by the attempt to keep services in-house as an end in 
itself. From the trade union perspective, this policy has been pursued in order to 
protect membership levels, national bargaining structures and conditions of 
employment The question of service standards has been useful for propaganda 
purposes but has not really formed a central consideration.
Whitfield (1983 and 1992) argues that most trade unions and certainly the TUC, 
failed to understand the Tories longer term strategy for the public sector and their 
privatisation policies. The point is that the right wing of the Conservative Party 
believes that restructuring public sector labour markets is the central issue, and view 
the public service unions as the main organised opposition to change. The CCT 
initiative has been designed from this perspective.
The unions' approach involves two distinct dangers. Firstly, it encourages a move 
towards private sector practice within DSOs, and secondly, it fails to recognise or 
adequately prepare for the possibility of defeat in the award of individual contracts. 
This is despite the fact that CCT will be around for the foreseeable future and that it is 
private contractors who are likely to improve their competitive advantage vis-a-vis 
DSOs.
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In these circumstances it is essential that the privatisation of a service is not regarded 
as a complete disaster, and associated with the inevitable end of union organisation. 
Organisation can be maintained, and there is clear evidence that it remains the most 
effective means of protecting jobs and conditions following privatisation. The 
capacity to secure union recognition and other concessions from private contractors 
appears to be dependent on the degree of trade union consciousness and commitment 
to retaining its organisational expression amongst the workers affected.
CCT has demonstrated that amongst certain sections of local government workers, 
whilst trade union membership levels have been high, the depth of union organisation 
has been limited. There is a clear need to address the question of union consciousness 
amongst local authority cleaners. The collapse of membership levels following the 
privatisation of building cleansing contracts illustrates how restricted cleaners' 
commitment to formal union structures can be.
There can be no reliance on DSO victories as a means of protecting union 
membership levels in this activity, since around 40% of building cleaning contracts 
have already been privatised. There is a need to address the specific concerns of 
cleaners, so that a belief in the importance of union organisation is developed, which 
can be maintained following the award of contracts to private, possibly anti-union, 
firms.
Organising workers in the contract cleaning industry is not an easy task, but since 
contractors tend to employ the often unionised local authority workforce when they 
win local government contracts, there is a basis for developing sustainable forms of 
organisation amongst these workers. Rather than treat local government cleaners as a 
peripheral element of the workforce, unions must develop better forms of 
representation, which recognise cleaners' specific demands and place them at the 
centre of the bargaining agenda. Mason and Bain argue that:
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"If unions are to translate recruitment potential into actual 
membership, then identifying and dismantling internal attitudinal and 
organisational barriers should constitute the starting point."
(Mason and Bain, 1991)
The predominance of women and ethnic minorities amongst local authority cleaners, 
means that demands must be made for extensive creche facilities, maternity leave 
entitlements, attention to cultural needs and training and education which will provide 
access to jobs which are not segregated on gender and ethnic lines. Crucially, 
cleaners must be represented by shop stewards drawn from within their own ranks, 
rather than by male school caretakers and chefs, and union meetings should be 
organised to fit in with cleaners' other commitments. But as Fosh and Cohen (1990) 
argue, representation must be accompanied by a participation style which entails local 
leaders responding to their members and each other as a group. This would increase 
trust amongst the membership, ensure the articulation of demands and allow for 
specific education and training of women activists by the trade unions.
The discussion and presentation of these demands should involve the widest possible 
membership. Fairbrother states that:
"membership involvement is the essential ingredient to the vitality and 
success of unions."
(Fairbrother, 1984)
A workforce that has witnessed the full potential of trade union organisation, and 
been part of a campaign resulting in improvements to their quality of life, will be far 
more committed to maintaining the structures which secured those developments.
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That increased commitment would improve trade union effectiveness in local 
government and help to sustain membership rates in the event of privatisation.
Beaumont and Harris (1990) argue that there is some basis to the assertion that non­
union status merely reflects the absence of union organising attempts. So the 
privatisation of local government cleansing services, could provide a new opportunity 
to achieve union organisation amongst contract cleaning firms. The biggest problem 
associated with organising contract cleaners is establishing a core membership around 
which to build. With a fully organised local authority workforce which transfers to a 
private contractor there is not such a problem, provided the unions adjust to the new 
conditions rapidly. In this respect there is a case for organising groups of local 
government workers, such as building cleaners, in separate union branches, prior to 
tendering exercises. It might also be useful to encourage members to shift to direct 
debit payment of subscriptions (as opposed to having them deducted from wages), 
before any possible privatisation, rather than after, when members are harder to trace. 
In this way, unions would stand a far better chance of maintaining their organisation 
following a DSO defeat, and so could concentrate on protecting their members 
interests, rather than having to concede to further waves of cuts.
In the other services, where union traditions are stronger, contractors are becoming 
more used to granting recognition to the trade unions. The main problem appears to 
be inter-union rivalry and the willingness to accept agreements which recognise one 
union only. Contractors have a vested interest in creating divisions between the 
different union organisations and are unlikely to grant recognition, unless they feel 
that it is in their own best interests. Where a contractor indicates its willingness to 
consider union recognition, it is likely to be based upon the company's negative 
perception of the power balance between itself and the workforce. In such a situation 
unions should have the confidence to exploit the contractor's uncertainty, by 
presenting a united front and holding out for full recognition of all unions. A similar
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approach should be adopted when contractors see trade unions as playing a positive 
role in the employment function. Short term sectional interests have no place in the 
protection of workers' jobs and conditions.
2 Increasing participation
Traditional forms of union resistance to local government cuts have become counter 
productive with the introduction of CCT. Consequently, there is a need to find 
alternative means of securing a local authority commitment to union goals. This can 
only be based upon a co-operative relationship, which centres around the involvement 
of affected groups of workers in the whole CCT process. As Fairbrother states:
"There is a vitality at the workplace that has its roots in the day to day 
experiences of workplace trade unionists. It is this that is the well 
spring for collective organisation and activity."
(Fairbrother, 1990)
It is pointless for unions to give their support to the in-house provision of services 
unless there are guarantees that such a form of provision will best serve the interests 
of their members. This must be used as a basis for seeking full involvement in the 
preperation of service specifications and reorganisation of work patterns. The 
participation of the trade unions needs to extend beyond formal committee structures 
to fully incorporate the suggestions and aspirations of workers and service users.
In this way, services can be organised to better reflect the needs of those using them 
and to protect the interests of those producing them. At the same time, a competitive 
advantage can be generated by creating a service specification which guarantees high 
standards of service, to which the in-house workforce has made a commitment on the 
basis of its achievability.
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It is vital that union involvement in strategic planning and service development does 
not result in a full incoiporation into authority structures. Trade union input should 
be determined by independent and representative decisions, based on full consultation 
of their memberships. Union representatives on CCT bodies must act as workforce 
delegates and not council officers. In this way, workers can retain the right to oppose 
decisions which conflict with their interests. This means that local authorities would 
retain the same freedom. So, ensuring that final decisions coincide with those desired 
by the unions will require well thought out contributions, which consider the wider 
objectives with which local authorities are concerned.
The development of such an approach has a number of pre-requisites. Firstly, the 
local authority itself must have a commitment to the public provision of services, the 
protection of employee interests and the involvement of trade unions in council 
business. This requires the development and maintenance of a considerable political 
will, in the face of the Government's pursuit of very different objectives. That will, 
and the desire to involve, must be upheld as long as CCT remains on the agenda, not 
just until the first round of tendering has been negotiated.
Secondly, there is a requirement that trade unions present a united front. Expecting 
local authority decisions to coincide with union interests would be a bit much to ask if 
the different unions cannot agree an appropriate policy themselves. Unions need to 
forge links and develop joint approaches applicable to the situation in each authority. 
The creation of new alliances and structures, should develop hand in hand with the 
wider involvement of members in union affairs and better representation of their 
interests discussed above (for a fuller discussion of the possibilities see Painter, 
1989).
418
Finally, there is a need for unions to redirect resources in the response to CCT. With 
the legislation in force, it is at a local level that the important decisions are made 
relating to the award of contracts, workforce concessions and the nature of bargaining 
structures. Consequently, trade union responses must be concentrated at the local 
level in the ways I have outlined and in an ongoing fashion (Mailly, 1986 and Sheaff, 
1988, have identified movements towards local initiatives in the NHS. Fairbrother, 
1988, points to a similar requirement throughout the public services). New forms of 
organisation and activity, and a redirection of policy initiative, necessarily requires a 
redirection of resources.
3 Redefining the policy agenda
Prior to the introduction of CCT, there was a widely held belief that local authority 
services were ineffeciently run and failed to meet users needs. The Left's failure to 
address these concerns and the trade unions' inability to deal with the sectional greed 
of their members, left an ideological vacuum which CCT has filled.
The responses now being promoted by the Labour Party and trade unions have failed 
to offer any real alternative. The debate surrounding quality in the provision of 
public services does not address the fundamental problems associated with CCT. 
Indeed the application of additional resources to ensure quality services, without a 
challenge to the mode of service provision, would be to reinforce the movement 
towards private provision, as is evidenced by BETs welcoming of the Labour Party's 
proposals.
The unions' campaign against privatisation in the water industry was a step in the 
right direction. Rather than concentrating on sectional issues, the question of 
different foims of ownership was considered. By talking about the effects of 
privatisation on public health and the environment, the unions highlighted issues
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which were already of considerable public concern. The co-operation of 
environmental groups was secured and this allowed for the development of alliances, 
which could address employment issues and other wider concerns, within a 
framework of positive support for public ownership (see Ogden, 1991).
The water industry was, of course, still privatised and it is likely that CCT will remain 
with local government for the immediate future. It is also possible that the private 
sector will continue to increase its share of those contracts put to tender. However, 
this should not result in a long term resignation to policies which do no more than 
tamper with the status quo. There is a need to develop an equally revolutionary 
approach as CCT, based on public sector provision, which considers the concerns of 
service producers and users rather than accountants and contractors.
Any new strategies that are prepared should not be developed purely on the basis of 
local economic plans or individual responses. Such approaches would be vulnerable 
to redefinitions of the legislation. A wider perspective should emerge, incorporating 
the need for immediate local responses, but based on an opposition to the private 
provision of public services and concepts such as commercialisation and the enabling 
state.
Ironically, CCT itself has generated the basis for a new approach. The need to draw 
up service specifications has led many authorities to give deep consideration to the 
services they provide and how to protect them. In several cases this has led to the 
involvement of trade unions, workers and service users in preperations for 
competition. These participative arrangements could provide the groundwork for 
new forms of public service provision.
In the absence of CCT, it would be wrong for local authorities to return to the 
unsatisfactory models of service provision which developed in the post-war period.
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Instead, public services should be organised to account for the entire spectrum of 
interests for which a local authority is responsible. 'Community environmental 
boards' could be established, with representatives from the Council, trade unions, 
elected members and key service users, such as tenents and community associations 
for refuse collection, or teachers, students and parents for school cleaning. The 
workforce would be employed by the local authority, with terms and conditions 
determined through the established bargaining procedures. Work requirements and 
specifications would be controlled by the 'environmental boards'. The competing 
desires of service users to maximise the effectiveness of service delivery and of 
authorities to control costs would be fought out without placing pressure on the wages 
and conditions of the workforce.
The principles of this approach could be applied under the conditions of CCT. This 
would help to prepare authorities for a favourable shift in policy and promote public 
confidence in the capacity of the public sector, to satisfy both producers' and users' 
needs.
The specific details of such an initiative could not be identified without more 
research. But if local authorities are to address the interests of all citizens, then the 
mode of service delivery needs to be decided on a far wider criteria than who can do 
the job cheapest. Dexter Whitfield's book, the 'Welfare State' (1992), addresses this 
question and provides welcome new ideas on how to develop a strategy for defending 
the public services. Detailed attention is given within a framework of opposition to 
commercialism and the defence of public sector provision.
As Whitfield recognises, the major obstacle to these developments lies in the nature 
of the State in capitalist society itself. The contracting out of manual, and now white 
collar services is part of a wider programme, aimed at transforming the State, to 
better suit the interests of capital. Any long term response to these developments
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must focus on this issue and consider new ways of organising and controlling the 
State, to suit the interests of the Community.
Section 6: Extending the Research
This thesis has focused on the impact that CCT has had upon workers jobs and 
conditions and local government industrial relations. Those effects will not have 
developed fully yet, since the introduction of CCT is still only three years old. 
Consequently, there is a need to continue monitoring the situation in order to identify 
new and developing trends.
In time, it will be possible to consider certain aspects of industrial relations in this 
sector on a quantitative basis, providing a new dimension to the research. It would 
be useful to monitor the incidence of industrial action amongst workers engaged in 
the provision of local authority services, both in the public and private sectors, and 
compare the data with that drawn up before the introduction of CCT. It would also 
be worthwhile to compare the wages and conditions offered by private contractors on 
different contracts and see whether there is any relationship with trade union 
membership levels.
The Government's continued commitment to the privatisation of public services 
means that a whole new section of local government workers are about to go through 
the CCT experience. The extension of the exercise to white collar professional 
activities, such as legal and computer services, raises a series of new questions. 
Private legal practices are not in the business of creating secondary labour markets, 
indeed the pay and conditions of workers in private sector professional jobs are often 
far more lucrative than those in the public sector. What then, will be the private
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sector's competitive advantage in these services and how will it affect council 
employees?
This thesis has highlighted a series of question marks which surround the CCT 
process, and whilst I have indicated my general thoughts in this Chapter, it is not the 
aim of this study to provide answers to these problems. There is a need for additional 
research to develop and test new ideas as part of a wider response to the current void 
of genuine alternatives to the Government's political and economic agenda.
Section 7: Summary of Conclusions
CCT has, in general, had a negative effect upon the role of trade unions and the jobs 
and conditions of the workers affected. The worst experiences have been associated 
with services that have been privatised but where they have been kept in-house, it has 
generally been on the basis of job cuts and a reduction in trade union militancy. The 
pattern bares a close resemblance to established experience in France and other 
European countries.
These experiences are particularly relevant in the light of the growing concentration 
within the public services industry. A handful of multinational contractors have been 
establishing powerful operational bases throughout the European Community and 
further afield. The competition for contracts is increasingly confined to these firms. 
The establishment of the Single European market is only likely to assist the 
development of this trend.
New structures designed to prepare DSOs for competition, have sometimes resulted in 
a widening of the trade union's sphere of influence, but this is increasingly challenged 
by a reassertion of management control. The fear of privatisation is being used as an 
additional tool in managements increasing control over public sector labour.
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The influence of national collective bargaining is gradually declining as privatised 
services move out of its scope, and as more local authorities decide to opt out of its 
coverage. Local bargaining has become more extensive, with its outcomes 
determined on the basis of a readjustment of the balance of power, in favour of local 
authority management.
Despite the determined efforts of local authorities and the co-operation of trade 
unions, private contractors have continued to make headway, winning around 30% of 
contracts during the first three years of tendering. Their share of the market looks set 
to continue its growth, as the initial lessons are digested and new strategies adopted. 
It is the giant multinational contractors, particularly those based overseas, that are 
beginning to dominate the industry.
Trade unions have failed in their efforts to prevent the introduction of CCT, although 
their experience of its impact has varied across authorities and the different activities. 
Building cleaning workers have been worst affected, with the most privatised 
contracts, heaviest job losses, most consistent deterioration in wages and conditions 
and the biggest decline in union membership. Conditions and union organisation 
have been best protected where workers have the strongest union traditions and 
commitments, provided they have avoided outright resistance to the cuts associated 
with DSO preparations for competition.
No alternative forms of public service provision, which fully reject the CT 
framework, have been advocated. Responses have concentrated on limiting the 
damage associated with the procedures, and attracting additional resources to the 
provision of local authority services.
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Appendix 1: Local Government Manual Workers Wape Rates and Service 
Conditions. 1989 - 1992.
"The 1987 agreement provided a modern grading structure based on 
job evaluation, and the principle of equal pay for work of equal value.
It confirmed the significance of national negotiations and conditions 
while allowing for local variations to meet changing circumstances, 
including the threat of compulsory privatisation
(NUPE, 1989)
GRADE 1
Domestic Assistant 
Road Sweeper 
Gardener 1 
School Cleaner
Office Cleaner 
Dining Room Assistant
Cook 1
GRADE 2
Supervisory Assistant 
Refuse Collector 
School Crossing Patrol 
Gardener 2
Domestic Assistant 2 
Cook 2
Leisure Attendant 1
GRADE 3
Grave Digger 
Road Worker 1
Leisure Attendant 2 
Driver 1
Housing Caretaker 
Senior Operative
Security Attendant/Porter 
School Cleaner in Charge 
Assistant School Caretaker 
Gardener 3
Cook 3
GRADE 4
Road Worker 2 
Waste Disposal Operative
Driver 2 
Care Assistant
GRADE 5
Gardener 4 
Road Worker 3 
Refuse Driver
Social Services Driver/Attendant
Home Help 
Cook 4
School Caretaker 1
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GRADE 6
Caretaker 2 
National Rates of Pav
The figures in Table 53 are national minimum rates which are normally supplemented 
by locally agreed bonus payments.
Grade 1 Sept. 1989 to 31 Aug. 1990 1 Sept. 1990 to 31 Aug.1991 1 Sept. 1991 to 31 Aug 1992
Weekly Rate Hourly Rate Weekly Rate Hourly Rate Weekly Rate Hourly Rate
1 £110.56 £2.83 £121.21 £3.11 £129.21 £3.31
2 £115.85 £2.96 £126.54 £3.24 £134.77 £3.46
3 £120.39 £3.09 £131.85 £3.38 £140.29 £3.60
4 £125.29 £3.21 £137.16 £3.52 £145.94 £3.74
5 £130.18 £3.34 £142.45 £3.65 £151.42 £3.88
6 £135.18 £3.47 £147.85 £3.79 £157.02 £4.03
Table 53: NJC Local Government Workers Rates of Pav 1989 - 1992 
Source: NUPE, 1989,1990a, 1991.
Premium Payments 
Shift Workers:
Alternating Shift: equivalent to 10% of Grade 2 in 1989 - 90, now 10% of Grade 3. 
Rotating Shift: equivalent to 16% of Grade 2 in 1989 - 90, now 16% of Grade 3.
Overtime:
Mondays to Saturdays:
Sundays:
Week-end Work:
Saturdays: Time-and-a half
Time-and-a half 
Double time
Sundays: Doubletime
Leave
Annual Leave:
4 weeks, reduced 
pro-rata.
5 weeks.
Sickness Leave:
Employees who have completed 12 months service: 
Employees who have completed 5 years service:
1st year of service:
2nd year of service:
3rd year of service:
4th and 5th years of service: 
After 5 years service:
1 month's full pay and (after completing 4 
months' service) 2 months' half pay.
2 months' full pay and 2 months' half pay.
4 months' full pay and 4 months’ half pay.
5 months' full pay and 5 months' half pay.
6 months' full pay and 6 months' half pay.
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Appendix 2: List of Those Interviewed During French Case Study
General Secretary Syndicate CGT du 
Nettoiement de Paris.
Secretary Fddfration CGT des Services 
Publics.
Jean Louise Machecout 
Jacques Delattre
CGT Transport Federation
General Secretary Federation Nationale 
du Syndicats de Transport.
General Secretary Section de Air France. 
General Secretary of the national branch 
for private sector refuse collectors.
Shop Steward.
Sylvie Salmon Thorreau
Alain Dubourg 
Guy Yesle
Daniel Gavard
CFDT
CFDT Syndicat des Services Publics 
Parisiens - full time officer.
CFDT Syndicat des Services Publics 
Parisiens - full time officer.
Shop Steward.
Shop Steward.
Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez
Jean Christophe Toutlemonde
Alain Chuilier
Francis Combaud 
Jean Pasquier
Dominique Geoffray 
Monsieur Auclare
Senior Manager in the West Paris 
Region.
Senior Manager in the West Paris 
Region.
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Glossary and Abbreviations.
ACC
ADC
ADLO
ALA
AMA
ASI
Audit Commission 
CCMA
CCT
CFDT
CGT
CLES 
Client Side
Contract Compliance
Contractor
COSLA
CPS
CSSA
DHSS
DLO
DOE
DSO
Dti
EC
EEC
EFCI
ETUC
ETUI
Association of County Councils.
Association of District Councils.
Association of Direct Labour Organisations.
Association of London Authorities.
Association of Metropolitan Authorities.
Adam Smith Institute.
The Government body which overseas local authority 
finances.
Contract Cleaning and Maintenance Association, now 
called Cleaning and Support Services Association 
(CCSA).
Compulsory Competitive Tendering.
Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail, 
French trade union confederation affiliated to the 
Socialist Party.
Confederation General du Travail, French trade union 
confederation affiliated to the Communist Party.
Centre for Local Economic Strategies.
The local authority department responsible for drawing 
up contract specifications, inviting tenders, awarding 
contracts and monitoring them.
The use of contract conditions with which contractors 
must comply.
An organisation which is awarded and seeks contracts, 
normally privately owned.
Confederation of Scottish Local Authorities.
Centre for Policy Studies, formally SCAT 
See CCMA
Department of Health and Social Security, Government 
department, since broken up.
Direct Labour Organisation. Theoretically any council 
department where direct employees of the council carry 
out the work. Sometimes refers to cleansing departments 
but more often to construction and housing and 
maintenance departments.
Department of the Environment. Government department 
responsible for local government.
Direct Service Organisation. A council department in 
which direct employees of the council deliver a service to 
the public. Often refers to cleansing departments. 
Department of Trade and Industry. Government 
department.
European Commission. Civil Service of the European 
Community.
European Economic Community.
European Federation of Cleaning Industries.
European Trade Union Confederation.
European Trade Union Institute.
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FT
GMB
IDS
In-house
IPPR
IRIM
IWC
JNHSPRU
LGIU
LGMB
LGPRU
LRD
MATSA
MBO
MJ
Monitoring
MSF
NALGO
NAO
ND
NIIS
NUPE
OFT
Privatisation
PSPRU
PULSE
SCAT
Financial Times.
General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades’ 
Union. A major manual workers' union in local
government.
Income Data Services. A labour market research 
organisation.
Where a service or workforce is provided or employed 
directly by the council.
Institute for Public Policy Research.
Institute for Research and Information on Multinationals. 
Institute for Workers Control.
Joint NHS Privatisation Research Unit. A joint union 
research unit providing and collecting data on 
privatisation in the NHS, now incorporated into PSPRU. 
Local Government Information Unit.
Local Government Management Board.
Local Government Privatisation Research Unit. Now 
incorporated into PSPRU.
Labour Research Department.
The GMB's white collar section.
Management buyout. Where local authority service 
managers acquire the capital assets from the council and 
operate as a private firm.
Municipal Journal.
The methods employed by councils to ensure that 
contracts are meeting the specification.
Manufacturing, Science and Finance. A major white 
collar union.
National and Local Government Officers Association. 
The main union for white collar workers in local 
government.
National Audit Office.
Not Dated.
National Health Service.
National Union of Public Employees. A major local 
government manual workers union also organising white 
collar workers.
Office of Fair Trading. Government office responsible 
for ensuring that uncompetitive practices are not used in 
British business.
The involvement of private companies in activities 
previously held by the public sector.
Public Services Privatisation Research Unit. Joint union 
body monitoring privatisation in the public services, 
incorporating JNHSPRU and LGPRU.
Public and Local Service Efficiency Campaign. Right 
wing pressure group campaigning in support of 
competition in the provision of public services.
Services to Community Action and Trade Unions, now 
CPS.
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Specification The document which specifies the work to be done in
relation to a particular contract.
STUC Scottish Trades Union Congress.
Tender The offer by a contractor to carry out the work in the
specification for a stated price.
Tender Evaluation The stage of the CCT process when the council assesses
the merits of the bids that have been received and decides
where to award the contract.
TGWU Transport and General Workers Union. A gereral union
representing some manual workers in local government.
TICL Transnationals Information Centre London. No longer
operating.
TUC Trades Union Congress.
TUSIC Trades Union Studies and Information Centre.
URTU United Road Transport Union. A lorry drivers union
organising some workers in local government
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